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In everyday life, one encounters many experiences of affliction that, for whatever reason, nature (ours or others') cannot resolve. Yet, when nature's finite resources are exhausted and hope seems in vain, humans often experience extra-ordinary moments of renewal and resolution—breakthroughs, remissions, insights, and conversions. We experience these moments in our natural existence; yet, we feel they cannot originate, cannot be attributed to nature alone. Rather, these experiences, called "graces" in Christianity, are attributed to a divine power acting in us. How do we come to describe these experiences in this way? Is it possible to formulate a general theory of these experiences as "graces"? Is there an "experience" of grace in general, a "state of grace", which serves as ground and unifying experience for the "graces" we receive? Working from the Catholic theological point of view, this paper examines such experiences of affliction and renewal, as well as the basic Catholic framework schematizing them as found in the Bible and Catholic religious writings. In doing so, this paper highlights the theme of impossibility (absolutely or in context) underlying each experience, and broadly categorizes them as happening within three regions of human life: the external, ethical sphere, the interior self-relationship, and the vertical relationship to the Divine. In dialogue with theologians and phenomenological thinkers, general formulations of the experiences are placed within their respective spheres, and certain problems in the identification or interpretation of these experiences are identified. The paper then explores how the experience of a "New Creation" can serve not only as a label for the totality of these experiences, but also as a totalizing and overarching ground-experience of "grace" and an interpretive hermeneutic for graces in general. As a result, a graced moment of total personal "rebirth" or "recreation", prevenient with respect to any personal co-operation or experiences of grace as grace, is identified as a potential ground for all other graces considered. Finally, this paper considers some potential implications of this account of grace for both Catholic thought and Phenomenology more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a study of the experiences of five individuals who explore their unique relationship between music and spirituality. Each participant critically narrates their faith and beliefs and explores how these relate to their experiences with music. The paper begins with a brief exposition of the literature concerning music and spirituality and the linkages between the two. The methodology combines narrative and auto-ethnography, underpinned by a phenomenological approach to reflection on experiences. Using deep self-analysis, the five authors derive and discover lessons concerning their own relationship between faith, spirituality, and music. These are then analysed to produce common themes concerning the intertwining of spirituality with music. Finally, the conclusions present a novel contribution which includes lessons on how through self-exploration, one can use music and spirituality to repair and ultimately enrich the soul. The paper exposes the interplay between faith, spirituality and music, which will be of general interest and provide inspiration to those who intend to use music to enrich their lives and heal themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epidemiologists and other health practitioners increasingly recognize religion as a social determinant of health. This paper is part of a bigger study that examines how religion and tradition influence the health of young people living with HIV in a highly religious society like Zimbabwe. An analysis of 67 interviews and 10 focus group discussions with a phenomenological approach revealed that religious and traditional beliefs influenced the meaning and perception of HIV and the choice of treatment. Study participants consulted religious, traditional, and conventional health practitioners in parallel. Together the three health systems potentially provide a holistic approach that responds to the social, spiritual, psychological, and physical needs of people living with HIV. However, the findings point to a lack of cooperation between stakeholders of the three health systems that led to conflicting approaches that compromised the physical and mental health of study participants. Thus, the findings endorse the importance of strengthening the efforts of everyone involved in HIV care to reach out to other stakeholders and to negotiate a way of collaboration that mitigates negative consequences of disparities and seeks to endorse what is life affirming and leads towards the end of the AIDS pandemic by 2030. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work sought to address the question of where religious violence is located in our constitution of experience, so as to show how transcendental phenomenology can help us begin to better understand religious violence. The paper begins with an outline of four distinct levels of phenomenological analysis provided by transcendental phenomenology. It then relates those four levels to religious experience, showing that religious violence can refer to violence occurring on all four of those levels. In doing so, it also shows that "religious experience" can refer both to particular experiences we call 'religious' and to a dimension of all experiencing. Finally, the paper ends with the suggestion that religious communities wishing to address the question of religious violence must pay attention both to the spiritual force that animates them and to the cultural context in which they express that force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If a new generation of phenomenologists (Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jean-François Courtine) in France sought to overcome the "methodic atheism" imposed on the phenomenological method by the fathers of phenomenology, it was at the price of going beyond experience immanent to existence which targeted the invisible, and therefore of lacking a discourse on the critical restriction of the phenomenological method and on the points of contact between phenomenology and theology. The task of this paper is to show how this lack is overcome by Marc Richir's "quasi theology" viewed from his articulation of the relationship between the phenomenological and the symbolical. This paper argues that whereas for the new French phenomenologists it is usually a question of a subreptitious crossing from one discipline to another, in Richir, what we have is an enigmatic relationship of the overlap between phenomenology and the symbolical. While Richir was only interested in the articulation of the relationship between the phenomenological, the symbolical and the absolute transcendence, his thoughts motivate us to explore, following Emmanuel Falque's approach, the reciprocal transformation between phenomenology and theology. The paper concludes, on the one hand, that experience remains the immanent ground for phenomenology and theological science and, on the other, that Richir's approach could be understood as a "metaphysical phenomenology". