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Pesticides are linked to global insect declines, with impacts on biodiversity and essential ecosystem services. In addition to well-documented direct impacts of pesticides at the current stage or time, potential delayed "carryover" effects from past exposure at a different life stage may augment impacts on individuals and populations. We investigated the effects of current exposure and the carryover effects of past insecticide exposure on the individual vital rates and population growth of the solitary bee, Osmia lignaria Bees in flight cages freely foraged on wildflowers, some treated with the common insecticide, imidacloprid, in a fully crossed design over 2 y, with insecticide exposure or no exposure in each year. Insecticide exposure directly to foraging adults and via carryover effects from past exposure reduced reproduction. Repeated exposure across 2 y additively impaired individual performance, leading to a nearly fourfold reduction in bee population growth. Exposure to even a single insecticide application can have persistent effects on vital rates and can reduce population growth for multiple generations. Carryover effects had profound implications for population persistence and must be considered in risk assessment, conservation, and management decisions for pollinators to mitigate the effects of insecticide exposure.

We consider two aspects of the human enterprise that profoundly affect the global environment: population and consumption. We show that fertility and consumption behavior harbor a class of externalities that have not been much noted in the literature. Both are driven in part by attitudes and preferences that are not egoistic but socially embedded; that is, each household's decisions are influenced by the decisions made by others. In a famous paper, Garrett Hardin [G. Hardin, Science 162, 1243-1248 (1968)] drew attention to overpopulation and concluded that the solution lay in people "abandoning the freedom to breed." That human attitudes and practices are socially embedded suggests that it is possible for people to reduce their fertility rates and consumption demands without experiencing a loss in wellbeing. We focus on fertility in sub-Saharan Africa and consumption in the rich world and argue that bottom-up social mechanisms rather than top-down government interventions are better placed to bring about those ecologically desirable changes.

The rapid growth of contemporary human foragers and steady decline of chimpanzees represent puzzling population paradoxes, as any species must exhibit near-stationary growth over much of their evolutionary history. We evaluate the conditions favoring zero population growth (ZPG) among 10 small-scale subsistence human populations and five wild chimpanzee groups according to four demographic scenarios: altered mean vital rates (i.e., fertility and mortality), vital rate stochasticity, vital rate covariance, and periodic catastrophes. Among most human populations, changing mean fertility or survivorship alone requires unprecedented alterations. Stochastic variance and covariance would similarly require major adjustment to achieve ZPG in most populations. Crashes could maintain ZPG in slow-growing populations but must be frequent and severe in fast-growing populations-more extreme than observed in the ethnographic record. A combination of vital rate alteration with catastrophes is the most realistic solution to the forager population paradox. ZPG in declining chimpanzees is more readily obtainable through reducing mortality and altering covariance. While some human populations may have hovered near ZPG under harsher conditions (e.g., violence or food shortage), modern Homo sapiens were equipped with the potential to rapidly colonize new habitats and likely experienced population fluctuations and local extinctions over evolutionary history.

Over the last 12,000 y, human populations have expanded and transformed critical earth systems. Yet, a key unresolved question in the environmental and social sciences remains: Why did human populations grow and, sometimes, decline in the first place? Our research builds on 20 y of archaeological research studying the deep time dynamics of human populations to propose an explanation for the long-term growth and stability of human populations. Innovations in the productive capacity of populations fuels exponential-like growth over thousands of years; however, innovations saturate over time and, often, may leave populations vulnerable to large recessions in their well-being and population density. Empirically, we find a trade-off between changes in land use that increase the production and consumption of carbohydrates, driving repeated waves of population growth over thousands of years, and the susceptibility of populations to large recessions due to a lag in the impact of humans on resources. These results shed light on the long-term drivers of human population growth and decline., Competing Interests: Competing interests statement:The authors declare no competing interest.

