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The article presents several papers related developments in economics as realist social theory. According to the author, social theory expressly committed to work out the nature of social being, and, or how people access social reality is going through something of a revival in economics. The papers presented, provide numerous results, arguments, conjectures, and critiques have been produced in recent years, and aim to take some of these specific developments further. Context of the papers and basic ideas and results are presented.

This paper argues that a Kantian model of decision-making, one that incorporates moral duties alongside standard preferences and constraints, can account for the complexities of actual ethical choice within a model with a single (constrained) preference ranking. Multiple utilities are required only to explain the failure to make appropriate decisions. Such occasions, often referred to as cases of weakness of will or akrasia , are easily explained with this approach, which is also consistent with the recent work of philosopher John Searle on action theory and rational choice. More generally, this paper highlights the need for discussion of the will in economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper distinguishes between epistemological naturalism, which it supports, and ontological naturalism, which it opposes. It sketches the emergence of anti-naturalist social theory among nineteenth-century African-American intellectuals and its refinement by twentieth-century feminists. These movements challenged ontological naturalism in the social sciences by substituting social constructionist concepts of race and gender for naturalist ones. Economics awaits a similar liberation. The paper identifies four naturalist concepts-atomism, determinism and biologically determined race and gender differences--as structuring mainstream economic theory. It concludes that ontological naturalism is inconsistent with the application of the epistemology of the natural sciences to the social sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interrelation between John Stuart Mill's political economy and his social philosophy is often neglected by economists, even though social and moral progress is the aim and focus of Mill's work as scholarship on Mill has made clear in past decades. This paper aims to show how Mill's political economy fits his framework of progress. It is argued that Mill characterized his economics in accordance with his theory of (individual) development, which explained how people could be induced to change patterns of behavior that prevented progress, enabling “a tendency towards a better and happier state.” Mapping out how to overcome the Malthusian trap of poverty, the most serious stumbling block to man's material and moral improvement, Mill brought economics into action as an instrument for progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theorizing in economics is often associated with some form of individualism. This paper considers the nature of this association in the work of Carl Menger. I adopt this focus not only because of continuing interest in Menger's work, but because recent developments in social theory facilitate a fruitful reevaluation of his general position. I argue that a convincing link between theory and individualism is absent in Menger's work. Moreover, I argue that the various criticisms often made of his work actually relate to the ideas which underlie his individualism rather than, as is usually supposed, those arising from an adherence to a form of Aristotelianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Roemer has argued in favour of rehabilitating Kanitanism as an antidote to the kind of utilitarian incentivisation theories associated with neoliberal economics. This article asks whether the ethical thought of Kant is in fact fit for purpose. Placing Kant in dialogue with other contemporary enlightenment thinkers, it also questions whether 'solidarist' social theories solve the problems Roemer associates with their 'selfish' competitors, and indeed whether the two approaches can be so neatly distinguished. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This response shows that, in their reply to my critique of their work, Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis generally maintain the impression that there is a single, widely accepted definition of methodological individualism, but they do not identify it. They assert that social structures (undefined but seemingly specified to exclude law and institutions) have ‘analytical priority’ and logically (but tacitly) imply that individuals should have no part in the analysis of social or economic phenomena. They mischaracterise Hodgson's (2011) position on Marshall by quoting just one part-sentence out of context. Fine, Milonakis and Hodgson agree that the intellectual roots of the predominance of technique over substance in modern economics can partly be traced to the 1870–1900 period, but disagree on what they are. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Stuart Mill has traditionally been portrayed as self-contradictory and failing to construct a unified social theory. Recent scholarship, however, has challenged this view, finding Mill's work to be creatively synthetic in bridging the antinomies inherent in liberal democratic thought. This revisionist interpretation of Mill is advanced by an understanding of his theory of justice and its role in shaping his policy positions on issues such as welfare, education, voting rights, property rights, taxation, government intervention, and the future of capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]