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This article seeks to provide some tentative answers to issues arising from comments on the paper "Current Folklore in the Criticisms of Parsonian Action Theory," which was written because certain features of sociologist Talcott Parsons' work have consistently been misinterpreted by the critics. According to the authors one of the purpose of this paper was to clarify what they perceived to be Parson's position on persistent theoretical issues social theory. The authors argue that critics incorrectly contend that the voluntaristic thesis has been abandoned, primarily because they fail to recognize that the analysis of emergent system levels requires the elaboration of additional concept. Critics have thus assumed that conceptual elaboration and specification represents an abandonment of the voluntaristic thesis, but in point of fact, just the contrary is true. The basic elements of the unit act-the actor, objects, orientations, informational organization, and energic constraint-have served as the general framework for subsequent developments in Parsonian theory.

In this article the author seeks to answer the adequacy of his own interpretation of sociologist Talcott Parsons' action scheme, and how to interpret Parsons. The author illustrates why conventional methods of analysis and exposition do not work well when applied to Parsons' writing, and recommends an alternative method. A proposal is made to forego the kind of critical analysis, which the author himself attempted to his own essays on voluntarism and the action scheme, to make sense of Parsons' work as a whole. The author remarks that it has been alleged that to the effect the abstractness of concepts stands in some sort of conflict or contradiction with empirical relevance. This allegation is unacceptable to the author in a general preposition. Going back to the prestigious natural sciences, such a concept as particle with its mass concentrated at a single mathematical point in Eucidean space, is exceedingly abstract, but its use in Newtonian mechanics scarcely seems to be either vague or irrelevant to empirical problems.

Parsons' theory of economy and society has reemerged as an important reference point in the development of social theory. This paper focuses on Parsons' contribution to a possible theoretical rapproachment between economic and social theory. The issue addressed is the indifference of economists to the project for theorctical reunification announced in the Marshall Lectures. The author argues that Parsons' understanding of economic theory was seriously incomplete, while his assumption of a shared commitment between the two disciplines to develop a general synthetic theory was highly dubious. At the same time, Parsons' attempt at rapproachment remains relevant in a contemporary situation where many social scientists propose an economistic annexation of sociology by rational choice theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to demonstrate the inherently practical intent of the Marshall Lectures. It argues that Parsons' views on the relationship between sociology and economics were presupposed by his broader vision of how the social sciences could contribute to the successful functioning of the social order. This conception of a new division of labor in the social sciences arose from Parsons' concern with the shortcomings of both utilitarian economics and Marxism. Evidence from Parsons' writings of the 1930s and 1940s is provided in support of these claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ‘conflict school’ in contemporary sociology emerged in large part as a critique of the theory of social change that Talcott Parsons developed during his middle period, which began with the empirically-oriented essays that appeared after The Structure of Social Action (Parsons, 1937), and extended through the simultaneous publication of Towards a General Theory of Action (Parsons and Shils, 1951) and The Social System (Parsons, 1951). The conflict critique, now enshrined in textbook lore and highbrow writing alike, accused Parsons of a static, idealist bias that ignored issues of process, conflict, and change. While Parsons's attitude toward change, during this and later periods of his development, was complex and often ambiguous, this evaluation was certainly incorrect. I will demonstrate, in fact, that in this middle period Parsons actually produced a more systematic and compelling approach to conflict and change than the theories produced by the conflict critics themselves. In the first part of this paper, I will present the formal elements of Parsons's change theory. The second part will add substance to this theory by showing how Parsons applied it to the empirical problematics of recent Western development. In the third section, I will relate this formal and substantive theorizing to the vastly misunderstood deviance paradigm from The Social System. In conclusion, I will return to the question with which I began: What is the real relationship between the conflict theorists and their very useful straw man, ‘Talcott Parsons’? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organized in three parts, this paper I. summarizes Parsons's analysis of fascism and National Socialism written during the 1940s; II. places his work into the context of earlier and later theories of fascism; and III. suggests how Parsons's later theoretical work may aid our understanding of National Socialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A response is offer to the article within the issue by American sociologist Professor Talcott Parsons on exchange theory and social institutions. An overview of the impact that social institutions have on the relations between mayors and lobbyists, including regard to social values and social norms involved in the relationship, is provided.

