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The aim of this paper is to advance psychological theory and research on attitudes and behavior towards low status minority groups by discussing group-level indispensability as an important yet largely unexplored factor in intergroup dynamics. Drawing on theory and international research from psychology and the social sciences, the distinction between functional indispensability and identity indispensability is first discussed. Subsequently various positive intergroup implications of perceived indispensability are considered, and for giving a balanced account possible negative outcomes are also discussed. Then, the minority perspective is considered and the question of when positive or negative intergroup implications of perceived indispensability are less or more likely. The paper concludes with future directions for theoretical and empirical development of the notion of group-level indispensability and its intergroup consequences in a range of settings and contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the end of the last century, there was a debate about whether cognitive psychology had superseded behavioral psychology and psychoanalysis, and the question was raised of whether the latter two might even be dead. The aim of this study was to investigate how these sub-disciplines have developed since then. The citation count, Journal Impact Factor (JIF), and Immediacy Index of four leading journals from each sub-discipline were abstracted for the years 1998, 2008, and 2018. Trends were analyzed using joinpoint regression analysis. The average number of times each sub-discipline's journals were cited increased between 1988 and 2018. The cognitive journals' JIF increased slightly, the behavioral journals' doubled, and the psychoanalytic journals' remained at the same level. The average annual percentage change for citations to the International Journal of Psychoanalysis showed that the number of citations statistically significantly increased over the years. This was also the case for the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis. Its JIF trend changed at one point: it decreased up through 2006, after which it increased. Citations to Cognitive Psychology also increased over time, while there was no evidence that its JIF changed. This shows that all three sub-disciplines are still alive and relevant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews an embodied or experientialist view of conceptual understanding. It focuses on George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's theory of embodied cognition and its framing of human conceptualization and reasoning in terms of embodied imagination. These ideas are summarized as ten basic claims: (a) objectivist assumptions are problematic; (b) many human categories have non-classical structure; (c) conceptual systems consist of cognitive models; (d) thinking utilizes frames, metonymies, and prototypes; (e) metaphor is prevalent and primarily conceptual; (f) image schemas structure our experiences; (g) the mind is embodied; (h) abstract thought is largely metaphorical; (i) truth is relative to embodied understanding; and (j) philosophy should be empirically responsible. Lakoff and Johnson's theory of embodied cognition offers a view of conceptual understanding that is cognitively realistic (or empirically responsible), biologically plausible, and self-critical, while providing adequate theories of meaning and truth grounded in embodied experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the past decade, a rich literature emerged focusing on "psychological capital," a multidimensional concept encompassing self-efficacy, hope, optimism, and resilience. So far psychological capital has been predominantly studied in the areas of work and organizational psychology, management, and organizational behavior. This paper argues that (1) the relevance of psychological capital is much broader than assumed so far and (2) that not only the outcomes but also the (social) origins and sources of psychological capital need to be studied. More specifically, the key questions that we address in this paper concern (1) how the notion of psychological capital can be integrated into a broader capital framework that allows studying (the reproduction of) social inequalities, (2) what such integration adds to disciplines such as psychology and sociology, (3) and which avenues for further research can be derived from such framework? Informed by the work of Pierre Bourdieu, we argue that psychological capital is the missing link to develop a comprehensive framework for studying (the reproduction of) social inequalities. Based on our theory building, we develop an interdisciplinary research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most nonwestern researchers regard the field of indigenous psychology as an intellectual movement across the globe to resist the hegemony of Western psychology in representation of the human mind, and in investigations of local mentality. Other than avoiding the hegemony of Western psychology, scholars may still wonder why they need to construct indigenous theories or conduct indigenous research. The answer usually is that existing theories and constructs (especially Western mainstream ones) cannot explain or clarify the local phenomena that they observe or want to talk about. They have to find a new way to describe the local phenomenon they want to describe. An indigenous (new) theory or construct is the solution; the local phenomenon is the basis of reality and needs to be explored and clarified, rather than applying existing theories and constructs. There are several ways to construct indigenous theories or conduct indigenous research. One of the most common ways is the emic approach. However, this paper wants to go a step further to distinguish two different approaches: reflective emic and reflexive etic approach. This paper elaborates on application of these two approaches and advocates a multiple paradigm perspective for constructing an indigenous psychological theory from a global perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Serendipity captures the interaction between a skilled human agent and a fortuitous event in the environment. Although it features in many stories of invention and discovery, its antecedents remain elusive. This paper combines research from different domains of psychology to present a model of the cognitive processes required for a serendipitous episode to occur. The model describes a prepared mind that consists of an informational state and an attentional state. Both states are considered as dynamic rather than fixed. An accident is then the trigger event that updates both of these and feeds information back into the prepared mind. If the accident is noticed, a cycle of judgement and amplification occurs, eventually leading to an output. The model generates novel predictions that point to an increased understanding of how best to scaffold serendipitous moments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes a variety of challenges faced by the author in studying and promoting indigenous psychologies of the Indian intellectual and cultural traditions. It narrates specific instances which tried to present a variety of obstacles that discouraged the author from his pursuit. For example, when a colleague stated that indigenous psychology is nonsense insofar as science is universal, and like physics, it does not admit regional variations; teachers or colleagues expressed extreme dejection about research on Yoga; he was advised against studying Indian psychology as it would ruin career prospects; his articles or book manuscripts were routinely rejected, and so on. In a specific situation, when a young colleague was hounded out of the department for his association with a school of theology, an example was set indicating that the religious association of Yoga would be dangerous. An autobiographical account is chosen over a survey or abstract analysis since academic pursuit must be sustained despite specific sorts of personal experiences that tend to undermine study and pursuit of indigenous psychologies. On the other hand, support offered by opposite types of experiences and by encouragement by mentors is also described. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent reform debates in psychological science, prompted by a widespread crisis of confidence, have exposed and destabilized the so-called myth of self-correction, that is, the problem that most scientists perceive their disciplines as self-correcting without engaging in actual practices that correct the scientific record. In this paper, building on the idea of self-correction as a myth, I propose another myth common to psychological science: the myth of self-organization. The myth of self-organization is the idea that scientific literature will organize itself into something the community adding to it would recognize as systematic knowledge; while the actual members of those communities do not engage in effective ways of organizing it. I argue for the existence of the myth self-organization by taking a historical look at how the scientific literature was construed by psychologists during the 20th century. In my view, the literature, and behaviors of scientists related to it, becomes a social institution exerting influence over the science it belongs to. I conclude with a critical discussion of self-organization through the debates about preregistration and theory formalization in psychology's reform movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often said that science is self-correcting, but the replication crisis suggests that self-correction mechanisms have fallen short. How can we know whether a particular scientific field has effective self-correction mechanisms, that is, whether its findings are credible? The usual processes that supposedly provide mechanisms for scientific self-correction, such as journal-based peer review and institutional committees, have been inadequate. We describe more verifiable indicators of a field's commitment to self-correction. These fall under the broad headings of 1) transparency, which is already the subject of many reform efforts and 2) critical appraisal, which has received less attention and which we focus on here. Only by obtaining Observable Self-Correction Indicators (OSCIs) can we begin to evaluate the claim that "science is self-correcting." We expect that the veracity of this claim varies across fields and subfields, and suggest that some fields, such as psychology and biomedicine, fall far short of an appropriate level of transparency and, especially, critical appraisal. Fields without robust, verifiable mechanisms for transparency and critical appraisal cannot reasonably be said to be self-correcting, and thus do not warrant the credibility often imputed to science as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The acquisition of virtue can be conceptualized as a self-regulatory process in which deliberate practice results in increasingly higher levels of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life. This conceptualization resonates with philosophical virtue theories as much as it converges with psychological models about skill development, expertise, goal motivation, and self-regulation. Yet, the conceptualization of virtue as skill acquisition poses the crucial question of motivation: What motivates individuals to self-improve over time so that they can learn from past experience, correct mistakes, and expand their ethical knowledge to new and unfamiliar circumstances? In this paper, it is argued that the motivation to increase one's level of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life is supported by a specific identity goal, namely the goal to be a moral person. However, this moral identity goal needs to carry specific goal characteristics in order to effectively provide this motivation. It needs to be sufficiently abstract, internally motivated and promotion- rather than prevention-oriented. Research in developmental psychology suggests that the moral identity of children is rather concrete, externally motivated, and prevention-oriented. With development, higher levels of abstraction, internal motivation, and promotion-orientation gain importance providing an important motivational basis for a self-regulated process of virtue acquisition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Listening, as a general psychological capacity, is a key aspect of perception, communication and experience. However, listening researchers frequently characterize it as a neglected, misunderstood and ill-defined phenomenon. This is a significant problem because questions of listening pervade social inequalities and injustices, as this paper demonstrates in the context of UK child protection practices. Exploring concepts of listening within and beyond psychology, the paper illustrates how a lack of overall theorization can contribute to inequality and injustice within applied listening practices. To address this, the paper theorizes listening in the spirit of Whiteheadian process ontology, drawing on the work of Nancy and Bonnet. Based on this, it develops the concept of 'Cultures of Listening' (CoL), which provides a tool for the critical analysis of troubled listening practices, indicating how they can be challenged and transformed. Within CoL, listening is not a mere aspect of auditory perception or communication, but each instant of listening is considered as shaped by and expressing political, social and experiential circumstances, that is, cultures. The paper demonstrates the theoretical, critical and applied value of CoL by offering a detailed analysis of the role of listening within troubled UK child protection practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our world is in a state of critical transition demanding new, creative, ecosystemically fit and sustainable responses to complex challenges. We need both new types of knowledge and new modes of knowledge production. Interdisciplinarity and Transdisciplinarity have the potential to support more congruently complex forms of knowledge (differentiated, integrated, recursive, emergent, ecosystemically fit). Their success is dependent on a deeper understanding of their own organizational complexity. In this paper, I highlight key knowledge gaps and research questions for the development of a richer knowledge base to guide the intentional management and facilitation of Interdisciplinarity and Transdisciplinary Relations toward creative and abductive outcomes. I defend the investigation of creativity and abduction, as hallmarks of the complexity of Interdisciplinarity and Transdisciplinarity, from a process, relational and complexity-informed perspective, mobilizing contributions from Psychology. I discuss Psychology's modes of engagement with Interdisciplinarity and Transdisciplinarity in addressing complex challenges. In this context, I introduce the notion of "dissolution" as an Interdisciplinary and Transdisciplinary relational process supporting the theoretical, methodological and pragmatic enrichment or transformation and increased complexity of different disciplines, bodies of knowledge or modes of knowing. Finally, I propose a new domain for research and practice: a ("Dissolved") Psychology of Interdisciplinary and Transdisciplinary Relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Skinner's (1953) Science and Human Behavior suggested that a science