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In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of a family of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (Soc Choice Welf 27:171-197, ) for voting rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a new method for conducting Single transferable vote (STV) elections and provide a unified method for describing classic STV procedures (the Gregory Method, the inclusive Gregory method and the Weighted inclusive Gregory method) as an iterative procedure. We also propose a modification for quota definition that improves the theoretical properties of the procedures. The method is justified by utilising a new set of axioms. We show that this method extends the Weighted inclusive Gregory method with the modified definition of quota and random equiprobable selection of a winning coalition in each iteration. The results are extended to the methods, allowing fractional numbers of votes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued that if a finite partially ordered population is given, and incomparability is taken as the relevant type of dissimilarity, then diversity comparisons between subpopulations may be conveniently based on widths namely on the maximum number of pairwise incomparable units they include. We introduce two width-based rankings. The first one is the plain width-ranking of subposets as induced by width computation. The second one is the undominated width-ranking of subposets namely the ranking induced by the sizes of undominated subposets. Simple axiomatic characterizations of the foregoing rankings are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the literature on the evaluation of sets of opportunities. The starting point is Lancaster's characteristics approach. However, instead of assuming the existence of a canonical utility function, a reference point or reference level is postulated from which an agent evaluates set expansions in appropriate directions. One of the major tools for this exercise is the notion of directed cones. Desirability of characteristics is restricted to the interior of these cones. Satiation and non-monotonic evaluation is considered as well. An axiomatic characterization for various cases is provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If a group is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of the group members. The group members may have different information, different prior beliefs and even different domains (algebras) within which they hold beliefs, accounting for differences in awareness and conceptualisation. As is shown, group beliefs can incorporate all information spread across individuals without individuals having to explicitly communicate their information (that may be too complex or personal to describe, or not describable in principle in the language). The group beliefs derived here take a simple multiplicative form if people's information is independent (and a more complex form if information overlaps arbitrarily). This form contrasts with familiar linear or geometric opinion pooling and the (Pareto) requirement of respecting unanimous beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

problem of axiomatic construction of a social decision function is studied for the case when individual opinions of agents are given as m-graded preferences with arbitrary integer m ≥ 3. It is shown that the only rule satisfying the introduced axioms of Pairwise Compensation, Pareto Domination and Noncompensatory Threshold and Contraction is the threshold rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we provide an application-oriented characterization of a class of distance functions monotonically related to the Euclidean distance in terms of some general properties of distance functions between real-valued vectors. Our analysis hinges upon two fundamental properties of distance functions that we call “value-sensitivity” and “order-sensitivity”. We show how these two general properties, combined with natural monotonicity considerations, lead to characterization results that single out several versions of Euclidean distance from the wide class of separable distance functions. We then discuss and motivate our results in two different and apparently unrelated application areas—mobility measurement and spatial voting theory—and propose our characterization as a test for deciding whether Euclidean distance (or some suitable variant) should be used in your favourite application context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people’s impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people’s judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the ‘constrained equal-award’ solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Equal Division Core (EDC) of a transferable utility cooperative game (TU game) is the set of efficient pay-off vectors for the grand coalition which are not blocked by the equal division allocation for any sub-coalition. Our objective is to provide an axiomatic characterization of the EDC as a solution of TU games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we present a constructive, behavioural and axiomatic approach to the notion of a stable set as a model of the standard of behaviour of a social organisation. The socially stable set we introduce is a generalisation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. In contrast with the original version, our stability concept is always solvable. The standard of behaviour, reflecting the established conceptual order of a society or organisation, emerges from a dominance relation on alternative conceptions that are relevant with regard to a certain issue. This common social choice phenomenon, that permeates our societies and organisations, we have tried to clarify. Two axiomatic characterisations as well as a construction algorithm for socially stable sets are presented. These characterisations are based on behavioural postulates regarding the individual or collective strategic behaviour of effective sets. Relations between socially stable sets and other notions of stability are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hotelling (1929) studied two competing firms choosing their locations on a street. We consider instead a planner who builds two identical public facilities (e.g., libraries, parks, bridges, etc). We ask a normative question: Where should the planner build these facilities? We prove an axiomatic characterization of the efficient social choice rules that satisfy what is called the replacement-domination, which is a formulation of the idea of “solidarity” among the agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract. Consider an agent with fuzzy preferences. This agent, however, has to make exact choices when faced with different feasible sets of alternatives. What rule does he follow in making such choices? This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a class of binary choice rules called the alpha satisfying rule. When alpha = 1, this rule is the Orlovsky choice rule. On the other hand, for alpha less than or equal to 1/2, the rule coincides with the M[sub alpha] rule that has been extensively analyzed in the literature on fuzzy preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we extend the axiomatic analysis of equitable opportunities developed in Kranich [6] from finite to continuous opportunity sets. This extended framework is amenable to economic applications. The main results establish conditions under which an ordinal ranking of profiles of opportunity sets can be represented by a cardinal advantage function which describes both the extent of inequality and the distribution of advantage among the agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]