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This response shows that, in their reply to my critique of their work, Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis generally maintain the impression that there is a single, widely accepted definition of methodological individualism, but they do not identify it. They assert that social structures (undefined but seemingly specified to exclude law and institutions) have ‘analytical priority’ and logically (but tacitly) imply that individuals should have no part in the analysis of social or economic phenomena. They mischaracterise Hodgson's (2011) position on Marshall by quoting just one part-sentence out of context. Fine, Milonakis and Hodgson agree that the intellectual roots of the predominance of technique over substance in modern economics can partly be traced to the 1870–1900 period, but disagree on what they are.

Hodgson's review of our books argues against us that marginalism neither adopted methodological individualism nor excluded the social from economics. Thus, he finds a partial solution to sickonomics in abandoning the term methodological individualism and using both structures and individuals as analytical starting point(s), revisiting Marshallian marginalism dressed up in socio-institutional clothing. He also denies any relationship between the current malaise in economics and the marginal revolution, as we claim, focusing exclusively on institutional developments since the Second World War. We show Hodgson is either partial or wrong on all of these counts. Firstly, his alternative to methodological individualism is untenable. Secondly, institutions, although implicitly present in Marshallian and Walrasian economics, play no substantive analytical role and as such are superfluous. Finally, although institutional factors help explain the sickness of modern economics (in addition to socioeconomic, ...

In their recent analysis of the alleged decay in modern economics, Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis claim to find its source and origin in the “marginal revolution” of the 1870s. They argue that this development led to “methodological individualism” and the detachment of economics from society and history. I contest their account of the marginal revolution and of the role of Alfred Marshall among others. They also fail to provide an adequate definition of methodological individualism. I suggest that neoclassical economics adopted a denuded concept of the social rather than removing these factors entirely. No such removal is possible in principle. It is also mistaken to depict neoclassical economics as the science of prices and the market. In truth, neoclassical economics fails to capture the true nature of markets. I consider some sketch an alternative explanation of the sickness of modern economics, which focuses on institutional developments since World War II.

The school of Analytical Marxism (henceforth, AM) has presented its work as response to certain crisis elements within Traditional Marxism (henceforth, TM). These crisis elements are both theoretico-analytical and historico-political; they involve questions about the validity of traditional Marxian categories (labor-values, exploitation, and so forth) and about the ability of TM to understand historical developments in both socialism and capitalism (Roemer 1986, 1-2 and 191). As a response to these crisis elements, AM has proposed that Marxian theory be reformulated from the standpoint of the principle of methodological individualism, and AM has indeed produced a transformation of the Marxian conceptual landscape, rejecting some concepts (labor values) while redefining others (exploitation). Our own view is rather critical of AM. While we recognize that there are problems with TM, and while we agree that these problems are significant enough to require a fundamental rethinking of Marxian theory, we do not believe that AM represents a successful attempt to reconceive the structure of Marxian theory. We believe, on the contrary, that AM represents a retreat from Marxian theory and, more precisely, a retreat even from those aspects of the Marxian tradition in which AM professes an interest. We believe, moreover, that whereas AM has claimed itself to be more scientific and analytically rigorous than TM, these claims of analytical rigor are a rhetorical device that only camouflages (though, perhaps, not consciously) the retreat from Marxian theory.1