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There is perennial debate in comparative politics about electoral institutions, but what characterizes this debate is the lack of consideration for citizens' perspective. In this paper, we report the results of an original survey conducted on representative samples in 15 West European countries (N = 15,414). We implemented an original instrument to elicit respondents' views by asking them to rate "real but blind" electoral outcomes. With this survey instrument, we aimed to elicit principled rather than partisan preferences regarding the kind of electoral outcomes that citizens think is good for democracy. We find that West Europeans do not clearly endorse a majoritarian or proportional vision of democracy. They tend to focus on aspects of the government rather than parliament when they pass a judgment. They want a majority government that has few parties and enjoys wide popular support. Finally, we find only small differences between citizens of different countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to examine the extent to which left-wing forces are making a comeback in Latin America and to draw out the political implications of their political ascendancy. It argues that while left-of-centre parties have developed a persuasive critique of the failures of liberal democracy and economic neoliberalism in the region, there is as yet no conceptual clarity or distinct policy initiatives materialising from the left's promises of deepening democracy and implementing an alternative economic model. When in power, left-of-centre parties have followed a strategy of ‘bending and moulding’ existing political institutions and the free-market economic model rather than attempting radical political and economic reforms. This paper concludes that left-of-centre parties are right in accepting that there is little room in the region for an anti-systemic model and that instead the emphasis should be placed on making states, markets and democracy work better to secure development, address social demands and attack the root causes of discrimination and inequality. But leaving behind old certainties and adapting to the new political and economic environment has come at the cost of a loss of intellectual confidence, ideological clarity and weakened identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the issue of political deception by exploring the role of self-deception in democratic politics. Within politics, deception of the people is actually very often produced by the self-deception of political leaders and officials, which is then supplemented by mechanisms of self-deception of the public itself. That self-deception, rather than simply straightforward deception, is a significant obstacle to truth and transparency in democratic politics is often hinted at by political scientists and historians but never properly pursued. And yet it should be, for which one of them is the case has important normative implications. This paper briefly presents the notion of self-deception and offers some reasons to take its presence in politics seriously. It also counters possible objections to doing so. Different kinds of political self-deception are presented and illustrated through historical examples so as to provide a clear typology and make the case for self-deception in politics stronger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does the value of political equality imply for the institutional design of democracies? The existing normative literature highlights the importance of proportional representation and legislative majority rule, but neglects the choice of an executive format. This paper explores two potential egalitarian trade-offs in this choice. First, while presidential systems tend to achieve too little bundling of separable decision-making issues (within political parties), parliamentary systems often tend towards too much bundling (between political parties), thus establishing informal veto positions in the democratic process. This is a trade-off between the 'adversarial' and 'deliberative' aspects of equality. Second, there is a trade-off between 'horizontal' and 'vertical' equality. Neither pure presidentialism nor pure parliamentarism may be able to maximise both dimensions of equality simultaneously. The paper argues that certain hybrids between parliamentarism and presidentialism have the potential to mitigate both trade-offs. These hybrids establish power separation between the executive and legislature without allowing for popular executive elections. The argument also has potential implications for the democratisation of the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely feared that the onset of populism poses a threat to democracy, as citizens' support for democracy is essential for its legitimacy and stability. Yet, the relationship between populism and democratic support at the citizen level remains poorly understood, particularly with respect to support for liberal democracy. Data measuring citizens' populist attitudes in conjunction with a comprehensive range of measures of democratic support have been lacking. Using unique data from the Netherlands, we study the relationship between individuals' populist attitudes and their attitudes towards democracy in three studies. We examine the association between populism and support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy (Study 1), populism and support for liberal democracy (Study 2), and populism and support for majoritarian conceptions of democracy (Study 3). We find that while citizens with stronger populist attitudes are dissatisfied with how democracy works, they are no less supportive of the principle of democracy. Contrary to most theorizing, we find that citizens with higher populist attitudes not less supportive of key institutions of liberal democracy, but reject mediated representation through political parties. At the same time, individuals with stronger populist attitudes are highly supportive of forms of unconstrained majoritarian rule. These findings suggest that the relationship between populism and support for (liberal) democracy is more complicated than commonly assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One