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many central creedal statements in Christianity presuppose the existence of a substantial self, even though Christian tradition has not always explicitly used this terminology. However, in contemporary philosophy, the traditional Christian view has been charged with empirical inadequacy, an objection often motivated by neuroscientific considerations. In this paper, I examine the empirical adequacy of the traditional Christian view from a phenomenological perspective and from emerging contemporary cognitive scientific perspectives that downplay or de-emphasize the brain's role in cognition. I argue that neither perspective supports fatal objections to the traditional view and I explain how the traditional Christian view of the self can be synthesized with some novel philosophical developments that suggest the continued relevance of the view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central intention of this paper is to explore original teleology and to solve the riddle of matter based on the analysis of the flow of absolute consciousness. The paper unfolds in four steps. Firstly, it analyzes the origin of teleology in terms of Husserl's theory of intentional acts. Since Husserl's phenomenology itself contains teleological ideas, the creativity and goal-direction of the will reveals the intrinsic connection between will and teleology. Secondly, the relationship between the will and original teleology is discussed around the riddle of matter raised by Husserl, and the reason why teleology originates in the act of will is explained. Thirdly, the paper reinterprets the divine entelechy from the perspective of the creativity of the divine will, and points out that Husserl's concept of God is not only the idea of the highest good, but also an entelechy that is constantly engaged in creating and becoming. Finally, in order to further argue for the important role of the will in solving the problem of teleology, this paper discusses the intrinsic relationship between transcendental reduction and the will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to perform a phenomenology of forgiveness by way of careful analysis of texts on time-consciousness and alterity by Edmund Husserl. It does so in two ways: first, by identifying the manner in which we give time to ourselves as both absolute and concrete subjectivity; and second by identifying the way in which our relation to other persons has an isomorphic, structural similarity with our self-relation as temporality. The final part of the paper engages with three biblical texts—the story of Joseph and his brothers in Genesis, where forgiveness is mentioned for the first time—and two short passages in the Gospels of Luke and John. Ultimately, the paper concludes that forgiveness of self and other occurs as a kind of pre-giving or fore-giving in the sense of opening up new meaning for us all to inhabit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eschatology is central to Christian theology: the significance of the death and resurrection of Christ is the promise of the "kingdom of God". This paper takes up this idea in discussion with contemporary Christian theologians and discusses it phenomenologically by recourse to Husserl's account of "horizon". The horizon is both finite and infinite: always limited in its actualization but with an infinity of potential actualizations. This is explored with respect to time and its relation to the eternal, as well as the dispositions of hope and fear with respect to the eschaton. The final section draws these insights together in a discussion of the eschaton to understand the eschatological destiny of nature in a "new heaven and a new earth" (Revelations, 21: 1) and conceiving of eschatological justice as a harmony of horizonal perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the experience of miracle through the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. Although he is often considered an anti-religious thinker, I argue that Nietzsche actually puts forth a positive conception of miracle because of its indispensable role in the creation of myth. I walk through Nietzsche's texts to describe his account of miracle (Wunder) and to demonstrate how it reveals a phenomenological perspective on miracle by placing it and rooting it in human life. Despite his rejection of traditional religion, Nietzsche reminds us that miracles are not an anomaly to human experience, but rather they are the way in which humans are able to embrace and affirm life through participation in myth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Divine hiddenness appears today as one of the most important and serious religious problems. This problem has been posed most clearly by the proponents of the "argument from hiddenness". They point to religious diversity as an important element working in the background of this argument and strengthening the force of its impact. In turn, religious diversity is seen as a result of the ambiguity of religious phenomena and the lack of conclusive testimony in favor of religious beliefs. In my paper, I pose the thesis that the ambiguity of religious phenomena can be counted among the "benefits of divine hiddenness". This will be possible when the ambiguity of religious phenomena becomes the basis for the formation of interreligious solidarity. I define the concept of interreligious solidarity and show the theoretical aspects of this attitude. In discussing the theoretical aspect of interreligious solidarity, I draw attention to the possible role of phenomenology. I also argue that in the context of divine hiddenness, the most important question is not the one concerning the genesis of this problem ("why are religious phenomena not more unambiguous?"), but the question concerning the meaning of this problem ("what to do with the ambiguity of religious phenomena?"). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article analyzes the relationship between phenomenology and theology, starting from some examples of the phenomenology of prayer. First, the article presents the phenomenology of prayer in the writings of phenomenologists such as Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Yves Lacoste, Christina Gschwandtner and Natalie Depraz, indicating that the type of phenomenology and its relationship with theology influence the way in which they approach the theme of prayer. Second, the paper proposes a systematization of prayer, starting from the personal pronouns uttered when praying: I, you (thou) and he. "I" sees oneself as being called by God to a transfiguration which is impossible through one's own powers and visible in the experience of the plenitude and joy of prayer; "You" provides the predicative dimension of the discourse and reveals communion either with God or, in the case of liturgy, with others; "He", used less frequently in prayer, can constitute a source for a later theoretical discourse, being recognized as a "mysterious presence". Following these analyses, the article concludes that there are two major relationships between phenomenology and theology: that of partial overlap, called theo-phenomenology, and that of rigorous delimitation. Regardless of the preferred model, the use of phenomenology for theology proves to be fruitful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In everyday life, one encounters many experiences of affliction that, for whatever reason, nature (ours or others’) cannot resolve. Yet, when nature’s finite resources are exhausted and hope seems in vain, humans often experience extra-ordinary moments of renewal and resolution—breakthroughs, remissions, insights, and conversions. We experience these moments in our natural existence; yet, we feel they cannot originate, cannot be attributed to nature alone. Rather, these experiences, called “graces” in Christianity, are attributed to a divine power acting in us. How do we come to describe these experiences in this way? Is it possible to formulate a general theory of these experiences as “graces”? Is there an “experience” of grace in general, a “state of grace”, which serves as ground and unifying experience for the “graces” we receive? Working from the Catholic theological point of view, this paper examines such experiences of affliction and renewal, as well as the basic Catholic framework schematizing them as found in the Bible and Catholic religious writings. In doing so, this paper highlights the theme of impossibility (absolutely or in context) underlying each experience, and broadly categorizes them as happening within three regions of human life: the external, ethical sphere, the interior self-relationship, and the vertical relationship to the Divine. In dialogue with theologians and phenomenological thinkers, general formulations of the experiences are placed within their respective spheres, and certain problems in the identification or interpretation of these experiences are identified. The paper then explores how the experience of a “New Creation” can serve not only as a label for the totality of these experiences, but also as a totalizing and overarching ground-experience of “grace” and an interpretive hermeneutic for graces in general. As a result, a graced moment of total personal “rebirth” or “recreation”, prevenient with respect to any personal co-operation or experiences of grace as grace, is identified as a potential ground for all other graces considered. Finally, this paper considers some potential implications of this account of grace for both Catholic thought and Phenomenology more generally.

