Search

Law is a social-normative and linguistic phenomenon. For this reason it shares the characteristic of indeterminacy with language. The main manifestations of linguistic indeterminacy are ambiguity and vagueness, hence the need to resort to interpretation as the main tool for applying the Law. There are various theories on legal interpretation, as well as methods or interpretative canons to identify those interpretations that are valid, excluding arbitrary or irrational ones. In this article we have carried out a brief examination of the characteristic features of current law, the indeterminacy of law, legal interpretation and interpretive canons, as well as the main theories that have been proposed on the subject, to end by developing the interpretation criteria included in the Civil Code, in light of the doctrinal contributions found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses a general class of theories that attempt to base a normative account ofjustice on consent-giving procedures. Contemporary political philosophers offer many different accounts of justice, but at present consent-based theories are probably the most popular. Notwithstanding their (often understandable) appeal, I will argue they cannot possibly succeed. All consent-based theories trade on a crucial ambiguity as to whether they are supposed to be understood as voluntarist accounts ofjustice on the one hand, or as rationalist accounts on the other. In the former case, consent-based theories fail because they are at best indeterminate and at worst incoherent; in the latter case, they fail because they are superfluous. I will refer to this fatal ambiguity as "Cassirer's Dilemma." Interestingly, Cassirer's Dilemma is not at all new, on the contrary, it may be among the oldest problems plaguing western moral and political philosophy. Faced with this insurmountable difficulty, I believe we ought to abandon proceduralism and focus instead on developing substantive accounts of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]