Search

In this paper, I shall argue that the law of non-contradiction can be used to constructively reframe the univocalist debate. Duns Scotus argued famously that a term is univocal in two statements if its unity is sufficient for a contradiction. This logical definition was woven into his arguments against Henry of Ghent's (and indirectly Thomas Aquinas') view of analogy, arguing that all successful analogies must be built upon a univocal core. As early as the 1960s, this Scotist univocity had been singled out by French scholars and, by the turn of the century, had become the cherished whipping boy of Radical Orthodoxy, which claims that Scotus was the progenitor of modern onto-theology, nihilism, and secular immanence. While the genealogical critique in its fullness is beyond this paper's scope, it illustrates the gravity of the question. If the doctrine of analogy is coherent—i.e., if Scotus turned to univocity without cause—then perhaps his condemnation is justified. However—in line with the principle quod est necessarium est licitum (that which is necessary is permissible)—if univocity is necessary for successful theological reference, then perhaps the doctrine of univocity can be defended regardless of its historical usage. This paper will argue that univocity is latent in all successful analogies, commencing with a fairly standard analysis of Scotus' Ordinatio, then moving beyond Scotus to more constructively suggest that an expanded version of the argument from non-contradiction can help reframe the univocalist debate for today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of this paper is to provide an account of Leibniz's engagement with the doctrine of cosmic dualism in his Theodicy, i.e., the view that there are two distinct fundamental principles that are responsible for the existence of the created world, one good and the other evil. Leibniz's discussion is primarily a response to arguments in favour of cosmic dualism that he finds in the writings of Pierre Bayle. However, in addition, he presents a genealogical argument that appears to be intended to provide reasons to reject the view. The paper also contains a critical discussion of Leibniz's case, and finishes by drawing attention to some issues which arise that are worthy of further consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we discuss with some contemporary Thomists the possibility of re-actualizing Thomas's fifth way to God in the science–theology dialogue. We start with a reference to Spinoza's critique of teleology in light of some recent Spinoza studies, and after summarizing several Thomistic defenses of Aquinas's teleological argument, we interpret that critique as targeting the fifth way as well. We then focus on Darwin's impact on biological design arguments. We argue that his naturalistic explanation of biological teleology also affects the fifth way. The distinction between internal-Aristotelian and external-Platonic conceptions of teleology does not seem to be able to protect the teleological argument from a Darwinian critique. We conclude by stressing the importance and fruitfulness of Thomas's thought for contemporary interdisciplinary dialogue, provided that Darwin's impact on the biological version of the fifth way is taken into due account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Western thinkers have often seen Confucianism as unique in that it does not fit well into standard categories of either religion or philosophy. In terms of how this difficulty is reflected in academia, it seems that Confucianism is simultaneously both a religion and a philosophy, and neither. This paper attempts to begin a discussion of a related issue, which has been relatively underappreciated; namely, how does Confucianism attempt to convince people to be Confucian? Restricting our discussion to the Analects, we can find appeals to a belief which seem almost religious, rational arguments which seem philosophical, and a host of other methodologies that may help to convince readers to follow the Confucian way. The discussion of the Analects is cursory here, and only a few passages will be discussed in a general manner. We will contrast this with a general outline of approaches to convincing people found in two-world theories, which can help to illuminate the uniqueness of the Analects, especially when it is read as a one-world perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper inquires into the nature of God's relationship to space. It explores two different views, one that God transcends space or exists aspatially and the other that God exists throughout space and so is spatially extended. It seeks to adjudicate the debate between these competing perspectives by weighing the principal arguments for and against each view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a typology of rhetorical questions in the Daodejing and examines their functions on rhetorical effects and argumentative construction. This paper argues against a reading of rhetorical questions that translates them directly into propositional statements. Instead, the fact that rhetorical questions appear in one version of the text but not in others shows us the unique subtleties of meaning that rhetorical questions deliver. An awareness of the performative and dialogical functions elicited through rhetorical questions deepens our understanding of the persuasive power of the Daodejing. Furthermore, emotional sentiments within the text can be detected through the use