of human behavior could potentially have both negative and positive impacts on human welfare. The present paper first outlines how the contemporary gambling, and advertising, industry illustrate several of Skinner's (1953) concerns and then discusses how medicalization and the critical psychiatry movement share important epistemological similarities with Skinner's work. Skinner (1953) worried that a science of human behavior might negatively impact human welfare, and Skinner's concerns, and potential solutions, are explored in the context of current research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is humanity destroying its wellbeing and its habitat, Earth? The suggestion here is that the dominant culture has unnested itself from humanity's millions-year-old adaptive heritages, impairing evolved capacities and human potential in a feedback loop of greater disconnection and destruction. Humanity's heritage is to be nested horizontally, respectful of deep history and future generations, nested developmentally with evolved ways of raising children to foster thriving, and nested vertically, consciously participating in Earth-cosmos dynamism. Nestedness fosters capacities that are often missing in westernized peoples: ecological relational consciousness and knowhow, which were central to human adaptation. The dominant culture undermines their development. Mainstream western scholarship has accepted the slippage in baselines, collaborated with industrialized-capitalism culture and its intentional divorce from Nature's ways, and is now caught and caged in the limitations of its models and metaphors. Enmeshed in the dominant culture, modernist psychology largely ignores species-normal child raising, human nature and capacities found all over the world among nomadic foraging societies and other traditional societies. In order to reverse the dominant culture's destruction of planetary integrity, biological and cultural diversity, psychology must transform itself to help reestablish evolved practices and support deep nestedness, thereby helping restore human and Earth wellbeing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical work on color and psychological functioning has a long history, dating back to the 19th century. This early research focused on five different areas: Arousal, physical strength, preference, time perception, and attention. In the present paper, I overview the relations observed in this early research, and detail methodological weaknesses therein. I then trace subsequent 20th and 21st century developments in these research areas, in terms of both content and methods. Finally, I extend the review to cover the full breadth of research in this domain of inquiry, and provide guidelines for interpreting existing work and conducting future work. Thus, this historically based review tells us much about research on color and psychological functioning, including where it started, where it has been, where it is, and where it can go. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does dealing with fictional stories involve at a cognitive level? A capacity that has received ample attention in this context, both from psychologists and literary scholars, is "theory of mind" or "mindreading." A dominant tradition in cognitive literary scholarship, mostly associated with Lisa Zunshine's work, puts particular emphasis on the importance of "recursive mindreading" or "multiple-order intentionality" (A thinks that B believes that C wants . . .). The current paper first discusses the key claims of this tradition, using passages from Virginia Woolf's novel Mrs Dalloway as illustrations. Next, textual analyses are offered of three excerpts from more recent literary texts; two by Haruki Murakami, one by Dave Eggers. Discussing these examples reveals various merits of applying recursively embedded mindstates in a framework for literary analysis, but also shows how it is problematic. While some interesting insights into structural properties of a text can be gained, it is argued that recursive mindreading falls short as a model for the cognitive tasks readers of a text have to complete. An alternative framework, based on narrative spaces/blending theory, is suggested and discussed. Overall, the article shows how literary analysis cannot only benefit from the application of ideas from the cognitive sciences, but also the other way around: narrative excerpts can provide detailed "test cases" for psychological models and theories, thereby casting light on their strengths and weaknesses in ways research within traditional paradigms cannot do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study employs the four regulatory forms (goal pursuit, goal maintenance, negative escape, and active avoidance) to illuminate the heterogeneousness among regulatory focus measurements and activations. The first two studies consistently found that promotion focus involves goal pursuit orientation; however, prevention focus encompasses a goal maintenance and a negative escape orientation. The regulatory forms were then applied to regulatory fit research to investigate how the matches of regulatory forms determine the effect sizes of regulatory fit. By meta-analyses, the weak effect in one third of regulatory fit studies, whose regulatory forms were mismatched or partially matched, decreased the overall fit effect and increased the heterogeneousness among regulatory fit studies. However, a strong and consistent regulatory fit effect was found in well-matched of regulatory forms. By examining and extending regulatory forms to measurement, activation, and regulatory fit studies, this paper offers further understanding of the mechanisms of regulatory focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a sketch of a new theory of wisdom based on the tree of philosophy (TOP) model. It is argued that philosophy—love of wisdom—has developed branches over the millennia that reflect the different aspects of thought and action that need to be considered in a comprehensive theory of wisdom. Although there is not a full consensus on what these branches are, the TOP usually has as branches, at minimum, metaphysics—including epistemology and ontology—and ethics, logic, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and axiology. Each of these branches is considered, and its implications for a philosophically based theory of wisdom are considered. Whereas some other theories of wisdom attempt to synthesize recent psychological attempts to understand wisdom, the TOP theory attempts to synthesize the contribution of millennia of philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contribution deals with the question of the constitution and persistence of the "self," linking psychological and sociological approaches. The central interface of this linkage is derived from the process character of the self. It is argued that transdisciplinary work aiming at this common conceptual core will prove particularly fruitful. After discussing the status of the term "the self" in both science and everyday usage, conceptual arguments and definitions (in contrast to related terms such as ego, individual, person, or subject) are examined. A third step provides a synopsis of established approaches and arguments both from psychological and sociological perspectives, offering points of convergence for a metadisciplinary concept of the self. The proposed process character of the self is discussed with respect to language pragmatics, memory performance, and body boundedness. The final section sums up the lines of argumentation and emphasizes intended inspiration for interdisciplinary discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introductory psychology is typically presented to undergraduates as a set of