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This paper analyzes the correlations between Horkheimer and Adorno’s essay, “The concept of Enlightenment”, and Heidegger’s thinking. Without overlooking the differences that exist between the hermeneutical horizons in which these authors operate, the paper focuses on the points of convergence of their respective positions with regard to the interpretation of essential aspects of twentieth-century reality and its storied past. These include the shaping of modern science, its key role in the ontological constitution of reality as a calculable and producible entity, and the forms of domination that it generates through technique. Finally, it is suggested that this convergence is due to the common influence of Marx’s work. This is evident in the case of Horkheimer and Adorno’s work, but is also recognizable in Heidegger’s legacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ‘method of superposition’ is described through the singular use of the diagram, but it is appropriate to study the latter in the context of visual-linguistic cooperation, that is, in the framework of inferentially relevant expressive heterogeneity, characteristic of Euclidean proof. The purpose of this paper is then to examine the ‘method of superposition’ in detail, in particular, its argumentative strategy, doing justice to such heterogeneous modality. This examination identifies two salient features: a) an original inferential use of the diagram (systematically counterbalanced by the linguistic contribution), and b) a precise awareness of the deductive limits of such an association. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does environmental ethics have to say about the urban context? Is the city an environment that has only negative value or is it possible, and in fact necessary, to develop ethical recommendations about how to design it? In this paper, I argue for the second of these disjuncts and sketch some ideas for an environmental city ethics. I try to show that the most important principle of such an ethics is procedural: anyone affected by a decision about the urban environment must have the possibility to participate in the process of making it. This principle has certain preconditions and there are also limitations on its applicability. For example, it is plausible that there are certain ecocentric ethical obligations, which are valid independently of the implementation of the principle. I sketch an idea for how a city's green areas can help to raise citizens' awareness of these obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common knowledge the position of Kant regarding the immorality of suicide. Several authors attribute him an absolutist-forbidden criterion. Nerveless, there is no extended analysis about the metaphysical-conceptual definition of suicide in Kantian theory. In this paper I hold that suicide in Kant can be defined as physical death, full, self-referential, voluntary, and immoral. This definition conflicts with the definition of deprivation of life which is not immoral. As voluntarily acts, both suicide and deprivation of life are rational acts that can be understood as maxims of action. The immorality property of suicide is due to the primacy of moral over non-moral reasons (technical or pragmatic). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1976, Nagel and Williams presented --at the congress of the Aristotelian Society-- two famous texts aimed at exposing the challenge that chance and fortune represent for moral thought. Since then, hundreds of articles have proliferated in the literature focused on analyzing this dilemma. This debate, however, is rarely situated within the analysis of the implausible and false premises that give rise to it. In this paper I reconstruct the central coordinates in which this philosophical problem originates. Later, I show that imputation of ethical responsibility to an agent not only does not exclude, but even presupposes, what I will call an impure capacity for agency where luck occupies a central place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I analyze Leopoldo Zea's thinking as a system whose ideas are ultimately based on a certain set of principles; far from having an abstract or deductive nature, it grows through the intense dialogue to biography and history. To attain its goal, this paper interprets the writings of this thinker in the period 1940-1949 and analyzes and articulates his epistemological and political principles, so placing the rational foundations of his philosophy in his chrono-logical beginnings (archaeo-logical method). Because of its theme and method, it has an approach different in respect to the previous contributions of the secondary bibliography, provides elements for an assessment of the Mexican philosopher from the point of view of the basic structure of his thinking, and presents an example of balance between political commitment, relativism, pragmatism and the pursuit for universal knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I want to follow the steps that, according to the early Heidegger, bring to the emergence of the theoretical attitude by means of the transformation of the genuine attitude of our being in the world. In the first part I present some basic aspects of the Heideggerian categories of the pre-theoretical life. In the second one, I expose how this genealogy produces an essential difference with respect to Husserl's phenomenological framework. In the third one I develop a correspondence between Heidegger's genealogy of the theoretical and the one contained in the first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics. In the conclusion, I explain why according to Heidegger the Aristotelian prejudice about movement is the origin of the absolutization of the theoretical that lasts along the history of philosophy up to the present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is important in philosophy to know the influences between philosophers because of that it depends to have an accurate and more complete knowledge of their proposals. An example of this are the investigations about the stoics origins of Spinoza's philosophy, which has been increasing in the last decades but it is still necessary to inquire in greater detail, author by author and idea by idea, what kind of stoicism and what part of it influenced the Dutch philosopher. In this paper I examine, particularly from explicit references, the influence of the Stoic Seneca in Spinoza's philosophy, for which I review, analyze, and compare several passages of both philosophers' works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the relation between the singular and the universal in mythical thinking. The initial problem holds that, conventionally, due to its fantastic expressions, mythical thought is non-objective knowledge of the world; however, I will argue the opposite. Based on Cassirer's Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, I will present two results: firstly, an evaluation of how myth relates singular events with universal concepts, which allows the reassessment of myth as a valid epistemological form. Secondly, the main epistemological resource of myth is the idea of mutation, unlike science, which uses concepts to relate the singular with the universal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Habermas's weak naturalism, in particular, his discussion of the problem of free will and determinism. Habermas challenges the reductionist aspect of strong naturalism on the basis of an epistemological dualism--one he considers unsurpassable--between the perspectives of the observer and the participant of a dialogue, but he accepts the search for a monist vision of reality. However, although Habermas's attempt to expand the constrained vision of nature is welcomed, this paper offers a critique of his position due to the vagueness in his way of understanding the relation between philosophy and science and his attempt--however weak--to naturalize reason, by trying to bring together Kant with Darwin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of ideology is emblematic in Luis Villoro's thought. This paper aims to examine this concept in relation to the dialogue that Villoro established with the work of Karl Marx and the subsequent Marxist tradition. There are two issues of concern regarding the political dimension to the author. The first because of the vagueness of the term; the second, due to Marx's repressive use by the states that pretended to be his heirs. My main thesis is that Villoro proposed an ethics of belief as a response to his critical reassessment of the political and philosophical dilemmas contained in the concept of ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gottlob Frege held that concept-words refer only to concepts not to objects, and that singular terms refer only to objects not to concepts. These claims give rise to the concept paradox according to which 'The concept F' does not refer to a concept at all. Mark Textor asserts that his mirroring principle (MP) explains the source of this problem. However, I argue that Textor's paper falls short in explaining all the consequences that follow Frege's claims, and that my semantic ontological assumption (SSO) can be seen as a consequence of Textor's mirroring principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, Gerson (2010) and Catana (2013a) have proposed the banishment of the category "Neoplatonism" from the history of philosophy based on the analysis of the historical genesis of its emergence as a pejorative term. In this paper I argue, by contrast, that the historiographical analysis is not enough to repair the marginalization of Neoplatonic philosophers. It is necessary to attack, rather than the notion of "Neoplatonism", that of "originality". This notion has been imported from external models and has significant similarities with the concept of originality proposed by some copyright theorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empiricism has frequently been said to appeal to non-empirical principles to defend empirical knowledge, which is why it has been accused of falling into some form of self-refutation. With the advent of logical empiricism, this objection became a questioning of the empiricist criterion of meaning, noting that since it is neither a logical nor an empirical proposition, it does not fulfill its own conditions of meaningfulness. This paper intends to show that responses to this criticism, consistent enough to resist the objection of self-refutation, have been developed whithin logical empiricism. In addition, the article claims that the assertion that the empiricist criterion of meaning is self-refuting is based on an inadequate understanding of the linguistic levels involved in its formulation, as well as on some unspecified assumptions regarding its status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]