of rhetorical questions which function to impress the readers/listeners while urging a point. A study of rhetorical questions in the Daodejing reveals textual differences across versions that transcend their wording, all the while motivating a new understanding of rhetorical questions based on classical Chinese texts enriches current definitions proposed in the field at large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops Mark D. Linville's brief description of "a sort of moral fine-tuning argument". I develop the argument in four ways: I unpack the argument and give it a clear formulation, I unpack the theistic explanation of why a somewhat reliable moral capacity is expected, I point to the significance of not seeking to explain a perfect moral capacity, and I put the argument up against the recent work on non-theistic moral epistemology by Derek Parfit, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an analysis of James Sterba's argument from evil in the world and the author's Thomistic counterargument. Many authors of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion discuss the concept of "horrendous evils", which is a representative name for pointless evil and suffering in the world. Sterba claims that the existence of such evil is not logically compatible with the existence of the all-good theistic God. If such a God existed, according to Sterba, he would have intervened in time and prevented and not permitted horrendous evil consequences; in other words, he would have acted as an ideal state. The author of this paper argues that the analogy of an ideal state does not disprove the existence of God of theism. Furthermore, people would prefer if God was not like an ideal state. Applying the characteristics of an ideal state to a theistic God is not reasonable because it relies on anthropomorphism. Such anthropomorphism is incoherent with some basic theistic beliefs. The author of this paper applies Thomistic concepts to the problem of horrendous evils. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about Catholicism in the Philippines, highlighting the events and objects of the popular devotion to the Black Christ Nazarene of Manila, popularly known as Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno of Quiapo or NPJN. What are the motivations of the devotees? How have the religious practices changed over time in Quiapo? This study also calls for more scholarly attention to the historical and religious connection between the Philippines and Mexico, so that through them we can better understand how Filipinos reimagined Baroque Catholicism. In addition to commercial goods, the Manila Galleon facilitated the first transpacific people-to-people exchange along with their ideas, and the transmission and transplantation of Catholicism to the Philippines. This study is both historical and ethnographic, using sources from the archives and research materials collected in the Philippines, Mexico, and Spain. Although the devotion to NPJN is central to the arguments of this paper, the discussion takes a broader consideration of Quiapo, a district of Manila as a shared space for performing the sacred vow or PSV, popularly known as panata. This analytical step is consistent with the main argument of this study, that consideration of the PSV particular to Jesus Christ is crucial to understanding the historical and religious connections and how popular Catholicism has changed in the Philippines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Hare argues that Kant, in his Third Critique, offers an aesthetic argument for God's existence that shares premises with his famous moral argument. Karl Ameriks demurs, expressing skepticism that this is so. In this paper, I stake out an intermediate position, arguing that the resources of Kant provide ingredients for an aesthetic argument, but one distinctly less than a transcendental argument for God or an entailment relation. Whether the argument is best thought of as abductive in nature, a C-inductive argument, or a Pascalian natural sign, prospects for its formulation are strong. And such an argument, for its resonances with the moral argument(s), can work well in tandem with it (them), a fact not surprising at all if Kant was right that beauty—in accordance with an ancient Greek tradition—exists in close organic relation to the good. More generally, along the way, I argue that the sea change in Kant's studies over the last decade or so should help us see that Kant is an ally, rather than foe, to aesthetic theodicists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of evil seems to have been the patent of theism for a long time. However, some philosophers notice that this is not necessarily the case and raise arguments from evil against atheism. In this paper, I follow this insight and raise the evidential argument from evil against naturalism. I argue that some human behaviors that cause evil and suffering contradict the principles of evolution and should not exist in a naturalistic world. Nevertheless, they do exist, and they accordingly disconfirm naturalism. To attain this conclusion, I first establish that psychological mechanisms as evolutionary causes are the ultimate causes of human behaviors if naturalism is true. Then, I argue that cases of rape with murder and suicide have contravened their relevant psychological mechanisms' adaptive functions and should not exist. Therefore, cases of these behaviors make it reasonable to believe that naturalism is not true. Both naturalists and theists now have to raise plausible explanations for various evils in the world. It is possible for theism to outcompete naturalism with respect to evil as a result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the aspect of place (space) in Buddhist narratives. Starting from the observation that narrated time is often vaguely indicated in Buddhist narratives, but places and sites of the narrated events are quite specific—although frequently introduced in a stereotypical way ("Once the Buddha dwelled in Śrāvastī ..." "Once when Brahmadatta was king in Vārāṇasī ...")