loosely related topics reflecting the organization of most textbooks. The empirically based evidence presented in the topical format is likely to be limited by progressive knowledge obsolesce and replicability challenges impacting contemporary science. We suggest that psychology instructors consider an alternative course format organized by theories or perspectives. A perspective-centered introductory psychology provides a consistent and pluralistic view of the field and embeds research findings and methodology within psychology's major explanatory theories. Current trends in undergraduate higher education emphasize career readiness. Development of critical thinking and applying psychological principles to real-world situations, including students' own lives, may be better achieved through a perspective-based approach. Given that the typical introductory psychology student is a non-major taking the course to fulfil liberal arts requirements, a perspective approach offers several advantages. A focus on understanding human behavior from multiple vantage points is a skill valued by prospective employers of new bachelor's degree recipients. With its emphasis on divergent and dialectical reasoning, a perspective centered introductory psychology course can become the centerpiece of the general education curriculum. In addition to promoting post-formal reasoning, a perspective-centered introductory psychology illustrates the diverse epistemologies that have shaped our field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes stock of the growing interest in flourishing measurement. The focus is on three challenges in this domain: the degree of coherent theorizing, the overreliance on psychometric validation, and the questionable universality of the measures. A rigorous process identified the eight most widely documented flourishing measures. All eight measures struggled with the three challenges. First, all measures were constructed on intuitive grounds, whether those bases were existing literatures, personal conceptualizations, or the intuition of an opposition of mental illness and flourishing. Second, all measures were assessed almost exclusively with psychometric studies, with little evidence of theoretical or cultural validity. Finally, all eight measures implicitly or explicitly assume cultural universality without providing theoretical argument or empirical evidence for that assumption. This stock-taking resulted in two main conclusions. First, there are areas of both consensus (e.g., that flourishing is a measurable, multidimensional construct) and dissensus (e.g., the components of flourishing) that can provide bases for future theory and research. Second, systematic theoretical argument is necessary to better understand what flourishing is, how it can be validly measured, and the degree to which it can be considered a universal human experience. It is time to address these theoretical and cultural questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its inception as a modern and evolving discipline, psychology has been concerned with issues of human security. This think piece offers an initial conceptualisation of human security as a broad security concept that encompasses a range of interrelated dimensions that have been responded to by different sub-disciplinary domains within psychology. We advance an argument for a human security psychology as a connecting focal point for general psychology that enables us to bring knowledge from across our eclectic discipline into further dialogue. This is a necessary step in understanding better the state of current thinking on the psychology of security and as a basis for informing further theory, research and practice efforts to address issues of human (in)security. This initial effort is informed by Assemblage Theory, which offers a dynamic and contextually rich perspective on people as agentive beings entangled within evolving natural and social formations that can foster or undermine their experiences of [in]security. The article is completed with a brief agenda for advancing human security psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It remains to be seen whether the American Psychological Association's new apology and resolutions on racism will help redress longstanding inequities in the field. To be sure, critiques of psychological science vis-à-vis racism have been around for decades, despite being ignored by psychological science, even when spoken by Dr. King—in his profound meditation on science, psychology, and racism in a speech delivered to the APA—or by psychiatrist Frantz Fanon—who has had a foundational influence on the broader history of anti-racism scholarship but remains relatively disregarded in his own psy-fields. This article addresses the viewpoints of these and other people of color on psychological science, which have yet to be adequately incorporated into the perspectives of psychological science. We also address traditions of communities of color that have become absorbed or consumed by psychological science but often after their cultural and historical origins are erased, like Buddhism. We locate these racial and scientific dynamics, and associated patterns of neglect and erasure, within a longstanding aversion in and by psychological science—here understood as a collective actor unto itself—to perspectives of people of color. Consequently, the promise not only of diversity, but of desegregation, has yet to be fulfilled within psychology. We conclude by discussing the psychosocial power of social movements—including South Africa's apartheid-related Truth and Reconciliation process as personally experienced by our second author—to suggest elements of pathways forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The personalization of digital environments is becoming ubiquitous due to the rise of AI-based algorithms and recommender systems. Arguably, this technological development has far-reaching consequences for individuals and societies alike. In this article, we propose a psychological model of the effects of personalization in digital environments, which connects personalization with motivational tendencies, psychological needs, and well-being. Based on the model, we review studies from three areas of application—news feeds and websites, music streaming, and online dating—to explain both the positive and the negative effects of personalization on individuals. We conclude that personalization can lead to desirable outcomes such as reducing choice overload. However, personalized digital environments without transparency and without the option for users to play an active role in the personalization process potentially pose a danger to human well-being. Design recommendations as well as avenues for future research that follow from these conclusions are being discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite their negative connotation, and the pervasiveness of blue-sky, outside-the-box thinking metaphors, constraints are at the heart of creativity. Using a multidisciplinary approach, as part of the Integrated Constraints in Creativity (IConIC) model, I propose that creative outcomes emerge from the successful leveraging of different types of constraints. I introduce a new, constraint-based definition of creativity, grounded in categorization theory, and parsimonious taxonomies of constraints based on which I outline testable predictions and corroborating evidence. I argue that constraints differ in terms of their flexibility (fixed, faux-fixed, or flexible) and functions (exclusionary or focusing), and in terms of whether they apply to the problem search time or the problem search space. Within the search space, constraints can refer to specific concepts or categories. I also advance