Phenotypic plasticity refers to the capacity of the same organisms to exhibit different characteristics under varied environmental conditions. A plastic developmental program allows organisms to sense environmental cues in early stages of life and express phenotypes that are better fitted to environments encountered later in life. This is often considered an adaptive strategy for living in varying environments as long as the plastic response is sufficiently fast, is accurate, and is not too costly. However, despite direct costs of maintaining plasticity and producing phenotypes, a fundamental constraint on the benefit of phenotypic plasticity comes from the predictability of the future environment based on the environmental cues received during development. Here, we analyze a model of plastic development and derive the limits within which this strategy can promote population growth. An explicit expression for the long-term growth rate of a developmentally plastic population is found, which can be decomposed into several easily interpretable terms, representing the benefits and the limitations of phenotypic plasticity as an adaptation strategy. This growth rate decomposition has a remarkably similar form to the expressions previously obtained for the bet-hedging strategy, in which a population randomly diversifies into coexisting subgroups with different phenotypes, implying that those evolutionary strategies may be unified under a common general framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eight extant species of pangolins are currently recognized. Recent studies found that two mitochondrial haplotypes identified in confiscations in Hong Kong could not be assigned to any known pangolin species, implying the existence of a species. Here, we report that two additional mitochondrial haplotypes identified in independent confiscations from Yunnan align with the putative species haplotypes supporting the existence of this mysterious species/population. To verify the new species scenario we performed a comprehensive analysis of scale characteristics and 138 whole genomes representing all recognized pangolin species and the cryptic new species, 98 of which were generated here. Our morphometric results clearly attributed this cryptic species to Asian pangolins ( Manis sp.) and the genomic data provide robust and compelling evidence that it is a pangolin species distinct from those recognized previously, which separated from the Philippine pangolin and Malayan pangolin over 5 Mya. Our study provides a solid genomic basis for its formal recognition as the ninth pangolin species or the fifth Asian one, supporting a new taxonomic classification of pangolins. The effects of glacial climate changes and recent anthropogenic activities driven by illegal trade are inferred to have caused its population decline with the genomic signatures showing low genetic diversity, a high level of inbreeding, and high genetic load. Our finding greatly expands current knowledge of pangolin diversity and evolution and has vital implications for conservation efforts to prevent the extinction of this enigmatic and endangered species from the wild.

Predicting how species' abundances and ranges will shift in response to climate change requires a mechanistic understanding of how multiple factors interact to limit population growth. Both abiotic stress and species interactions can limit populations and potentially set range boundaries, but we have a poor understanding of when and where each is most critical. A commonly cited hypothesis, first proposed by Darwin, posits that abiotic factors (e.g., temperature, precipitation) are stronger determinants of range boundaries in apparently abiotically stressful areas ("stress" indicates abiotic factors that reduce population growth), including desert, polar, or highelevation environments, whereas species interactions (e.g., herbivory, competition) play a stronger role in apparently less stressful environments. We tested a core tenet of this hypothesis--that population growth rate is more strongly affected by species interactions in less stressful areas--using experimental manipulations of species interactions affecting a common herbaceous plant, Hibiscus meyeri (Malvaceae), across an aridity gradient in a semiarid African savanna. Population growth was more strongly affected by four distinct species interactions (competition with herbaceous and shrubby neighbors, herbivory, and pollination) in less stressful mesic areas than in more stressful arid sites. However, contrary to common assumptions, this effect did not arise because of greater density or diversity of interacting species in less stressful areas, but rather because aridity reduced sensitivity of population growth to these interactions. Our work supports classic predictions about the relative strength of factors regulating population growth across stress gradients, but suggests that this pattern results from a previously unappreciated mechanism that may apply to many species worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organisms can adapt to a randomly varying environment by creating phenotypic diversity in their population, a phenomenon often referred to as "bet hedging." The favorable level of phenotypic diversity depends on the statistics of environmental variations over timescales of many generations. Could organisms gather such long-term environmental information to adjust their phenotypic diversity? We show that this process can be achieved through a simple and general learning mechanism based on a transgenerational feedback: The phenotype of the parent is progressively reinforced in the distribution of phenotypes among the offspring. The molecular basis of this learning mechanism could be searched for in model organisms showing epigenetic inheritance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agriculture-specifically an intensification of the production of readily stored food and its distribution-has supported an increase in the global human population throughout the Holocene. Today, with greatly accelerated of growth during recent centuries, we have reached about 8 billion people. Human skeletal and archaeobotanical remains clarify what occurred over several millennia of profound societal and population change in small-scale societies once distributed across the North American midcontinent. Stepwise, not gradual, changes in the move toward an agriculturally based life, as indicated by plant remains, left a demographic signal reflecting age-independent ([Formula: see text]) mortality as estimated from skeletons. Designated the age-independent component of the Siler model, it is tracked through the juvenility index (JI), which is increasingly being used in studies of archaeological skeletons. Usually interpreted as a fertility indicator, the JI is more responsive to age-independent mortality in societies that dominated most of human existence. In the midcontinent, the JI increased as people transitioned to a more intensive form of food production that prominently featured maize. Several centuries later, the JI declined, along with a reversion to a somewhat more diverse diet and a reduction in overall population size. Changes in age-independent mortality coincided with previously recognized increases in intergroup conflict, group movement, and pathogen exposure. Similar rises and falls in JI values have been reported for other parts of the world during the emergence of agricultural systems.