—the question is asked why a place is so important for and in Buddhist narratives. Based on selected examples, the argument is made that it is the "blueprint" of "early" Buddhist biographical sources, with the Buddha acting/preaching at specific places, which made these places accessible spaces where merit could be gained through "contact" with soteriologically important events in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent can the Reformed heritage of the prophetic office sharpen the perception of the cultural witness of the church in secular Europe? The so-called munus propheticum as a heritage of the Swiss Reformation is the focus of this paper. In a first attempt, the Reformation origin of guardianship will be traced. A look at the debate on Swiss refugee policy during the war years shows how controversial church involvement was at that time. Using the example of the prophetic office, the sensitivity and fragility of the church's witness in secular society can be better understood and used for the theological discussion on the function of the public church. In a concluding reflection, arguments for and against its use are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vimalamitra's (ca. the 8th–9th cent.) *Āryaprajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā (hereafter the PHT) sparks interest not only because of its detailed verbal commentary on the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya or the Heart Sūtra but also because it developed various philosophical arguments. However, these arguments have not always been clear due to the difficulty surrounding Tibetan translation and the complexity of the discussion. For instance, in 2021, Mathes, who examined some passages of the PHT, suggested that Vimalamitra endorsed the Yogācāra idea that the perfect nature exists ultimately as the dharmakāya—an idea that can be traced back to 1996, Lopez. However, a close reading of the relevant passages of the PHT through consultation with the commentary on the Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā by Vimalamitra himself, a sub-commentary on the PHT by rNgog blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), and a reading of the Tibetan translation (the only translation preserved) conjecturing the underlying original Sanskrit reveals that the opposite is true: there is a fierce and complex debate between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra on the passage, with Vimalamitra sharply criticizing the latter's views as a Mādhyamika. Thus, this paper will reveal for the first time the previously unknown details of the dispute between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in the PHT. This will offer new evidence for the confrontation between the two around the eighth and ninth centuries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that James Sterba's argument from evil involves a category mistake. He applies moral principles that pertain to ethical requirements that apply within creation to what may be called the ethics or axiology of creating and sustaining creation. The paper includes reflection on the relationship between justification and redemption, justice and mercy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Logical and evidential arguments from evil are generally thought to have been rebutted by various refutations, defenses, and theodicies. While disparate, these responses employ similar strategies to show that God has morally sufficient reasons to permit evil and suffering in the world, either to preserve human freedom, for the sake of the moral growth of human souls, or to train humans to be able to act freely without sinning once in heaven. In this paper, I defend the heaven ab initio argument from evil (HAIAFE), which demonstrates that God could have accomplished all these goals, without the need for evil and suffering, by creating human beings directly as spiritual beings in a non-physical state of eternal bliss. Moreover, I will argue that the HAIAFE is both a logical argument from evil and a "deodicy", i.e., a vindication of a deistic god. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Erik Wielenberg has offered a fascinating argument from moral psychology against a sophisticated theistic account of moral obligations: Divine Command Theory (DCT). This argument focuses on the pathology known as psychopathy—a perennial interest for those concerned with abnormal and moral psychology. The argument can be labeled the argument from psychopathy for convenience. The strength of the argument is that it forces the DCT-ist to maintain that there are some human beings who have no moral obligations yet still do evil actions. This, he argues, is an implausible thesis. Therefore, DCT is false. In this paper, I defend DCT and argue that there is good reason to be neutral or skeptical that psychopaths have moral obligations and, to the degree that they do, they are able to grasp morality in a way consistent with DCT. Furthermore, if the argument does present a serious problem for DCT, then it does so for Wielenberg's own view, Robust Normative Realism (RNR), just as much as DCT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robert Nola has recently defended an argument against the existence of God on the basis of naturalistic explanations of religious belief. I will critically evaluate his argument in this paper. Nola's argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation: since the naturalistic stance offers a better explanation of religious belief relative to the theistic explanation, the ontology of God(s) is eliminated. I rebut Nola's major assumption that naturalistic explanations and theistic explanations of religion are incompatible. I go on to criticize Nola's proposed naturalistic explanations: Freudianism, a Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device, and a Moralising Mind-Policing God. I find these inadequate as actual explanations of religious belief. Even if they are correct, they will not show that theism is false. So Nola's argument fails to convince. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I reformulate Sterba's argument from evil and consider the various ways theists might respond to it. There are two basic families of responses. On the one hand, theists can deny that God, as a perfect being, needs to act in accordance with Sterba's moral evil prevention requirements (MEPRs). We can call these responses exceptionalist responses. On the other hand, the theist can deny that God's acting in accordance with the MEPRs would imply an absence of significant and especially horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions in the world. We can call these responses compatibilist responses. I argue that the availability of both sorts of responses shows that Sterba's argument should not be taken as a logical argument from evil. A good God is logically possible. However, this does not show that Sterba's argument fails as an evidential argument from evil. In the second section, I argue that if we work within the framework of what Jonathan Kvanvig calls Creator Theology (CT), the force of Sterba's argument as an evidential argument is greatly weakened. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a defense of the big ideas behind the free-thinking argument. This argument aims to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with epistemic responsibility in a desert sense (being praised or blamed for any thought, idea, judgment, or belief). This lack of epistemic responsibility is problematic for the naturalist. It seems to be an even worse problem, however, for the exhaustive divine determinist because not only would humanity not stand in a position to be blamed for any of our thoughts and beliefs, but it also surfaces a "problem of epistemic evil", which can be raised against the knowledge of God, the rationality of humans, and the trustworthiness of Scripture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine the ideas regarding image reception that can be extracted from the De altera uita, a theological treatise written by the Iberian bishop Lucas de Tui in ca. 1230. In this book, he devotes one chapter to rejecting the changes that were taking place at the time in the image of the Crucifixion, especially concerning the variation in the number of nails and the shape of the cross. I will show that this text provides illuminating references regarding image reception, mainly through Lucas's concerns about the visual misleading of the faithful and their devotional responses to artworks. By examining this work, which I will set against the theological and devotional background of its time, I will argue that this treatise reflects the importance of sight within the religious experience of late-medieval Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evolutionary theory has greatly influenced science and technology, but in recent decades contemporary scholarship has demonstrated religious influence in evolutionary thought. Religious premises do not merely provide insight; they underwrite evolutionary theory both by mandating strictly naturalistic origins and by providing key arguments for evolution. These arguments are common in the evolution literature, but what are the theological traditions and doctrines underlying these arguments? This paper presents a survey of the historical context of five theological traditions that have been important in the evolution literature. This is a step toward a better understanding of this highly influential theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I consider Sterba's recent criticism of skeptical theism in context of his argument from evil. I show that Sterba's criticism of skeptical theism shares an undesirable trait with all past criticisms of skeptical theism: it fails. This is largely due to his focus on causal connections and his neglect of logical connections. Because of this, his argument remains vulnerable to skeptical theism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the months following the Turkish capture of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas of Cusa composed his De Pace Fidei, a text with which he defended and highlighted the value of interreligious dialogue and peace. Beginning with a textual analysis of its central formula ("una religio in rituum varietate"), I analyze the role that Christianity occupies in the text: I