strategy in defence of compulsory voting is based on what I call the non-instrumental value of high turnout: the idea that almost-universal participation in elections is valuable per se. This article argues that we do not have democratic reasons to value compelled turnout. First, thanks to an original analysis of the practice of voting, I identify three constitutive rules that make the physical acts of marking and casting a ballot count as proper voting. This preliminary analysis serves to illuminate the fact that the act of voting has democratic value if it is performed in a free and reason-responsive way. Second, I identify political equality and popular control as democratic values that high turnout expresses. Finally, the article rejects the non-instrumental case for compulsory voting because it cannot ensure that people vote in a reason-responsive way and, if they do not, high turnout lacks democratic value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent popularity of nationalist movements bears witness to the continued power of national feeling in politics. This article considers the potential relationship between different kinds of national attachments and what we call active and allegiant citizenship—support for democracy, community participation, and prosocial behavior. We analyze these relationships using data from two waves of the European Values Study. We find that a set of attachments often called civic nationalism—including patriotism, national identity, and respect for one's country's institutions—are connected with better citizenship on virtually all of our outcomes, whereas ethnic nationalism is frequently connected with worse citizenship. These associations, however, tend to be weaker in the postcommunist states which have a different experience with both nationalism and democracy. The results suggest that national feeling can be a double-edged sword for citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the concept of "AI governance" is frequently used in the debate, it is still rather undertheorized. Often it seems to refer to the mechanisms and structures needed to avoid "bad" outcomes and achieve "good" outcomes with regard to the ethical problems artificial intelligence is thought to actualize. In this article we argue that, although this outcome-focused view captures one important aspect of "good governance," its emphasis on effects runs the risk of overlooking important procedural aspects of good AI governance. One of the most important properties of good AI governance is political legitimacy. Starting out from the assumptions that AI governance should be seen as global in scope and that political legitimacy requires at least a democratic minimum, this article has a twofold aim: to develop a theoretical framework for theorizing the political legitimacy of global AI governance, and to demonstrate how it can be used as a compass for critially assessing the legitimacy of actual instances of global AI governance. Elaborating on a distinction between "governance by AI" and "governance of AI" in relation to different kinds of authority and different kinds of decision-making leads us to the conclusions that much of the existing global AI governance lacks important properties necessary for political legitimacy, and that political legitimacy would be negatively impacted if we handed over certain forms of decision-making to artificial intelligence systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we investigate how external election interventions influence satisfaction with democracy. We expect that mere knowledge about a foreign intervention will not affect system support. Instead, only those who believe that the external influence campaign had a decisive impact on the election outcome should see a reduction in democratic satisfaction. Furthermore, since electoral winners are likely to think that their preferred party provides superior policy outputs, supporters of winning parties should be less affected by their beliefs in the decisiveness of an influence campaign. Finally, we expect that those who place a high value on in-group loyalty will be more likely to engage in motivated reasoning. Thus, in-group loyalty should cause electoral winners to discount the substantive impact of a given electoral intervention, whereas it should have the opposite effect for losers. Our analysis relies on US survey data, and it uncovers broad support for our theoretical expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editors note the theme of the special issue, "Governance, Trust and Democracy," and cite articles in the issue on topics including institutions of democratic governance, regional government in Russia in the context of post-Communism, and trust and citizen representation in Spain.

Will Kymlicka has argued that ‘democratic politics is politics in the vernacular’. Does this statement mean that democratic politics is impossible in a multilingual community, whether at the local, national, regional or global level? This paper discusses this assumption and maintains that democratic politics should imply the willingness of all players to make an effort to understand each other. Democratic politics depends on a willingness to overcome the barriers to mutual understanding, including the linguistic ones. Anytime that there is a community of fate, a democrat should search the available methods to allow deliberation according to the two key conditions of political equality and participation. If linguistic diversity is an obstacle to equality and participation, some methods should be found to overcome it, as it is exemplified by the Esperanto metaphor. The paper illustrates the argument with four cases of multilinguistic political communities: (1) a school in California with English-speaking and Spanish-speaking students; (2) the city of Byelostok in the second half of the nineteenth century, where four different linguistic communities (Polish, Russian, German and Yiddish) coexisted. This led Markus Zamenhof to invent Esperanto; (3) the linguistic problems of the Indian state and the role played by English – a language unspoken by the majority of the Indian population in 1947 – in developing Indian democracy; and (4) the case of the European Parliament, with 20 languages and a wealth of interpreters and translators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a preliminary attempt to evaluate changing patterns of democratic governance, at least in Westminster-style parliamentary settings, and possibly more generally. It has two specific purposes: first, to propose a paradigm for evaluating the empirical evolution of democratic governance; and second, to illustrate the explanatory potential of this paradigm through a mini-case study of changing patterns of governance in one particular polity. The conceptual framework is drawn from March and Olsen's eponymous study (1995) from which polar (‘thick’ and‘thin’) forms of democratic governance are derived. Four conjectures about its evolution are then explored. First, in its mass party phase, the pattern of democratic governance approximated the‘thick’ pole. Second, the subsequent evolution of democratic politics has been in the direction of the‘thin’ (minimalist or populist) pole. Third, the cause of this shift was a failure to adapt political institutions to changing citizen identities, which was masked by the ascendancy amongst political elites of the neo-liberal account of governance. Fourth, the paper considers the means by which democratic governance might be renewed. The approach is applied to explain changes in Australian politics over recent decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The classic accounts of deliberative democracy are also accounts of legitimacy: ‘that outcomes are legitimate to the extent they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question’ ( , p. 651). And yet, in complex societies deliberative participation by all those affected by collective decision-making is extremely implausible. There are also legitimacy problems with the demanding procedural requirements which deliberation imposes on participants. Given these problems, deliberative democracy seems unable to deliver legitimate outcomes as it defines them. Focusing on the problem of scale, this paper offers a tentative solution using representation, a concept which is itself problematic. Along the way, the paper highlights issues with the legitimate role of experts, the different legitimate uses of statistical and electoral representation, and differences between the research and democratic imperatives driving current attempts to put deliberative principles into practice, illustrated with a case from a Leicester health policy debate. While much work remains to be done on exactly how the principles arrived at might be transformed into working institutions, they do offer a means of criticising existing deliberative practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a critical assessment of current initiatives to deepen democracy and seeks to examine why they often fail. By analysing their various, and conflicting, conceptions of participation and associational life, it argues that many of the difficulties they encounter can be attributed to a usually unexamined set of organisational assumptions. These assumptions are then inspected in order to analyse the breakdown of communication that can occur between incumbent social engineers trying to institutionalize more democracy, and those more critical and grassroots initiatives which emanate from the periphery of power. With this distinction in view, a series of recurrent problems around the institutionalization of democratic processes are investigated. Finally, the paper explores the implications of the distinction for how we can aid and deepen democracy more effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although some conventional liberal democratic regimes are likely to become consolidated in Latin America, the dominant pattern is better understood as ‘democracy by default’, and in a few cases little more than ‘facade democracy’ is to be expected. This paper reviews the major factors accounting for the fragility, instability and policy ineffectiveness of many of these new regimes. Although current fiscal crises lend some plausibility to the ‘neo-liberal’ analyses of democratization, the paper argues that in the longer run consolidated democracies will tend to develop a range of ‘social democratic’, participatory and interventionist features that are at variance with the neo-liberal model. Latin American nation-states are relatively well integrated and contain a stock of human and social resources that should favour constitutional outcomes, so that although many of these new democracies will remain provisional and incomplete for the time being, they possess the potential for subsequent extension and entrenchment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Liberal democracy is liberalized democracy; that is. democracy defined and structured within the limits set by liberalism. The paper outlines the constitutive features of liberalism and shows how they determined the form and content of democracy and gave rise to liberal democracy as we know it today. It then goes on to argue that liberal democracy is specific to a particular cultural context and cannot claim universal validity. This, however, does not lead to cultural relativism as it is possible to formulate universal principles that every good government should respect. The paper offers one way of reconciling universalism and cultural diversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that social media companies' power to regulate communication in the public sphere illustrates a novel type of domination. The idea is that, since social media companies can partially dictate the terms of citizens' political participation in the public sphere, they can arbitrarily interfere with the choices individuals make qua citizens. I contend that social media companies dominate citizens in two different ways. First, I focus on the cases in which social media companies exercise direct control over political speech. They exercise quasi-public power over citizens because their regulation of speech on social media platforms implies the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with citizens' democratic contestation in the political system. Second, companies' algorithmic governance entails the