Understanding the role of climate change, resource availability, and population growth in human mobility remains critically important in anthropology. Researching linkages between climate and demographic changes during the short settlement history of Aotearoa (New Zealand) requires temporal precision equivalent to the period of a single generation. However, current modeling approaches frequently use small terrestrial radiocarbon datasets, a practice that obscures past Māori population patterns and their connection to changing climate. Our systematic analysis of terrestrial and marine 14 C ages has enabled robust assessments of the largest dataset yet collated from island contexts. This analysis has been made possible by the recent development of a temporal marine correction for southern Pacific waters, and our findings show the shortcomings of previous models. We demonstrate that human settlement in the mid to late 13th century AD is unambiguous. We highlight initial (AD 1250 to 1275) settlement in the North Island. The South Island was reached a decade later (AD 1280 to 1295), where the hunting of giant flightless moa commenced (AD 1300 to 1415), and the population grew rapidly. Population growth leveled off around AD 1340 and declined between AD 1380 and 1420, synchronous with the onset of the Little Ice Age and moa loss as an essential food source. The population continued to grow in the more economically stable north, where conditions for horticulture were optimal. The enhanced precision of this research afforded by the robust analysis of marine dates opens up unique opportunities to investigate interconnectivity in Polynesia and inform the patterns seen in other island contexts.

