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The Easter controversy of the late second century unveiled a profound theological and cultural debate within early Christianity. Originating from differing practices regarding the calculation of Easter dates, the dispute pitted the churches of Asia Minor against the Roman Church. This paper primarily employs a method of documentary analysis. It analyzes the accounts provided by the fourth-century historian Eusebius of Caesarea in his work The History of the Church. It is also cross-referenced with the works of second-century Christian writers. Through this process, this paper seeks to reconstruct the situation of this Easter controversy. Furthermore, it aims to uncover the struggle for apostolic authority concealed beneath the surface of this debate over dates. Central figures like Victor I and Polycrates engaged in this struggle for Apostolic authority, responding to challenges posed by heresies. Victor I leveraged his position to convene religious conferences and issue excommunication decrees against dissenting churches, laying claim to the papal primacy. However, Polycrates invoked the apostolic succession and heritage from John the Apostle to assert the legitimacy of the churches in Asia Minor, challenging Victor I's attempts at centralizing power within the Roman see. The controversy reflected broader debates over apostolic succession and ecclesiastical power structures. The Easter controversy serves as a case study of the Early Church's engagement with practical theology and the integration of religious festival culture with social backgrounds, highlighting the significance of Easter as a symbol of Christian unity and collective memory. This debate highlighted theological nuances and underscored broader issues of communal identity and the power struggle within early Christian communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the urban centers of Türkiye, where cultural changes are more widespread and effective, wedding processional is replaced by the solemnization of the marriage at indoor weddings, and the Kūdegū (old Turkic language; refers to bridegroom, son-in-law) awaiting the bride's arrival at the boy's house is replaced by differences in the way of the bride and groom's entry together; moreover, while wedding rituals such as the bridal bath and groom's hammam are being forgotten, bachelor/bachelorette parties are on the rise. The beliefs and practices related to the bride being taken out of the girl's house with a special ceremony have deep meanings, such as blessing the bride who has just joined the family, acclimatizing the bride who feels like an outsider and avoiding her from these feelings, and protecting the bride and groom from the körmös (spirits in Turkic mythology, devilish entities living in the underworld), bad spirits, and the evil eye. In this paper, the structure, function, practices, and beliefs of the rituals surrounding the bride and groom on the last day of Anatolian Turkish weddings are analyzed using a qualitative research method. In addition, this study identified the betrothal, performance, beliefs, and practices surrounding the ritual of "bridal pick up" among Anatolian Turks and evaluated the symbols and signs in the ritual procedures in the functional context of the origins and reflections of traditional Turkish beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even though Turkey's ruling party's (Justice and Development Party, the AKP) nation-building and desired citizen creation policies have been studied, its use of necropolitical narratives and propaganda in education has not been investigated. This paper addresses this gap by examining how the Turkish state ruled by the AKP has propagated its religious necropolitical narrative through the national curriculum and Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in school textbooks, and magazines and comic books for children. The paper shows that these texts and comics try to indoctrinate children into a religious cult of martyrdom in different ways by encouraging them to view tragic death and getting killed for the nation as a positive event. This paper argues that these propaganda efforts are part of a religious necropolitical indoctrination campaign that seeks to create a new Islamist and jihadist generation of lifelong supporters of the AKP, which portrays itself in the educational texts as the embodiment of Islam, the Muslim Turkish nation and even the global Muslim community (ummah). This new religious generation is expected to believe that dying for the Islamist populist authoritarian regime is the greatest honour a person can bring upon themselves. This paper contributes to the necropolitics literature by showing that not only adults but also children have been targeted by authoritarian rulers' necropolitical propaganda attempts to create desired citizens who are ready to die for the regime, believing this is a religious obligation. Further research is needed to assess if and to what extent this propaganda has an impact on children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The warnings about Turkey's not-so-near accession to the EU are explored as a strategic tool in the Brexit campaign, linking concerns about sovereignty and immigration compounded with the anxieties surrounding Islam and the threat of terrorism. Drawing on the theoretical framework of Edward Said's Orientalism and the unique perspectives gathered from British Turks, this paper sheds light on their nuanced responses. It