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Abstract: The Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) has been introduced to reduce child morbidity and mortality in countries with a poor health infrastructure. Previous studies have documented a poor adherence to clinical guidelines, but little is known about the reasons for non-adherence. This mixed-method study measures adherence to IMCI case-assessment guidelines and identifies the reasons for weak adherence. In 2007, adherence was measured through direct observation of 933 outpatient consultations performed by 103 trained clinicians in 82 health facilities in nine districts in rural Tanzania, while clinicians' knowledge of the guidelines was assessed through clinical vignettes. Other potential reasons for a weak adherence were assessed through both a health worker- and health facility survey, as well as by a qualitative follow-up study in 2009 in which in-depth interviews were conducted with 40 clinicians in 30 health facilities located in two of the same districts. Clinicians performed 28.4% of the relevant IMCI assessment tasks. The level of knowledge was considerably higher than actual performance, suggesting that lack of knowledge is not the only constraint for improved performance. Other important reasons for weak performance seem to be 1) lack of motivation to adhere to IMCI guidelines, stemming partly from a weak belief in the importance of following the guidelines and partly from weak intrinsic motivation, and 2) a physical and/or cognitive “overload”, resulting in lack of capacity to concentrate fully on each and every case and a resort to simpler rules of thumb. Poor remunerations contribute to several of these factors. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Mothers are commonly blamed for the ill-health of their children, and this is well documented in research. However, few studies have considered gendered patterns of blame for hereditary conditions caused by mutations from both parents through dual, shared genetic inheritance. This paper explores the 'gendering' of blame in the context of an inherited blood disorder known as sickle cell disease. The findings are drawn from 18 focus group discussions with 117 caregivers of children with sickle cell disease in Malawi and Uganda. Although one mutation from each parent is required for the disease to develop, low awareness about their status as healthy carriers of a sickle cell trait complicated the caregivers' recognition and acceptance of their genetic link to the child's condition. This study demonstrates how fathers and other members of the paternal side of the child's family would deflect blame from their own lineage by directing sole 'genetic responsibility' for the child's disease towards mothers. We discuss the implications of gendered blame on household dynamics and healthcare-seeking for children with sickle cell disease in this setting. • Sickle cell disease develops if the child inherits one mutation from each parent. • Low awareness about sickle cell disease led to gendered blame-shifting. • Mothers were attributed sole genetic responsibility for the child's condition. • Invisible inheritance through healthy carriers may cause gendered patterns of blame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Payment for Performance (P4P) aims to improve provider motivation to perform better, but little is known about the effects of P4P on accountability mechanisms. We examined the effect of P4P in Tanzania on internal and external accountability mechanisms. We carried out 93 individual in-depth interviews, 9 group interviews and 19 Focus Group Discussions in five intervention districts in three rounds of data collection between 2011 and 2013. We carried out surveys in 150 health facilities across Pwani region and four control districts, and interviewed 200 health workers, before the scheme was introduced and 13 months later. We examined the effects of P4P on internal accountability mechanisms including management changes, supervision, and priority setting, and external accountability mechanisms including provider responsiveness to patients, and engagement with Health Facility Governing Committees. P4P had some positive effects on internal accountability, with increased timeliness of supervision and the provision of feedback during supervision, but a lack of effect on supervision intensity. P4P reduced the interruption of service delivery due to broken equipment as well as drug stock-outs due to increased financial autonomy and responsiveness from managers. Management practices became less hierarchical, with less emphasis on bureaucratic procedures. Effects on external accountability were mixed, health workers treated pregnant women more kindly, but outreach activities did not increase. Facilities were more likely to have committees but their role was largely limited. P4P resulted in improvements in internal accountability measures through improved relations and communication between stakeholders that were incentivised at different levels of the system and enhanced provider autonomy over funds. P4P had more limited effects on external accountability, though attitudes towards patients appeared to improve, community engagement through health facility governing committees remained limited. Implementers should examine the lines of accountability when setting incentives and deciding who to incentivise in P4P schemes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]