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This paper analyzes the relation between the singular and the universal in mythical thinking. The initial problem holds that, conventionally, due to its fantastic expressions, mythical thought is non-objective knowledge of the world; however, I will argue the opposite. Based on Cassirer's Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, I will present two results: firstly, an evaluation of how myth relates singular events with universal concepts, which allows the reassessment of myth as a valid epistemological form. Secondly, the main epistemological resource of myth is the idea of mutation, unlike science, which uses concepts to relate the singular with the universal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is difficult to frame Leibniz's treatment of imagination in his broader gnoseological theory. On the one hand, some of his texts seem to relate imagination with a poor display of cognitive faculties; on the other hand, there is textual evidence that the imagination plays a major role on his gnoseological theory, as presented in the New Essays. The aim of this paper is to analyze this role in connection with Leibniz's theory of expression and apperception. To do so, I will present first a brief outline of these two latter notions; second, I will relate them to the concept of imagination. Finally, I will give some guidelines to explain the apparent contradictions in Leibniz's writings on imagination, in order to show its epistemological role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]