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Why has Britain declined to adopt the single currency? The conventional view holds that there are multiple political and economic barriers to British entry into monetary union-large fractions of public opinion, business leaders, and the Conservative party oppose entry; Britain's economic cycle is not synchronized with that of the euro-zone; adoption of the single currency would harm foreign trade and investment; British political institutions make it difficult to muster support for such a move, and so on. I argue that policy failure is a more important influence on British economic policy. Major changes occur when extant policy fails and there exists an alternative policy idea that both explains this failure persuasively and prescribes a new and more effective way forward. A British government might advocate euro membership if the current framework for policy in Britain - central bank independence with a floating exchange rate - fails, and policies pursued by the European Central Bank address the source of this failure. This combination would also lead many politicians, business leaders, and voters to see the advantages of euro membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eight years after the launch of its third stage, and on the brink of its expansion, the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has proven to be successful. However, EMU has also highlighted the diversity of its members economic performance, and their need to run larger public deficits than they initially committed to. This special issue attempts to find out what can be done to relieve the tensions in EMU. The source of EMU's difficulty seems to lie in its weak legitimacy, ambiguous gevernance, and asymmetric institutional design. The EU needs to improve its fiscal rules and streamline decision making in the European Central Bank without eroding legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the consequences of the political 'incompleteness' of the monetary union for the democratic accountability of its external monetary policy, comparing the euro area to the United States. In most countries, exchange-rate policymaking is substantially delegated to the finance ministry and central bank; oversight by other domestic actors is relatively weak. While this is true of the United States, the role of the Congress provides the possibility for 'democratic override' when policy diverges substantially from the preferences of a broad set of private sector interests. Europe's monetary union, by contrast, lacks such a mechanism; no institution can provide an effective check on the policies pursued by the core actors, the ECB and Eurogroup. A comparison of the postures of the United States and euro area toward Chinese exchange rate policy suggests that these institutional differences affect policy outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political economists have raised concerns that EMU's asymmetric institutional design leaves the project's legitimacy vulnerable to fluctuations in the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the euro. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that overall support for EMU within the euro area remained high over the period 1999-2005, thus allaying concerns over the project's legitimacy. At the same time, public attitudes towards EMU did vary from one euro-area member to another with perceived rather than actual economic performance appearing to be an important factor behind this cross-country variation. In policy terms, these findings underline the need for a system of euro-area economic governance that promotes a high degree of support for the single currency over the long-term. This will necessitate a more effective approach to output legitimation as well as policies that seek legitimacy for EMU by emphasising process, values and inputs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the ways in which the classical gold standard established the foundations for a modern international monetary system with its distinctive forms of crisis and regulatory frameworks. The specific nature of this transformation is often overlooked because of a tendency in the literature to compare the gold standard in relation to subsequent monetary systems, such as Bretton Woods. To remedy this historical bias, the classical gold standard is compared with previous monetary systems and it is concluded that it contributed to expand the array of monetary instruments for conducting monetary policy. By progressively subjecting the management of fiduciary money to state control the institutions of the gold standard created a new monetary framework that opened the way for central banking. However, the commitments taken to this effect, such as provisions on the convertibility of banknotes, created new opportunities for speculation. I argue that this new weakness would become the main preoccupation of monetary policy in the 20th century and lay down the foundations for international cooperation and its novel emphasis on monetary stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]