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Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy, which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes an ontological approach to the subject of promising. Setting aside the typical concern over promissory obligations, I draw on recent work from the field of social ontology and develop a promissory schema that characterizes the functional role the practice of promising plays in our lives. This schema, put in terms of one agent's voluntary and intentional attempts to provide another agent with a specific kind of assurance, helps explain what we are doing when we make a promise, and what we desire when we ask that a promise be made. The promissory schema is explanatorily beneficial as it can help us understand why certain actions may be interpreted as promises, thereby reminding us that we need to be sensitive to the ways our actions can give rise to expectations in others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If there is a second dimension of time – a so‐called 'hypertime' – is it logically possible for the past to change? Some have said yes; others have said no. I say yes provided that one has the appropriate ontological view of hypertime. So far, the ontology of hypertime has seldom been discussed. As such, this paper not only defends the logical possibility of a changing past, but aims to start a discussion on what ontological commitments are required to make sense of a changing past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to defend a naturalistic approach to instantiation and the Principle of Instantiation. I argue that the instantiation of an ordinary property F consists of two coordinated relationships at the levels of the manifest and scientific images, namely, constituency and entailment. Also, I offer an account of the Principle of Instantiation related to this conception of instantiation based on the notion of scientific prediction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper explores what could justify some intuitive temporal asymmetries regarding redemption and the distribution of ills and goods throughout an agent's lifespan. After exposing the inadequacies of causal explanations – based on our differential ability to affect the future, but not the past – a metaphysical explanation is outlined in relation to three competing temporal‐ontological profiles of agents, and their varying accounts of a being's development. Only one of those conceptions of agents – supported by Presentism, the thesis that everything is present – offers an account justifying the intuitive temporal asymmetries. Finally, consequences are then drawn for the possibility of true redemption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Hylomorphism is the theory that objects are composites of form and matter. Recently it has been argued that form is structure, or the arrangement of an object's parts. This paper shows that the principle of form cannot be ontologically exhausted by structure. That is, I deny form should be understood just as the arrangement of an object's parts. I do so by showing that structure cannot play the role form is supposed to in a certain domain of objects, specifically, in mereological simples. Thus, I show that Hylomorphism does not reduce to Structuralism. I also draw out some important consequences from my argument for Hylomorphism in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent issue of this journal, Benjamin Schnieder has presented an objection to the account of individual substance that we have developed and put to various uses in our works on metaphysics. According to Schnieder's objection, our proposal to analyse this notion of substantiality suffers from a special kind of circularity. In this paper, we give two replies to Schnieder's objection. The first is that a successful analysis is not, in fact, required to avoid the sort of circularity about which Schnieder complains. The second is that our analysis does not involve the alleged circularity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Those who favour an ontology based on dispositions are thereby able to provide a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature. In part 1 of this paper I sketch the dispositional essentialist conception of properties and the concomitant account of laws. In part 2, I characterise various claims about the modal character of properties that fall under the heading ‘quidditism’ and which are consequences of the categoricalist view of properties, which is the alternative to the dispositional essentialist view. I argue that quidditism should be rejected. In part 3, I address a criticism of a strong dispositional essentialist view, viz. that ‘structural’ (i.e. geometrical, numerical, spatial and temporal) properties must be regarded as categorical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that, by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token-physicalism. The argument cannot be supplemented so as to show that experiences have properties which are illegitimate from a physicalist perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I try to give an assessment of a three-cornered fight over the issue of scientific realism. On the one hand there are Putnam-Boyd realists, who believe that there are things about science that realism alone explains well. There is the constructive empiricist, notably Bas van Fraassen. And then there is the natural ontological attitude of Arthur Fine. I try to show that the issue has not been clearly posed, but that when it is a surprising 'quietism' or pessimism about a metatheoretical position begins to seem attractive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When, for example, we say of something that it 'is an object', or 'is an event', or 'is a property', we are engaging in categorial predication: we are assigning something to a certain ontological category. Ontological categorization is clearly a type of classification, but it differs radically from the types of classification that are involved in the taxonomic practices of empirical sciences, as when a physicist says of a certain particle that it 'is an electron', or when a zoologist says of a certain animal that it 'is a mammal', or when a meteorologist says of a certain weather-phenomenon that it 'is a hurricane'. Classifications of the latter types presuppose that the items being classified have already been assigned to appropriate ontological categories, such as the categories of object, species, or event. What do categorial predications mean? How are their truth-conditions to be determined, and how can those truth-conditions be known to be satisfied? Do they have truthmakers? Questions like these are amongst those addressed in the present paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Metaethical realists believe that moral facts exist, but they disagree among