exclude its possible reduction to the una religio or to one of the multiple world religions. I then identify through a literal analysis its role as a mediator between the plurality of historical religions and that religio founded on the fides orthodoxa on which the cardinal rests his argument. In addressing this matter, I also establish how the German cardinal makes the heavenly representatives of Christianity consciously use philosophical and not only theological arguments to avoid the reduction of his position to any kind of historical one. I, hence, argue for the possible transposition of the De Pace Fidei's method to a contemporary philosophy of interreligious dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been argued for a long time that God has been involved in the biological evolutionary processes observed on Earth. However, no convincing theistic argument has yet been formulated for biological evolution. In this article, I use the concept of creativity to argue that biological evolution manifests an embedded intelligence. This articulates a new form of theistic argument related to biological evolution and offers another sound argument supporting the existence of God. My reasoning suggests that nature might be panentheistic, or that an external personal God manipulates natural laws to direct the process of evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a response to Zain Ali's critique in this journal of our presentation of a 'right relationship' normatively relativised 'logical' Argument from Evil. Our argument aims to show that the existence of horrendous evils (as defined by Marilyn Adams) is incompatible with the existence of the personal omniGod (a person or personal being who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good), given certain reasonable judgments about what a personal God's perfect goodness would imply about the way God relates to those caught up in horrendous evils. We reply to Ali's main criticism that our assumptions about divine goodness are unjustified, and show a lack of intellectual humility. We defend the claim that, if God is a person, then God's goodness is moral goodness according to our best human theory of what that implies. We accept that God's situation as creator and sustainer of all that exists may justify 'divine exceptionalism': God's personal moral goodness may be consistent with ways of relating to others that would fall far short of perfection in human-to-human relationships. But in that case, we argue, intellectual humility may be better served by accepting that God is so exceptional that God should not be understood as a person at all, which is the prevailing Muslim view, as Ali himself acknowledges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study I propose rethinking the nature, purposes, and impacts of relations between the kingdoms of Portugal and Kongo in the period between 1511 and 1665. My main argument is that the Pact of Confederation formed by these two kingdoms was decisive, exceptional, and unprecedented. While covert attempts by the Portuguese to gain control of the Kingdom of Kongo were common during this period, the relations spelled out by the pact nevertheless endured for over a century and would have global repercussions. From the vantage point of historiography, the pact presents modern historians with serious difficulties, largely because it spells out modes of interaction that do not fit readily into recognized systems of European colonialism. Central to these modes of interaction is the significant role that religion played in defining Portuguese imperialist policies in Central Africa. In the end, the Pact of Confederation between the kingdoms of Portugal and Kongo forces historians to rethink Portuguese imperial dynamics and the modalities of their presence in Africa and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Avicenna scholars unanimously agree that Avicenna takes the position that God is not classifiable according to the Aristotelian scheme of the ten categories. However, Avicenna scholars are in little agreement about precisely why God evades categorial classification. Scholars report numerous and, at times, mutually inconsistent arguments purportedly made by Avicenna. In this study, I argue that Avicenna has only one argument as to why God is not in the category of substance—the Essence-Being Distinction Argument—and that he makes this argument consistently throughout his major philosophical encyclopediae. Having clarified this argument, two consequences follow. First, we can study this argument to learn not only about God in Avicenna's philosophical theology but also about the nature and structure of the categories in Avicenna's metaphysics. I argue that Avicenna's Essence-Being Distinction Argument reveals a route by which one may arrive at a real distinction between essence and being from a philosophical, rather than a theological premise. Second, Avicenna's Essence-Being Distinction Argument, along with the prevalence and consistency thereof, suggests that God has an essence for Avicenna and that texts, wherein Avicenna denies that God has an essence, are exceptional and should not govern our broader interpretation of Avicenna's philosophical theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The panda's thumb argument, championed by the late Stephen Jay Gould, stands as one of the most famous polemics for common ancestry. In this essay, I analyze Gould's argument in several steps. First, I attempt to reconstruct