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Objectives: There are a limited number of studies about the cost-effectiveness of occupational health and safety (OSH) interventions. Applying the results of a cost-effectiveness study from one country to another is hampered by differences in the organization of healthcare and social security. In order to find out how these problems can be overcome, we transferred the results of a Dutch occupational cost-effectiveness study to the Finnish situation and vice-versa., Methods: We recalculated incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICER) for the target country based on resource use in the original study and the associated costs in the target country. We also allocated the costs to the employer, the employee, and tax-payers., Results: We found that the ICER did not differ very much from those in the original studies. However, the different healthcare funding structure led to a more unfavorable ICER for employers in the Netherlands. Both interventions represented a cost saving for tax-payers and employees. Employers had to invest euro10-54 to avert one day of sick leave., Conclusions: We conclude that results of cost-effectiveness studies can be transferred from one country to another, but many adjustments are needed. An extensive description of the intervention, a detailed list of resource use, allocation of costs to various parties, and detailed knowledge of the healthcare systems in the original studies are necessary to enable calculations.

Incentives are regarded as a promising policy tool for promoting occupational safety and health (OSH). This article discusses the potential of different kinds of incentives in light of economic theory and evidence from research. When incentives are used as a policy tool, it implies the existance of an institution that has both the interest and the power to apply incentives to stakeholders, usually to employers. Governments can subsidize employers' investments in OSH with subsidies and tax structures. These incentives are successful only if the demand for OSH responds to the change in the price of OSH investments and if the suppliers of OSH are able to increase their production smoothly. Otherwise, the subsidy will only lead to higher prices for OSH goods. Both public and private insurance companies can differentiate insurance premiums according to claim behavior in the past (experience rating). There is evidence that this can effectively lower the frequency of claims, but not the severity of cases. This papers concludes that incentives do not directly lead to improvement. When incentives are introduced, their objective(s) should be clear and the end result (ie what the incentive aims to promote) should be known to be effective in achieving healthy and safe workplaces.

Objective: Business cases are commonly developed as means to rationalize investment. We systematically reviewed 26 reported cases on occupational safety and health (OSH) interventions to assess if health and productivity arguments make a good business case., Methods: To be included in the review, studies had to analyze the costs and benefits, including productivity, of an OSH intervention at the enterprise level. We searched Medline and Embase for studies and used Google search in addition. Two reviewers independently selected studies and extracted data. The intervention profitability was calculated in euros (euro in 2008) as the first year's benefits minus the total intervention costs per worker. The payback period was calculated as the intervention costs divided by the first year's benefits., Results: We found three ex-ante and 23 ex-post cases. In 20 cases, the study design was a before-after comparison without a control group. Generally a 100% reduction of injuries or sickness absence was assumed. In two cases, productivity and quality increases were very large. The main benefit was avoided sick leave. Depreciation or discounting was applied only in a minority of cases. The intervention profitability was negative in seven studies, up to euro 500 per employee in 12 studies and more than euro 500 per employee in seven studies. The payback period was less than half a year for 19 studies. Only a few studies included sensitivity analyses., Conclusions: Few ex-ante business cases for management decisions on OSH are reported. Guidelines for reporting and evaluation are needed. Business cases need more sound assumptions on the effectiveness of interventions and should incorporate greater uncertainty into their design. Ex-post evaluation should be based preferably on study designs that control for trends at a time different from that of the intervention.