Is it legitimate to talk about religion as a phenomenology of modern philosophy? Some French phenomenologists have argued that philosophical discourses can be used in phenomenology to describe religious phenomena, and doing so does not contradict the absolute and irreducible nature of phenomenology as a philosophy. Their purpose is to justify the legitimacy of the phenomenological possibilities of religion. This paper aims to describe the progress made by the phenomenon of the call and response as a French phenomenology of religion. Marion talks about l'adonné in the "call and response" structure in the phenomenology of religion. In his third reduction, l'adonné, due to boredom, nihilates the Being, leaving a possibility of the call in a pure form. When the call responds, it hears and then establishes a quasi-subject status, which serves as Marion's reflection on the metaphysical subject. Focusing on prayer as one of the religious phenomena, Chrétien argues that vocal prayer reconciles the opposition of the soul and body, of spirit and matter. Through the description of such a religious act, Chrétien emphasizes an interactive-subjective relationship with the Absolute Other. Through the study of Marion and Chrétien, we find that when phenomenologists talk about religion, it does not make phenomenology lose its own principles but instead expands new fields for phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analogy between goodness and color is often drawn since George Edward Moore to demonstrate the objective validity of goodness, and this way has elicited many responses. German philosopher Max Scheler also frequently analogizes goodness to color. However, his theory of the good distinguishes two approaches to claim for objective validity under the framework of fact and value, and is thus based on value theory: the goods are based on the qualities of values, while what is morally good is based on material value. From the perspective of phenomenology of value, Scheler traces the former approach back to the latter. This paper analytically exposes the reasons, progress, and problems of Scheler's grounding of the objective validity of goodness in value theory, and endeavors to clarify some misunderstandings of Scheler's conception of value in contemporary phenomenological research, as well as to highlight the intrinsic correlation of his phenomenology of value with the good life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious or spiritual experiences (RSE) are often difficult to fully express even if one might be able to describe particular aspects of them. Yet the influences that such carry in a person's mode of being can be vast, and they are clearly a fundamental part of the human condition (whether accepted, denied, or dismissed, their occurrence appears universal). How then might these RSE—and the corresponding grounding implications—be better explained? This paper seeks to elucidate the problematic via an applied investigation of a self-theoretical framework which is composed of three interlaced "sets": (1) Self-defining traits, (2) Self-directing traits, and (3) Self-evaluating traits. We will suggest that these elements (with consciousness and bodily presence) form a core self that is a separable facet from those of personal identity and whole person; and this finding will in turn require a brief look at consciousness and a two-tiered mental model. Taking the self-view into a phenomenological hermeneutical examination will illuminate the position at which RSE might reside within an individual's cognition, and thence to exploring the pre-thought (the functionally pre-aware) foundations involved. Finally, some considerations will be given for how an understanding of the foregoing structure (if it be found valid) might contribute towards the purposive shifting of that self-basis from out of and towards which RSE are situated in a lifeworld. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines two fundamental claims by Michel Henry on his philosophy's relationship with classical phenomenology (Husserl and Heidegger) and Christianity. It shows in what way Henry's phenomenology is the radicalization and absolutization of classical phenomenology: pure phenomenological truth is the identification of appearing and what appears rather than the separation of the two. According to Henry, his notions of life and truth is fully in accordance with Christianity's Revelation of God. In the last part, the paper challenges Henry's claim that his phenomenology is a Christian philosophy from a Kierkegaardian point of view and argues that Henry's phenomenology is, as a matter of fact, a philosophy without Christ. Contrary to a popular viewpoint that Michel Henry is a Christian thinker of our age, I would argue that Henry's concept of God and Christ is essentially a scholarly philosophical invention. If Henry's philosophy is an absolute and ultimate form of phenomenology, then it is reasonable to draw a conclusion that Christ as the Truth of Christianity is outside the boundary of phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first-person perspective, developed by Husserl for the scientific study of consciousness, consists of formal categories which can be used both for the analyses of consciousness as such and its concrete forms. Evidence (Evidenz), the central category in this approach, characterizes consciousness as knowledge. This paper presents the phenomenology of changes in perception and embodiment which lead to evidence for religious/spiritual experience (RE). Such change develops over time via contemplative practice, but also can be a part of spontaneous RE. Because of the presence of evidence, RE containing the change of perception are presentational (as distinct from appresentative). This temporally extended evidence concerns reality's giving of itself, granted that the main distinction between religious and non-religious experience is in the kind of reality to which they refer: physical in the case of non-religious, and 'ultimate' in the case of religious experience. Involving flesh and the reversibility of the body, the change in such complex RE also entails the transmutation of emotion from negative to positive. I compare these findings with Husserl's analysis of religious experience in HUA XVII, and argue that grounding religious experience in the preconceived idea of God, as Husserl does, limits RE to regressive forms which do not constitute knowledge. Such experiences remain teleologically directed at the world-horizon. By contrast, REs grounded in change of perception have a different teleology and do constitute knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the paper is to develop a thesis about the potential of phenomenology as a method for analyzing classical ancient texts. The article outlines the key issues of the doctrine of the time of Augustine and raises the question of the principles of phenomenological interpretation. Proceeding from the presentism approach, parallels are drawn between the philosophy of Augustine and the phenomenology of E. Husserl, the issue of duration and structure of the present is especially considered. The philosophy of Augustine includes both theological and epistemological conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of this paper is to illustrate human–nature relations from a comparative study of the contexts of later Merleau-Ponty and the Zhuangzi. I argue that the Zhuangzi has its own phenomenology of the natural world, which is worth comparing to Merleau-Pontian later phenomenology. To compare the arguments on human–nature relations in the contexts of later Merleau-Ponty