On Shakespeare's stage, the rattle of thunder framed the comings and goings of princes. Other heralds bracket the years of this story: the rattle of choppers crossing the Parrots Beak, and stirring the sand at Desert One. But in Cambridge, such distant cues are masked by the nearer cacophony of commuters and scholarly discourse; here a shy little man stood astride the world of theory for half a century. He responded to everything, near and distant, in the same manner: in his own time, in his own roundabout way, with the inborn assurance of a compass needle centering on true north. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The four structural elements of action identified in Talcott Parsons' The Structure of Social Action—means, ends, conditions, norms—can be directly assimilated to the four variables which generate the AGIL schema: instrumental, consummatory, external, internal. The former set primarily define the unit act; the latter are generalized to the action system level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Talcott Parsons' ideas are shown to have operational meaning when applied to organizations in two respects. (1) Parsons' typology of system needs provides a meaningful way of categorizing administrative rules (protocols) developed by the subunit under study, and (2) 'phase dominance,' anticipated by structural functionalists, is tested. Our analysis adds to Parsons' framework (a) by helping to clarify the distinctive (and generally unappreciated) role that can be played by ground-level administrative units in the process of adaptive change within large and complex organizations, and (b) by informing our understanding of organizational alignment with external societal forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parsons' Marshall Lectures were an important and still arc a relevant contribution to the critique of the utilitarian, rationalist, radically individualist paradigm which still dominates scholarship, especially economics, today. Parsons advised economists to stop ignoring the broader societal context of which the economy is only a sub-system; economic actors are not impersonal, fully independent individuals but should be viewed as people with internalized moral and social values, values which cannot be accounted for as mere external, environmental constraints. Parsons, however, paid little attention to the role of power in the market. Socio-economics incorporates issues addressed in the Marshall Lectures, treats the leverage of interventionist power (large corporations and labor unions) as significant, and seeks to grow as a coherent alternative to the neoclassical paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The publication of the Marshall Lectures is part of the current upswing of interest in what is happening at the boundaries between the economy and society as well as between economics and sociology. Parsons welcomed the opportunity to give the Marshall Lectures because he wanted to apply his system of action to other areas within the social sciences. Parsons' argument in the lectures, however, was too general and his interpretation of Keynes was incomplete. Economy and Society (Parsons and Smelser 1956) represents in these and a few other aspects a clear advance in Parsons' thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Marshall Lectures and in Economy and Society Parsons endeavored to demonstrate that economic theory was a special case Iii the general theory of social systems. He then attempted to show that the parameters of macroeconomic theory could be analyzed as variables within a general social systems theory. But Parsons' economic sociology failed to redeem its promise. He did not succeed in using macroeconomic theory as the basis for the formulation of a propositional macrosociology; nor did he sociologically reconstruct the logic of utilitarian, neoclassical economic theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on various levels in sociologist Talcott Parsons' intellectual development on economic and sociological theory. As reported, Parsons' scholarly inquiry deals with the connection between economic theory and sociological theory. After graduating in 1924, Parsons made the decision of becoming an academic and writing a dissertation. It is further reported that Parsons' decision led to the discovery of the German tradition in economic thought, more specifically the work of Max Weber, the German sociologist and economist.