the argument in both deductive and likelihood formulations. I contend that both versions of the argument rest on a theological claim—namely, that God would not (likely) create or allow a suboptimal panda's thumb. I then argue that a wide range of people are not rationally obligated to accept this theological claim. Next, I give special attention to the likelihood formulation's emphasis on a contrastive argument for evolution over special creation. I contend that a great number of people are not rationally obligated to accept this formulation either. I next consider and reply to an objection that Gould never intended the panda argument as an apologetic for evolution (and an attack on special creation) but rather as a critique of adaptationism. Finally, I argue that the panda argument conflicts with Gould's broader views about the human mind and the relationship between theology and science. I also note along the way that the shortcomings of the panda argument apply to a number of other arguments for evolutionary theory. To be sure, I do not criticize evolution itself or the comprehensive grounds for it. Instead, my primary aims are to analyze the panda argument and suggest that caution is in order about similar arguments as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of the history of what is termed the secular moral project by providing a synopsis of the history of the moral argument for God's existence and the various historical processes that have contributed to the secularization of ethics. I argue that three key thinkers propel the secular moral project forward from the middle of the 19th century into the 20th century: John Stuart Mill, whose ethical thinking in Utilitarianism serves as the background to all late 19th century secular ethical thinking, Henry Sidgwick, who, in the Methods, indisputably establishes the secular autonomy of ethics as a distinctive discipline (metaethics), and finally, G.E. Moore, whose work, the Principia Ethica, stands at the forefront of virtually all secular metaethical debates concerning naturalism and non-naturalism in the first half of the 20th century. Although secular metaethics continues to be the dominant ethical view of the academy, it is shown that theistic metaethics is a strong reemerging position in the early 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary scholarship has significantly advanced our understanding of the grammarian Bhartṛhari's influence on the Pratyabhijñā Śaivism of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. One area that has been somewhat neglected, however, is the subject of relation (sambandha). Here, I examine the influence of Bhartṛhari's sambandha-vāda on the Pratyabhijñā school. As I see it, Bhartṛhari's understanding of the holistic movement of sphoṭa—the practical process of 'encoding' and 'decoding' linguistic information—leads to a necessary reevaluation of the general logical form of sambandha, i.e., 'relationality-as-such.' On this account, Bhartṛhari articulates a basically transcendental conception of sambandha as a 'śakti-of-śaktis' in his 'Exposition of Relation' (Sambandhasamuddeśa [SSam]). This effectively means that one cannot designate the general logical form of sambandha in linguistic terms without also thereby changing its essential nature as such (cf. Houben: 170–4). I maintain that Utpaladeva's 'Proof of Relation' (Sambandhasiddhi [SS]) leverages this insight into a series of pragmatic arguments to demonstrate that vimarśa, or recognitive judgment, is the true locus of relational action—i.e., unity-in-diversity (bhedābheda). In doing so, he effectively salvages a coherent understanding of relation as necessarily real (satya) from the deconstructive agenda of the Buddhist eliminativist, even though the referent may indeed appear paradoxical from the perspective of theoretical reason alone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role assumed by Costa Rican conservative religious activism during the public controversy that arose in the Central American country regarding the legalization of same-sex marriage. This public debate found its highest point during the presidential elections of 2018. The article is divided into two parts. Firstly, it identifies the arguments used by conservative actors during the controversy, with special emphasis on the conceptions of democracy and human rights that informed their political praxis. Secondly, it ponders the significance that the politicization of religion in a conservative direction has had on the dynamics and democratic institutions of contemporary Costa Rica. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with Alvin Plantinga's arguments against St. Thomas Aquinas's third way to show that God exists. Although attacks on this argument have come from Christians and non-Christians, my contention is that these rebuttals of the third way arise because of a misunderstanding of the argument itself. Thus, the metaphysical background for understanding the third way is first explained, and then the arguments Plantinga raises against it are dealt with. After reading this article it should be clear that the third way to show God's existence is plausible and that Plantinga's attacks against it are based on a straw man rather than the substantive argument the third way actually is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central argument of James Sterba's "Is a Good God Logically Possible?" relies crucially on the notion that a good God would have to abide by various