capacity to interfere with citizens' choices about what mode of discursive engagement they endorse in their relationships with fellow citizens. By raising the cost of deliberative engagement, companies narrow citizens' choice menu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Covid-19 has shocked governance systems worldwide. Legislatures, in particular, have been shut down or limited due to the pandemic, yet with divergence from one country to another. In this article, we report results from a cross-sectional quantitative analysis of legislative activity during the initial reaction to this shock and identify the factors accounting for such variation. Exploring legislatures across 159 countries, we find no relation between the severity of Covid-19 and limitations on legislatures' operation, thus suggesting that legislatures are at risk of being shut down or limited due to policy "overreaction" and that a health risk may serve as an excuse for silencing them. However, we find that legislatures in democratic countries are relatively immune to this risk, while those in frail democracies are more exposed. In partially free countries, the use of technology can mitigate this risk. We also find that the coalitional features of the government may lead to legislatures' closing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political science has long viewed education as an instrumental factor in developing support for democracy and beneficial for democratization. However, governments, both democratic and authoritarian, have substantial control over the curriculum and develop education institutions with the specific aim to instill in students the norms and values that underpin the regime. With this in mind, this study asks, does the effect of education vary by the political regime in which education was undertaken? We use a quasi-experimental approach exploiting European compulsory schooling reforms, implemented under both democratic and authoritarian regimes, to answer this question. We find that education has no effect on principle and functional support for democracy, but that education's effect on satisfaction with democracy is conditional on regime type. For those educated under a democratic regime, education led to greater satisfaction with democracy, whereas those educated under an authoritarian regime became less satisfied with democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Property rights necessarily generate violent, and oftentimes lethal, processes of dispossession. While liberal theorists from Locke to Hayek consider property rights as an essential and emancipatory component of human freedom, they fail to consider societal power asymmetries impeding the ability of property rights to protect the interests of the weak and marginalised. If property rights produce freedom and prosperity, they do so very selectively. More obvious is the ongoing historical process of already propertied classes making ‘clever usurpation into an irrevocable right’ by extending private property regimes along two key dimensions – type and space. Examining various uses of private property over time reveals processes whereby relatively basic notions of private property, enforced by a Weberian state at the local level in the early era of industrialisation, are extended to encompass new and sophisticated forms of property that are enforced globally via international institutions. Two contemporary empirical cases of using property rights are examined in this paper: land reform in Southern Africa (specifically Zimbabwe) and intellectual property rights. In this context of ongoing dispossession, further privatisation and commodification can only exacerbate contemporary problems of marginalisation and dispossession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a norms-based account of institutional change. It compares two cases of attempted change, one successful and one unsuccessful. The argument advanced is that norm-based change occurs when the norms are congruent with the perceived interests of the actors who have the power to take on the decision. Norms affect the process of institutional change not only by providing legitimacy to some forms of political action, but also by shaping the actors’ perception of their interests as well their strategies. It is argued that norms, in that sense, help political actors combine Max Weber's zweckrational (goal-orientated) and wertrational (value-orientated) categories of behaviour. Empirical evidence drawn from the context of the evolving European Union supports this argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic theorists often distinguish between two views of democratic procedures. ‘Outcomes theorists’ emphasize the instrumental nature of these procedures and argue that they are only valuable because they tend to produce good outcomes. In contrast, ‘proceduralists’ emphasize the intrinsic value of democratic procedures, for instance, on the grounds that they are fair. In this paper. I argue that we should reject pure versions of these two theories in favor of an understanding of the democratic ideal that recognizes a commitment to both intrinsically valuable democratic procedures and democratic outcomes. In instances in which there is a conflict between these two commitments, I suggest they must be balanced. This balancing approach offers a justification of judicial review on the grounds that it potentially limits outcomes that undermine democracy. But judicial review is not justifiable in any instance in which a bad democratic outcome results from democratic procedures. When the loss that would result from overturning a democratic procedure is greater than the gain to democracy that would result from ensuring against an undemocratic outcome; judicial review is not justifiable. Loss or gain to democracy is defined by the negative or positive impact of each action on the core democratic values of equality and autonomy, aspects of the democratic ideal. Even when judicial review is justified, the fact that it overturns intrinsically valuable procedures suggests that such review is never ideal from the standpoint of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to describe the conditions necessary for the