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In response to the euro area crisis, policymakers took a gradual, incremental approach to official lending, at first relying on the blueprint followed by the International Monetary Fund, then developing their own crisis resolution framework. We describe this process of institutional development, marked by a substantial divergence in the terms of official loans offered to. We use a unique dataset of the characteristics of the various official loans to provide key stylised facts, and use regression and event analysis techniques to study the effect of different lending terms on market borrowing costs and fiscal performance. Euro area loans, when in longer maturities and lower rates, go hand in hand with improved market access. Instead, the terms of IMF loans appear to have no significant effect on market access, but primary balances are larger when IMF maturities are longer. We discuss arguments for refocusing debt sustainability analysis and embed debt management techniques in programme design, while considering the trade-off between adjustment incentives and official lending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores whether IMF-supported programs in low-income countries (LICs) catalyze Official Development Assistance (ODA). Based on a comprehensive set of ODA measures and using the Propensity Score Matching approach to address selection bias, we show that programs addressing policy or exogenous shocks have a significant catalytic impact on both the size and the modality of ODA. Moreover, for gross disbursements the impact is greatest when LICs are faced with substantial macroeconomic imbalances or large shocks. Results indicate a sharp difference between the responsiveness of multilateral and bilateral donors to programs. While multilateral donors significantly raise their gross and net disbursements to program countries, the aid allocation by bilateral donors, on both a gross and net basis, does not seem to be affected by programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existence of shadow economies is an important, yet understudied, issue for international political economy and development. This study examines how two distinct types of international economic engagement—economic openness and participation in International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs—affect the growth of shadow (informal) sectors. We theorize that increased economic openness will reduce the size of countries’ shadow sectors. More specifically, we posit that eliminating market-distorting trade barriers will decrease the incentives for shadow sector activities such as smuggling. Additionally, we posit that increased participation in global production and supply chains is likely to lead to a positive, “climb to the top” effect on states’ regulatory and labor policies that enhance the prospective benefits associated with formal sectors. Conversely, we argue that participation in IMF structural adjustment programs can lead to great shadow sector activity as IMF-imposed structural conditions might cause significant near-term economic hardship and degrade states’ regulatory capacity. The results from a panel of 145 countries from 1971 to 2012 indicate that economic openness reduces the size of the shadow economy, while participation in IMF programs is significantly related to a larger shadow economy. These findings have important implications for understanding how the divergent forms of international economic engagement might affect shadow economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does state obligation to international human rights treaties (HRTs) affect mobilized dissent? We argue that obligations to protect human rights affect not only state behavior but also the behavior of dissidents. We present a theory in which the effect of HRTs on dissent is conditional on expectations of when it will constrain government behavior. We assume that HRT obligation increases the likelihood that government agents face litigation costs for repression but argue that leaders are only constrained when they would be most likely to repress. The expectation of constraint creates opportunity: citizens are more likely to dissent in HRT-obligated states with secure leaders and weak domestic courts. We find empirical support for the implications of our theory using country-month data on HRT obligation and dissent events from 1990 to 2004. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how the staff exercise informal governance over lending decisions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund). The essential component of designing any IMF program, assessing the extent to which a borrowing country is likely to fulfill its policy commitments, is based partly on informal staff judgments subject to informal incentives and normative orientations not dictated by formal rules and procedures. Moreover, when country officials are unable to commit to policy goals of the IMF, the IMF staff may bypass the formal channel of policy dialogue through informal contacts and negotiations with more like-minded actors outside the policymaking process. Exercising informal governance in these ways, the staff are motived by informal career advancement incentives and normative orientations associated with the organization's culture to provide favorable treatment to borrowers composed of policy teams sympathetic toward their policy goals. The presence of these sympathetic interlocutors provides the staff both with greater confidence a lending program will achieve success and an opportunity to support officials who share their policy beliefs. I assess these arguments using a new dataset that proxies shared policy beliefs based on the professional characteristics of IMF staff and developing country officials. The evidence supports these arguments: larger loan commitments are extended to countries where government officials and the Fund staff share similar professional training. The analysis implies informal governance operates in IOs not just via state influence but also through the evolving makeup, incentive structure, and normative orientations of their staffs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Up on the 12th floor of its 19th Street Headquarters, the IMF Board sits in active session for an average of 7 hours per week. Although key matters of policy are decided on in the venue, the rules governing Boardroom