Plant mortality and birth rates are critical components of plant life history affecting the stability of plant populations and the ecosystems they form. Although allometric theory predicts that both plant birth and mortality rates should be size-dependent, this prediction has not yet been tested across plants ranging the full size spectrum. Here we show that both population mortality and population birth rates scale as the -¼ power and plant lifespan as the ¼ power of plant mass across plant species spanning from the tiniest phototrophs to the largest trees. Whereas the controls on plant lifespans are as yet poorly understood, our findings suggest that plant mortality rates have evolved to match population birth rates, thereby helping to maintain plant communities in equilibrium and optimizing plant life histories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Early mathematical models varied in their predictions of the impact of HIV/AIDS on population growth from minimal impact to reductions in growth, in pessimistic scenarios, from positive to negative values over a period of 25 years. Models predicting negative rates of natural increase forecast little effect on the dependency ratio. Twenty years later, HIV prevalence in small towns, estates, and rural villages in eastern Zimbabwe, has peaked within the intermediate range predicted by the early models, but the demographic impact has been more acute than was predicted. Despite concurrent declines in fertility, fueled in part by HIV infections (total fertility is now 8% lower than expected without an epidemic), and a doubling of the crude death rate because of HIV/AIDS, the rate of natural population increase between 1998 and 2005 remained positive in each socioeconomic stratum. In the worst-affected areas (towns with HIV prevalence of 33%), HIV/AIDS reduced growth by two-thirds from 2.9% to 1.0%. The dependency ratio fell from 1.21 at the onset of the HIV epidemic to 0.78, the impact of HIV-associated adult mortality being outweighed by fertility decline. With the benefit of hindsight, the more pessimistic early models overestimated the demographic impact of HIV epidemics by over-extrapolating initial HIV growth rates or not allowing for heterogeneity in key parameters such as transmissibility and sexual risk behavior. Data collected since the late 1980s show that there was a mismatch between the observed growth in the HIV epidemic and assumptions made about viral transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present an expanded data set of 50 unlinked autosomal noncoding regions, resequenced in samples of Hausa from Cameroon, Italians, and Chinese. We use these data to make inferences about human demographic history by using a technique that combines multiple aspects of genetic data, including levels of polymorphism, the allele frequency spectrum, and linkage disequilibrium. We explore an extensive range of demographic parameters and demonstrate that our method of combining multiple aspects of the data results in a significant reduction of the compatible parameter space. In agreement with previous reports, we find that the Hausa data are compatible with demographic equilibrium as well as a set of recent population expansion models. In contrast to the Hausa, when multiple aspects of the data are considered jointly, the non-Africans depart from an equilibrium model of constant population size and are compatible with a range of simple bottleneck models, including a 50-90% reduction in effective population size occurring some time after the appearance of modern humans in Africa 160,000-120,000 years ago. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Filling the global biodiversity financing gap will require significant investments from financial markets, which demand credible valuations of ecosystem services and natural capital. However, current valuation approaches discourage investment in conservation because their results cannot be verified using market-determined prices. Here, we bridge the gap between finance and conservation by valuing only wild animals’ carbon services for which market prices exist. By projecting the future path of carbon service production using a spatially explicit demographic model, we place a credible value on the carbon capture services produced by African forest elephants. If elephants were protected, their services would be worth $20.8 billion ($10.3 to $29.7 billion) and $25.9 billion ($12.8 to $37.6 billion) for the next 10 and 30 y, respectively, and could finance antipoaching and conservation programs. Elephant population growth would generate a carbon sink of 109 MtC (64 to 153) across tropical Africa in the next 30 y. Avoided elephant extinction would also prevent the loss of 93 MtC (46 to 130), which is the contribution of the remaining populations. Uncertainties in our projections are controlled mainly by forest regeneration rates and poaching intensity, which indicate that conservation can actively reduce uncertainty for increased financial and biodiversity benefits. Our methodology can also place lower bounds on the social cost of nature degradation. Poaching would result in $2 to $7 billion of lost carbon services within the next 10 to 30 y, suggesting that the benefits of protecting elephants far outweigh the costs. Our methodology enables the integration of animal services into global financial markets with major implications for conservation, local socioeconomies, and conservation.

Correctly assessing the total impact of predators on prey population growth rates (lambda, λ) is critical to comprehending the importance of predators in species conservation and wildlife management. Experiments over the past decade have demonstrated that the fear (antipredator responses) predators inspire can affect prey fecundity and early offspring survival in free-living wildlife, but recent reviews have highlighted the absence of evidence experimentally linking such effects to significant impacts on prey population growth. We experimentally manipulated fear in free-living wild songbird populations over three annual breeding seasons by intermittently broadcasting playbacks of either predator or nonpredator vocalizations and comprehensively quantified the effects on all the components of population growth, together with evidence of a transgenerational impact on offspring survival as adults. Fear itself significantly reduced the population growth rate (predator playback mean λ = 0.91, 95% CI = 0.80 to 1.04; nonpredator mean λ = 1.06, 95% CI = 0.96 to 1.16) by causing cumulative, compounding adverse effects on fecundity and every component of offspring survival, resulting in predator playback parents producing 53% fewer recruits to the adult breeding population. Fear itself was consequently projected to halve the population size in just 5 years, or just 4 years when the evidence of a transgenerational impact was additionally considered (λ = 0.85). Our results not only demonstrate that fear itself can significantly impact prey population growth rates in free-living wildlife, comparing them with those from hundreds of predator manipulation experiments indicates that fear may constitute a very considerable part of the total impact of predators., Competing Interests: The authors declare no competing interest., (Copyright © 2022 the Author(s). Published by PNAS.)