uncovers strategies of disbelief and denial in the face of the constructed narrative that portrayed Turkey as an undesirable 'Other' with its predominantly Muslim population. A closer analysis of some British Turks' narratives is premised not only on the sacralised defence of the principles of Turkish westernisation but also on the socio-political reputation of the Islamic Ottoman past as almighty. The article equally contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex interplay between British national identity and discourses surrounding immigration, sovereignty, and Islamophobia within the context of Brexit, as well as the principles by which the privileges of modern, secular Turkey, as well as the demise of the mighty Ottoman image, are maintained. In a paradoxical manner, the act of denial only serves to affirm the Brexit campaign's narrative depicting Turkey as an undesirable 'Other' with a predominantly Muslim demographic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once voted into office, populist governments have often found undemocratic means to prolong their stay. The literature on populists in power is evolving and expanding. However, it has mainly focused on how the populists in power attack institutions such as the judiciary, rule erosion, and dirty institutionalism. How populists make use of the law and the judiciary to prolong their authoritarian rule remains an area that is under-researched. The populists' use of informal institutions such as the unofficial law when in power has not been studied either. This paper addresses these gaps in the populism literature by studying Turkey's Islamist populist ruling party's use of informal law in prolonging its authoritarian rule. The paper argues that the Islamist civilisational populist AKP has been using informal Islamist law for both the legitimation of its rule and the repression of the opposition. It shows how the AKP officials, the state's Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the pro-AKP Sharia scholars, and other informal religious authorities employ the civilisational populist Islamist legal narrative to argue that according to Sharia it is obligatory to choose the side of the God that is represented by the AKP and to vote against the infidel opposition that is an existential danger to the pure Muslim people of Turkey and their religion. The paper combines and contributes to two theoretical strands. The first is civilisational populism, and the second is the informal institutions, with a focus on informal law and legal pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the use of religion by an authoritarian ruling party to delegitimize political opposition through securitization. The case study presented is the ruling AKP in Turkey, which initially promised to desecuritize the Kurdish issue to co-opt the Kurdish opposition but eventually resorted to the demonization narratives and repressive policies of the secular Turkish state; however, in addition to labeling the Kurdish opposition as terrorists, the AKP deployed religion to legitimize its repressive policies on religious grounds. The Turkish case shows that not in legitimizing (via desecuritization), but in delegitimizing opposition (via securitization) religion has been the main tool deployed by the ruling party. This finding needs to be tested in other contexts and cases. Additionally, since this paper only focuses on the narrative of the AKP's religious delegitimization, further research is needed to measure its efficacy and impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey's government seeks to apply both "religious soft power" and "economic soft power" to increase its influence in Ghana. Turkey's religious soft power relationship with Ghana is exemplified by Turkey's paying for construction of a new national mosque in the African country, at a cost of USD 10 million. Turkey's economic soft power relationship with Ghana is exemplified by both considerable recent investments and in fast-growing bilateral trade. The overall aim of the government of Turkey is to increase the country's influence in Ghana, part of a wider initiative to expand its regional influence in Africa. Ghana is important to Turkey as it is regarded as a strategically important African country, one of the region's few democracies and an economic success. The paper assesses Turkey's various forms of influence in Ghana and considers what Turkey hopes to achieve in foreign policy terms. The paper is in four sections. The first examines religious soft power and Turkey–Ghana relations, noting that recently they have become closer and more cordial, involving both religious and non-religious aspects. The second section examines Muslims' traditionally marginal political position in Ghana and explains that over time Muslims have become more politically assertive, open to external religious influences, including from Turkey, a country well known to use religious soft power to try to expand its foreign policy influence. The third section assesses recent Ghana-Turkey relations, including the expansion of Turkey's economic soft power, with three examples: the national mosque, encouraging Islamic education, and mutual desire to quell the activities of what the government of Turkey refers to as the "Fethullah Terrorist Organisation". The section also considers the role of Turkey's economic soft power in increasing the country's presence in Ghana. The concluding section argues that the government of Turkey uses several techniques to increase its influence