interactions remain opaque, resting on an uneasy combination of consensual decision-making and weighted voting. Through a detailed analysis of IMF Board discussions surrounding the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), this article sheds light on the mechanics of power in this often overlooked venue of global economic governance. By exploring the key issues of default liability and loan conditionality, I demonstrate that whilst the Boardroom is a more active site of contestation than has hitherto been recognized, material power is a prime determinant of both Executive Directors' preferences and outcomes reached from discussions. And as the decisions reached form the backbone of the 'instruction sheet' used by Fund staff to guide their everyday operational decisions, these outcomes-and the processes through which they were reached-were factors of primary importance in stabilizing the operational norms at the heart of a controversial phase in the contemporary history of IMF concessional lending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While often considered a purely financial institution, the IMF has throughout its history performed non-financial services for its membership. The latest example is the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), a certification mechanism established in 2005 for which only poor members are eligible. Based on a formal game-theoretic model, I argue that it is unlikely that the PSI will serve well the intention of facilitating capital market access for members requesting the service. Their low income, the lack of significant consequences for markets, the IMF's traditional reluctance to criticize members, as well as the need to promote the use of the new arrangement indicate that the Fund could emphasize participants' welfare over the interests of private lenders. The continued importance of foreign aid in eligible countries also puts the IMF in the role of gatekeeping such flows, which might conflict with sending clear signals to commercial actors. All these reasons imply that in many cases its seal of approval will be of little use to third-parties, despite the high standards to which PSI-countries are supposed to adhere. The best argument in favor of the PSI being a useful addition to the Fund's tool kit for low-income members is the fact that several countries have already signed a second one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We estimate the impact on economic growth of the joint participation in both IMF and World Bank programs. More specifically, using panel data for 128 developing countries over the period 1982-2005, and employing 2SLS to control for the possible endogeneity of participation in an IMF/World Bank program, we find that the interaction between these two organizations has a positive and significant impact on growth. The paper then opens up interesting new research questions related to investigate further on the effects of Bank-Fund simultaneous action and, to the extent to which their stronger impact on growth may depend on Bank-Fund interaction, also ways to optimize their joint effect through greater cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1944, United States financing of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been appropriated and approved in Congress by roll-call vote. If voting to increase funds to the IMF is viewed as an observable signal of 'support' for the IMF, these votes provide a historical record of legislative support for the IMF in the United States. I analyze roll-call voting on IMF financing from 1944 to 2009 at both the aggregate (congressional) and the micro (legislator) levels. At the aggregate level, I show that support for the IMF has fallen over time in the House of Representatives but not in the Senate. In the micro-analysis, I use a 'natural experiment' to establish that this intercameral difference is the result of the Senate's larger and more heterogeneous constituencies, as opposed to other modeled and unmodeled factors. I also find that legislator support for the IMF is shaped strongly by ideology: regardless of chamber, left-wing legislators are as much as 31 percentage points more likely to support the IMF than right-wing legislators. Yet controlling for ideology, senators are more likely to support the IMF than representatives, and representatives are more sensitive to constituency pressures than senators. I attribute these differences to chamber-specific rules governing the size of constituencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Power in the world's preeminent international financial institutions-the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund-resides in their Executive Boards. How do governments get elected to these international committees? This study quantitatively explores whether wealthy governments provide more foreign aid to poor governments that offer them political support. The focus is on Switzerland, which is elected to the Executive Board of the Bretton Woods Institutions by a group of countries from Central and Western Asia, and Eastern and Southern Europe. Results confirm the hypothesis. Implications for governance in a multipolar world are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically investigates the economic and political factors that affect a country's likelihood to sign an arrangement with the IMF and the determinants of the financial size of such a program. Arguably the world and the global financial architecture underwent structural changes after the ending of Cold War and so did the role of the IMF. Hence, we update and extend the work of Sturm et al. ( Economics and Politics 17: 177-213, ) by employing a panel model for 165 countries that focuses on the post-Cold War era, i.e., 1990-2009. Our results, based on extreme bounds analysis, suggest that some economic and political variables are robustly related to these two dimensions of IMF program decisions. Furthermore, we show that it is important to distinguish between concessional and non-concessional IMF loans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How has the Fund institutionalized independent evaluation as a means of assessing its performance? This paper process-traces the contentious creation of the Fund's Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). I use primary interviews conducted at the Fund headquarters in 2008-2010 and Fund archive documents dating back to the beginning of the debate over independent evaluation in 1992 to analyze the interaction of internal and external actors and interests that led finally to the creation of the IEO in 2001. I then comment on the 'performance of the performance evaluator.' I draw from a recent external evaluation of the IEO (Lissakers et al. 2006), as well as interviews and secondary sources, to identify enduring contestation over the IEO's function and scope of authority and to discern how this has affected the ability of the IEO to inform and shape the Fund's process and outcome performance. To this end, I discuss four issues currently facing the IEO: the need to establish both actual and perceived independence, the problems of ambiguous or non-existent metrics for assessing Fund performance, difficulties in balancing candor of evaluation reports with credibility in the eyes of multiple constituencies, and the challenges of fostering a culture of learning in the Fund. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important theory of international cooperation asserts that governments comply with international law because of the reputational costs incurred by reneging on public agreements. Countries that sign binding international agreements in the realm of monetary relations signal their commitment to an open economic system, which should reassure international market actors that the government is committed to sound economic policies. If the theory is correct, we should observe evidence that noncompliance is in fact costly. I test this argument by examining the effect of noncompliance with Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement on sovereign risk ratings. The results show that noncompliance with the agreement mitigates any benefits that accrue to Article VIII signatories. The empirical evidence suggests that, in addition to improving economic and political conditions at home, governments in the developing world would improve their access to financial markets by signing and complying with international monetary agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the popular wisdom that the U.S. government influences IMF policies and tends to support the business community, it might be expected that IMF programs benefit U.S. firms abroad and thus borrower nations are attractive destinations for U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI). Surprisingly, no study has tested the impact of IMF loans on U.S. FDI. Controlling for common explanations in the literature, we use a treatment effects model and interviews with IMF staff researchers to investigate whether countries under different kinds of IMF programs receive more U.S. FDI than countries not under IMF arrangements. Using panel data for 126 developing countries from 1980 to 2003, we find that IMF borrowers tend to be more attractive to U.S. investors but not all IMF programs have the same effect. Our findings suggest that differences in loan duration, the extent of borrower input in policy decisions, and loan amounts affect borrowers’ leverage with the Fund and the U.S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On June 15, 2007, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) adopted the “2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Members’ Policies,” a landmark reform that modernizes the general principles of the IMF’s bilateral surveillance. This paper assesses the first year of the Decision’s implementation in Article IV reports. We develop a questionnaire based on the key aspects of the Decision, which is used to evaluate Article IV reports published before and after the adoption of the new Decision for twenty-four countries. We find that the Decision has significantly increased the overall quality of Article IV reports, with improvements noted in emerging-market, advanced, and developing countries. Bilateral surveillance is more focused on external stability and core macroeconomic policies. Exchange rate analysis, in particular, has improved significantly. We note, however, that the integration with multilateral surveillance remains relatively weak and that cross-country spillovers still do not receive sufficient attention. Moreover, while most reports examine domestic stability in some detail, the link between domestic stability and external stability is not adequately analyzed. On the issue of the even-handed application of the Decision, we conclude that implementation has been broadly similar across country income groups, although differences remain for specific aspects of the Decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that political economy factors play an important role in shaping the exchange rate policies of transition economies. We argue that tradables producers prefer a floating rate to allow active exchange rate policy to affect their competitiveness, while internationally exposed sectors prefer a fixed rate to provide currency stability. We find support for that argument using data on de facto and de jure exchange rate behavior for 21 countries during the period from 1992 to 2004. Our empirical results serve as the basis for predictions regarding the adoption of the euro in the EU accession countries and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops an analytical framework for studying international organization (IO) boards of directors and applies the framework to a sample of 12 international organizations. It argues that the boards of IOs are asked by their political masters to play four distinct roles: (1) political counterweight, (2) performance police, (3) democratic forum, and (4) strategic thinker. Because there are trade-offs among them, no IO board can play all four roles effectively. Policymakers must therefore choose among them, and they must make choices of institutional design accordingly. The article also shows how in practice, international organizations fall into three governance “models” based on the characteristics of their boards of directors. Each model has a different combination of strengths and weaknesses. The analysis suggests that because trade-offs are inescapable, state actors sometimes willingly surrender a measure of control in order to strengthen other aspects of institutional performance. IO autonomy is often not something that surprises or annoys governments, but rather something that was been built into the institutional design as the result of a conscious trade-off. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research into IMF program implementation has usually taken the form of large sample regression analyses. A more detailed explanation is offered in this paper through a case study of program implementation in Turkey between 1999 and 2004. Our research is based on a series of in-depth interviews with policy makers, program negotiators, bureaucrats, interest groups and IMF personnel. Our results reinforce hypotheses that emerge from the theory of implementation and the large sample econometric work, but they also offer new and enhanced explanations. Program implementation depends on a range of factors which interact with one another. These include domestic political economy factors, such as the importance of special interest groups, political cohesiveness and program ownership by the government and the IMF, but also other idiosyncratic factors such as, in the case of Turkey, the existence of a crisis, the desire to join the EU and the role of influential technocrats. Our research has implications for the design of IMF programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we present a vision for IMF surveillance that seeks to produce a more accountable, transparent, and independent surveillance process. First, to make surveillance more focused, the IMF’s assessment should be principles-based; that is, the Fund should assess the overall coherence of exchange rate, monetary, fiscal and financial policies, with a view to analyzing their effects on external stability. Second, the IMF should have a governance structure that increases incentives to support candid, transparent assessments of surveillance. In practice, this entails a different role for the Executive Board: the Board will set out the Fund’s strategic framework for surveillance; the Managing Director and the staff will conduct surveillance. These reforms clarify the roles and responsibilities of the IMF and its member countries in the surveillance process. Also, our proposed reforms aim at making surveillance more even-handed and objective. We believe that this principles-based approach can bolster the credibility and legitimacy of surveillance, giving the Fund greater influence on the economic policies of members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) supervised programs on changes in government respect for physical integrity rights in developing countries between 1981 and 2003. A longer period under an IMF program increased government use of torture and extra judicial killing and also worsened the overall human rights conditions in developing countries. The use of a two-stage model ruled out the possibility that human rights practices would have worsened even if IMF programs had not been in effect. Previous studies of the impacts of IMF programs also found that they had worsened government respect for human rights. However, those studies did not control for the effects of selection. We found preliminary evidence that the worsened human rights conditions persisted even after the reforms in program lending of the late 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States is the largest contributor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, providing resources in exchange for voting power in these international financial institutions (IFIs). While the Treasury Department manages the day-to-day aspects of US participation in these institutions, Congress retains authority on funding. With the aim of understanding the microincentives of US support for the IFIs, I analyze congressional voting on bills to fund the IFIs. I argue that members of congress are more likely to support a funding increase (1) the more “liberal” their ideology, (2) the larger the share of campaign contributions they get from banks that specialize in international lending, and (3) the larger the share of voters that gain from economic globalization that reside in their districts. Statistical analyses of voting on five IFI funding bills since 1977 provide support for these arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates changes in IMF activities using the analytical framework of international public goods. The IMF promotes international financial stability, whose outputs are joint products with varying degrees of publicness. In recent years, IMF loans (recipient-specific benefits) have assumed decreased importance, while the Fund’s technical assistance and monitoring activities have taken on greater importance. As a consequence, the club and purely public outputs (e.g., disseminating best practices) have grown as a share of IMF activities. Changes in the mix of IMF activities alter the mix of international public goods and, in so doing, change policy recommendations regarding the role of IMF. The future of IMF is also addressed, especially in light of increased private capital flows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financial assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) aims to help member countries reduce their economic policy distortions. Because these distortions are endogenously generated, it is important to understand how IFI assistance interacts with the domestic political economy. In this paper, we review recent models of IFI conditional assistance that are based on the theory of special interest politics (Grossman and Helpman 2001). In these models, governments adopt inefficient economic policies and instruments because of lobbying by interest groups. IFI assistance helps reduce these inefficiencies, at least under perfect and symmetric information, and provided IFIs are representative of the general public in creditor and debtor countries. Factors limiting the effectiveness of conditional assistance as an incentive system are also identified. These are related to information asymmetries, the potential for political instability in debtor countries, and the IFIs’ own financial solvency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A review of recent quantitative studies on the International Monetary Fund reveals that much of the conventional wisdom is incorrect. Recent studies have demonstrated a new degree of methodological rigor, have drawn more heavily upon insights from political science, and have asked a number of new questions. We review studies of participation in IMF programs, design of IMF conditionality, implementation and enforcement of IMF conditions, conventional program effects and catalytic effects. At every stage, we find substantial evidence of the