Drawing on past pandemics, scholars have suggested that the COVID-19 pandemic will bring about fertility decline. Evidence from actual birth data has so far been scarce. This brief report uses data on vital statistics from a selection of high-income countries, including the United States. The pandemic has been accompanied by a significant drop in crude birth rates beyond that predicted by past trends in 7 out of the 22 countries considered, with particularly strong declines in southern Europe: Italy (-9.1%), Spain (-8.4%), and Portugal (-6.6%). Substantial heterogeneities are, however, observed., Competing Interests: The authors declare no competing interest., (Copyright © 2021 the Author(s). Published by PNAS.)

Multiple, simultaneous environmental changes, in climatic/abiotic factors, interacting species, and direct human influences, are impacting natural populations and thus biodiversity, ecosystem services, and evolutionary trajectories. Determining whether the magnitudes of the population impacts of abiotic, biotic, and anthropogenic drivers differ, accounting for their direct effects and effects mediated through other drivers, would allow us to better predict population fates and design mitigation strategies. We compiled 644 paired values of the population growth rate ( λ ) from high and low levels of an identified driver from demographic studies of terrestrial plants. Among abiotic drivers, natural disturbance (not climate), and among biotic drivers, interactions with neighboring plants had the strongest effects on λ However, when drivers were combined into the 3 main types, their average effects on λ did not differ. For the subset of studies that measured both the average and variability of the driver, λ was marginally more sensitive to 1 SD of change in abiotic drivers relative to biotic drivers, but sensitivity to biotic drivers was still substantial. Similar impact magnitudes for abiotic/biotic/anthropogenic drivers hold for plants of different growth forms, for different latitudinal zones, and for biomes characterized by harsher or milder abiotic conditions, suggesting that all 3 drivers have equivalent impacts across a variety of contexts. Thus, the best available information about the integrated effects of drivers on all demographic rates provides no justification for ignoring drivers of any of these 3 types when projecting ecological and evolutionary responses of populations and of biodiversity to environmental changes., Competing Interests: The authors declare no competing interest., (Copyright © 2020 the Author(s). Published by PNAS.)

An approach to the coalescent, the fractional coalescent (f-coalescent), is introduced. The derivation is based on the discrete-time Cannings population model in which the variance of the number of offspring depends on the parameter α. This additional parameter α affects the variability of the patterns of the waiting times; values of [Formula: see text] lead to an increase of short time intervals, but occasionally allow for very long time intervals. When [Formula: see text], the f-coalescent and the Kingman's n-coalescent are equivalent. The distribution of the time to the most recent common ancestor and the probability that n genes descend from m ancestral genes in a time interval of length T for the f-coalescent are derived. The f-coalescent has been implemented in the population genetic model inference software Migrate Simulation studies suggest that it is possible to accurately estimate α values from data that were generated with known α values and that the f-coalescent can detect potential environmental heterogeneity within a population. Bayes factor comparisons of simulated data with [Formula: see text] and real data (H1N1 influenza and malaria parasites) showed an improved model fit of the f-coalescent over the n-coalescent. The development of the f-coalescent and its inclusion into the inference program Migrate facilitates testing for deviations from the n-coalescent., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2019 the Author(s). Published by PNAS.)