A common criticism of Parsonian theory has been that it is really not a theory but only a classificatory scheme. Critics claim that its concepts are not amenable to operationalization and that low-level empirically testable hypotheses cannot be derived from the theory. We argue that: (1) These criticisms are based upon a limited concept of theory, one that neglects other important Junctions that theory performs. (2) Many concepts in Parsonian theory can and have been operationalized. (3) Empirically testable propositions can be deduced from Parsons's theory. Examples from the areas of social evolution, criminology, small groups, and the sell are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents some of sociologist Neil J. Smelser's recollections of the intellectual and personal dialogues that transpired in his episodes of collaboration with sociologist Talcott Parsons. Reviewing these reflections, Smelser notes a kind of evolution in Parson's and his collaboration from an initial period of closeness in a clearly dominant-subordinate relationship to a period of establishing independence and finally to a more frankly competitive, more nearly equal relationship. To consider these simply as qualitatively different phases, however, would be erroneous, because in fact they developed in the context of a continuing base of intellectual respect and friendship. Smelser first encountered Parsons in 1949, when he was a freshman at Harvard University while Parsons was already a senior professor and Chairman of the Social Relations Department. The occasion was a series of three lectures Parsons gave in Social Relations 1B, the second half of the year-long freshman course offered primarily by Gordon Allport and George Homans. In lectures delivered in the spring of 1949, Parsons made an effort to spell out his current thinking on the major functional problems in society, and the social institutions that it developed in confronting these problems.

According to Professor Habermas, Parsons's later system paradigm is in conflict, to some extent, with his earlier action paradigm, as Menzies contended; but Parsons concealed the conflicts from himself, Habermas thinks, and retained his ‘cultural determinism’ and ‘secret idealism.’ According to Habermas, Parsons lacked any adequate equivalent of the concept of a ‘life world’ built up on the basis of Intersubjective communication. Parsons's unrealistic assumption of harmony between actors' orientations on the one hand and functional requirements of systems on the other prevented him, according to Habermas, from seeing what Marx for example saw, namely that in modern society the symbolic life worlds of actors suffer distortion because of their subordination to the rationalizing tendencies of money and power. (Professor Habermas did not provide an abstract for this translation of his address on Parsons, which he delivered to the German Sociological Association in 1980. Readers are urged to regard this abstract as only suggestive and as inadequately reflecting a complex argument.—Editor.) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parsons's analysis of Marx and its conclusion that Marx was a utilitarian are criticized. I endeavor to demonstrate that Marx succeeded in avoiding the pitfalls of both idealism and positivism and that he must be viewed as the founder of the voluntaristic theory of social action. In addition, I contend that this categorization makes a difference; if we incorporate Marx into action theory, build action theory on a Marxian foundation, certain problems within Parsons's work can be resolved. I illustrate this contention in a discussion of the relationship between structural and Junctional theory. "An earnest warning is given against … premature claims to finality. The author has been more or less intensively concerned with the major works of the men treated in this study over periods ranging from six to ten years. After considerable periods of occupation in other fields, he has come back to intensive reconsideration of their works. Every time this reconsideration brought to light fundamentally important things about them which had been missed before. The most important points, for the purposes of this study, were not understood at the first reading, but generally only alter repeated consideration." (Parsons, 1948:40) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parsons and I were friends and colleagues from 1963 until his death in 1979. I recall, herein, a small part of our personal and intellectual relationship, especially that portion having to do with the creation of The American University. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis of Durkheim in The Structure of Social Action is integral to Parsons's discussion of the utilitarian-positivist tradition and the emergence of a voluntaristic theory of action from it. The four ‘stages’ of theoretical argument in Durkheim can be related directly to the four defining elements of the ‘utilitarian dilemma,’ namely empiricism, rationality, atomism, and the randomness of ends. The most questionable aspect of Parsons's argument is the alleged stubbornness of Durkheim's empiricism. On the other hand, much of the criticism of Parsons's argument, by Pope in particular, although also by Scott and Warner, is either misdirected or itself questionable. The development and conclusions of Durkheim's moral sociology are as Parsons claims, and form a viable basis for a non-positivist theory of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relationship between structural-functionalism, exchange theory and new political economy, through referencing the 20th century American sociologist Talcott Parsons' perspective on structural-functionalism. An overview of social institutions, or social institutionalization, including their relationship with social roles, social values and social norms, is provided.