themselves about whether moral facts have ontological import. Robust realists think that they do. Quietist realists deny this. I argue that quietist realism faces a new objection; viz., the moral determination objection. This is the objection that general moral facts (or moral principles) must determine specific moral facts (or which actions in the world are right and wrong) but that general moral facts cannot do this if they lack ontological import. I also argue that some robust realists can answer the moral determination objection. This gives these robust realists an edge over quietist realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Much recent work in metaontology challenges the so‐called ‘Quinean tradition’ in metaphysics. Especially prominently, Amie Thomasson argues for a highly permissive ontology over ontologies which eliminate many entities. I am concerned with disputing not her ontological claim, but the methodology behind her rejection of eliminativism – I focus on ordinary objects. Thomasson thinks that by endorsing the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment eliminativism goes wrong; a theory eschewing quantification over a kind may nonetheless be committed to its existence. I argue that, contrary to Thomasson's claims, we should retain the Quinean criterion. Her arguments show that many eliminativist positions are flawed, but their flaws lie elsewhere: the Quinean criterion is innocent. Showing why reveals the importance of pragmatism in ontology. In §1 I compare Thomasson's account and the eliminativist views to which it stands in opposition. In §2 I re‐construct Thomasson's reasons for rejecting the Quinean criterion. In §3 I defend the Quinean criterion, showing that the eliminativists’ flaws are not consequences of applying the Quinean criterion, before explaining the criterion's importance when properly understood. I conclude that Thomasson, though right to criticise the methodology of ordinary‐object eliminativists, is wrong to identify the Quinean criterion as the source of their mistake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary theories of the temporal asymmetry of deliberation seek the origins of the asymmetry either in the physics of the early universe or in the epistemic orientation of agents. An attempt is made in the following lines to consolidate the rival thesis that the temporal asymmetry of deliberation is rooted in an ontological divide between the past and the future. I argue that agents can deliberate about the future but not the past because while the past is in a sense real, the future is nothing at all. The argument for the thesis includes striking a connection between deliberation and truth on the one hand and truth and being on the other. The argument thus proceeds, via a modal principle, from the asymmetry of deliberation into the semantics of propositions about the past, the present, and the future and from there to the ontology of the past, the present, and the future. The 'ticket' for transition in the argument from semantics to ontology is a truth-making principle, according to which propositions are true or false in virtue of an existing reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Physical realism is the thesis that the world is more or less as present-day physical theory says it is, i.e. a mind-independent reality, that consists fundamentally of physical objects that have causal powers, are located in space and time, belong to natural kinds, and interact causally with each other in various natural kinds of ways. It is thus a modern form of physicalism that takes due account of the natural kinds structure of the world. It is a thesis that many present-day scientific realists would surely accept. Indeed, some might say that physical realism just is scientific realism, but under another name. However, the argument that is presented for physical realism is not the standard one for scientific realism. It is not a two-stage argument from the success of science to the truth of scientific theories to the reality of the entities postulated in these theories. It is more powerful than this, because it is more direct, and its premisses are more secure. It is more direct, because it develops what is basically a physicalist ontology as the only plausible metaphysical explanation of the new scientific image of the world. It is more secure, in that it does not depend, as the standard argument does, on any doubtful generalisations about the nature or role of scientific theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brian Ellis advances a robust species of realism he calls Physical Realism. Physical Realism includes an ontology comprising three kinds of universal and three kinds of particular: a six-category ontology. After comparing Physical Realism to a modest two-category ontology inspired by Locke, I mention two apparent difficulties a proponent of a six-category ontology might address. 1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the new essentialist asking us to accept? Not that there are natural kinds, nor that there are intrinsic causal powers. These things could be accepted without a commitment to essentialism. They are asking us to accept something akin to the Kripke-Putnam position: a metaphysical theory about kind-membership in virtue of essential properties. But Salmon has shown that there is no valid argument for the Kripke-Putnam position: no valid inference that gets us from reference to essence. Why then should we accept essentialism? A remaining reason is Ellis's argument by display: we should buy essentialism because of the benefits it will bring. But are these benefits real? The problem is that the putative benefits of essentialism – that the laws of nature are necessary, that the problem of induction is solved, and so on – look actually to be the assumptions of Ellis's theory. If that is the case, there is no real benefit to be gained from adopting the theory. The argument for essentialism is therefore underdetermined and it remains possible to accept natural kinds into one's ontology without accepting their corresponding essences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is there a universe rather than nothing? And if there is a universe did it have to burst into being through the Big Bang? And if so, will the answer to the question: what caused the Big Bang? eventually be discovered, or will it remain a mystery forever? Or is there nothing mysterious about it at all? Is the suggestion that the Big Bang was a result of a divine act simply false, or devoid of meaning? The main argument of this essay is that a considerable amount of clarity will be achieved if we realise the radical difference between the kinds of hypothesis that are legitimate to account for events within the universe and events accounting for the very existence of the universe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]