furthering of democracy in Turkey by focusing on a certain conception of democratic legitimacy that goes beyond formal arrangements. It argues that the effective participation of citizens in democratic procedures is necessary for the consolidation of democracy in public life. To defend this argument, the theoretical background developed in deliberative models of democracy is followed. The quality of‘talk’, as a constitutive feature of democracy, is explored by following the critical perspectives in deliberative theory that focus on the discursive mechanisms of exclusion and on power relations intrinsic to deliberative procedures. For this purpose, the deliberative processes in a series of‘working group meetings’, carried out as a part of the Local Agenda 21 project, are analysed. The democratic capacity of deliberative experiences and public dialogue is analysed by examining the inclusion/exclusion of opposing ideas, different identities and discourse styles during these working groups meetings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the idea of empowering citizens by means of teaching them political philosophy. First, I explain and define empowerment as an experience leading to the development of critical and philosophical capabilities. Several challenges to using philosophy to empower citizens are then discussed and rejected. This group of challenges is called the‘divorce theory’, because, according to them, philosophy and politics should be distinguished, as if divorced from each other, so that they can live happily side by side, but not together. Finally, empowerment is normatively defended and distinguished from paternalism, and examine the relationships between empowerment through political philosophy and deliberative democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In political theory, descriptive representation as a corrective to structural asymmetries within society is usually debated against the background of formal political institutions. It is discussed in this paper as a means to enhance the declining legitimacy of Dutch works councils as important sites of democratic decision-making in their own right. The aim is to show that the moral requirements of democratic inclusion have to be weighed against the functional requirements of effective representation, concluding that in some cases the costs in terms of effectiveness exceed the gains in terms of inclusiveness. Hence, the debate about descriptive representation is clearly in need of a more contextualized assessment of its pros and cons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on populism used to depict the phenomenon as an alternative to the standard path from traditional to modern society; as a way to enfranchise the underclass; or as an anomaly vis-à-vis class politics and liberal institutions. More recently, the debate has shifted into something of a terra incognita as a result of the growing interest in the connection between populism and democratic politics. One of the more intriguing contributions to this debate is an article by Margaret Canovan, if only because it makes this unknown territory less confusing. Her argument draws from Michael Oakeshott's claim that political modernity is characterised by the interplay of two distinct styles – the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism. She renames them the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy and suggests that populism arises in the gap between them. This establishes a relation of interiority between populism and democracy. The former will follow democracy like a shadow. At times, however, the theoretical status of the gap is somewhat uncertain, as it seems more appropriate for thinking politics (particularly radical politics) in general. The political valence of the shadow could also be specified further to show the undecidability between the democratic aspect of the phenomenon and its possible ominous tones. This paper looks into this in some detail to engage in a friendly interrogation of Canovan's claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by Habermasian critiques of liberalism, supporters of deliberative democracy seek an extension of social democratic institutions to further a reinvigorated communicative rationality against the ‘atomism’ of market processes. This paper offers a critique of deliberative democratic theory from a Hayekian perspective. For Hayek, the case against the social democratic state rests with the superior capacity of markets to extend communicative rationality beyond the realm of verbal discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles Taylor's engagement with Marx and the Marxist tradition has been relatively neglected in the literature on his work. This is a strange omission, because he was not only a pivotal figure in the development of the New Left, but also wrote many pieces which critically engaged with the main principles of Marx and Marxism. This paper re-examines Taylor's engagement with Marxism and thereby exposes a neglected element in his political philosophy. The following themes emerge: the self; Taylor's conception of the affirmation of ordinary life; democracy; ecology; and religion. In one area at least, the affirmation of ordinary life, a crucial element of Marxism is retained and positively endorsed by Taylor. In relation to the other themes, while he raises important issues for Marxist theory, he is, at times, far too quick to dismiss Marx's arguments and also misses similarities between those arguments and his own work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper returns to J. S. Mill to draw out democratic conceptions of education and equality that challenge still-current conceptions of intractable human inequalities. Mill acknowledges that individuals differ in abilities. Nonetheless, he develops a broad conception of ‘education for freedom’ and insists that only ‘wretched social arrangements’ prevent virtually all people from exercising capacities for self-government in citizenship, marriage, and industry. In the same breath, he qualifies his democratic egalitarianism with reference to a sub-class of working people whose ‘low moral qualities’ leave them unfit for such self-government. Modern