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This paper deals with the model of constitutional control in Peru. The author comes to historical, conceptual and jurisprudential sources for, on the one hand, identify and understand the context that gives rise to its origin and secondly, to analyze its procedural operation in Peru, baring the deficiencies that presents. Hence it is claimed that the Peruvian judicial review is a "model even put together". Finally, it states that the exploration of judicial review serves to clarify some concepts that link it very closely with constitutional interpretation, in the light not only of what holds the current comparison doctrine but also its reception in the jurisprudence of the Peruvian Constitutional Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on the amendment of Article 10 of the Normative of the Peruvian Constitutional Court to analyze a problem: the distinctions between the types of decisions handed down by the Constitutional Court (binding precedent, constitutional jurisprudence, interpretative rulings). It is held that this distinction undermines the status and role of Supreme Interpreter of the Constitution which currently holds the Constitutional Court. And it is argued that the type of decisions is inconsistent with that role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is based on the idea that the constitutional evolution of Peru designates a "process" in which happend gradually was consolidated an alteration in the structure of political and social relations that developed in our territory as a result of his inflection, or regulation based on constitutional texts or legal documents that served as such. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper develops the fields of social market economy regarding the constitutional protection of the healthy and balanced environment. It also raises the challenges of public and private investment in relation to extractive industries located in Peru. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper will analyze the procedural autonomy that the Constitutional Court has in order to solve the causes that are put under it knowledge. As it is observed, there are two theses; one of them totally denies the procedural autonomy to the Constitutional Court, but the other one agrees about the procedural autonomy of the Constitutional Court. From my point of view I consider that the Constitutional Court has procedural autonomy, which will be sustained throughout the present investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]