Phenotypic plasticity refers to the capacity of the same organisms to exhibit different characteristics under varied environmental conditions. A plastic developmental program allows organisms to sense environmental cues in early stages of life and express phenotypes that are better fitted to environments encountered later in life. This is often considered an adaptive strategy for living in varying environments as long as the plastic response is sufficiently fast, is accurate, and is not too costly. However, despite direct costs of maintaining plasticity and producing phenotypes, a fundamental constraint on the benefit of phenotypic plasticity comes from the predictability of the future environment based on the environmental cues received during development. Here, we analyze a model of plastic development and derive the limits within which this strategy can promote population growth. An explicit expression for the long-term growth rate of a developmentally plastic population is found, which can be decomposed into several easily interpretable terms, representing the benefits and the limitations of phenotypic plasticity as an adaptation strategy. This growth rate decomposition has a remarkably similar form to the expressions previously obtained for the bet-hedging strategy, in which a population randomly diversifies into coexisting subgroups with different phenotypes, implying that those evolutionary strategies may be unified under a common general framework., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Within the next decade India is expected to surpass China as the world's most populous country due to still higher fertility and a younger population. Around 2025 each country will be home to around 1.5 billion people. India is demographically very heterogeneous with some rural illiterate populations still having more than four children on average while educated urban women have fewer than 1.5 children and with great differences between states. We show that the population outlook greatly depends on the degree to which this heterogeneity is explicitly incorporated into the population projection model used. The conventional projection model, considering only the age and sex structures of the population at the national level, results in a lower projected population than the same model applied at the level of states because over time the high-fertility states gain more weight, thus applying the higher rates to more people. The opposite outcome results from an explicit consideration of education differentials because over time the proportion of more educated women with lower fertility increases, thus leading to lower predicted growth than in the conventional model. To comprehensively address this issue, we develop a five-dimensional model of India's population by state, rural/urban place of residence, age, sex, and level of education and show the impacts of different degrees of aggregation. We also provide human capital scenarios for all Indian states that suggest that India will rapidly catch up with other more developed countries in Asia if the recent pace of education expansion is maintained., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2018 the Author(s). Published by PNAS.)

Predicting how species' abundances and ranges will shift in response to climate change requires a mechanistic understanding of how multiple factors interact to limit population growth. Both abiotic stress and species interactions can limit populations and potentially set range boundaries, but we have a poor understanding of when and where each is most critical. A commonly cited hypothesis, first proposed by Darwin, posits that abiotic factors (e.g., temperature, precipitation) are stronger determinants of range boundaries in apparently abiotically stressful areas ("stress" indicates abiotic factors that reduce population growth), including desert, polar, or high-elevation environments, whereas species interactions (e.g., herbivory, competition) play a stronger role in apparently less stressful environments. We tested a core tenet of this hypothesis-that population growth rate is more strongly affected by species interactions in less stressful areas-using experimental manipulations of species interactions affecting a common herbaceous plant, Hibiscus meyeri (Malvaceae), across an aridity gradient in a semiarid African savanna. Population growth was more strongly affected by four distinct species interactions (competition with herbaceous and shrubby neighbors, herbivory, and pollination) in less stressful mesic areas than in more stressful arid sites. However, contrary to common assumptions, this effect did not arise because of greater density or diversity of interacting species in less stressful areas, but rather because aridity reduced sensitivity of population growth to these interactions. Our work supports classic predictions about the relative strength of factors regulating population growth across stress gradients, but suggests that this pattern results from a previously unappreciated mechanism that may apply to many species worldwide., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Future population growth is uncertain and matters for climate policy: higher growth entails more emissions and means more people will be vulnerable to climate-related impacts. We show that how future population is valued importantly determines mitigation decisions. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model, we explore two approaches to valuing population: a discounted version of total utilitarianism (TU), which considers total wellbeing and is standard in social cost of carbon dioxide (SCC) models, and of average utilitarianism (AU), which ignores population size and sums only each time period's discounted average wellbeing. Under both approaches, as population increases the SCC increases, but optimal peak temperature decreases. The effect is larger under TU, because it responds to the fact that a larger population means climate change hurts more people: for example, in 2025, assuming the United Nations (UN)-high rather than UN-low population scenario entails an increase in the SCC of 85% under TU vs. 5% under AU. The difference in the SCC between the two population scenarios under TU is comparable to commonly debated decisions regarding time discounting. Additionally, we estimate the avoided mitigation costs implied by plausible reductions in population growth, finding that large near-term savings ($billions annually) occur under TU; savings under AU emerge in the more distant future. These savings are larger than spending shortfalls for human development policies that may lower fertility. Finally, we show that whether lowering population growth entails overall improvements in wellbeing-rather than merely cost savings-again depends on the ethical approach to valuing population., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2017 the Author(s). Published by PNAS.)

