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Financial support for children's medical expenses has been introduced in many countries. Limited work has been done on price elasticity in children's healthcare demand, especially in countries other than the United States. Moreover, it remains unclear how the effects of a change in the cost sharing rate on healthcare demand would differ by medical condition. We investigated the impact of an increase in the cost sharing rate on medical service utilization among school children as a whole and for each of nine common conditions, applying a difference-in-differences approach. The study period ranged from April 1, 2012, to March 30, 2014. Participants were elementary school children in an urban area who were eligible for National Health Insurance (a community-based public insurance) during the study period and who were enrolled in the 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade in April 2013. We collected observations from 2896 persons and 69,504 (2896 × 24 months) person-months. When elementary school children were promoted to the 4th grade, they became disqualified for a municipal medical subsidy. The control group was the children promoted to the 2nd or the 3rd grade, who remained eligible for the subsidy. All data were obtained from health insurance claims. We identified the nine most common medical conditions among the subject children, and stratified the analyses by the condition diagnosed. We found that an increase in the cost sharing rate reduced outpatient service utilization as a whole. Also, we observed an increase in inpatient service utilization, not because of worsened health conditions, but rather due to substitution of inpatient service for outpatient service. The reductions in outpatient service were heterogeneous across medical conditions; declines were sharper for mild or chronic conditions. These findings may help to characterize how a change in cost sharing rate affects health outcomes in children.

The geographical distribution of health professionals reflects behavioral characteristics of such professionals and of the health system in which they work. The spill-over hypothesis asserts that their oversupply leads to a more even geographic distribution. The current surplus of dentists in Japan is a suitable opportunity to observe such situations. This study demonstrates the transition of the geographic distribution of dentists from 1980 to 2000 in comparison with that of physicians. Using data from the Population Census and the Physician, Dentist, and Pharmacist Census, we calculated the ratio of dentists working in clinics and hospitals per population in 1980, 1990, and 2000 and the Gini coefficients according to the municipality boundaries at the end of 2000. We also plotted the municipalities on a graph, which illustrated the ratios of the dentists by population. We did the same analysis with physician data. The number of dentists increased by 71% during the 20 years studied. The ratios of dentists/100,000 population were 44.1, 58.3, and 69.7 in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively. The Gini coefficients for dentists by municipality were 0.270, 0.213, and 0.197, excluding the municipalities with a dental university or its hospital. In contrast, the Gini coefficients for physicians barely changed while the number of physicians increased by 60% during the same periods. The graphs for dentists appeared to indicate the ceiling of those ratios (approximately 100 dentists/100,000 population), but such a ceiling was not seen for physicians. The supply of dentists might have reached a level that generated the geographic diffusion and redistribution of dentists in Japan, in contrast with the situation involving physicians. This supports some results from other countries suggesting that saturation of local markets for health professionals may result in geographical redistribution, producing a more equal pattern of provision across the national space.

Oncologists encounter the uncertainty of time horizons in their patients' lives. Although American oncologists are given a cultural mandate to instill hope in the therapeutic narratives they create with patients, uncertainty leads them to expressions of time without horizons or of time with highly foreshortened horizons as they seek to create for patients an experience of immediacy rather than of chronology. The distinctiveness of the American pattern is highlighted through comparison with Japanese exemplar cases and stories of therapeutic practices in oncology. Concepts drawn from narrative analysis of temporality and the construction of the therapeutic plot are employed.

This paper examines the financing of elderly health care in Japan for medical institutions, nursing homes, and at home. The analysis demonstrates that the conventional figures for elderly health expenditures in Japan systematically underestimate the real costs by excluding the costs of uninsured services, nursing homes, and home health care. The paper estimates these costs and shows that they add about 10% to the conventional figure for elderly health care costs in Japan. This inquiry also shows how government policy for health care financing shaped distinctive Japanese patterns of elderly care provision. The financing system provided a hidden subsidy--through national health insurance coverage of long-term hospitalization--that encouraged high institutionalization rates of elderly in medical facilities. Public financing for long-term elderly hospitalization, however, has not been matched by government attention to quality of care, resulting in serious quality problems and reflecting a social trade-off between cost and quality. Also, until recently the financing system rarely reimbursed home health care, thereby creating strong disincentives to the development of formal home health care services. This analysis has important implications for reforms now being considered by the Japanese government in the financing and provision of health care for the elderly, especially the limitations of relying on reimbursement price policy. The reforms could have unintended negative consequences for equity, efficiency, and quality of care.