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This paper presents a theoreticalmodel examining the influence of two stylized types ofvoters: ``loyal voters'' and ``swing voters''. The model showswhy both types of voters will influence thedistribution of benefits by a reelection-seekingincumbent, and it predicts how their influence willvary with the importance of the general electionrelative to that of the primary: closer competitionbetween parties in the general election, ceterisparibus, increases the influence of swing votersrelative to that of loyal voters. County-level dataon the allocation of money and jobs by New Deal reliefprograms confirm the model's predictions.

Federal regulation of child labor (unlike that passed in early nineteenth century England) did not materialize until the New Deal of the 1930s. The present paper examines, using anecdotal and empirical evidence, the motives underlying the passage of depression-based child labor legislation embodied in the Senate vote on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Our study, which utilizes both dichotomous and trichotomous probit models of the vote, finds evidence that there were critical and dominantprivate as opposed to public interests behind the restrictions that the FLSA placed on child labor and the exemptions that it established.