evil prevention requirements. Because it appears that God has not done so, Sterba concludes that God does not exist. I challenge the notion that theists must accept the notion that God is bound by the particular set of evil prevention requirements Sterba's argument presupposes. However, I argue that investigating ways God may in fact be required to prevent evils may serve as a helpful heuristic for theists as they seek further to understand God's nature and purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We build an argument directed to agnostics who think there's a realistic possibility some specific revelatory claim is true (for instance, the Christian, or Judaic, or Islamic claim) and who find that claim more plausible than its theistic competitors. Though such agnostics may have serious reservations about the claim, perhaps not even deeming the chance it's true to be at least fifty-fifty, we contend that—surprisingly—it's obligatory for them to assent to the claim if it provides a means for remediation of wrong-doing. Our focus is the Christian revelatory claim, but the argument's template can be applied to other religions that, like Christianity, promise to fix the world's ills in an afterlife. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two recent atheistic arguments from evil have made much of natural evil and the suffering of animals in their case contra theism. The first argument is that of James Sterba. Sterba's argument is an incompatibility argument premised on the claim that there are actual events logically incompatible with the existence of God. The second is that of Michael Tooley, who erects his argument in part on the claim that failing to prevent the suffering of animals cannot be justified by appeals to the great value of regular and predictable laws of nature, nor to the desirability of divine hiddenness. This article examines the arguments of Sterba and Tooley and contends that both are self-undermining. Each of the arguments employs premises that provide reason for thinking that other premises found in their arguments are false. Prior to a discussion of the two arguments, we explore the nature of incompatibility arguments, and examine three assumptions that lurk in the background of discussions of the problem of evil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We pose two challenges to Sterba's position. First, we show that Sterba fails to consider alternative historical positions such as Leibniz's (who argues that God knows that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds) or Kant's (who suggests that God does not necessarily know what free agents would choose or would have chosen, had God not intervened), both of which bear direct relevance to some major aspects of Sterba's argument. Second, we show that Sterba neither rules out the possibility that God has always intervened in history when his not intervening would have led to significant and horrendous evils, nor the possibility that every immoral action (and its consequences) might have led to significant and horrendous evils. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The logical argument from evil, generally thought to have been defused by Alvin Plantinga's free will defense, has been reinvigorated by James Sterba's exposition and defense of a new version of the argument that draws on recent work in moral philosophy. Whereas J.L. Mackie's argument uses what can now be seen to be overly simplistic principles to try to establish a logical incompatibility between the existence of God and any evil at all, Sterba's argument uses more sophisticated moral principles and seeks to establish a logical incompatibility between the existence of God (specifically, the God of Perfect Being Theology) and specific sorts of evil that our world contains. Here, I provide a brief exposition of Sterba's argument and then sketch one possible theistic response to the argument. On the basis of that discussion, I conclude that Sterba's argument is not decisive as it stands. However, I then develop a revised version of Sterba's argument and argue that the Perfect Being Theist faces the following dilemma: she can answer the revised version of Sterba's argument only by accepting a position that is deeply at odds with commonsense morality. Therefore, although Sterba's argument does not quite succeed, it points us in the direction of a serious problem for Perfect Being Theism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Buddhist view, all real things are subject to constant change, and nothing real endures for more than one moment. The Buddhist holds that only causally productive things are real and offers arguments to prove that anything that produces an effect must undergo immediate change and cannot be permanent. In his Ātmatattvaviveka (ATV), Udayana (a Nyaya philosopher of the 11th century) raises objections to Buddhist arguments and tries to show that a causal condition can endure through time. Moreover, although a causal condition may have the ability to produce an effect, the production of an effect may be delayed until all other causal conditions are available; during this time, a causal condition may continue to exist and remain unchanged. I explain Udayana's critique of the Buddhist position with the help of selections from the Sanskrit text. I translate the selected texts into English with notes and provide expository comments. (Diacritical marks are omitted from names). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]