There is growing awareness of the need for fishery management policies that are robust to changing environmental, social, and economic pressures. Here we use conventional bioeconomic theory to demonstrate that inherent biological constraints combined with nonlinear supply-demand relationships can generate threshold effects due to harvesting. As a result, increases in overall demand due to human population growth or improvement in real income would be expected to induce critical transitions from high-yield/low-price fisheries to low-yield/high-price fisheries, generating severe strains on social and economic systems as well as compromising resource conservation goals. As a proof of concept, we show that key predictions of the critical transition hypothesis are borne out in oceanic fisheries (cod and pollock) that have experienced substantial increase in fishing pressure over the past 60 y. A hump-shaped relationship between price and historical harvest returns, well demonstrated in these empirical examples, is particularly diagnostic of fishery degradation. Fortunately, the same heuristic can also be used to identify reliable targets for fishery restoration yielding optimal bioeconomic returns while safely conserving resource abundance., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2017 the Author(s). Published by PNAS.)

Competing Interests: The author declares no conflict of interest.

Adult sex ratio (ASR) is a central concept in population biology and a key factor in sexual selection, but why do most demographic models ignore sex biases? Vital rates often vary between the sexes and across life history, but their relative contributions to ASR variation remain poorly understood-an essential step to evaluate sex ratio theories in the wild and inform conservation. Here, we combine structured two-sex population models with individual-based mark-recapture data from an intensively monitored polygamous population of snowy plovers. We show that a strongly male-biased ASR (0.63) is primarily driven by sex-specific survival of juveniles rather than adults or dependent offspring. This finding provides empirical support for theories of unbiased sex allocation when sex differences in survival arise after the period of parental investment. Importantly, a conventional model ignoring sex biases significantly overestimated population viability. We suggest that sex-specific population models are essential to understand the population dynamics of sexual organisms: reproduction and population growth are most sensitive to perturbations in survival of the limiting sex. Overall, our study suggests that sex-biased early survival may contribute toward mating system evolution and population persistence, with implications for both sexual selection theory and biodiversity conservation., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

The science and engineering workforce has aged rapidly in recent years, both in absolute terms and relative to the workforce as a whole. This is a potential concern if the large number of older scientists crowds out younger scientists, making it difficult for them to establish independent careers. In addition, scientists are believed to be most creative earlier in their careers, so the aging of the workforce may slow the pace of scientific progress. We develop and simulate a demographic model, which shows that a substantial majority of recent aging is a result of the aging of the large baby boom cohort of scientists. However, changes in behavior have also played a significant role, in particular, a decline in the retirement rate of older scientists, induced in part by the elimination of mandatory retirement in universities in 1994. Furthermore, the age distribution of the scientific workforce is still adjusting. Current retirement rates and other determinants of employment in science imply a steady-state mean age 2.3 y higher than the 2008 level of 48.6.

Commercial fishing generally removes large and old individuals from fish stocks, reducing mean age and age diversity among spawners. It is feared that these demographic changes lead to lower and more variable recruitment to the stocks. A key proposed pathway is that juvenation and reduced size distribution causes reduced ranges in spawning period, spawning location, and egg buoyancy; this is proposed to lead to reduced spatial distribution of fish eggs and larvae, more homogeneous ambient environmental conditions within each year-class, and reduced buffering against negative environmental influences. However, few, if any, studies have confirmed a causal link from spawning stock demographic structure through egg and larval distribution to year class strength at recruitment. We here show that high mean age and size in the spawning stock of Barents Sea cod (Gadus morhua) is positively associated with high abundance and wide spatiotemporal distribution of cod eggs. We find, however, no support for the hypothesis that a wide egg distribution leads to higher recruitment or a weaker recruitment-temperature correlation. These results are based on statistical analyses of a spatially resolved data set on cod eggs covering a period (1959-1993) with large changes in biomass and demographic structure of spawners. The analyses also account for significant effects of spawning stock biomass and a liver condition index on egg abundance and distribution. Our results suggest that the buffering effect of a geographically wide distribution of eggs and larvae on fish recruitment may be insignificant compared with other impacts., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest.