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The classification of novel disease events is central to public health action surrounding them. Drawing upon the sociology of scientific classification, this article examines the role and contestation of the World Health Organization’s Pandemic Alert Phases, as applied to the spread of 2009/10 H1N1 Influenza. The analysis of World Health Organization texts, including policy documents, public statements and epidemiological documents, has been utilized to examine the Organization’s actions and public narratives around the event of H1N1. Analytically, the functional role of such classificatory schemes and the social construction of scientific classifications are examined. It is argued that in understanding the World Health Organization’s 2009/10 application of the Pandemic Alert Phases, the critical limitation of the functions served by the classificatory scheme led to the breakdown of its construction. This case study highlights the importance of classification for the successful production of scientific ‘facts’, the constructed nature of classificatory systems and the potential for contestation that arises when such classifications do not adequately fulfil their functional roles. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Researchers interested in the structure of scientific fields have documented increases in specialization and collaboration. How, if at all, are these two trends related? Is specialization so severe that scholars cannot collaborate unless they share specific research interests? Or, have specializing tendencies promoted research that joins specialty areas and broaches new topics? We answer these important questions for a single discipline, sociology, using both qualitative interviews and latent profile analysis. We empirically identify three collaborative styles that depend on both the areas and extent of specialization in coauthors' research programs. The prominence of the reinforcing generalist profile suggests that specialization in science mainly serves to encourage scholars to work with others in their specialty area. However, the existence of two other styles - a more complementary one and one that is characterized by migration into new intellectual terrain - suggests that subfields within sociology are permeable enough to permit boundary-spanning, original research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Divisions between variable oriented and person-oriented approaches in social and behavioral research are newly drawn. Yet few person oriented approaches have been fully articulated; those that have are predominantly quantitative This work presents an argument for a qualitative, person oriented study of careers; an approach identified as careers in context Based on a national study of scientists, this contextualist approach is grounded by three interacting, but analytically distinct, emphases to suggest how careers can be studied in and beyond science: (1) an emphasis on time and place as under-utilized dimensions on which to direct further study of careers; (2) an emphasis on the subjective career as a concept that qualitatively encapsulates temporal and spatial dimensions; and (3) an emphasis on career study in life course perspective. Subjectively (and objectively), careers are, of course, not static. By situating subjective careers in the times and places in which they occur, we are drawn to how those careers ‘play out’ over the course of the lives of the people leading them. This paper concludes by stressing ways in which contextual studies of careers in and beyond science will advance our understanding in five larger domains of social process: identity construction; institution building; social psychological differentiation; job satisfaction; and mystification of work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The communication between distinct social worlds or forms of life is a central topic in the sociology of knowledge. How do different communities interact with each other? Based on a sociological analysis of the work of Japanese-Portuguese interpreters in the Brazilian steel industry, I argue that the ‘language barrier’, which is normally thought as a problem, can aid communication by preventing people who hold potentially clashing concepts, beliefs and customs from directly confronting each other. The importance for such people of not understanding each other is revealed in the work of interpreters, who facilitate the interaction between representatives of different steel companies and support the transfer of technology from Japan to Brazil. They maintain cordial relationships by acting as ‘buffers’ between the Japanese and Brazilian forms of life. Three ‘models of mediation’ are discussed in a comparison of the Japanese-Portuguese interpreters with other cases of interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The priority dispute between Raymond Damadian and Paul Lauterbur over the ‘invention’ of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) has attracted the attention of social and natural scientists for more than 30 years. In this paper, I have used this priority dispute to analyze the complex socio-epistemic processes through which a claim for an invention is made and strengthened. I argue that a tension exists because techno-scientific practices are embedded within a particular disciplinary regime of authorship: even though techno-scientific practices occur through distributed cognition and are contingent upon particular socio-epistemic contexts, a claim for an invention requires assigning authorship to a particular person, company, or institution in order to clearly define the origin and the novelty of that particular techno-scientific event. Nevertheless, the outcomes of socio-epistemic practices for making and strengthening priority claims are shifting, open-ended, and contingent upon particular socio-epistemic contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives a characterization of distributed cognition (d-cog) and explores ways that the framework might be applied in studies of science. I argue that a system can only be given a d-cog description if it is thought of as performing a task. Turning our attention to science, we can try to give a global d-cog account of science or local d-cog accounts of particular scientific projects. Several accounts of science can be seen as global d-cog accounts: Robert Merton's sociology of scientific norms, Philip Kitcher's 20th-century account of cognitive labor, and Kitcher's 21st-century notion of well-ordered science. Problems that arise for them arise just because of the way that they attribute a function to science. The paper concludes by considering local d-cog accounts. Here, too, the task is the crux of the matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers comments of the author on Hurricane Katrina and focuses on what one might expect from the U.S. public inquiries and official investigations in the aftermath of disaster. The huge disaster and the many actors involved, can prolong the series of investigations. Moreover, the massive redressive measures are likely to continue producing second-order overflows. The wave of scrutiny and blame that Katrina unleashed will prove impossible to contain quickly or neatly.

