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This paper deals with two spheres of application of extraordinary cognition - criminal and civil law, while outlining its organizational and functional rules viewed in development from Augustus to Justinian. Analysis of cognitio extra ordinem in the protection of individuals' interests shows that this public-law procedure appeared as an exception to regular, formulary procedure of a private-law character, and that it was applied by new organs created by Augustus' delegation of judicial powers drawn from tribunitia potestas and imperium proconsulare. The gradual development of the Roman state to absolute oriental-type monarchy led to the consolidation of a network of hierarchically organised judicial organs, as well as of rules for a single dual-instance procedure, which in the time of Justinian took on their final shape of an exclusive judicial procedure of a libellar (written) type. Similarly, analysis of cognitio extra ordinem in the protection of the interests of the Roman community (at first, especially of the person of the princeps) shows that this public-law procedure of an inquisitory nature (with a written judgment containing not only the decision on the sanction, but also the legal grounds) appeared as extraordinary in relation to the regular system of quaestiones perpetuae characterised by an accusatory procedure. It was applied by new organs formed by delegation of Augustus' auctoritas. However, up until the 2nd century the Senate court operated, and developed its specific procedure, the so-called cognitio senatus. Further strengthening of imperial power during the 4th and 5th centuries highlighted the principles of singular and efficient cognitional criminal procedure, but also limited the principles of publicity, oral litigation and judges' freedom of ruling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]