liberal states largely dismiss Mill's more radical democratic impulse. Meanwhile, they reiterate and refine his exclusionary one through new practices for constructing and managing inequalities – for example, IQ tests, educational ‘tracking’, and social science categories like the ‘underclass’. I reconsider this divided legacy of Mill's egalitarianism as a basis for rethinking the limits of today's ‘meritocratic’ egalitarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cosmopolitan international relations theorists envisage a process of expanding cosmopolitan democracy and global governance, in which for the first time there is the possibility of global issues being addressed on the basis of new forms of democracy, derived from the universal rights of global citizens. They suggest that, rather than focus attention on the territorially limited rights of the citizen at the level of the nation-state, more emphasis should be placed on extending democracy and human rights to the international sphere. This paper raises problems with extending the concept of rights beyond the bounds of the sovereign state, without a mechanism of making these new rights accountable to their subject. The emerging gap, between holders of cosmopolitan rights and those with duties, tends to create dependency rather than to empower. So while the new rights remain tenuous, there is a danger that the cosmopolitan framework can legitimise the abrogation of the existing rights of democracy and self-government preserved in the UN Charter framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iris Marion Young's theory of democracy aims to accommodate the idea of difference by combining anti-essentialist, identity conferring social groups and mediated socio-economic relations. In this way they are supposed to combine instrumental rationality with inclusiveness and the recognition of difference. Using the political thought of F.A. Hayek, this paper mounts a critique of Young's difference theory. In particular it argues that Young's theory of group representation at the institutional level of politics contradicts her commitment to an anti-essentialist account of groups. Whereas her account of group identity is necessarily fluid and inclusive, her account of recognition is rigid and exclusionary. Furthermore the epistemological demands of democratic communication and economic coordination undermine her instrumental account of public- decision making. In contrast it will be argued that Hayek's political thought provides instructive alternative way of addressing the tensions at the heart of Young's theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three different constituencies are becoming increasingly common across Western European electorates: mainstream voters, non-voters and populist voters. Despite their distinct behaviours in electoral politics, we have limited empirical knowledge about the characteristics that distinguish these three groups, given the typical underrepresentation of non-voters in surveys and the relative recency of large-scale research on populist voters. To address this gap, we analyse novel survey data from contemporary Germany that oversamples non-voters and includes a sizeable share of both populist radical left and populist radical right party supporters. Two main findings with broader implications stand out. First, populist voters resemble their mainstream counterparts in their expectations about democracy but correspond more closely to non-voters regarding (dis-)satisfaction with democracy. Second, non-voters and populist voters seem to reject mainstream democratic politics in distinct ways, throwing doubt on the (further) mobilization potential of abstainers for populist projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much early public choice theory focused on alleged pathologies of democratic legislatures, portraying them as irrational, manipulable, or subject to capture. Recent years have seen the emergence of a new strand of argument, reaffirming the old skepticism of legislatures but suggesting that transferring power from legislatures to chief executives offers a solution. Just as the earlier prescriptions ignored the pathologies of the agencies empowered to check and constrain legislatures, so the new scholarship overlooks the pathologies of executive power. The primary sources of congressional dysfunction call for reforms that would strengthen Congress instead of hobbling it in new ways that exacerbate the drift toward authoritarian presidentialism in the American system. Executive aggrandizement is a consequence of decades of institutional malfunction, worsened by right-wing attacks on legislative capacity. This has been the enduring impact of the public choice movement since the 1950s, but its twenty-first century offshoot is especially malign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some associations provide members with an effective voice whereas others appear to have internal democracy in name only? We theoretically combine population ecology with Hirschman's strategic response model. This leads us to hypothesize that in dense, competitive organizational environments, the effective alternatives available make it likely that dissatisfied members respond with exit rather than voice. However, in low-dense, monopoly-like situations dissatisfied members demand and receive effective voice options. We further hypothesize that the particular sets of incentives of firms and individuals as members moderates this effect. We assess our argument on the basis of the Comparative Interest Group elite survey among interest group leaders in five European countries and at the EU level. We control for the level of professionalization and use country dummies to identify country-level differences. We find strong empirical support for our theoretical argument. The contribution of this article is to theoretically connect macro-level population-level factors to micro-level intra-organizational processes and specifies the nature of the organizational link between interests in society and those represented in the interest group system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the neo-liberal case for economic limits to democracy, assesses the