influence of major IMF shareholders, of the Fund’s own organizational imperatives, and of domestic politics within borrowing countries. We conclude that very little is known with certainty about the effects of IMF lending, but that a great deal has been learned about the mechanics of IMF programs that will have to be taken into account in order to obtain unbiased estimates of those effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IMF supported programs have conventionally been assessed by examining their effects on intermediate variables and final outcomes. More recently greater attention has been paid to their implementation, on the assumption that in order to work programs need to be implemented. Empirical studies have begun to include political economy variables in an attempt to explain implementation. They have used the concept of ‘ownership’ to provide a theoretical foundation. This paper provides an alternative and simple conceptual framework based on the marginal benefits and costs of implementation. It goes on to discuss policies that might be expected to improve implementation based on this framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent challenges to traditional international relations theory have questioned the nature of international organizations (IOs) as agents of powerful state-members and have examined various conduits through which non-state actors can voice their concerns. Yet little work has focused on participation in IOs when a powerful state’s official position contradicts the goals of actors within it. This article examines the archival record of American involvement in the League of Nations’ economic section to explore such a circumstance. I correct the prevailing historical view of American isolationism in the interwar period and argue that participation by advanced, industrial democracies can better be understood as combinations of exit, voice, and loyalty on the part of individual components of state and civil societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a historical case study this article provides an example of how heterogeneity of interests within a government may affect the interplay between country ownership of reforms and conditionality in IMF-supported programs. The case study also highlights how pro-reformers’ preferences may be conditional on reforms advancing their personal agendas. This suggests a new issue to be addressed by formal models of conditionality. Two main themes emerge from the analysis: (a) the importance of a clear hierarchy to unify heterogeneous interests among decision makers; and, (b) a flexible country-tailored approach to conditionality can contribute to domestic ownership of reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasing attention is being paid to IMF governance and operations, but not to how IMF programs are differentiated under the array of available lending windows. This paper examines empirically the economic and political circumstances associated with the use of IMF facilities. It therefore extends existing research into the determinants of IMF arrangements by investigating the extent to which different influences are at work in the case of different facilities. Focusing initially on extended arrangements as compared to stand-bys, the results indicate that although initially the facilities were used in different economic circumstances, since the mid 1980s these differences have largely disappeared. Instead the differences between user countries have become more political than economic. There are, however, some differences between concessionary and non-concessionary facilities beyond the income levels of countries using them. The policy implications for the range and design of the Fund’s lending windows are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper shows that the economic forecasts of the IMF are frequently distorted by political bias. Longer-term growth forecasts for the industrial countries reveal an absolute as well as relative optimism bias and a significant correlation with election dates in the US. Furthermore, the IMF projections for the developing regions are strongly biased toward optimism. The significant relationship between forecast errors and IMF net credit flows to a region supports the hypothesis that the IMF staff tries to legitimize its lending activities with overly optimistic forecasts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current IMF reform proposals are preoccupied with changing governance structures by reallocating Executive Board chairs and quota shares and with expanding and altering the Fund’s surveillance role, but not enough attention has been paid to whether organizational change at the staff level is also needed. IMF staff have intellectual dominance and discretion in the design of loan conditionality, writing of surveillance reports, and provision of technical and policy advice. There are also clear internal and external criticisms of how the Fund’s organizational culture—that is perceived to be hierarchical, technical/economistic, bureaucratic, and homogeneous/conforming—negatively affects the Fund’s policy output and relationship with borrowing members. This article suggests altering ’how things are done’ at the IMF by making changes to recruitment and organizational structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consensus has grown that the economic reform programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have failed to promote economic development. There is little consensus about how IMF programs should be reformed, however, because we do not understand why IMF programs have failed. Some critics contend that the IMF’s austere policy conditions are inappropriate for most program-countries and cause economic crises to deepen. Other critics argue that the policy conditions are actually ignored, and the IMF program loan ends up subsidizing the bad policies that caused the economic crises in the first place. This debate begs the compliance question. Unfortunately, the study of IMF compliance is not straightforward. IMF agreements span many dimensions, and the dimensions vary from agreement to agreement. Even along one dimension, governments are not held to the same standard. Rather than look at aggregate measures of compliance, this article proposes a return to studying specific conditions as was done in the earliest studies on IMF compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]