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In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of a total preorder for assessing the mobility associated with any pair of rankings relative to a same group by means of a new class of rank-mobility measures. These measures constitute a strong generalization of Spearman's ρ index. The problem of dealing with mobility of subgroups, which is a pressing issue in several and various applicative contexts ranging from the use of socio-economic indicators to information retrieval, is addressed in terms of partial permutations which include standard permutations as a special case. Literature is lacking in a theoretical discussion for comparing mobility of variable-size subgroups: we show that our axiomatic approach fills this gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A social dichotomy function maps a collection of weak orders to a set of dichotomous weak orders. Every dichotomous weak order partitions the set of alternatives into approved alternatives and disapproved alternatives. The Borda mean rule returns all dichotomous weak orders that approve all alternatives with above-average Borda score and disapprove alternatives with below-average Borda score. We show that the Borda mean rule is the unique social dichotomy function satisfying neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness, and the quasi-Condorcet property. Our result holds for all domains of weak orders that are sufficiently rich, including the domain of all linear orders and the domain of all weak orders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An axiomatic analysis of the concept of unequal exchange (UE) between countries is developed in a dynamic general equilibrium model that generalises John Roemer's (Central Planning and the Soviet Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1983) economy with a global capital market. The class of UE definitions that satisfy three fundamental properties-including a correspondence between wealth, class and UE exploitation status-is completely characterised. It is shown that this class is nonempty and a definition of UE exploitation between countries is proposed, which is theoretically robust and firmly anchored to empirically observable data. The full class and UE exploitation structure of the international economy is derived in equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the possibility of defining a non-utilitarian normative standard for assessments of welfare and deprivation. The paper formalises a key aspect of Amartya Sen's critique of the assumption of consistent utility-maximisation in the revealed preference theory and proposes a generalisation of the standard Samuelsonian choice model for the case in which choices are based on plural motives (here, self-interested and moral motives). Based on a set of intuitive assumptions about the way in which unobservable motives are linked to observable choices, we then construct an alternative normative ranking rule that can be used in non-utilitarian welfare economics to rank social outcomes or provide a normative basis for the construction of composite indices, for instance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic systems generate various distributions of opportunity sets for individuals to choose consumption bundles. This paper presents an axiomatic analysis of distributions of opportunity sets. We introduce three properties for distributions of opportunity sets, and show that they axiomatically characterize the distributions of the budget sets in the market economy. We also axiomatically characterize the distribution of equal-income budget sets by considering two equity properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We provide alternative axiomatic characterizations of the extended egalitarian rules (Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, Econometrica 74:1419-1427, ) in a fixed-population setting of the canonical resource allocation model based on individual capabilities (output functions). Our main axioms are disability monotonicity (no reduction in the amount of resources allocated to an agent after she becomes more disabled) and agreement (when there is a change in agents' capabilities or total resources, all agents who remain unchanged should be influenced in the same direction: all unchanged agents get more or all get less or all get the same amount as before). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]