counterposed argument of socialists and social democrats and considers why the latters' practical experience in ‘democratizing economic life’ has been so unsatisfactory. The second half of the paper considers the claim that some form of market socialism can overcome these limitations. While the market socialists have some success in undermining the claims of the neo-liberals, there are acute difficulties in transforming their agenda for economic democracy into a practicable politics. At the same time, it is suggested that while there may indeed be some economic limits to democracy, we are still very far from reaching them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feminists have taken issue with liberal democracy on a number of counts, including the conditions necessary to achieve political equality and the importance to be attached to political participation. This paper considers issues currently raised under the rubric of citizenship, earlier and continuing arguments for a more actively participatory democracy, and questions associated with representing social heterogeneity and group difference. The argument throughout is that while liberal democracy has signally failed to deliver on its promises to women, it does not help to address these failings in terms of giving up on liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper contrasts the liberal conception of democracy as the aggregation of individual preferences with the deliberative conception of democracy as a process of open discussion leading to an agreed judgement on policy. Social choice theory has identified problems – the arbitrariness of decision rules, vulnerability to strategic voting – which are often held to undermine democratic ideals. Contrary to common opinion, I argue that deliberative democracy is less vulnerable to these difficulties than liberal democracy. The process of discussion tends to produce sets of policy preferences that are ‘single peaked’; and within a deliberative setting it may be possible to vary the decision rule according to the nature of the issue to be decided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increased discussion of economic democracy in America in recent years makes sense given the context of crises in Keynesianism, the welfare state, corporate legitimacy and American 'competitiveness;. Departing from Dahl's recent analysis, this paper argues that one notion of economic democracy - the internal democratization of the firm - can be conceived and plausibly linked to objectives of increased American competitiveness and community stability. The argument rejects purist schemes of universal cooperative ownership as well as so-called shareholder democracy. It proposes a representative system for the firm based on a balance among shareholder, employee and community interests, a separation of powers between boards of directors and management, and a concept of transition based on democratic development of already widespread employee stock-ownership plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are several important justifications for autonomous units of local government, derived from the writings of J. S. Mill and later theories concerning the value of pluralism. These arguments fail to show that local government is a morally necessary, as opposed to expedient, adjunct to liberal-democratic government. The paper develops from J. S. Mill's ideas on liberty a more substantive justification for local government based on the principle that local government can be a means for ensuring that the determination of collective decisions are made solely by those people affected by the decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper attempts two tasks. The first is to provide a characterization of the social democratic approach which sets it in contrast to liberal democratic theories. This is pursued by contrasting the different interpretations of the ideal of equal respect which are associated with the two approaches. The second task is to establish that the social democratic approach is, if not clearly superior, at least worth considering further. This task is pursued by the attempt to vindicate three assumptions which the social democratic approach must make about the state [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question addressed in this paper is whether it is permissible to use violence for political ends within the confines of a liberal democracy. After a brief defence of the liberal conception of violence, the standard liberal position on violence (which answers the above question unequivocally in the negative) is rejected as theoretically unsound. However the alternative radical view, which endorses the selective use of violence on democratic and/or humanitarian grounds, fails to come to terms with some important empirical facts about violence in democracies. The concluding section urges a more discriminating response to such violence than either the liberal or the radical view fosters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individualism is the foundation of democratic theory and practise in the United States. A multi-ethnic, but not really a multi-communal society in the same sense as Northern Ireland or India, the United States has not generally had to confront the nature and justification of its historical opposition to group rights and communal social and political organization. Only the American Indian tribes, with their treaty-mandated communalism, have presented exceptions to this pattern. This paper explores the assumptions underlying liberal democratic attitudes towards communalism, the ways in which group claims pose challenges to conventional notions of justice and equality, and the utility of introducing alternative assumptions about the nature and role of groups in democratic society. Discussion centers on the most recent attempt to reduce the group rights of American Indian tribes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capital to the best-known classification of Political Arguments is a distinction between want-regarding and ideal-regarding principles, upon which this paper bases alternative representations of the dynamics of political debate. These are discussed with specific