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To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00704.x Byline: John Horton (1) Author Affiliation: (1)Keele University Article History: (Accepted: September 2007)

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2006.00621.x Byline: John Horton (1) Abstract: Part One of this article seeks to defend the idea of associative political obligations against a number of criticisms that have been advanced opposing it. The purpose of this defence is not to demonstrate that the associative account is therefore the best explanation of political obligations, but only that the principal reasons which have been given for rejecting it are much less compelling than its critics maintain. The argument focuses in particular on the various criticisms advanced by A. John Simmons. Two general lines of defence figure especially prominently. First, it is shown how many of the criticisms in one way or another ultimately rest on the assumption that political obligations must be voluntarily acquired, when it is just this assumption that is contested by an associative account. Secondly, it rebuts the charge that the idea of associative obligations faces a particular problem because it entails the view that members must have obligations to associations or groups that are evil. While it is not claimed that the idea of associative political obligations is entirely without difficulties, it is contended that stories of its demise are greatly exaggerated, and in this respect the ground is laid for Part Two of the article, which sketches a particular account of associative political obligations. Author Affiliation: (1)Keele University Article History: (Accepted: 25 March 2004)

Associative theorists of political obligation argue that individuals are bound to the political society of which they are members and that membership itself is the primary ground of political obligation. Some critics claim that this argument fails in large part because any plausible associative account collapses into some non-associative theory of political obligation. This article rejects such claims, arguing that associativism is in fact a distinctive approach to political obligation. Specifically, it holds that the normative force of associativism is irreducible to either the voluntarism of consent or the universalism of natural duty theories of political obligation. Although there may be some similarities between associative accounts and these alternative theories, there are also important differences that mean the associative account cannot be assimilated without significant remainder to non-associative theories. Hence, associative accounts offer a genuinely distinctive approach to political obligation. However, whether they offer a better approach is not a question that this article addresses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents the book "The Morality of Freedom," by Joseph Raz.