a distinction between creativity maximizers and satisficers as a function of creativity goals, semantic networks, expertise, and the new constructs of constraint leveraging power and constraint leveraging mindset, that help to explain differences in successful integration of constraints for creativity and creative achievement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we examine the place of culture in the human sciences with specific reference to psychology and the cultural histories of India. Despite the depth of scholarly writing on the intimate and inextricable ties between culture and psychological processes, core advancements and definitive positions in psychology have remained elusive. The privileging of a single culturally specific world-view alongside the exclusion of others has seriously hindered the authentic internationalization of psychology. We propose that linkages between culture and psychology need to be visualized as a dialogue between different cultural traditions. In the dialectics between bheda–abheda (difference and non-difference), structural-developmental, dispositional-relational, and social-collective processes will be invoked to develop our arguments for a human-science approach to the study of persons in culture. We argue that it is through the inclusion, rather than suppression, of diverse ideologies that generalizability can be best achieved. This is a call for an audit and reconstruction of psychology and its practices as an international discipline with a roadmap for theory construction and research informed by a cultural psychological approach toward human phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by a set of converging empirical findings and theoretical suggestions pertaining to the construct of ownership, we survey literature from multiple disciplines and present an extensive theoretical account linking the inception of a foundational naïve theory of ownership to principles governing the sense of (body) ownership. The first part of the account examines the emergence of the non-conceptual sense of ownership in terms of the minimal self and the body schema—a dynamic mental model of the body that functions as an instrument of directed action. A remarkable feature of the body schema is that it expands to incorporate objects that are objectively controlled by the person. Moreover, this embodiment of extracorporeal objects is accompanied by the phenomenological feeling of ownership towards the embodied objects. In fact, we argue that the sense of agency and ownership are inextricably linked, and that predictable control over an object can engender the sense of ownership. This relation between objective agency and the sense of ownership is moderated by gestalt-like principles. In the second part, we posit that these early emerging principles and experiences lead to the formation of a naïve theory of ownership rooted in notions of agential involvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The challenges faced by science in the international communication process range from the choice of philosophical and epistemological assumptions used in scientific research to the choice of participants who comprise the sample of the studies produced. There is, in the hierarchy of scientific production, Westernized trends of theoretical assumptions that predominate. The challenge of producing and communicating scientific knowledge is now guided by a review that geographically and philosophically shifts the Western prominent place. The purpose of this article is use a decolonial perspective to theoretically problematize scientific practice and the process of publishing its results. It criticizes the assembly line in which psychology ends, especially in the publication of results as a condition for the constitution of scientific communities. The scientific community can assist in the dissemination of a certain theory, but it can also constitute an obstacle to new ideas. It points to decoloniality as an alternative path as a possibility of breaking with the production-line logic of publications. By presenting the example of González Rey's theory of subjectivity, it advocates the history-education-time tripod as necessary elements to address contemporary crises studied by psychology. The article demonstrates the possibility of rupture with the market-related scientific status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The replication crisis has preoccupied psychology for over a decade and has led to many reform proposals. In this Special Issue, we argue that a reflexive discussion of both the replication crisis and possible reforms is crucial. With the plural 'replication of crises' in the title, we want to make clear that the current crisis is more than one. What is perceived as a crisis varies depending on the scientific field, theoretical background, and epistemological perspective. As a consequence, this Special Issue aims to promote both an intra-disciplinary dialogue between scientific and theoretical psychology, and an inter-disciplinary dialogue between psychology, the humanities and the social sciences. The individual contributions focus on three central questions: (1) What is specific about the replication crisis in psychology? (2) What are the connections between the replication crisis in psychology and that in other scientific fields? (3) What are possible underlying causes of the replication crisis in psychology, and what are the opportunities for improvement? Although each of the articles offers a unique and sometimes challenging perspective to understanding the replication crisis, they all share the assumption that we need to reflect in order to learn and improve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The replication crisis led to the rise of metascience as a possible solution. In this article, we examine central metascientific premises and argue that attempts to solve the replication crisis in psychology will benefit from a tighter integration of approaches from the psychological humanities. The first part of our article identifies central epistemic merits that metascientific endeavors can contribute to psychology. However, we argue secondly against the widespread claim that metascience is the only way to deal with the replication crisis in psychology and point to major epistemic problems: the one-sided notion of a singular scientific method, the homogenizing view of psychology, and the exclusion of practices of theorizing. As a possible compensation for such shortcomings, we introduce, third, the reflective and pluralistic approach of psychological humanities. In so doing, we show how psychological humanities can serve as an important complement to the objective of improving psychological research. Psychological humanities contribute to a more precise determination of validity, to ethical considerations, and a better understanding of psychology's objects in regard to replication. Accordingly, we argue for the integration of psychological humanities into both metascience and psychology to provide a better basis for addressing epistemic and ethical questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions of the replication crisis in psychology require more substantive analysis of the crisis of academic labour and of social reproduction in the university. Both the replication crisis and the crisis of social reproduction in the university describe a failure in processes of reproducing something. The financial crisis of 2007–8 shortly preceded the emergence of the replication crisis, as well as exacerbated ongoing tendencies in the organisation and practices of university research (particularly the use of precarious contracts and the adjunctification of research). These provide two reasons to address