and the Zhuangzi in detail, first, I briefly compare the cultural philosophies of nature in ancient Greece and China and their possible influences on our contemporary understanding of nature. Second, I compare the concept of "flesh" of Merleau-Ponty with the concept of "vital energy" in the Zhuangzi and point out the main roles of these concepts in their respective theories of the natural world. Third, I use the "reversibility thesis" created by Merleau-Ponty to analyze the ontological significance of illness in the arguments of Merleau-Ponty and the Zhuangzi. Fourth, inspired by Merleau-Pontian and Zhuangzian ideas about language and expression, I expound on a view of illness as a primordial language of nature and its possible role in mediating human–nature relations. Ultimately, I conclude that the comparative study of thoughts on human–nature relations in the literatures of later Merleau-Ponty and the Zhuangzi can help us reconsider and readjust our main attitudes toward nature, illness and nonhuman beings in the contemporary postpandemic era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perceived belonging to a community is one of the most frequently given reasons for the regularity of religious practice. However, it also plays a key role in the practice of religious violence. The paper addresses the relationship between felt belonging, which is established in shared religious experiences, and different expressions of religious hostility. By means of a phenomenological analysis based on the work of Bernhard Waldenfels, the author distinguishes between different modes of religious self-localization. On the one hand, the performative moments of religious practices are reconstructed, unfolding their effect even in regular and less intensive experiences. On the other hand, the intrinsically shared nature of religious assemblies becomes describable, which includes the co-actors in the process of religious self-constitution. Due to the existential and shared nature of this self-constitution, violent affects appear to be group-directed, which particularly encourages the self-sacrificial behavior that seems to distinguish religious violence. This methodological focus on performative communitarization keeps the study also interoperable with a variety of meaning-based theories, promoting phenomenology as a resourceful method for a philosophical division of labor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study examines the ways in which the Filipino Christian value of pakikipagkapwa (fellowship) can be seen and experienced in modern society. Using empirical phenomenology, this paper aims to (re)imagine the ways of cultivating ways of dialogue with religious others while understand the meaning of pakikipagkapwa (fellowship). This study explores the contemporary notions and practices of pakikipagkapwa among select Filipino Christians and how such cultural value fosters interreligious dialogue. Moreover, the study investigates the importance of dialogue between religious actors as they navigate the uncharted waters of the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors contend that pakikipagkapwa and interreligious dialogue build communities, support social cohesion, and help religious actors find meaning in difficult circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a study of the experiences of five individuals who explore their unique relationship between music and spirituality. Each participant critically narrates their faith and beliefs and explores how these relate to their experiences with music. The paper begins with a brief exposition of the literature concerning music and spirituality and the linkages between the two. The methodology combines narrative and auto-ethnography, underpinned by a phenomenological approach to reflection on experiences. Using deep self-analysis, the five authors derive and discover lessons concerning their own relationship between faith, spirituality, and music. These are then analysed to produce common themes concerning the intertwining of spirituality with music. Finally, the conclusions present a novel contribution which includes lessons on how through self-exploration, one can use music and spirituality to repair and ultimately enrich the soul. The paper exposes the interplay between faith, spirituality and music, which will be of general interest and provide inspiration to those who intend to use music to enrich their lives and heal themselves.

This article takes up the onto-theological critique of metaphysics and questions whether onto-theology is not something to evade or overcome, but is inevitable. Consequently, it furthers the exploration of onto-theology by asking, if it is inevitable, then what comes after onto-theology? For the past half-century, onto-theology has been a central concern for philosophy, particularly in phenomenology where one sees a theological turn in order to understand and incorporate what might be beyond, or within, consciousness that does not readily appear to the self. In this turn, one often sees philosophers (and theologians) attempt to craft a post-metaphysical understanding. Resultantly, many of these philosophers herald what I call the 'end of everything,' often due to their onto-theological character: from the 'end' of philosophy of religion, to the 'end' of metaphysics, to the 'end' of theology. However, when investigating their findings, one often sees these concepts arise from the grave, perhaps showing that some onto-theological construction is inevitable. This paper proceeds by first giving a brief overview of the philosophers Jean-Luc Nancy, Richard Kearney, John Caputo, and MeroldWestphal to propose how onto-theology is still an issue for their philosophies by revealing a necessary link between ontology and empirical reality. It then builds off of this proposal through the work of Joeri Schrijvers to show what might lie ahead of philosophy (and philosophy of religion in particular), arguing that if onto-theology is inevitable then philosophy should turn further into theology to explore how theology deals with this inevitability on an empirical basis. Basically, since theology always already accepts being in default (through concepts like original sin), then how does it help believers cope with this inevitability and how does it focus upon the empirical reality of this ontological gesture. Finally, this paper investigates the work of Colby Dickinson in order to solidify this finding into a programmatic, philosophical framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mystical experiences in various forms are fundamental to major religious traditions. The idea of "mysticism" brings up the concept of the ineffable mysterium, which is seen as the central theme around which religions are based. The comparative studies of Rabia al-Adawiyya and Catherine of Genoa do not intend, as with phenomenological and essentialist approaches to the study of religion, to only focus on the similarities of the mystics in order to find universal structures and essential meanings. Nor does it seek to concentrate solely on the differences between the mystics as done by constructivist scholars. Instead, the comparative methodology used in this article highlights the similarities and differences between the respective mystics, Rabia and Catherine, and uses these comparisons to draw attention to an example of interreligious spirituality that cuts across religious traditions. To illustrate this point, it helps to compare two mystics: Rabia from the Islamic tradition and Catherine from the Christian tradition. This study is structured in four parts: an introduction to the