The variance in electoral magnitude and in district malapportionment is relevant to understand the political consequences of the spanish electoral system. This paper proposes a threefold classification of districts into subsystems and validates it by its diverging results in fractionalization and proportionality. The inequality of electoral magnitudes places a special overrepresentation bonus on certain parties; and the same happens with malapportionment. Both things accumulate into a geographical electoral price which results in a conservative bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
In this paper we present a new electoral system for the Spanish Congress. This new system does not require any changes in the current Spanish Constitution. The main objectives are representativity, governability and equity. For this purpose, political party seats are allocated in several stages, and a biproportional allotment is applied to determine how many seats are allocated to each party in each constituency. The possibilities of forming stable governments, with the proposed electoral systems, are similar to those obtained with the present electoral system; however with the proposed system the results are more equal in the sense that two parties with a similar number of votes would obtain the same or nearly the same number of seats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Published
2010
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