in Ghana, including both religious soft power and economic soft power. The government of Ghana broadly welcomes Turkey's influence from both religious and economic perspectives: from a religious point of view, Turkey's Sunni orthodoxy is seen as very unlikely to stimulate radicalization among Ghana's Muslims, while Turkey's economic presence is welcomed as an important means to help further build Ghana's economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of 'civilizational populism' and work towards a concise but operational definition. To do this, the article examines how populists across the world, and in a variety of different religious, geographic, and political contexts, incorporate and instrumentalize notions of 'civilization' into their discourses. The article observes that although a number of scholars have described a civilization turn among populists, there is currently no concrete definition of civilization populism, a concept which requires greater clarity. The article also observes that, while scholars have often found populists in Europe incorporating notions of civilization and 'the clash of civilizations' into the discourses, populists in non-Western environments also appear to have also incorporated notions of civilization into their discourses, yet these are rarely studied. The first part of the article begins by discussing the concept of 'civilizationism', a political discourse which emphasizes the civilizational aspect of social and especially national identity. Following this, the article discusses populism and describes how populism itself cannot succeed unless it adheres to a wider political programme or broader set of ideas, and without the engendering or exploiting of a 'crisis' which threatens 'the people'. The article then examines the existing literature on the civilization turn evident among populists. The second part of the article builds on the previous section by discussing the relationship between civilizationism and populism worldwide. To do this, the paper examines civilizational populism in three key nations representing three of the world's major faiths, and three different geographical regions: Turkey, India, and Myanmar. The paper makes three findings. First, while scholars have generally examined civilizational identity in European and North American right-wing populist rhetoric, we find it occurring in a wider range of geographies and religious contexts. Second, civilizationism when incorporated into populism gives content to the key signifiers: 'the pure people', 'the corrupt elite', and 'dangerous 'others'. In each case studied in this article, populists use a civilization based classification of peoples to draw boundaries around 'the people', 'elites' and 'others', and declare that 'the people' are 'pure' and 'good' because they belong to a civilization which is itself pure and good, and authentic insofar as they belong to the civilization which created the nation and culture which populists claim to be defending. Conversely, civilizational populists describe elites as having betrayed 'the people' by abandoning the religion and/or values and culture that shaped and were shaped by their civilization. Equally, civilizational populists describe religious minorities as 'dangerous' others who are morally bad insofar as they belong to a foreign civilization, and therefore to a different religion and/or culture with different values which are antithetical to those of 'our' civilization. Third, civilizational populist rhetoric is effective insofar as populists' can, by adding a civilizational element to the vertical and horizontal dimensions of their populism, claim a civilizational crisis is occurring. Finally, based on the case studies, the paper defines civilizational populism as a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite' who collaborate with the dangerous others belonging to other civilizations that are hostile and present a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper which comes under the theme of macro-historical perspectives and Mediterranean history I shall discuss the exchange of gifts in three sections: first between the Lusignan kings of Cyprus and the sultans of Mamluk Egypt and Syria, between the Lusignan kings and the Turkish emirs of Anatolia, and thirdly between the Venetian rulers of Cyprus, including Queen Catherine Cornaro, and the Mamluk sultans for the period postdating 1473. Many of these exchanges of gifts took place during times of war, sometimes during the prelude to hostilities and sometimes immediately after their end. In addition, exchanges of gifts between Christian and Muslim rulers occasionally took place at times of peace. The reasons why gifts were exchanged, the type of gifts exchanged when these are described, not an invariable occurrence, and the symbolism underlying these exchanges of gifts will also be analyzed where possible. Furthermore, occasions when the recipient refused to accept the gift and why it was rejected shall also be examined. Where possible, comparisons with the exchange of gifts taking place in other societies and countries of the Eastern Mediterranean will be alluded to and discussed. In terms of source materials, the Cypriot chronicles of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries will form the principal source but reference shall also be made to diplomatic correspondence of the period under discussion. The exchanges of gifts normally took place within a diplomatic setting, this being the arrival of embassies, and gifts were sent sometimes to the close advisers of a ruler who could influence his policy and decision-making. On certain occasions, however, the exchanges of gifts could take place outside of this diplomatic context, for example as an expression of gratitude for assistance received. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The resurgence of religion worldwide proved that secularization is not a de facto reality of modernity and the initial chaos that came along with the birth of postmodernity evolved into uniquely developing combinations that recognized cosmopolitan, multicultural, and hybrid (i.e., fluid and hyphenated) identities. Universal values became more instrumental than ever to connect members of hyper diverse societies while ethnocentric, nativist and exclusivist patriotism expired (and only recently starting to attract far right and white supremacist groups alone). Most Islamic revivalist movements emerging from this context have had minimal interactions with non-Muslims and influence on mainstream societies. Being in search of a solution to respond to the overwhelming effects of the West on Muslim societies, these revivalist movements could not change (and maybe contributed to) the binary positioning of Islam and the West. On the contrary, the Hizmet movement, inspired by Muhammed Fethullah Gülen and his predecessor Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, appeared in the global arena as an Islamic revivalist movement whose discourse resonated with the commonly shared universal values of every culture, ethnicity, and religion. The Hizmet movement did not position itself as an antithesis to Westernization, secularism, and modernity; the movement adopted a universalist and all-inclusive attitude, which re-introduced to the world that Islam is universal religion with the capacity to accommodate people of diversity and meet the needs of every age. This paper explores the Hizmet movement's historical, theological, and social roots as a transnational Islamic revivalist movement. It analyzes the movement's outreach across multicultural societies and its capability to adapt to a changing world through its educational and interfaith and intercultural activities across the globe. While unpacking thirty years of the Hizmet movement's activities and the contribution to the literature, the paper also addresses some of the criticisms that have emerged regarding the movement and its activities, particularly in the wake of the 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey. It should be noted that much criticism toward the movement emerged in recent years, and the movement did not face much backlash in its early years of development. With this in mind, this paper explores the development of the Hizmet movement and how much of its initiatives rapidly left a positive mark on diverse societies around the world. The paper is thus structured chronologically, tracing the birth, growth, stagnation, and transition (or according to some collapse) of the movement. The paper, by extension, too, positions the Hizmet movement within the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism as this movement is born out of similar conditions as are other Islamic revivalist movements but taking a slightly different direction, which is that it challenges the prevailing binary 'us and them' discourses produced mostly in ethno-centric political discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The founders of the secular Turkish Republic, the Kemalists used secular nationalist education to build a secular Turkish nation and to create their own version of modern pro-Western secular Turkish citizens. This paper argues that Turkey's current ruling party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) has been using the same system of education to create its own desired citizens with Islamist Populist ideals. This has been done without changing the secular principles of the constitution and laws on national education since there are several constraints that would prevent AKP to have open and declared pro-Sharia changes to the law. Thus, unlike many other Islamists in the other parts of the world, the paper shows that the AKP has chosen to undermine the secularity of the system, constitution, and law in an ad hoc, gradual and undeclared fashion. The paper concludes by noting that no matter the change in political actors and their ideologies, education is monopolized by the state for political purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper delves into the intricate relationship between religious populism and the legitimization of digital authoritarianism in Turkey. Specifically, it investigates how the ruling party, AKP, has strategically linked Islamist values to state policies as a means of justifying its repressive control over digital technology. Through an examination of internet governance at multiple levels—full network-level governance, sub-network or website-level governance, proxy or corporation-level governance, and network–node or individual-level governance—the study reveals the instrumentalization of religious populism to consolidate support and validate the government's autocratic agenda. Furthermore, it sheds light on the role of state-controlled religious institutions, traditional media, social media outlets, as well as religious leaders and organizations in shaping public opinion, enabling the government to exert greater control over the dissemination of information. By dissecting the religious populist justification of digital