Search

Spanish religious indicators have experienced one of the most drastic declines in Europe. The low levels of church attendance and religious denomination contributed to reject the perception of religiosity as a relevant explanatory factor of electoral behavior . However, leaders continued introducing debated related to secular education, divorce and abortion not only during the eighties, but also more recently from 2004 to 2011. The facts encourage us to reconsider the strength of the religious vote. Is the political elite able to mobilize religious voting through the inclusion of such issues in the electoral debate? In this paper I demonstrate that religiosity has been and still is a key element to understand Spanish electoral behavior, especially in those elections in which the political elite has focused the debate on issues related to moral issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spanish religious indicators have experienced one of the most drastic declines in Europe. The low levels of church attendance and religious denomination contributed to reject the perception of religiosity as a relevant explanatory factor of electoral behavior. However, leaders continued introducing debated related to secular education, divorce and abortion not only during the eighties, but also more recently from 2004 to 2011. The facts encourage us to reconsider the strength of the religious vote. Is the political elite able to mobilize religious voting through the inclusion of such issues in the electoral debate? In this paper I demonstrate that religiosity has been and still is a key element to understand Spanish electoral behavior, especially in those elections in which the political elite has focused the debate on issues related to moral issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although non-ideological voters make up a considerable share of the electorate, the literature has systematically overlooked their voting behaviour. Using Spanish electoral data from the 1979-2008 electoral period, we seek to identify the alternative cues —in the absence of ideology— these voters may use when casting their ballot. We do not find that evaluations of the incumbent's performance have a greater influence on non-ideological voters, as the retrospective voting literature suggests. Nor do we find that other shortcuts such as candidate evaluations or party identification are used more by this group when they vote. Instead, our results indicate that non-ideological voters have exchanged the traditional ideological shortcut for simple proincumbent voting as a decision rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spain is the country with the highest number of industrial disputes in the European Union. Moreover, figures show relevant differences across regions. In this article, an analysis is made of the strike frequency, participation and lost working days during the period 1987-2006. We relate these figures to the industrial distribution of employment, the unemployment rate, the existence of regional pacts and agreements and the political orientation of the population. The regressions show the influence of all these aspects on the frequency, the magnitude and the volume of strikes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses and compares two kinds of logic that explain electoral behaviour: the performance vote and the ideological vote. To be exact, this paper puts one of the main hypotheses of both theories to the test: that the rules guiding citizens' voting decisions are the same, regardless of their level of interest, knowledge and information about political matters. In order to do this, empirical material taken from post-electoral surveys in four democracies —Spain, Portugal, Hungary and Poland— is analysed. The data belongs to the second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES 2005) programme which contains information on citizens' electoral conduct and knowledge of politics. The results indicate that while the influence of political knowledge on the logic of the performance vote is clear and conclusive, it is much less conclusive in the case of the ideological vote. All this suggests that democratic control of governments through sanctioning their performance requires citizens to have minimum levels of knowledge and information about politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]