This article presents list of books by Robert K. Merton. Many of the books are written and assisted by other authors. Some of them are: "Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England," "The Family Encounters," "Social Theory and Social Structure," "Continuities in Social Structure," "Patters of Social Life: Exploration in Sociology of Housing," "Contemporary Social Problems," "The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations," and "The Sociology of Science in Europe."

This paper is reminiscence and a critique of Robert K. Merton's work in the sociology of science. The author got to know Merton very well as he served as his student assistant, and colleague for 15 years from 1960. Merton's works which are most discussed are his doctoral dissertation on Puritanism and science, his paper on scientific norms, and his paper 'The Matthew Effect'. He is criticized for not generalizing far enough from his work on the Puritan thesis and for not paying close enough attention to the empirical data, which cast doubt on the validity of his theory of the Matthew Effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a response of the author, to Martin Kusch's article "Rule-Scepticism and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge." Philosopher Martin Kusch re-opens the controversy between David Bloor and Michael Lynch over the application of Ludwig Wingenstein's philosophy to the problem of rule-scepticism. Kusch comes down on Bloor's side against Lynch's deflationist argument, but opposes floor's claim to have answered the sceptic. Bloor and Kusch agree that the sceptic can be answered and they also agree upon the form that an adequate answer needs to take. Kusch denies that Bloor's argument satisfies the requirements: namely, for a non-circular reductive explanation in which "intentionality" is derived from "non intentional" causes. According to the author, arguments about whether they should "explain practices" sociologically or otherwise are apt to be complicated by the fact that scarcely anyone takes the trouble to make clear what it is about practices, that can be explained.

This article focuses on rule-scepticism. In the article, the author presents a reply to Martin Kusch for his article on rule-skepticism. According to the author, in the original exchange with Michael Lynch two things were at stake: first, they disagreed on the best way to analyze science as a social activity, and second, they disagreed on how to exploit the legacy of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's work in the course of such an analysis. Lynch opts for an ethnomethodological approach, which is descriptive but not explanatory in any causal way; the author opted for a form of the sociology of knowledge in which the aspiration to provide causal explanations plays a central role. Lynch sees Wittgenstein's work as constituting a challenge to the sociologist, while the author sees it as a resource that can be used to deepen and further the sociological enterprise. Although they have a running disagreement about the interpretation of particular arguments in the Philosophical Investigations they agree, in general terms, that Wittgenstein's work is capable of being read in either way. Predictably, they define fruitfulness differently. The result is that Lynch sees Wittgenstein as an embryonic ethnomethodologist; the author sees him as a proto-sociologist.

This article presents reply of the author to his critics. In this article, he expresses gratitude to David Bloor and Wes Sharrock for their lengthy responses to his article "Rule-Scepticism and the Sociology of Knowledge." According to the author, he has said a little about philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his paper. In his reply, Bloor speaks of "Wittgenstein's reductive approach to meaning" and aligns Wittgenstein with his own reductionist ambitions. Whether Bloor's move is defensible depends on what the author means by "reductionism" or "reductive approach." Bloor is surprised that the author finds his position vis-a-vis reductionism ambiguous. In order to make sense of his assessment, he assumes that he must, have ignored "half of the theory" that he puts forward in his article, "Wittgenstein: Rules and Institutions." The author agrees with Bloor that Barry Barnes' work on designation devices is of great interest. Bloor's discussion of Barnes' theory displays precisely the ambiguity that the author was worried about in his paper. According to Bloor, Barnes' paper shows that a structure of non-intentional processes can provide the underpinning and matrix for sustaining intentional processes and which derive their intentionality from it.