reference tot eh possibility that want-regarding goals are served less well by British planning decisions than if ideal-regarding arguments were permitted. The representations provide a limited explanation of how such a situation might come about and be maintained. Initially the draw on Down's models of voting and party competition, but explore alternatives because of: (1) the possibility that some assumptions needed for a Downsian representation cannot realistically be made about political arguments; and (2) the probability that factors other than verbal arguments enter into planning decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Citizens who voted for a party that won the election are more satisfied with democracy than those who did not. This winner–loser gap has recently been found to vary with the quality of electoral democracy: the higher the quality of democracy, the smaller the gap. However, we do not know what drives this relationship. Is it driven by losers, winners, or both? And Why? Linking our work to the literature on motivated reasoning and macro salience and benefiting from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project—covering 163 elections in 51 countries between 1996 and 2018, our results show that the narrower winner–loser gap in well-established electoral democracies is not only a result of losers being more satisfied with democracy, but also of winners being less satisfied with their victory. Our findings carry important implications since a narrow winner–loser gap appears as a key feature of healthy democratic systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the relationship between hybrid regimes and civil society. It examines the extant debate between 'neo-Tocquevilleans' and their opponents over whether or not a robust civil society portends democratic transition and consolidation. It demonstrates the limits of these two models by arguing that civil society in hybrid regimes can in fact agitate against the state, advocate for democratic freedoms and achieve significant political reforms even when these do not lead to broader democratization. To demonstrate, this article documents the case of the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions through 15 years of complex Iraqi politics, from the 2003 US-led intervention and during the incumbency of Prime Minister's Maliki (2006–2014) and Abadi (2014–2018). By analysing primary materials produced by and about the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions, it finds that this case holds important lessons for those seeking to understand the complex interface between civil society and the state in hybrid regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented which addresses an article by writers Robert A. Huber and Christian H. Schimpf which appears in the journal and examines the influence of populism on democratic quality in Latin America from the mid-1990s to 2009, and it mentions Latin American political mobilisation.

An abstract for an article on mass media and political activity in Egypt after the Arab Spring protests in relation to support for democracy is presented.

How effective are different political institutions, policy-making processes and policies when it comes to mediating, mitigating and managing vertical and horizontal political tensions caused by disruptive societal challenges and political polarization? The present crisis for liberal democracy places this question high on the research agenda. A concept of political robustness is helpful for identifying the properties of political systems with a strong capacity for coping with political instability and conflict. This article defines political robustness, draws the contours of a conceptual framework for analysis of the political robustness of political systems and applies it illustratively to the political robustness of liberal democracies. We propose that the robustness of a political system depends on how much those who voice political demands—which differs greatly over time and between regimes—are involved in aggregating and integrating political demands into binding decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between deliberation and democracy? Despite the volumes dedicated to this question, recent admissions by prominent deliberative democrats—that we need not pursue a necessarily deliberative political system, but merely a democratic one—suggest that this remains an open question. Here, I defend the deliberative model's staying power against those who argue that it has been set normatively adrift. Addressing concerns of "concept-stretching," I show that the deliberative model provides much more than a defense of the practice of deliberation. Indeed, its key contribution is the answer it provides to the question of what democracy itself means in large pluralistic societies. Moreover, I show that by de-centering the practice of deliberation from deliberative theories of democracy, we can acknowledge the weakness of deliberation and the strengths of non-deliberative practices, while retaining the model's normative commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the growth of the populist radical right as a concrete example of the scenario where liberal democratic ideas are losing support in broadly liberal democratic societies. Our goal is to enrich John Rawls' influential theory of political liberalism. We argue that even in that underexplored scenario, Rawlsian political liberalism can offer an appealing account of how to promote the legitimacy and stability of liberal democratic institutions provided it places partisanship centre stage. Specifically, we propose a brand-new moral duty binding 'reasonable' partisans committed to pluralism. This duty establishes conditions where partisans must strategically transform society's public reason (i.e. transform the visions for society their parties campaign on) in ways that promise to attract back support from illiberal and antidemocratic competitors. While this strategic behaviour might seem impermissible, we show that Rawls' distinctive account of sincerity in democratic deliberation is uniquely placed to justify it as perfectly ethical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]