these two named crises together. But many analyses of and responses to the replication crisis turn to research culture, often at the expense of adequate investigations of research labour. Today's psychological sciences are made through multiple forms of labour: these include researchers, who range from senior principal investigators to sub-contracted, and exploited, research assistants; research participants/subjects, who include those providing labour for experiments via exploitative platforms including Amazon Mechanical Turk; and workers providing heterogeneous technical and administrative labour. Through understanding what is at stake for these multiple forms of labour, psychology might better analyse problems besetting psychology today, as well as develop different imaginaries and practices for how to address them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychology's current crisis attends most visibly to perceived problems with statistical models, methods, publication practices, and career incentives. Rarely is close attention given to the objects of inquiry—to ontological matters—yet the crisis-related literature does features statements about the nature of psychology's objects. Close analysis of the ontological claims reveals discrepant understandings: some researchers assume objects to be stable and singular while others posit them to be dynamic and complex. Nevertheless, both views presume the objects under scrutiny to be real. The analysis also finds each of these ontological claims to be associated not only with particular method prescriptions but also with distinct notions of the scientific self. Though both take the scientific self to be objective, one figures the scientist as not always a rational actor and, therefore, requiring some behavior regulation, while the other sees the scientist as largely capable of self-governing sustained through painstakingly acquired expertise and self-control. The fate of these prevalent assemblages of object, method, and scientific self remains to be determined, yet as conditions of possibility they portend quite different futures. Following description of the assemblages, the article ventures a futuristic portrayal of the scientific practices they each might engender. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current dismay within the mainstream of nomological psychology may result from the fact that the anomaly of non-replicability has a direct bearing on its very own methodological requirements and quality criteria of empirical research. The call for more scientific rigour on the customary avenue in order to secure unambiguous empirical findings gives, however, rise to suspect that the deeper reason for this anomaly is not yet recognised: namely, the misguided regulation of a strictly objective inquiry, distorting what is present and relevant in everyday life and treating the 'subjective' of the subject matter as the central root of interfering factors which have to be eliminated or neutralised in the pursuit of experimental hypothesis testing. The problems of replicability would thus be a proof once again that the notorious inversion between matter and method does not really work, due to the uncircumventable characteristics of human inter-/subjectivity. In this sense, the replication crisis replicates the perennial topic of all historical discussions about a crisis in psychology – the failure of a 'psychology without subject'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article outlines what we call the "narrative of psychology exceptionalism" in commentaries on the replication crisis: many thoughtful commentaries link the current crisis to the specificity of psychology's history, methods, and subject matter, but explorations of the similarities between psychology and other fields are comparatively thin. Historical analyses of the replication crisis in psychology further contribute to this exceptionalism by creating a genealogy of events and personalities that shares little in common with other fields. We aim to rebalance this narrative by examining the emergence and evolution of replication discussions in psychology alongside their emergence and evolution in biomedicine. Through a mixed-methods analysis of commentaries on replication in psychology and the biomedical sciences, we find that these conversations have, from the early years of the crisis, shared a common core that centers on concerns about the effectiveness of traditional peer review, the need for greater transparency in methods and data, and the perverse incentive structure of academia. Drawing on Robert Merton's framework for analyzing multiple discovery in science, we argue that the nearly simultaneous emergence of this narrative across fields suggests that there are shared historical, cultural, or institutional factors driving disillusionment with established scientific practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the replication crisis in psychology, a "tone debate" has developed. It concerns the question of how to conduct scientific debate effectively and ethically. How should scientists give critique without unnecessarily damaging relations? The increasing use of Facebook and Twitter by researchers has made this issue especially pressing, as these social technologies have greatly expanded the possibilities for conversation between academics, but there is little formal control over the debate. In this article, we show that psychologists have tried to solve this issue with various codes of conduct, with an appeal to virtues such as humility, and with practices of self-transformation. We also show that the polemical style of debate, popular in many scientific communities, is itself being questioned by psychologists. Following Shapin and Schaffer's analysis of the ethics of Robert Boyle's experimental philosophy in the 17th century, we trace the connections between knowledge, social order, and subjectivity as they are debated and revised by present-day psychologists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The vocabulary of anglophone psychology largely developed during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The creators of this vocabulary include such well-known names as William James, Joan Riviere, E. L. Thorndike, and James Strachey. Along with others, they invented many new words and word meanings for psychology. The more a psychologist responded to the need for new vocabulary the more likely were they to be mentioned in publications. Moreover, linguistically creative psychologists occurred together in publications to a greater extent than less linguistically creative psychologists, with William James having the most co-occurrences. A network is presented that links each member of a sample of 59 linguistically creative psychologists to the other member of the sample with whom they most frequently co-occur (e.g., E. L. Thorndike co-occurs most frequently with William James). For each pair, we provide brief descriptions of their similarities and/or differences. There is also a cluster of translators who created new English words and word meanings in order to capture the meanings of words in other languages that had no satisfactory equivalents in English. Generally speaking, the more success psychologists have had in filling the lacunae in psychology's vocabulary, the more they have been recognized by others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Values have long been considered important for psychology but are frequently characterized as beliefs, goals, rules, or norms. Ecological values theory locates them, not in people or in objects, but in ecosystem relationships and the demands those relationships place on fields of action within the system. To test the worth of this approach, we