This article presents information about the book "Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama," by Stephen Hilgartner. Hilgartner's book is great, not just because it is about an interesting subject, but because it reveals and celebrates the development of the field, the maturity of the field, it is Latourian, but it is not actor networks. It links up with classical sociology, the man himself, Erving Goffman. The book combines organizational analysis with discourse analysis impeccably, and throws in new literary forms for good measure. Most important are the questions that it raises a litany of some of the most significant issues for science studies. Everyone knows that knowledge, claims generated from research studies are important, these are High Science. Media science is important, press releases, science writing and so forth, this is Low Science. The subject of the study is the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Now it is considered to be part of the National Academies. This NAS is indeed a national resource, unbelievably understudied.

Can sociological variables significantly predict researchers' positions on a scientific issue? Carcinogenesis offers a good test case because it is not definitively established how important man-made substances are as contributors to human cancer. American cancer researchers divide on this issue, some broadly emphasizing the importance of man-made carcinogens, others consistently minimizing their importance relative to natural carcinogens. We find that cancer researchers who are male, are affiliated with a medical school, and have more publications, are more likely than their colleagues to minimize the importance of man-made carcinogens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much debate has taken place in science and technology studies (S&TS) regarding how to speak about the capacities of technology. Alternative approaches are bound up with questions over the merits of realist and relativist accounts of technology and their potential for analytical insight and practical engagement. This paper advances a basis for examining the link between politics and artefacts, one that draws on but reconfigures the work of post-essentialist authors. This is done by moving away from attempts to detail the social basis of technology to consider instead where the ambiguities associated with technology are resolved. These issues are examined through the case of a (re-)emerging class of devices called 'non-lethal' weapons and, in particular, the chemical incapacitant spray used by British police forces. In doing so, this paper reframes debates in technology studies over how far it is possible and desirable to pursue relativist lines of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent report from the UK House of Lords on Science and Society proposes that the public's understanding of science should not be construed on the 'deficit' model, but approached through improved 'dialogue'. This Comment suggests that this approach is insufficient in itself: what is required is the effective 'empowerment' of the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When abstract quantitative and generalizing sociologies are juxtaposed to qualitative sociologies, the relationship is often seen as complementary or competitive. Our purpose is to articulate a different type of relationship between abstract social scientific knowledge (as exemplified in Survey Research [SR]) and the form of concrete and particularized knowledge represented in ethnomethodological conversation analysis. SR, historically, represents what we (following Jean Converse) refer to as the `ascendance of the objectivized subjective realm'. Like other kinds of (in Ted Porter's phrase) `mechanical objectivity', this ascendance is everywhere made possible because it is accompanied by practitioners' (researchers' and interviewers') tacit practical forms of knowledge that enable them to work through the situated problems endemic to SR. As endeavours that locate orderliness and social organization in the details of actual social activity, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis find that SR Centres have intrinsic interest as sites of locally-produced structures. Investigating the situated tacit practices of investigators actually conducting SR and survey interviews, ethnomethodological and conversation analytical approaches to SR are also akin to the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), which has largely investigated practices in natural science laboratories. This may suggest that there is `symmetry' between natural and social science, but we also argue that `asymmetry' is a serviceable notion for science studies. Indeed, understanding the asymmetry between survey-based and ethnomethodological social sciences offers potential for communication (rather than a `state of non-intercourse') between sociologists and the scientists they study. As an illustration of the Sociology of Social Scientific Knowledge (SSSK), we examine a successful attempt at `refusal conversion' in an SR Centre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT In this paper we investigate the intricacies of an admirable water pumping device - the Zimbabwe Bush Pump 'B' type - so as to find out what makes it an 'appropriate technology'. This turns out to be what we call the 'fluidity' of the pump (of its boundaries, or of its working order, and of its maker). We find that in travelling to intractable places, an object that isn't too rigorously bounded, that doesn't impose itself but tries to serve, that is adaptable, flexible and responsive - in short, a fluid object - may well prove to be stronger than one which is firm. By analyzing the success and failure of this device, its agency and the way in which it shapes new configurations in the Zimbabwean socio-technical landscape, we partake in the current move in science and technology studies to transform what it means to be an actor. And by mobilizing the term love for articulating our relation to the Bush Pump, we try to contribute to shaping novel ways of 'doing' normativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT In recent decades, large-scale product liability litigation, so-called 'mass torts', have become increasingly visible on the US legal and political landscape. Invariably, mass tort litigation incorporates a range of specialist scientific knowledges. Drawing upon fairly conventional images of law and science, most judges and legal commentators attribute the apparent difficulties encountered in addressing the refractory issues involved with scientific evidence in mass torts to uncertainties, jury incomprehension, partisan scientists and the distortion of evidence caused by the adversarial legal system ('sociologies of error'). Adopting a more symmetrical social constructivist approach to scientific evidence, this paper endeavours to account for some of the complexities in the litigation surrounding the anti-nausea drug Bendectin. Rather than interpret the Bendectin litigation as an instance of the judges eventually valuing the scientific evidence properly, and thus resolving the controversy (the truth winning out), this paper explores the manner in which lawyers, scientists and judges together 'negotiated' a series of cases and judgments which privileged epidemiology as a means of 'resolving' a recurrent socio-legal 'problem'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sociological study of boundary-work and the political-economic approach of principal-agent theory can be complementary ways of examining the relationship between society and science: boundary-work provides the empirical nuance to the principal-agent scheme, and principal-agent theory provides structure to the thick boundary description. This paper motivates this complementarity to examine domestic technology transfer in the USA from the intramural laboratories of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH). It casts US policy for technology transfer in the principal-agent framework, in which politicians attempt to manage the moral hazard of the productivity of research by providing specific incentives to the agents for engaging in measurable research-based innovation. Such incentives alter the previously negotiated boundary between politics and science. The paper identifies the crucial rôle of the NIH Office of Technology Transfer (OTT) as a boundary organization, which mediates the new boundary negotiations in its routine work, and stabilizes the boundary by performing successfully as an agent for both politicians and scientists. The paper hypothesizes that boundary organizations like OTT are general phenomena at the boundary between politics and science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Steve Woolgar has urged the sociology of scientific knowledge to 'interrogate representation', and he has advocated an exploration of reflexivity issues as a means toward this end. However, ten years of scholarship addressing the meaning and purpose of a subdiscipline dedicated to displaying the social constructedness of all texts (including, at least by implication, its own) have yielded little. I propose an approach to the reflexivity dilemma, and to the larger question of 'representation', which differs significantly from those previously attempted. This alternative requires the genuinely radical step of considering a very different philosophy of language than the one(s) currently shared by SSK researchers and the scientists whose accounts constitute SSK's 'data'. Philosophies of language which might serve as instructive examples presently exist in the thought of some indigenous peoples, particularly American Indians. I explore one such philosophy as it is articulated by a Navajo student of traditional learning. I then show how such a philosophy of language reconfigures the reflexivity problem, and also offers SSK some ideas about how it might begin to do what it cannot presently do: formulate a genuinely radical interrogation of representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents responses and replies concerning the zero-sum assumption and the symmetry thesis. In this response the author cannot even begin to give a careful discussion of rival views of the possible relationships between the social and cognitive aspects of science. What she will attempt, however, is an explanation of why scientists and others often invoke the zero-sum assumption. To avoid prejudging the proper division of labour between sociologists and philosophers, here the author will speak of the person doing the case study as a historian.

This article presents the response of Noretta Koertge to the recent discussion in the journal of the book she edited. She describes features of scientific method and explains that scientists devote much of their energies to trying to exclude their own biases from their observations, and she lists the familiar techniques that are used to accomplish a degree of what is commonly called objectivity. It is noted that those who work in the history and sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) not only know scientific method and its aspirations, they value and cleave to it. Thus, SSK tries to generalize so that its results can be repeated in other settings, historical details are checked with respondents and, where possible, sources are carefully documented so that they can be checked by others.

How can we characterize an individual creator 'in vivo' - or, to use a more traditional category in philosophy, a knowing subject 'in the making'? While informed by philosophical modes of questioning, this paper addresses this problem using tools developed by anthropologists and sociologists of science. Based on two case studies - William X, a researcher working at France's largest petroleum company (Elf Aquitaine), and Stephen Hawking - the paper examines how these scientists came to distinguish themselves as creative geniuses. By breaking down the narrative representation of the creative process as a simple mental operation, the paper shows how creation is materially 'distributed' in specific tools, practices and social networks. Conversely, it demonstrates how and why the distribution of competences into heterogeneous practices provides an explanation of how a person becomes a singular, inventive individual. In conclusion, it proposes a new conceptualization of the knowing subject as the distributed-centred subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article comments on Langdon Winner's analysis of Moses' bridges. Winner claims that the bridges built by Moses are an example of a technology which has political qualities: by this he means that the bridges were designed to have a particular social effect. The critical structural features of the argument are pointed out. Winner constitutes a disjunction between the alleged appearance and the reality of the technology; he construes antecedent circumstances to account for this apparent disjunction; and he renders the effects of the technology as consistent with Moses' motives.

Peripheral countries are at a disadvantage with respect to the construction of scientific knowledge, which is mostly carried out by a small number of traditional core loci countries. However, in a few cases, groups of scientists are able to break through exclusion barriers. Sometimes they tackle relevant issues, share values and procedures with core loci representatives, and take part in heated controversies: in short, they participate in the construction of legitimate science. These scientists form 'centres of excellence' in scientifically marginal countries. In this paper, contextual conditions involving the emergence, establishment and decline of such enterprises are discussed, on the basis of examples drawn from the history of Chagas disease (Cd). In this history, we see a major discovery established, deconstructed and re-established. Quantitative analyses of publications on Cd over 70 years show the relation between the choice of different types of journals and methodological approaches, and the legitimation strategies adopted by different groups of practitioners. It also shows the outcomes of such strategies in terms of production concentration, emergence of new authors and growth of institutional work. This story shows that it is important for the pioneers to establish a different intellectual culture in their local environment. Unless they do so, and gain its acceptance among their immediate colleagues, the enterprise cannot preserve its status as a centre of excellence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Successful testing depends upon projecting from a test situation to the performance of a technology under working conditions. Some have argued that projection is made possible primarily through a collective agreement that the test circumstances and working conditions are similar in crucial ways. This paper argues that projection is better understood in many cases as a set of local practices through which testing produces change in a wider context of technology use. In the earthquake-engineering laboratory described here, this connection depends upon the circulation of skilled people, material objects and symbolic representations across distinct work settings, in such a way as to construct a continuous 'chain of practices' between the laboratory and the worlds of construction, academia and design engineering. This analysis highlights the importance of the division of labour in shaping technical practice both inside and outside the laboratory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivism's founding assumptions are being questioned by its proponents and opponents in a quest for alternatives to, or refined forms of, that theoretical approach. This paper suggests that such questioning may indicate that science and technology studies (S&TS) is ready to reconsider another approach based on Heideggerian phenomenology. Some innovators and innovation scholars appear ready to move on to this alternative approach to knowledge. They seem to have opened to the Heideggerian alternative by confronting the practical inadequacies of orthodox science and engineering. This paper suggests that S&TS is facing a similar confrontation with the inadequacies of constructivism's founding assumptions. The alternative approach explored involves a partnership with 'Being' that decentres the subject, but without resorting to heterogeneous agency or to realism. This partnership is based on understanding the implications of the interplay between 'Being' granting and withholding knowledge. This paper suggests that S&TS may now be ready to look at this interplay as an alternative to people constructing knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article replies to Steve Woolgar's and Geoff Cooper's (W&C) study on urban legends, in this case, referring to Winner's Moses-story. They proposed that the bridge-story is itself a dynamic, shifting and essentially inconcludable narrative, a form of urban legend. Before addressing some of the points W&C raise, the author likes to make clear that his case against Winner was not about the referential adequacy of the bridge-story. However, to be able to make his point, the author has to raise the issue of referentiality. His case against Winner is twofold: 1) that parables should be handled with care in teaching social science, and; 2) that what Winner asserts about technical artefacts is doubtful for any technical artefact, not only for Moses' low bridges.

Historical and sociological studies have shown that precision measurement and metrology play an important social and scientific role. This paper contrasts the dynamics of four metrological configurations. The first concerns an instrument for routine car repair. It displays the network of institutions, conventions and procedures allowing for the conservation of legal metrological precision. Such resources are not yet available during the genesis of an instrument. Very often in scientific laboratories, instruments and their metrology are elaborated simultaneously. The three other case studies analyze this construction by looking at ordinary metrological operations: the collective elaboration of standards; the translation of scientific instruments in metrological laboratories; and the intercomparison of instruments. It appears that the diversity and heterogeneity of resources associated with metrological networks result in different ways of articulating the natural and conventional character of precision measurement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Scientific Knowledge, Barry Barnes, David Bloor and John Henry (BBH) explicitly repudiate the notion that the physical environment plays no role in the creation of scientific knowledge, thereby removing a major bone of fruitless and heated contention between scientists and practitioners of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). There remain, however, many aspects of BBH's view of scientific knowledge that clash with my own experience as a practitioner of (theoretical) physics. I offer some examples of ways in which BBH seem to get things wrong, in the hope of starting a more constructive dialogue, leading to a better understanding of sociology by scientists, and perhaps even vice-versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a brief response to the replies by Vicky Singleton and Brian Wynne. The author will base what he has to say on the original papers and his response to them, take account of the replies by Singleton and Wynne, and summarizes his main conclusions from the exchange. The two replies to the author's original response to the Special Issue of Social Studies of Science on "The Politics of SSK" carry on the debate in rather different ways. Hence, the author discusses them separately in this paper.

The importance of infrastructural work for the mobility of practices and for the capacity of centers to act on distant sites is stressed in both science studies and the sociology of state formation. Employing Kula's typology of metrological systems, this paper examines four areas of metrological reform in pre-Confederation Canada, stressing the existence of metrological hybrids. Metrological standardization is held to depend upon the exercise of sovereign state power at the same time as it extends the administrative capacity of state agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his response to the Special Issue of this journal on "The Politics of SSK," Hans Radder makes two main points about the relations of politics and sociology of scientific knowledge. First, he argues that science and technology studies (STS) can and should go beyond descriptive analyses of the politics of science and technology, to engage in normative criticisms, assessments or recommendations. Significantly, however, he restricts his vision of this engagement to a certain type of STS normativity. Thus, the role for STS of offering reflexive critique of existing public issue-definitions goes hand-in-hand with the normative role of helping change existing definitions of agency, and of encouraging problematization of entrenched ideas of the human subject, and of human relations.

This article presents a reply to Hans Radder's response to the author's paper. Radder has carefully identified several points which invite clarification and elaboration. It is noted that Radder clearly situates the author as recommending that science and technology studies (STS) accounts should stick to descriptive analyses. Radder acknowledges that neutrality is an illusion and that taking sides can be politically and theoretically problematic, as well as being too narrow an approach for STS. The author's paper suggests that issues surrounding neutrality versus commitment and issues surrounding descriptive versus normative approaches are inextricably linked. However, Radder is able to separate these issues, as his stated aim is to deal only with the descriptive/normative issue which is for him, the neutrality/commitment issue had been dealt with adequately in this Special Issue.

The topic of neutrality versus commitment within the sociology of scientific knowledge was the direct cause of the Special Issue of the journal "Social Studies of Science." The set of papers as a whole embraces many aspects of the theme under discussion. In this brief Response, the author will focus on two central questions. The first is whether science and technology studies (STS) accounts should stick to descriptive analyses of the politics of science and technology, or whether they should also engage in normative criticisms, assessments or recommendations. It is concluded that a certain type of STS normativity is legitimate, and may constitute a specific contribution to political debates on science and technology. The second question concerns the realism-relativism issue. It is argued that this issue continues to integrate descriptively adequate and normatively engaged accounts of science and technology.

In this paper we apply the laboratory study approach of the new sociology of scientific practice to a `thinking science': theoretical physics. To specify the work and accomplishments of theoretical physicists we choose the notion of `deconstruction'. Deconstruction involves the expansion of a concrete object, such as an equation, into a series of other objects upon which the `hardness' of a problem can be shifted and distributed. In solving an equation, however, the determinate path of a deconstruction method needs to be supplemented by the exploration of clues and guesses, trials and tricks. We trace a series of devices, and iterations thereof, which physicists mobilize in dealing with hard problems: formal deconstructions, detours and tricks to identify a working deconstruction, variation, `doing examples' modelling and, finally, thought alliances between subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses that in the paper "Scientific Controversy as Farce," Caroline Joan Picart deals with the rapid closure of a scientific controversy surrounding a claim made by a French scientist Jacques Benveniste, that substances diluted beyond the Avogadro number were, in fact, still potent. Making partial use of a theoretical conceptualization suggested by authors H.M. Collins and T.J. Pinch, Picart suggests that the short lifespan of the controversy can be explained by the use of humor and the blurring of the boundaries between the constitutive and contingent forums of scientific discourse. The determining feature both of the development and the conclusion of the Benveniste controversy is to be found in the boundary separating the scientific and lay communities. The short lifespan of the controversy, as well as the manner in which it was handled, can therefore be explained by forces acting on the boundary between the scientific community and the lay public. Scientific knowledge generally emanates from the professional publications and is then simplified for publication in the more general publications.

This paper examines the debate over the relationship between SSK and politics by exploring the implications of 'the reflexive turn' during the 1980s. However, it does this by looking outward, at the ways in which a reflexive SSK can potentially help enlighten the culture of political issues, rather than inwards, at the methods and forms of SSK itself. The key element of this strategy is to sustain an analytical vocabulary which problematizes the human subject, whether as author of SSK work, or of public policies and public policy knowledges. I take it for granted that this cannot be fully achieved, but it remains a key principle. Reconsidering the 'Capturing' debate, the paper notes several unfortunate features held in common (and uncritically reinforced) by both 'sides' to that agenda. These include the reification of 'sides' and (more generally) of social actors (and thus of the issues at stake); and the reproduction of an implicit model of society as constituted exhaustively by active choices and decisions - thus neglecting the cultural dimensions of social (including cognitive) life. Using examples drawn from environmental opposition to nuclear power, and the construction of scientific and policy knowledge about global climate change, I argue that problematizing the identities and interests of actors within our own sociological knowledge forum, as is achieved through the reflexive turn' and extending this to the construction and deployment of knowledge in public issues, allows a much richer, more contingent and more multivalent understanding of what is at stake in any 'given' issue to come into view. This may appear to undermine the basis of policy bodies' authority - except that their authority is, I suggest already failing precisely because they cannot recognize the contingencies in the knowledges on which they rely. Refusing to enter public controversies with scientific or technical content as either partisans or disengaged neutrals, and eschewing false debates about epistemic probity, SSK(scholars can nevertheless offer intellectual resources with which to encourage institutional reflexivity, and to rebuild a democratic culture of public policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper engages with the debate over SSK's normative role (and over the moral and political responsibilities of the SSK analyst) by utilizing a 'sociology of monsters' framework to criticize Collins' insistence on the methodological and political necessity of neutrality, and his associated principles of compartmentalization and alternation. The advantages of viewing the analyst as an exemplary monster -- as marginal to, or simultaneously inhabiting, a number of intersecting social worlds -- are explored through a discussion of my attempts to draw on my contextualized SSK analysis of the vitamin C and cancer controversy, to inform policy recommendations intended to address asymmetries of power in the conduct and evaluation of clinical trials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author became involved with the theory that AIDS originated from contaminated polio vaccines by arranging for publication of a key paper, by interacting with prominent partisans and by writing articles himself. These experiences suggest some of the advantages and disadvantages of partisan intervention in the scientific reception system by a social analyst. Open partisanship should be added to the repertoire of social analysts of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this Introduction, we attempt to convey something of the angst we have experienced at various times during the long drawn out process of being commissioned as Editors of this Special Issue, of commissioning the authors and thereafter variously exhorting, encouraging and congratulating them (at a crucial stage, when the whole thing had got too big and the consulting referees had reported, being obliged to reject the efforts of some potential contributors); engaging the services of said referees, and later, with some difficulty, negotiating with them the continuation of the project; and finally, after an incredibly intense period of solid wall-to-wall subediting on the final drafts (Ashmore) and the writing of this Introduction (Richards), finding it all, almost, over: at last, at last, This is attempted through the deployment of an extended narrative metaphor which likens our field to a restaurant, and a lyrical coda celebrating anticlimax. We also manage to introduce the papers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issues of science and technology policy in the Republic of Belarus are explored within the framework of center-periphery theory. As a newly independent state, Belaurs inherited a considerable scientific potential that was on the periphery of the Soviet research system. Now the socioeconomic crisis restricts the options for the development of science and technology in Belarus, and makes the situation uncertain. In these conditions, the government must play a strategic, coordinating role if it is to generate a research policy capable of meeting the country's social needs, and of overcoming its peripheral economic position. From a comparative analysis of center-periphery relations historically in Finland, one can expect in Belarus a gradual shift in the state's goels for science and technology policy, from national revival to modernization, and subsequently to full international economic competitiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first part of this article presents information related to floating-point arithmetic, as performed by computers and advanced digital calculators. The second part of the article discusses mathematical proof of the correctness of programs and hardware designs, which is increasingly being demanded for systems crucial to safety or security. It argues that the extension of the domain of application of mathematical proof involves the negotiation of the contents of the proof. There is an important difference between the cases of computer floating-point arithmetic and the proof of computer systems. In the former, there was a stable, consensual human arithmetic against which computer arithmetic could often be judged. Human arithmetic was, however, insufficient to determine the best form of computer arithmetic. Formal proof of computer-system correctness is an interesting test case for the sociology of knowledge. This prediction is contrary to ordinary intuitions about mathematical certainty. It concerns not informal or semiformal mathematics of the sort that has to date provided most of the empirical material for the sociology of mathematics, but mathematical deduction of the most formal kind.