authoritarianism in Turkey, this research provides valuable insights into the complex dynamics at play in the realm of online governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates whether Turkish populism has undergone a 'civilizational turn' akin to what Brubaker, Haynes, Yilmaz, and Morieson have described occurring among populist parties in Europe and North America. The article applies Yilmaz and Morieson's definition of 'civilizational populism' to Turkey under the rule of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) in order to determine whether the party conforms to this definition. The article investigates how the AKP, an Islamist and populist political party lead by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has increasingly incorporated what we term 'civilizational populism' into its discourse. The article shows the impact of civilizational populism on Turkey's domestic and foreign policy under the AKP rule. The article finds that the AKP has increasingly, and especially since the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the mysterious coup attempt in 2016, construed opposition between the Turkish 'self' and the 'other' not in primarily nationalist terms, but in religious and civilizational terms, and as a conflict between the Ottoman-Islamic 'self' and 'Western' other. Furthermore, the article finds that the AKP's domestic and foreign policies reflect its civilizational populist division of Turkish society insofar as the party is attempting to raise a 'pious generation' that supports its Islamizing of Turkey society, and its nostalgic neo-Ottomanist power projections in the Middle East. Finally, the paper discusses how the AKP's civilizational populism has become a transnational populist phenomenon due to the party's ability to produce successful television shows that reflect its anti-Western worldview and justify its neo-Ottoman imperialism in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the cultural identity of Turkish Shi'is in a border province in East Turkey and how their ethnic and religious identities are positioned within the political and cultural context of Turkey. Shi'is living in Igdir, the easternmost province of Turkey, may share the ethnicity of the majority in Turkey, but they are in the minority in terms of their religious identity. Their cultural identity is shifting contextually and is always under construction. In this context, cultural theorist Stuart Hall explains identity as a never-ending construction, a process never completed—always in progress. This paper traces the multilayered and interdisciplinary approach of Hall's identity interpretations and applies them to discuss the social, cultural, and political positionings of Igdir Ja'faris in Turkey. The study uses ethnographic data based on field observation and semi-structured interviews with Turkish Ja'faris in Igdir. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Blame avoidance has been one of the most applied strategies by policy makers in both democratic and non-democratic regimes to avoid responsibility and accountability in cases of failure and tragic events. It is also known that politicians have used religion for Machiavellian purposes, as exactly advised by Machiavelli. However, a systematic empirical analysis of how religion is used for blame avoidance by politicians has not been conducted. In this article, we aim to address this gap by examining the empirical data derived from the weekly Friday sermon texts produced by Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs and delivered in more than 90 thousand mosques every week to a large segment of the population in Turkey, where the majority claims to be religious. Starting with its violent response to the peaceful Gezi protests in 2013, the ruling AKP has opened up a new phase in Turkish political history by resorting to civilizational populism: it blamed the Western world for financing and masterminding the protests, using the protestors as internal pawns to attack Turkey and the Muslim World, suppressed the protests brutally and entered into a populist authoritarian regime. Our paper shows, following this turn, how the Diyanet sermons started using religion to help with the AKP's blame avoidance. The Diyanet either parroted the AKP's conspiratorial narrative or tried to convince the citizens that all negativities are works of God and with these humans are being tested by God. The AKP's use of religion to avoid blame is a text-book case of how both a religious institution and religious discourse can be used to help the incumbent avoid responsibility. Whenever, there was a problem that would the AKP votes, the Diyanet's sermons tried to shift the blame to either God or citizens or conspiratorial enemies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades, multiple Islamic parties have become incumbent parties and/or joined coalition governments. Such a development brought debate as to whether these parties could moderate into democratic actors à la Christian Democratic Parties in Western Europe, or whether they were aiming at the formation of an Islamist state and society through electoral means. What remains relatively unaddressed in the literature, however, is to what degree Islamic parties truly derive their socio-political agenda from Islam. Hence, this paper will ask, how do Islamic parties utilize Islam? To answer this question, this paper will use a single case-study approach to test and to rethink Islamic political parties and what is "Islamic" about them in the