consider skilled coordination tasks in social psychology (e.g., negotiating disagreements, synchrony and asynchrony in interactions, and selectivity in social learning) and perception-action (e.g., driving vehicles and carrying a child). Evidence suggests that a diverse array of values (e.g., truth, social solidarity, justice, flexibility, safety, and comfort) work in a cooperative tension to guide actions. Values emerge as critical constraints on action that differ from goals, rules, and natural laws, and yet provide the larger context in which these can function effectively. Prospects and challenges for understanding values and their role in action, including theoretical and methodological issues, are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does a name mean in translation? Quine argued, famously, that the meaning of gavagai is indeterminate until you learn the language that uses that word to refer to its object. The case is similar with scientific texts, especially if they are older; historical. Because the meanings of terms can drift over time, so too can the meanings that inform experiments and theory. As can a life's body of work and its contributions. Surely, these are also the meanings of a name; shortcuts to descriptions of the author who produced them, or of their thought (or maybe their collaborations). We are then led to wonder whether the names of scientists may also mean different things in different languages. Or even in the same language. This problem is examined here by leveraging the insights of historians of psychology who found that the meaning of "Wundt" changed in translation: his experimentalism was retained, and his Völkerpsychologie lost, so that what Wundt meant was altered even as his work—and his name—informed the disciplining of Modern Psychology as an experimental science. Those insights are then turned here into a general argument, regarding meaning-change in translation, but using a quantitative examination of the translations of Piaget's books from French into English and German. It is therefore Piaget who has the focus here, evidentially, but the goal is broader: understanding and theorizing "the mistaken mirror" that reflects only what you can think to see (with implications for replication and institutional memory). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coloniality describes the way in which racialized conceptions of being, personhood, and morality inherent in colonial regimes are maintained long after the formal end of colonial enterprises. Central to coloniality has been the material and psychological colonization of space and time, largely by Western and industrialized nations. We propose the importance of understanding the coloniality of time and space through a historically grounded framework called time-space distanciation (TSD). This framework posits that via the global spread of capitalism through colonization, psychological understandings of time and space have been separated from one another, such that they are now normatively treated as distinct entities, each with their own abstract and quantifiable value. We discuss the construct and its centrality to coloniality, as well as the ways in which contemporary psychology has been complicit in proliferating the coloniality of psychologies of time and space. Finally, we discuss ways to employ the decolonial strategies of denaturalization, indigenization, and accompaniment in the context of future research on the psychology of time and space. TSD contributes to decolonial efforts by combatting the reification of hegemonic psychological constructs, showing how these constructs arise as a function of historical changes in understanding, experience, and use of time and space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shares choices made as part of an introductory decoloniality curriculum in a non-clinical community psychology M.A./PhD program where the authors are faculty members. We focus on the basics of decoloniality and decolonial pedagogies in two first-year foundational psychology courses: one course on implications of decoloniality for studying differing psychological paradigms, ontologies, and epistemologies, particularly relational ontologies that might reframe community environments, and another course on implications of decoloniality for post-humanist and indigenous qualitative research methodologies. We present currently emerging forms of theory, content, pedagogy, dialogue, artivism, and methodology in process in our work, as well as responses from students and our own reflections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent psychology scholarship has engaged topics of decoloniality, from conferences to journal publications to edited volumes. These efforts are examples of the decolonial turn, a paradigm shift oriented to interrupting the colonial legacies of power, knowledge, and being. As critical community psychologists, we contend that decoloniality/decolonization is an epistemic and ontological process of continuously disrupting the coloniality of power that is the hegemonic Western Eurocentric approach to theory, research, and practice. To document and critically understand this process of colonial disruption--the roots and routes toward decoloniality within and outside of community psychology--we collected information at conference workshops and an open-ended online survey disseminated across international contexts. Through an analysis of two conference workshops (Chile; United States) and a survey, we describe four orientations that capture how participants engage with a decolonizing praxis. The four orientations include Generating knowledge With and from Within, Sociohistorical Intersectional Consciousness, Relationships of Mutual Accountability, and Unsettling Subjectivities of Power/Privilege. The coloniality of power, which characterizes the ethics and tensions within the discipline, is uprooted through these orientations, thereby enabling possibilities to trek a route away from colonial theory, research, and practice, and toward the decolonial turn in community psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critics have faulted the project of general psychology for conceptions of general truth that (1) emphasize basic processes abstracted from context and (2) rest on a narrow foundation of research among people in enclaves of Eurocentric modernity. Informed by these critiques, we propose decolonial perspectives as a new scholarly imaginary for general psychology Otherwise. Whereas hegemonic articulations of general psychology tend to ignore life in majority-world communities as something peripheral to its knowledge project, decolonial perspectives regard these communities as a privileged site for general understanding. Indeed, the epistemic standpoint of such communities is especially useful for understanding the coloniality inherent in modern individualist lifeways and the fundamental relationality of human existence. Similarly, whereas hegemonic articulations of general psychology tend to impose particular Eurocentric forms masquerading as general laws, the decolonial vision for general psychology Otherwise exchanges the universalized particular for a more pluralistic (or pluriversal) general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coinciding with the recent psychological attention paid to the broad topic of wisdom, interest in the intellectual virtue of phronesis or practical wisdom has been burgeoning within pockets of psychology, philosophy, professional ethics, and education. However, these discourses are undercut by frequently unrecognized tensions, lacunae, ambivalences, misapplications, and paradoxes. While a recent attempt at conceptualizing the phronesis construct for the purpose of psychological measurement offers promise, little is known about how phronesis develops psychologically, what motivates it, or how it can be cultivated. Many psychologists aspire to make sense of wise thinking without the contextual, affective, and holistic/integrative resources of phronesis. This article explores some such attempts, in particular, a new "common model" of wisdom. We argue for the incremental value of the phronesis construct beyond available wisdom accounts because phronesis explains how mature decision-making is motivated and shaped by substantive moral aspirations and cognitively guided moral emotions. We go on to argue that, in the context of bridging the gap between moral knowledge and action, phronesis carries more motivational potency than wisdom in the "common model." The phronesis construct, thus, embodies some unique features that psychologists studying wise decision-making ignore at their peril. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lev S. Vygotsky is one of the major figures of psychology; however, his deep engagement with the arts is less known. This is surprising, given the fact that the arts, and especially Shakespeare's Hamlet, are present throughout his career. In this article, we argue, first, that Hamlet was a major symbolic resource for Vygotsky in times of liminal transitions, and second, that it is this very deep experience of having been transformed by means of Hamlet that grounds his psychology of art, which aims precisely to show how Hamlet works as a "technique of emotions." Our demonstration is organized into three main movements. In Part 1, we retrace the historical and cultural context in which Vygotsky grew up as a young man. We emphasize his experiences of liminality and transitions, due to transformations of the social world and his own life. In Part 2, we examine Vygotsky's proposition itself through a close analysis of his Psychology of art. Finally, in Part 3, we further explicate the relation between art and life at play in Vygotsky's approach and relate this to Vygotsky's broader psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pluralistic ignorance occurs when group members mistakenly believe others' cognitions and/or behaviors are systematically different from their own. More than 20 years have passed since the last review of pluralistic ignorance from a psychological framework, with more than 60 empirical articles assessing pluralistic ignorance published since then. Previous reviews took an almost entirely conceptual approach with minimal review of methodology, making existing reviews outdated and limited in the extent to which they can provide guidelines for researchers. The goal of this review is to evaluate and integrate the literature on pluralistic ignorance, clarify important conceptual issues, identify inconsistencies in the literature, and provide guidance for future research. We provide a comprehensive definition for the phenomenon, with a focus on its status as a group-level phenomenon. We highlight three areas of variation in particular in the current scoping review: variation in topics assessed, variation in measurement, and (especially) variation in methods for assessing the implications of individual-level misperceptions that, in aggregate, lead to pluralistic ignorance. By filling these gaps in the literature, we ultimately hope to motivate further analysis of the phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article gives an overview of sociocultural approaches to creativity and advances a particular theory of the creative process grounded in the notions of difference, position, perspective, dialogue, and affordance. If sociocultural psychology challenges old dichotomies between mind and body, individual and society, then creativity is ideally placed to demonstrate their interdependence. While sociocultural thinking in creativity research has traditionally emphasized the social or collaborative nature of creative processes, recovering old scholarship and reviewing it in light of current empirical developments shows how socio-materiality can properly inform psychological theory in this area. The article starts with an outline of sociocultural principles before considering their application to creativity. It then formulates four propositions regarding the creative process: (a) differences of perspective increase creative potential; (b) exchanging positions and perspectives, within and between individuals, fosters creative processes; (c) these exchanges result in perspectives that reveal previously unperceived affordances; and (d) oftentimes, it is the affordances of material objects or of unique idea combinations that guide the development of novel perspectives in creative work. Evidence supporting these key hypotheses of the perspective-affordance theory of creativity (PAT) comes from research conducted in a variety of areas within psychology and in related fields. In the end, the methodological and practical implications of considering creativity as a process of recognizing differences, exchanging positions, developing perspectives and discovering affordances will be discussed, as well as the broader implications of building theories that bring together, rather than keep separate, the social, the material, and the psychological. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Simplicity is a fundamental tenet of cognition intended to cope with a complex and intricate world. Based on the writings of the German philosopher Hans Vaihinger, this article introduces a wide-ranging simplification scheme denoted the "as if" heuristic. Following this heuristic, much of our productive and constructive thoughts about the world, specifically in science, are based on idealized fictitious assumptions. Although descriptions of the world as portrayed by psychological models and theories may contain fictitious elements (antithetical or at least indifferent to the search for truth), they afford a simplification tool that facilitates our comprehension of a complex and obscured world. Numerous examples from the psychological literature in which the "as if" heuristic is apparent are presented. Specifically, we analyze the implications of exploiting the heuristic for the development of psychological constructs, theory building, and the foundations of psychological measurement. While highlighting the gains acquired from the use of the "as if" heuristic, we also discuss its possible pitfalls if not properly used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the United States, many adolescent girls experience sexual harassment before they leave high school, and between 20% and 25% of college women are survivors of sexual assault. Despite the many negative consequences associated with these experiences, perpetrating sexual harassment and assault is often viewed as normative. Using Bronfenbrenner's bioecological theoretical framework, we propose a bioecological theory of the perpetration and tolerance of sexual harassment of girls. We propose children's proximal and distal contexts contribute to the endorsement of sexualized gender stereotypes, which in turn impacts high rates of both perpetration and acceptance of sexual harassment. We discuss the ways that three important microsystems—parents, peers, and schools—contribute to this acceptance. We also propose that key components of media within the exosystem work to further normalize sexual harassment of girls and women. These contexts inform children's development, creating a culture that is permissive of sexual harassment, resulting in high rates of sexual harassment and assault in adolescence and emerging adulthood. Implications of our proposed theory for policymakers, teachers, parents, and researchers are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]