concept of mystical experiences, a brief overview of the lives of Rabia and Catherine, a comparative analysis of their mystical characteristics, and a discussion of how their experiences can serve as a model for interreligious spirituality and friendship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital technology became a substantial component of daily life activities where people grew less dependent on the constraints of the physical world. Recent developments of new media platforms have led to important changes in religious practices, resulting in digital religion. However, there is a lack of empirical research assessing the effect on the spiritual experience. Some elements of sacred architecture, light for instance, influence the perception and experience of space. Light is a symbol of the sacred as it uplifts the worshiper's soul and contributes to the transcendental experience. This paper proposes an analysis of a contemporary space, cyberspace, in framing the sacred experience. The focus is on light and its effect on the spiritual experience in a virtual church. The method employs an empirical approach, adapted from the social sciences scholarship, to examine the extent of the spiritual experience(s) manifested by the participants as emotional responses to the sacred space. The findings highlight people's experiences of the cyber-sacred space and offer insights into the design of those spaces. This spiritual event could be considered a spiritual appreciation of architectural elements translated as subjective emotional responses to virtual sacred architecture. Such study bridges the research of architecture and social sciences in creating a platform for the empirical exploration of virtual 'built' environments. It provides a quantitative approach to a phenomenological concept of digital religion and the future of spiritual practices related to virtual sacred architecture. The importance of the study lies on the designed methodology to assess the effect of light on the spiritual experience in virtual sacred architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central intention of this paper is to explore original teleology and to solve the riddle of matter based on the analysis of the flow of absolute consciousness. The paper unfolds in four steps. Firstly, it analyzes the origin of teleology in terms of Husserl’s theory of intentional acts. Since Husserl’s phenomenology itself contains teleological ideas, the creativity and goal-direction of the will reveals the intrinsic connection between will and teleology. Secondly, the relationship between the will and original teleology is discussed around the riddle of matter raised by Husserl, and the reason why teleology originates in the act of will is explained. Thirdly, the paper reinterprets the divine entelechy from the perspective of the creativity of the divine will, and points out that Husserl’s concept of God is not only the idea of the highest good, but also an entelechy that is constantly engaged in creating and becoming. Finally, in order to further argue for the important role of the will in solving the problem of teleology, this paper discusses the intrinsic relationship between transcendental reduction and the will.

This paper attempts to perform a phenomenology of forgiveness by way of careful analysis of texts on time-consciousness and alterity by Edmund Husserl. It does so in two ways: first, by identifying the manner in which we give time to ourselves as both absolute and concrete subjectivity; and second by identifying the way in which our relation to other persons has an isomorphic, structural similarity with our self-relation as temporality. The final part of the paper engages with three biblical texts—the story of Joseph and his brothers in Genesis, where forgiveness is mentioned for the first time—and two short passages in the Gospels of Luke and John. Ultimately, the paper concludes that forgiveness of self and other occurs as a kind of pre-giving or fore-giving in the sense of opening up new meaning for us all to inhabit.

This paper deals with a research hypothesis tying the legacy of German idealism to the first foundation of Michel Henry's "phenomenology of life". Based on a series of archive documents, the paper reconstitutes the hermeneutical horizon in contrast with which the young Henry (1946–1963) defined his conception of phenomenology, philosophy, and religion, i.e., the French existential–Hegelian debate (Wahl, Kojève). The reconstitution of this dialogue between the young Henry and the French Hegelianism of the 20th century will provide the theoretical framework for the analysis of the "religious attitude" in Henry's philosophy and in his attempt to rethink the transcendental connection between phenomenality and (philosophical) discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the apocalyptic is marginalized, not only is theology under threat of malpractice, but phenomenology is also, for at the core of apocalyptic thinking is the attempt to restrain the totalities that are at work implicitly in our social imaginaries. Most totalities are subtle, appearing even in efforts of unification through global peace. One might extract such insight from Günther Anders, who depicts an immanent, apocalyptic reality beyond the pale of bourgeois optimism and the theological imaginaries that enervate it. We have fallen out of imaginative touch with our everyday activities, and this has resulted in an apocalyptic blindness (Apokalypse-Blindheit) and optimism rooted in abstraction. Such blindness has degraded our "conscience" into "conscientiousness" to the point that even the Hiroshima bomber can abstract from his actions and be exempted easily from responsibility. Although a kind of phenomenologist, Anders criticized colleagues who, in the name of "presuppositionlessness" and observation, could abstract their thoughts far from the reality in which they lived and acted. This paper provides a general introduction to Anders' work and interprets his "Transcendence of the Negative" in order to demonstrate the values of "apocalyptic phenomenology" today. Anders extends a Levinasian eschatology of anticipation (which is precisely of that which one cannot "expect") and demonstrates how transcendence, which typically is understood only in its positive element, also holds the capacity for turning a blind eye to the negative sociality of action. This transcendence often fuels a false optimism for an order of global peace and oneness, which inherently brings about an apocalyptic age, for it ends at "one" and eliminates any "outside". Apocalyptic phenomenology can be one way to disrupt this tendency of blind abstraction by attending to "unveiling" (apokalypsis) itself, attuning our "conscience" to the level of concern proportionate to the threats that stand before it, and becoming "restrainers" of what Anders calls "annihilism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how conceptions of death and the ways in which such conceptions shape responses to death determine ways of living as well as valued approaches to dying. The paper posits the question: can a fundamental understanding of death contribute to the development of adaptive social traits that lead to more sustainable phenomenological experiences of happiness and flourishing? Employing an anthropological lens, this work starts from the initial inquiry of "what is death?" by looking at cross-cultural historical and theoretical accounts of death and comparing the modern (medicalized) death to the Tibetan Buddhist notion of death. It examines how the practice of a "medicalized death" has shaped the understanding of