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Pressures to cut public expenditure and to reach high value for money of projects that use scarce public money are evident across the globe. At the same time there seems to be a lack of decision support tools for pin-pointing whether public services are yielding net benefits. Accountability is called for but the ‘accounting systems’ that validate the right choices in service delivery are not yet thoroughly established. As a response, an impact evaluation via a real-world case study of a multi-modal transport safety agency is presented. The main contribution of this article is methodological, including a summary of study cordoning; description of methods to map impact mechanisms; quantification of socio-economic impacts of services; the benefit to cost (B/C) appraisal of services and service bundles, and evaluation of an agency's overall B/C ratio by applying the findings to systems level. The described analytical process is repeatable elsewhere with modifications or as it stands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports the findings of a comparative analysis of bus rapid transit (BRT) performance using information on cross-section data of 121 BRT systems throughout the world, in which random effects regression is employed as the modelling framework for stand alone patronage and ridership models, and 3SLS for joint models in which frequency is treated as an endoneous effect on patronage. A number of sources of systematic variation are identified which have a statistically significant impact on BRT patronage in terms of daily passenger numbers such as fare, frequency, connectivity, pre-board fare collection, and location of with-flow bus lanes and doorways of a bus. In addition to the patronage model, a bus frequency model is estimated to identify the context within which higher levels of service frequency are delivered, notably where there exists higher population density, more trunk lines, the corridor provides bus priority facilities such as priority lanes for many bus routes, and where there is the presence of overtaking lanes at more than half of all stations along the heaviest section of the corridor. The findings offer important insights into features of BRT systems that are positive contributors to growing patronage which should be taken into account in designing and planning BRT systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: BRT appears to be less expensive to build and operate than tram systems but can it really approach the performance level of a tram system and what is the environmental performance of comparable systems? This paper reports systematic research on these issues, particularly relating to where an urban transit system seeks to attract discretionary car users. A model has been developed to compare the implementation, operational costs and environmental impacts of a comparable tram and high quality guided BRT system. This models a UK situation, but draws upon information from elsewhere in Europe and North America. The design of the BRT system delivers equivalent performance to trams in capacity and passenger experience. This ‘equivalence’ model shows that the capital costs of the high-spec BRT system are two-thirds those of tram. This is less of a cost saving than is often claimed, suggesting that, in practice, BRT is built to a lower specification that tram systems. Operational costs do not significantly differ. Using hybrid-engine BRT vehicles, CO2 emissions are similar, BRT has lower PM10 emissions, but NOx from BRT remains higher than for trams. Although the cost differences for equivalent systems are less than is often claimed, there are substantial benefits in the flexible development of BRT, with it less vulnerable to variations from forecast ridership numbers, and development can be split into fundable stages, growing the business case for incremental upgrading. High-spec BRT can to be the new tram, but the ‘value for money’ case for BRT should not be at the expense of quality and transport planning impact. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper presents a qualitative assessment of the risk perceptions held by key Australian stakeholder groups in the context of tollroads operated under the public–private-partnership model. The findings confirm that experience accumulated in recent years has contributed toward the betterment of risk-sharing optimisation amongst the contracting parties. The knowledge acquired through in-depth interviews supports the common view that equitable risk sharing is the vital ingredient of value for money. The proposition that the private sector is better equipped to manage commercial risks involving economic decision making whilst risks that have embedded unquantifiable social and public values and those in the domain of public governance are best left with government alone, appears to be replete with refutable implications. Public perception is a malleable concept and should be managed by both sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In January 2009, following a lengthy industry review and consultation process, the New Zealand Public Transport Management Act (PTMA) came into force. The Act allows Regional Transport Authorities, as the primary procurers of public transport services, to place either a control or a contracting requirement upon services that are registered as commercial requiring no subsidy. The imposition of either the control or the contracting requirement is designed to facilitate greater system integration, improve service continuity and enhance services to the customer, andallow the Authority to invest in key strategic projects, such as integrated fares and ticketing, so as to grow patronage. The PTMA’s other objective is to ensure improved value for public subsidies. Recent years have seen significant subsidy inflation for seemingly little commensurate benefits. The Act will allow the Regional Transport Authority to achieve greater value for money through improved farebox, a shift to longer, larger contracts to increase competition in the market, a more appropriate allocation of risk, and the removal of the ability of operators to ‘game’ the current system by using strategically placed commercial services as barriers to competition. Similar concerns have also stimulated new legislation in the UK and this paper illustrates the parallels in the environment and proposed response. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The new Public Transport Operating Model (PTOM) recently introduced by the New Zealand government for local public transport services involves a mix of competitively-tendered and negotiated bus contracts in the main metropolitan areas. Most features of the procurement procedures and almost all the contract terms and conditions are common to both types of contract. This has provided a rare opportunity internationally to compare the impacts of the alternative procurement methods on contract prices. The paper analyses the prices for the tendered and negotiated bus contracts in NZ's two largest metropolitan areas, Auckland (50 contracts, c.1100 buses) and Wellington (16 contracts, c.400 buses). Key findings are that: (i) for the tendered contracts, significant cost reductions were achieved compared with previous tendering rounds, reflecting the considerable increase in the number of bidders per contract; and (ii) for the negotiated contracts, (gross) costs averaged about 10–15% higher (Auckland) and 30–35% higher (Wellington) than the equivalent tendered costs. These cost disparities reflected the weak position of the regional councils in their contract negotiations with the operators, as a result of the councils not having recourse to tendering as a fallback negotiating position and coming under considerable time pressures to introduce the new services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]