Turkish case. This paper will study the Turkish case because the country's incumbent party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), has been governing Turkey since 2002, making the Party the longest ruling Islamic party still in power. Based on the literature on populism, this paper will argue that the way the JDP utilized Islam can be characterized as populism flavored by religion that is based on (i) a thin theological foundation, (ii) a majoritarian rather than a multivocal interpretation of Islam, and (iii) a Muslim unity rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on martyrdom has not, so far, systematically analysed a constitutionally secular state's extensive use of religion in propagating martyrdom narratives by using state-controlled religious institutions. This paper addresses this gap in martyrdom literature. In addition, even though some studies have analysed how martyrdom narratives have been used for political purposes in Turkey for mythmaking and building a collective memory, a religious institution's active use by the state for the purposes of mythmaking and collective memory building has not been studied. This paper shows that the contents of the Friday sermons, that reach at least 50 percent of the country's adult males every week, have moved from Turkish nationalist understanding of militarism and martyrdom to more radical, Islamist and pro-violence interpretations that actively promote dying for the nation, homeland, religion and God. The sermons also emphasise that new generations must be raised with this pro-violence religious spirit, which is also novel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an outgrowth of globalization, religious globalization has significantly transformed the religious landscape worldwide. Contemporary societies exhibit religious pluralism, posing challenges for services such as spiritual or pastoral care. This study aimed to investigate how pastoral/spiritual caregivers of divergent cultural and religious backgrounds navigate religious diversity and how their religious location influences their inter-religious relations. Data were gathered through a standardized open-ended interview protocol. The study sample consisted of German Christian pastoral caregivers and Turkish Muslim spiritual caregivers from Germany and Turkey, respectively (N = 67). Overall, the entire sample expressed a generally positive attitude towards providing spiritual/pastoral care (S/PC) to individuals of other religious affiliations. German participants emphasized a human-centered approach towards individuals from diverse religious and cultural backgrounds, whereas Turkish participants placed greater emphasis on the qualifications of the caregiver. Turkish participants exhibited less exposure to other cultures/religions compared to their German counterparts, yet both subsamples responded positively to requests for care from individuals of different faiths. Both subsamples adhered to standard procedures during S/PC visits. German participants were more inclined to incorporate elements from other religions/cultures into their S/PC work compared to Turkish participants. The majority of participants regarded their respective institutions (Church/Diyanet) as responsible for addressing the spiritual needs of others. However, the German subsample displayed greater reluctance towards the employment of pastoral caregivers from different religious backgrounds by their institution, as opposed to the Turkish subsample. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amidst increasing globalization and religious diversity, acknowledging and embracing openness towards religious and/or cultural others has become crucial for societal cohesion and international relations. Theological scholars, holding significant potential in mitigating inter-religious and intercultural prejudices, can play a pivotal role in addressing this challenge. However, it is acknowledged that theologians themselves may harbor such biases. This study, conducted within the framework of the Religious Openness Hypothesis, employed an online questionnaire among theology students, seen as future multipliers of religiosity, in Germany and Turkey (N = 513) using convenience sampling. The results reveal the consistent relation of religiosity to all forms of prejudice among German Christians, with a linked defense against secularism potentially leading to self-isolation and the protection of their own worldview against religious or cultural outgroups. In contrast, the (generally high) prejudice among Turkish Muslims appears to be rooted not primarily in religiosity or defense against secularism but in fundamentalism and, most likely, in other socio-cultural factors such as politics and education. For both subsamples, religiosity was positively linked with xenosophia, particularly when accounting for fundamentalism. The article concludes by proposing curriculum implications for universities and schools in both cultural contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chalcolithic religious practice at the site of Çadır Höyük (central Anatolia) included the insertion of ritual deposits into the architectural fabric of the settlement, "consecrating" spaces or imbuing them with symbolic properties. These deposits are recognizable in the archaeological record by their consistent use of ritually-charged material, such as ochre, copper, human and animal bone, and certain kinds of ceramics. During the 800-year period considered in this paper, the material practice