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This comment on Bottaccioli & Bottaccioli’s (2024a) article critically analyzes Franz Alexander’s role in developing contemporary psychosomatics in both its innovative aspects and limitations. On the one hand, Alexander contributed to emancipating the explanation of physical symptoms from the classical approach of the early 20th century stiffened on the model of hysterical conversion and promoted the organization of the international psychosomatic movement, including the Italian one. On the other hand, his limitations mainly concern the theoretical approach typical of 20th century psychoanalysis: adopting a one-dimensional model centered on intrapsychic conflict and the indeterminacy – necessary for the time – of a biological “X” factor as mediator. Instead, in the second half of the 20th century, a deficit-centered model of explanation (e.g., alexithymia) and complexity (e.g., biopsychosocial model) emerged, in which various moderating biomedical, psychological, and socio-cultural factors assume different relative weights in the explanation of physical illnesses and the clinical management of patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sixty years after the death of Franz Alexander, it is necessary to investigate what is alive and what is dead in his thought about psychosomatics, focusing in particular on the notions of emotion and vegetative neurosis as central to his model of explanation. It is then worth noting, in the light of the developments after Alexander, the today’s difficulty in supporting psychosomatics as an autonomous discipline, to the point of questioning the legitimacy of the expression itself: Bottaccioli & Bottaccioli’s (2024a) proposal to identify it with Psycho-Neuro-EndocrineImmunology (PNEI) must be measured in this problematic context. In any case, the always valid need remains, already supported by Alexander, for a unitary, “holistic” consideration of the human being, sick and healthy. However, this is a paradigm that has to be justified and clarified conceptually in the actual role it plays as an inspirer of research and specific explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problems posed by Leonardo’s pathographies written by Freud are examined. The historical path of the problem of the relationship between genius and psychopathology is reconstructed, showing that psychoanalysis fits into a very active vein at the end of the 19th century, expressing different theoretical approaches with which Freud relates. The interest for the problem then continued, with alternate answers, until the current days. The distortions made by Freud in Leonardo’s pathographical description are examined; these distortions are extensively examined by several authors, which, however, is not distant from what Freud implements in his other works, nor from what other pathographists of the time did. It is a common behavior in the history of science and well known in modern epistemology that identifies in the development of theories also the importance of rhetorical tools with which scientists support them. It is emphasized that one cannot read particular psychological aspects in these Freudian behaviors, making in fact a pathography of the author of pathographies, but only lead his work to the coherence of the historical contexts in which he operates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Freud’s lecture given on December 1, 1909, at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society on Leonardo da Vinci is examined. This lecture is a forerunner of his later article Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood (Freud, 1910b). An attempt is made to emphasize the inconsistency between Freud’s hypotheses and the historical data by then at his disposal. Avoiding entering Freud’s vulture slip that many scholars have pointed out and Freud never acknowledged, concerns are expressed about Freud’s required documentation in the field of art history and about the method he employed for the portrayal of Leonardo da Vinci’s personality. It seems that Freud willingly avoided historical data choosing almost entirely to rely on applied psychoanalysis widely employing his own phantasies in attempting to overcome the paucity of knowledge on Leonardo da Vinci’s childhood. Freud himself later acknowledged that his 1910 paper was partly a fictional story along the lines of Mereskovskij’s 1895 book on Leonardo. A crucial inconsistency of this lecture, that will not be amended in his paper of 1910, relates to the fact that Freud changed into a phantasy what Leonardo had reported as a childhood memory. Many scholars have taken for granted this shift so that they talked about Leonardo’s “phantasy” or “dream”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Viennese historian Johannes Reichmayr has edited the Collected Works of the psychoanalyst Paul Parin (1916-2009) in 19 volumes, published by the Viennese publisher Mandelbaum from 2018 to 2024. A pioneer of ethnopsychoanalysis, Parin has lived psychoanalysis as a form of social critique and political action, whose gradual and systematic articulation comes out very clearly from his Collected Works. Parin’s works are reconstructed in great detail in the context of his life, of the Zurich Psychoanalytic Seminar (PSZ) founded by him, and of his close collaboration with the journal Psicoterapia e Scienze Umane. The same is true for his successful literary activity, and for his participation in political life, documented as they are by a whole series of autobiographical papers and by various collections of letters, as it is shown also in the light of volumes 9 and 10, the latter being centered around “The burning problems of our times” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is mainly concerned with the conception of free will in Freudian theory and psychoanalytic ego psychology. There are a number of Freuds, not all consistent with each other, on the issue of free will: the Freud who views free will as an illusion, the Freud who identifies as a goal of psychoanalytic treatment the enhancement of the ego’s freedom to choose, and the Freud who locates control of motility (action) in the conscious ego. As for an ego psychology perspective, free will lies in the ego’s relative autonomy from drives, as well as in the freedom to not will and to relinquish control. In contrast to Freudian theory and ego psychology, the question of free will is not salient in post-Freudian theories, where the greater emphasis is on issues having to do with meeting needs rather than on gratification of wishes. Finally, free will is not only a matter of freedom from inner compulsion, but also of freedom from external coercion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]