This paper takes the form of a double text which simultaneously investigates the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) through citation analysis, and investigates citation analysis using theoretical ideas from SSK and Foucault. One strand of the text performs an analysis of citation patterns in SSK. This text identifies the figures who have had the most impact through their articles and books, and examines the possible effects of cultural and linguistic bias. It also investigates the impact of SSK outside the field, asks whether this impact has changed over time, and identifies researchers who have had a particularly high impact outside SSK. The other strand takes citation analysis, as exemplified in the citation study of SSK, as its topic. This text focuses on the way the citation analysis constitutes its field of study, and on the way a citation is produced as a separable, countable category. It notes the 'realistic' idea of science categories which is deployed, and the individualistic model of scientific activity. It questions the involvement of citation analysis with power, both in the traditional sense of institutional control of science through funding changes, and in the Foucaldian sense of scientists adopting citation counting as a regime of self-regulation. The paper ends with a dialogue between the 'authors' on/in these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extended conttoversies over a new definition of death have occurred in most Western countries, providing good examples of the kind of 'science-based' disputes that increasingly characterize the policy of contemporary welfare states. In this paper, with the aim of introducing and testing a conceptual framework capable of capturing the more general features of such controversies, we reconstruct and examine the death-concept dispute in Sweden. The controversy is approached from both a diachronic and synchronic perspective. First, concepts are proposed for characterizing its origin, crystallization and termination. Then, we categorize and outline its 'argumentative structure' and typically 'mixed' character. Finally, we discuss some key concepts for understanding the sources of rival contentions, and apply them in more detail. In conclusion, we suggest that science-based controversies constitute an important research site for turning extant sociology and philosophy of science into a more politically relevant research field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes an interpretive framework for understanding the cognitive or mental processes of inventors, and applies this framework to narrating how Thomas Edison developed the kinetoscope, or motion picture. A review of recent developments in the history of technology and cognitive science suggests the need for better conceptual categories for understanding and comparing how inventors approach problems. We show how Edison created a mental model of the kinetoscope from his existing phonograph, and how his assistant William K. L. Dickson (who is often credited with inventing the kinetoscope) developed his own alternative mental model. We further discuss how Edison utilized building blocks or mechanical representations from previous inventions, and what strategies or heuristics he employed, in particular, we examine how Edison divided the project between himself and Dickson. The overall result of applying our framework to this case is to provide a clearer picture of the roles played by Edison and Dickson in this invention. The paper closes with a discussion on the potential relationship between cognitive and sociological approaches to technological innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to a recent descriptive account of the state of science studies in France, this Comment - which is a participant observer's account, not a research paper - seeks to contribute towards a sociological explanation of the observed state of affairs. The absence of specifically social studies of science in France is an aspect of the traditional French construal of science studies as consisting of (positivist or philosophically-minded) history of science. The reason why new approaches have difficulty in getting established is sought mainly in the structure of French institutions: decision- making bearing on intellectual choices is concentrated in very few hands, and these decisions affect, and streamline, most institutions throughout the country. Moreover, the large and overarching decision-making bodies, whose members have divergent preferences and interests, are inherently prudent and shun risk -taking: their very social structure favours conservatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that there remains a significant place in the sociology of science for epistemologically couched accounts. By examining 'strong programme' work, particularly Andrew Pickering's history of HEP, I show how the decidedly social aspects accentuated in sociological accounts typically have parallel epistemic aspects. The treatment of such aspects as explanatory factors often complements decidedly sociological accounts. This view is defended against the objection that epistemic norms or values are really of only secondary importance in comparison with social practice, perhaps only epiphenomenal. Episternic values can be understood in a way that is compatible with an appreciation of the importance of practice. The place for epistemologically couched accounts is also defended by showing that generally telling objections to rationalizing explanation as it is commonly understood can be avoided in a superior, fully naturalist, understanding of such explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After attempting to clarify Peter Slezak's challenge to the `strong programme' in the sociology of science, this Response outlines a cognitive/historical/sociological approach to understanding the development of scientific knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]