of making these ritual deposits remained remarkably consistent. However, the types of spaces where the deposits are made change as shifting social organization reforms the divisions between private and public space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye in 1923, the madrasah system was abolished, and new schools, called Imam Hatip Schools (IHSs), were established to train "officials responsible for the performance of religious services" in 1924. These schools have slowly transformed from vocational schools into mainstream schools, partly because of the public's demand for religious and academic education at state schools. In this qualitative research, through official documents and existing studies, we explore the IHSs' historical foundations and their features. Then, we examine the recent initiatives, namely the "project school" and "program diversity", launched by the conservative government to improve the quality of the IHSs and to make them competitive in today's exam-oriented education system. The history of the IHSs shows that these schools have always been at the centre of politics of religion and have experienced periods of prosperity and decline depending on the ruling elites and governments. The IHSs have some crucial features which make them a unique model for Islamic education in the Turkish education system. The new initiatives seem to positively impact the IHSs, as they can now enrol students through central exams and aptitude tests. Yet, they also have ramifications, the most important being that these schools will move further away from their initial purpose, which was to train religious officials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Muslim communities in the West, teaching Islam to children in mosques is an important part of the intergenerational maintenance of young people's heritage, identity, and communal ties. However, children with a migrant background benefit from fostering identification and feelings of belonging both to their heritage community and to the majority society. This study seeks to understand the negotiation of sense of belonging and self-identification as Turkish, Dutch, and Muslim, in a sample of mosque students in The Netherlands (N = 29). It is based on interviews conducted with Turkish-Dutch students (ages 6–16) during fieldwork in the mosques between March and December 2017. The study reveals that most respondents identify as Dutch-Turkish and have a stronger sense of belonging to The Netherlands than to Turkey. Nevertheless, there is also a group of mosque students who struggle with growing up between two cultures. Furthermore, the analyses of the mosque student's perspectives show that they are negotiating a space for the possibility of identifying as Muslim and feeling a sense of belonging to The Netherlands without feeling Dutch. The study concludes by discussing a number of key issues arising from the findings, namely the role of the mosque context, the development of reactive identity, and the meaning attribution by the students. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey exerts significant influence over Balkans Muslims. While some of this has to do with Turkey's military and economic power, much relates to their shared religiosity and common history. Some may characterize this as "soft power"; however, this term struggles to completely explain these dynamics. Many Balkans Muslims have an ambivalent attitude towards Turkey, even as they accept its influence. Moreover, Turkish influence comes not from passive qualities it possesses but active steps it takes to maintain its image. We argue that this can be better explained through the practice turn in international relations; Turkey follows commonly accepted religious practices that Balkans Muslims recognize, granting Turkey influence even if they do not internalize its dominant position. We demonstrate this with the results of interviews conducted among Balkans Muslim political, religious and media figures. The article provides insight into the strategies non-state religious actors, states and the media implement in world politics, while also expanding our understanding of soft power in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with violence after the 2013 military coup. Following the Brotherhood's sudden ouster from government, scholars predicted that renewed repression would lead to the radicalization of wings of the movement, particularly speculating that the youth would resort to violence as a way to respond to the regime. Indeed, calls in favor of the use of violence were recorded and associated with the activities of the New Office in Egypt during 2015, and with radicalization within the country's prisons. Yet, this phenomenon has remained limited with reference to both time and context. Relying on interviews with members in Egypt, Turkey and the UK (2013–2021), this article critically unpacks the Brotherhood's relationship with violence in the aftermath of the coup, investigating how the majority of Brotherhood members who subscribed to the movement's peaceful resistance navigated nonviolent and violent strategies advocated by competing movements' factions, as they became exposed to state-led violence. It looks at how members, male and female, endured repression, what role violence had in their resistance, if any, and how they justified it. The conclusion reflects on the role that violence plays in the Brotherhood's strategies to reunite and rebuild after 2013. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]