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Recent views recognize that abstract concepts encompass a variety of exemplars, each relying on different dimensions, including not only sensorimotor but also inner, linguistic, and social experiences. How these dimensions characterize types of abstract concepts, and whether their weight varies across contexts and individuals remains an open question. We investigated the role of linguistic and social situations in the processing of institutional concepts, such as justice, by individuals with different levels of expertise. In a priming study, legal experts and non-experts were asked to respond to target words (go-trials) consisting of different kinds of abstract (institutional, theoretical) and concrete concepts (food, tools) and to ignore filler words (no-go trials). The verbal stimuli were primed by pictures depicting social-action, linguistic-social, linguistic-textual situations, and a control condition. As predicted, critical priming modulated performance on abstract concepts, likely due to their highly context-dependent meaning. Interestingly, we found that the processing of institutional concepts was selectively facilitated by social action prime, suggesting that this situational content may be integrated to support their representation. Crucially, the dialogic context, the linguistic social prime, affected more non-experts than law-experts, who tended to frame institutional concepts as shared idea for regulating social practices. Our results show that linguistic and social inputs become differently salient for institutional concepts representation depending on individual competence., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Concepts allow us to make sense of the world. Most evidence on their acquisition and representation comes from studies of single decontextualized words and focuses on the opposition between concrete and abstract concepts (e.g., "bottle" vs. "truth"). A significant step forward in research on concepts consists in investigating them in online interaction during their use. Our study examines linguistic exchanges analyzing the differences between sub-kinds of concepts. Participants were submitted to an online task in which they had to simulate a conversational exchange by responding to sentences involving sub-kinds of concrete (tools, animals, food) and abstract concepts (PS, philosophical-spiritual; EMSS, emotional-social, PSTQ, physical-spatio-temporal-quantitative). We found differences in content: foods evoked interoception; tools and animals elicited materials, spatial, auditive features, confirming their sensorimotor grounding. PS and EMSS yielded inner experiences (e.g., emotions, cognitive states, introspections) and opposed PSTQ, tied to visual properties and concrete agency. More crucially, the various concepts elicited different interactional dynamics: more abstract concepts generated higher uncertainty and more interactive exchanges than concrete ones. Investigating concepts in situated interactions opens new possibilities for studying conceptual knowledge and its pragmatic and social aspects., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Influential lines of research propose dual processes-based explanations to account for both the cognitive cost implied in lying and for that entailed in the resolution of the conflict posited by Simon tasks. The emergence and consistency of the Simon effect has been proved to be modulated by both practice effects and transfer effects. Although several studies provided evidence that the lying cognitive demand may vary as a function of practice, whether and how transfer effects could also play a role remains an open question. We addressed this question with one experiment in which participants completed a Differentiation of Deception Paradigm twice (baseline and test sessions). Crucially, between the baseline and the test sessions, participants performed a training session consisting in a spatial compatibility task with incompatible (condition 1) or compatible (condition 2) mapping, a non-spatial task (condition 3) and a no task one (condition 4). Results speak in favour of a modulation of individual performances by means of an immediate prior experience, and specifically with an incompatible spatial training.

Stroop-like and Simon tasks produce two sources of interference in human information processing. Despite being logically similar, it is still debated whether the conflicts ensuing from the two tasks are resolved by the same or different mechanisms. In the present study, we compare two accounts of the Stroop-like effect. According to the Perceptual Account, the Stroop-like effect is due to Stimulus-Stimulus congruence. According to the Decisional Account, the Stroop-like effect results from the same mechanisms that produce the Simon effect, that is, Stimulus-Response compatibility. In two experiments we produced Stroop-like and Simon effects by presenting left/right-located stimuli consisting of a colored square surrounded by a frame of the same color as the square or of a different color. Results showed that discriminating either the color of the square (Experiment 1) or that of the frame (Experiment 2) yielded additive Stroop-like and Simon effects. In addition, the patterns of temporal distributions of the two effects were different. These results support the Perceptual Account of the Stroop-like effect and the notion that the Stroop-like effect and the Simon effect occur at different processing stages and are attributable to different mechanisms.

In two behavioural experiments we tested whether performing a spatial task along with another agent changes space representation by rendering some reference frames more/less salient than others. To this end, we used a Simon task in which stimuli were presented in four horizontal locations thus allowing for spatial coding according to multiple frames of reference. In Experiment 1 participants performed a go/no-go Simon task along another agent, each being in charge of one response. In Experiment 2 they performed a two-choice Simon task along another agent, each being in charge of two responses. Results showed that when participants were in charge of only one response, stimulus position was coded only with reference to the centre of the screen hence suggesting that the co-actor's response, or the position of the co-actor, was represented and used as a reference for spatial coding. Differently, when participants were in charge of two responses, no effect of the social context emerged and spatial coding relied on multiple frames of reference, similarly to when the Simon task is performed individually. These findings provide insights on the influence played by the interaction between the social context (i.e. the presence of others) and task features on individual performance.

In three experiments, we tested whether the amount of attentional resources needed to process a face displaying neutral/angry/fearful facial expressions with direct or averted gaze depends on task instructions, and face presentation. To this end, we used a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation paradigm in which participants in Experiment 1 were first explicitly asked to discriminate whether the expression of a target face (T1) with direct or averted gaze was angry or neutral, and then to judge the orientation of a landscape (T2). Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that participants had to discriminate the gender of the face of T1 and fearful faces were also presented randomly inter-mixed within each block of trials. Experiment 3 differed from Experiment 2 only because angry and fearful faces were never presented within the same block. The findings indicated that the presence of the attentional blink (AB) for face stimuli depends on specific combinations of gaze direction and emotional facial expressions and crucially revealed that the contextual factors (e.g., explicit instruction to process the facial expression and the presence of other emotional faces) can modify and even reverse the AB, suggesting a flexible and more contextualized deployment of attentional resources in face processing.