contemporary death and the ways in which dying is approached. It employs the hermeneutic of a biopsychosociospiritual death to gain a holistic understanding of human mortality. This analysis, based on an 18-month ethnographic study among a Tibetan refugee community in southern India, explores the conception of death for this community using biological and cultural lenses. Moreover, it presents conceptions of death in Tibetan Buddhist culture, paying particular attention to how death is employed as an adaptive cultural tool in pursuance of positive behavioral changes and happiness at both individual and societal levels. In doing so, the paper presents both the theoretical conception of death and dying as well as its role in animating Buddhist cultural values and beliefs. Importantly, it presents a general landscape of Tibetan Buddhist cultural models that facilitate multiple ways of dying that are specifically dependent on an individual's familiarity with practices related to death and dying and his or her own level of engaging such spiritual practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the emergence of what is nowadays called "postsecular" religion from German-Jewish philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s. The three different cases of Franz Rosenzweig, Alexander Altmann, and Leo Strauss impel us to pay particular attention to a few recurring argumentative and rhetorical strategies. The emergence of postsecularism marks a shift in the epistemic foundations of Jewish religious thought, which had long been under pressure from secular European thought. Beginning with Rosenzweig, Jewish philosophy used secular categories of European philosophy to facilitate a return to the foundations of Judaism, eventually turning against what it sees as the epistemic weaknesses of secularism itself. This article traces the new phenomenon to Rosenzweig's evolving view of secularism, especially to his ridicule of Siegfried Kracauer's secular messianism, before examining a few key arguments in his book The Star of Redemption (1921). A brief discussion of Alexander Altmann's writings of the early 1930s provides that even modern Orthodox Jewish thought, which had never been "secular", used postsecular categories and arguments to make the philosophical case for orthodoxy. Leo Strauss's introduction to his Philosophy and Law (1935) provides a far more elaborated form of Rosenzweig's argument. As this article seeks to show, postsecular Jewish thought comes with a slight twist of epistemic relativism, particularly when it comes to the juxtaposition of the Biblical and scientific "world-views". But here it merely draws the full consequences of modern science, beating scientism with its own weapons. Furthermore, religious thought in the 20th century had no other option than to rebuild itself on postsecular grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hans Urs von Balthasar, one of the leading theologians of the twentieth century, uses the methods and results of classical phenomenology in many ways. Balthasar's repeated criticism of Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger conceals the fact of his dependence on these authors in various ways. The present text examines the implicit and explicit phenomenological elements in Balthasar's thought. As a starting point, the title of the first French translation of one of his early books, Phénoménologie de la vérité, is used to outline the context of Balthasar's endeavor. In what follows, I will show the phenomenological features of some of his major writings, analyze what he himself calls supernatural phenomenology, and argue for a more consistent phenomenological methodology that Balthasar could have worked out had he carefully considered the internal development of the phenomenological movement. "Apocalyptic phenomenology" emerges as the general title of an approach that links Balthasar's methodology to that of the major phenomenological works, properly examined and extended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Preachers have long perceived that the power of proclamation can only partially be traced to sermonic language. Something is always stirring beneath the surface of our words—a sublinguistic property of preaching tugs at the attention and responses of our hearers. Many homileticians affirm that preaching is empowered by the Spirit. God gives preaching its efficacy, sometimes despite our language. We frequently describe effective preaching as anointed, evoking the distinctly divine quality of preaching. But preaching—like scripture, the sacraments, and the incarnation—is a mysterious union of the divine and the human, the Creator and the created. This essay focuses on a creaturely aspect of preaching, namely, the way it awakens, conjures, transmits, and configures emotion. The divine cannot be parsed from the experiencing body; however, affect theory offers insight into creaturely emotional interplay that elucidates what happens in preaching and how. This essay follows the lead of affect theorists who contend that activities such as preaching are always inherently affective, and that affects contribute to the structuring of social power. Attention to the emotional experiences of bodies in preaching offers a mode by which a phenomenology of social power in preaching may emerge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interfaith or multifaith chapels are so ubiquitous now in the United States—present in colleges and universities, hospitals, shopping malls, and airports—that their development as a distinct architectural form is often taken for granted. Yet that development in the mid-twentieth century was complex and even fraught. Taking a religious studies approach, this article examines the development of three early examples—the Chapel of the Four Chaplains, the Brandeis University chapels, and the MIT Chapel—to reveal the gradual movement, conceptual and architectural, toward a viable space serving many religions. While the former two examples proved unsuccessful in their goal of establishing a shared interfaith space due to their reliance on an understanding of religion as discrete traditions that resulted in exclusivist incompatibilities, the latter example moved beyond the emphasis on traditions to advance an unconventional, phenomenological understanding of religion as individual experience and spiritual life, and by doing so successfully achieved the goal of creating a space amenable to practitioners of many traditions, or none. Further, this article demonstrates how architecture functioned as a constitutive component in the developmental and popularization of this fresh understanding of religion and religious experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work sought to address the question of where religious violence is located in our constitution of experience, so as to show how transcendental phenomenology can help us begin to better understand religious violence. The paper begins with an outline of four distinct levels of phenomenological analysis provided by transcendental phenomenology. It then relates those four levels to religious experience, showing that religious violence can refer to violence occurring on all four of those levels. In doing so, it also shows that “religious experience” can refer both to particular experiences we call ‘religious’ and to a dimension of all experiencing. Finally, the paper ends with the suggestion that religious communities wishing to address the question of religious violence must pay attention both to the spiritual force that animates them and to the cultural context in which they express that force.

Contemporary philosophy of religion is often focused, at a theoretical level, on the epistemic value of religious doctrines, and at a practical level, on the possible impact of organized religion on secular society and politics. However, the cultic dimension of religion, such as prayer, religious service, ascetic practices, and other rituals, is considered as completely "irrational" and incomprehensible from a secular perspective and therefore often neglected by postmodern philosophy. The paper intends to call into question this rather simplistic interpretation by retracing the historical origins of the devaluation of religious symbolism in occidental thought, which culminates in Kant's philosophy of religion. We then shall analyze to what extent certain paradoxical aspects of Habermas' view on religion can be interpreted as consequences of the dilemma brought about by the Kantian dichotomy between man as moral subject and man as natural, sensible being. In a third step, we shall develop an alternative, phenomenological interpretation, which does not consider religious practice as a primitive, irrational phenomenon but as a proto-ethical schematism that aims at integrating the sphere of pure practical reason into the rhythmic structure of living, embodied consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does philosophy of religion, specifically, have anything to contribute to the cultural debate about the modern crisis of meaning, and particularly to attempts at retrieving a sense of enchantment beyond human construction? Suggesting a methodological rapprochement between philosophy of religion and phenomenology, I explore a recent popular attempt to reenchant the world through a retrieval of the sacred: All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age (2011) by Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly. Using their work as a foil, I discuss the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics in the experience of the sacred, specifically the possibility of a pluralism that is nonetheless realist; the necessity of social embeddedness and pedagogy in the constitution of sacred meaning; and finally, the problem of moral discrimination within this sphere. Through this critical discussion a constructive argument emerges: philosophy of religion done in a phenomenological mode has resources to address these difficult issues, and thus to explore experiences of the sacred in ways that are metaphysically sophisticated, attentive to historical tradition and pedagogy in the constitution of meaning, as well as to the need of communal moral deliberation in the sphere of the sacred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary thinking on religion is confronted with the challenge of shifting from a 'philosophy of religion' to a 'philosophy of religious experience'. This challenge, on which the common future of philosophy and theology depends, is not to draw a line between the two, but rather to cross that very line. Crossing the boundary between philosophy and theology, which is what is being discussed here, means transcending its naive geometric understanding in order to take up the old task of thinking in a new way. This is a challenge to both philosophy and theology because it is an existential, or rather an experiential, task. It is about a specific experience and a specific way of life that emerges from it, which must be described in philosophy and at the same time elaborated in theology. This is perhaps the greatest challenge to religious thought. The most representative recent attempts to meet this challenge will be traced below. As we shall see, the best method for both philosophical and theological description of religious experience seems to be phenomenology. The latter allows a free exploration of this experience, while avoiding the trap of falling into the limitations set by either philosophy or theology unduly separated by the boundaries set by a conventional academic rigor. The problem of this article is the quest of exploring religious experience itself: the possibility of such an undertaking, its method, and its future. The considerations presented beneath will lead us to conclude that religious thought, to survive and develop further, needs a specifically understood conversion: its future lies, namely, in converting to experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with a research hypothesis tying the legacy of German idealism to the first foundation of Michel Henry’s “phenomenology of life”. Based on a series of archive documents, the paper reconstitutes the hermeneutical horizon in contrast with which the young Henry (1946–1963) defined his conception of phenomenology, philosophy, and religion, i.e., the French existential–Hegelian debate (Wahl, Kojève). The reconstitution of this dialogue between the young Henry and the French Hegelianism of the 20th century will provide the theoretical framework for the analysis of the “religious attitude” in Henry’s philosophy and in his attempt to rethink the transcendental connection between phenomenality and (philosophical) discourse.

Religion often is conceived as the sine qua non of the human, thus imbedding religious activity implicitly even within our cosmopolitical globalization processes and secular political concepts. This depiction of the human as ever-religious raises a host of concerns: Does it justify that we can believe ourselves to hold a religious identity without any existential choice or faith? Would it entail the presumption of God's existence, thus possibly leading to God's becoming a banal Faktum that inhibits the subject from being able to disavow God or not believe? And finally, how is it possible to relate authentically/existentially with our religious life without disregarding this quality of religion as always already operative? In order to provide more specificity to this latter question in particular, this paper focuses on an essential aspect of homo religiosus: faith. Focusing principally upon Heidegger and Jean-Louis Chrétien, this paper develops three ways "forgetfulness" is indispensable to faith; or in another sense, how faith itself also operates in, and is acheived through implicit ways. Indeed, if forgetting is essential to faith, and faith is essential to homo religiosus, then "forgetting" also to some degree is essential to religious life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following Rowland's and Foucault's respective observations that apocalypses are not necessarily temporal, and that historical analyses have diverted attention unduly from spatial phenomena, this paper examines Revelation using a spatial hermeneutic, comparing it to the semi-contemporaneous Parables of Enoch. Analyzing ostensibly similar spaces that are presented divergently, the paper focuses particular attention on "doorway" phenomena in Revelation. Recent research in cognitive psychology by Radvansky et al. suggests that passing through a doorway has a measurable cognitive effect, inducing forgetfulness of prior thoughts. Revelation employs doorway and gateway language repeatedly, while Parables of Enoch does not. The respective spatial emphases of Revelation and Parables suggest diverging engagements with a traumatized material world. References in Parables of Enoch to oppressive landowners and transformative goals for the earth suggest a continuing critical engagement with the material world. The lack of comparable language in Revelation suggests a comparatively more escapist perspective. Revelation combines polemic against all the "inhabitants of the earth", an emphasis on the replacement of the old order, and the use of compensatory cultic language to orient the reader away from the existing material world. The parallel narrative employment of doorway language suggests an operative governing psychology of separation and forgetfulness in Revelation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins to develop an interpretation of European cave art based on Martin Heidegger's account of artistic production and 'dwelling' so as to indicate a potentially rich area for future research. The paper will also draw on Foucault's account of heterotopic space and will engage with one of the key researchers on the archaeology of cave art, Randall White. The role of a work of art for Heidegger is to hold open a world. Art enables a decision to be made by a group regarding how things are going to matter for, and to, them as dwellers in their world. Works of art, on Heidegger's account, put up for decision what will count as the highest values (the gods) for a group while determining what will prove essential for human dwelling in a world. With reference to Foucault, it will be suggested that caves are a good candidate for a heterotopic space. Caves are uncanny, numinous spaces and because of this, I suggest, they enable human beings to produce art as a world-opening event. I suggest that there is something significant about human experience in caves and I attempt to make a connection between heterotopic space, dwelling, and the art of the last Ice Age in Europe in order to point towards a novel field of research: dwelling and prehistoric art. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Poverty" is a term Levinas uses to describe the face-to-face encounter and the Other all through his corpus. Scholars regularly use this term, but no research has shown its origin nor that Levinas has a concept of poverty. This paper addresses both of those questions through an analysis of an early reflection on Judaism and the relevant sections of his Totality and Infinity. In the process, I argue for an alternative interpretation of Levinas's ethical phenomenology on the basis of poverty concluding with some suggestions on how a Levinasian spiritual poverty can aid the pursuit of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to create a comparative framework for evaluating transformative experiences for different types of ritual contexts found in sacred architecture by bridging the gap between the phenomenology of human experience and architecture's built conditions. The methodology creates a framework for statistical analysis, whereby evidence of people's actual (i.e., real, lived) "subjective" experiences can be evaluated against the "objective" architectural conditions. The comparative framework is put to the test by comparing the experiential and environmental conditions found at the Pantheon in Rome. Experiential data for the Pantheon is extracted from Julio Bermudez's large survey database (N = 2872) of "extraordinary architectural experiences" for this study. This data is compared against "objective" graphical architecture analysis using Lindsay Jones' "morphology of ritual-architectural priorities" with a specific focus on ritual contexts. The quantitative and qualitative data reveals that the Pantheon produces transformative experiences for visitors that are related to the expected outcomes of specific design features. The percentages from the "objective" and "subjective" analysis both rank the priorities of theatre, contemplation, and sanctuary in the same order. This study concludes that built environments possessing a higher presence and quality of "ritual-architectural priorities" are more likely to be perceived as sacred and produce transformative experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper consists of two parts. In the first part (Section 1, part of Section 2), I put forward a critique of what I refer to as the 'received' or 'standard' view of mindfulness in the Western cultural milieu. According to the received view, mindfulness is the acontextual 'core' of Buddhism whose determining characteristic is bare (present-oriented, non-judgmental) attention to the flow and content of experience. As noted by many researchers, this conception is in stark contrast to the traditional Buddhist understanding, where mindfulness is not only embedded in a broader context that provides it with a specific philosophico-existential orientation (normative aspect) but is also construed as a reflective activity (noetic aspect). In the second part (part of Sections 2–4), I argue that one of the main issues with the standard view is that it frames experience in terms of what Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls 'objective thought' (using objectivity, or 'thinghood', as an onto-epistemological standard of reality), which makes the two aspects of the traditional conception (normative and noetic) unintelligible. I then provide an alternative view based on the phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty that attempts to integrate the two aspects into a broader conception of experience. By drawing on Merleau-Ponty's notions of 'phenomenal field' and 'radical reflection', I argue that mindfulness needs to be understood as a reflective attitude that allows one to discern not only the content but also, and primarily, the context of each experience, and that this also includes seeing itself—the act of reflection—as an act that stems from, and returns back into, the pre-reflective current of existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines a strain of French Spiritualism, a philosophical tradition extending from Maine de Biran, Félix Ravaisson, and Jules Lachelier to their reception in the work of Maurice Blondel and his protégé Henry Duméry. In receiving and transforming this tradition, Blondel and Duméry have helped to provide a distinct philosophical paradigm in philosophy of religion, capable of providing insight into the spiritual nature of the human being, both in how spirituality relates to the advanced stages of religious culture in addition to its primitive presence in spontaneous action. As a tradition consecrated to the study of human consciousness, and the operations of the mind [l'esprit], the French spiritualist tradition provides a rich conceptual matrix for analyzing the nature of human thinking and its relationship to action. In such an analysis of human thought, Maurice Blondel set up a moral psychology and metaphysical anthropology, highlighting how the consciousness of the human being is linked to the objective order of existence, both in its material form and in the intelligible realities behind the nature of existence. This philosophical matrix helps to show how religious practices, through embodied engagement with the material world, are effective at generating a consciousness of metaphysical or transcendent realities. As such, this philosophical paradigm provides the means for constructing a theory of ritual, where ritual acts with symbols and signs may be rendered intelligible as the sensible means for the cognitive expression of spiritual activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than two decades, the phenomenologies of revelation emerging from twentieth century French philosophy have met a North American reception framed largely within the context of a hermeneutic critique. This essay seeks to intervene in this situation by developing Jean-Luc Marion's own sketch of a phenomenological hermeneutics and putting it in dialogue with Hans-Georg Gadamer's account of language in Truth and Method. Thus, in an attempt to further develop Marion's phenomenological hermeneutics of 'giving' and 'showing', a space is opened for Gadamer's notion of 'saying'. As a result, in the midst of the horizon opened by language itself, the 'impossible' phenomenality of revelation shines forth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay considers J. H. Newman's and Aurel Kolnai's conversions from a phenomenological point of view. Newman's conversion or conversions are often cited as classic examples, though he was reluctant to use this notion, preferring to see his journey as a long process, an account of which is provided in his Apologia Pro Vita Sua. His Grammar of Assent is less often cited in this context, but it helps more to make sense of conversion as an experience. Kolnai was a phenomenologist himself. He also provided a personal account of his conversion in his autobiography. The two thinkers' reflections on conversion are highly congruent, highlighting four dimensions: familiarity or homecoming (conversion makes one at peace with oneself); discovery of reality or real meaning of a notion (of truth, of God, of the scriptures, of the Church); the paramount importance of conscience (the indispensability of the approval of moral authority); the intelligibility of conversion which makes it, in the end, the proper subject of philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenology and theology continue to induce interdisciplinary analysis of selfhood and spiritual experience. In what follows, I discuss minimalist and maximalist phenomenologies. The latter opens up space for phenomenology to be informed by the theological concept of mystery. A maximalist phenomenology makes possible a particular variety of selfhood, what I call the dilated or middle-voiced subject, which belongs neither to pure passivity of recent French phenomenology nor to the strong agency of Cartesian and Kantian legacies. Such a middle-voiced structure facilitates the given to be received in the act of dilation or expansion of the self. The final section discusses the implications this may hold for spiritual experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]