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Drawing on publications produced by one of the oldest and leading professional associations dealing with intellectual disability (ID), this paper explores the continual maintenance of expertise over potentially contested classifications. I find that, given unforeseen difficulties among professionals in actually defining and classifying what is currently known as ID as well as the later addition of new stakeholders in the advocacy field, professionals’ understanding of revision shifted over time from a problem to ultimately be solved to a “legacy of revision” used to explain past changes in criteria and anticipate further ones. In analyzing this legacy, I focus on professionals’ understanding of several shifts surrounding diagnostic and classification criteria over the course of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. To the extent that previous literature suggests that ambiguities surrounding classification are to be expected, this paper shows how professionals in the ID field drew on resonant themes and rhetorically (re)framed past and future changes in their maintenance of expertise in a field that dramatically shifted in what was acceptable in the treatment of people with disabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countries worldwide are experiencing a sharp wave of democratic decline that is cutting away at the gains made toward democracy that had occurred in decades prior. While the majority of scholars demonstrate a robust positive association between civil society and democracy, historical case studies in political sociology have demonstrated that nations with robust civic spheres can become cauldrons of anti-democratic politics under particular circumstances, particularly when the country has weak and ineffective political parties and when the country has autocratic movements working to degrade the democracy. While these case studies illuminate important caveats to leading research on civil society, these findings have not been tested at a cross-national level. In this paper, we ask how weak political parties and autocratic mobilization moderate the extent to which countries with more civic participation have stronger democracies around the world. We examine this research question using the continuous level of electoral democracy. Findings of our statistical analysis reveal support for the conditioning effects of weak political parties and autocratic mobilization on the relationship between civil society and electoral democracy and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unequal homeownership access is a major component of ethno-racial stratification. Previous studies have demonstrated substantial ethno-racial disparities in access and outcomes throughout the homeownership process. In addition, prior research has assumed that mortgage applicants have a similar age distribution across ethno-racial groups. This paper draws on annual data from the 2018 and 2019 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to assess variation in ethno-racial disparities in loan outcomes associated with different ages. I show that ethno-racial disparities in loan outcomes vary tremendously when considering the age of the applicant. I demonstrate that loan rejections and high-cost loan originations are highest among Latino and Black borrowers across age groups compared to Whites. Black borrowers have worse adverse loan outcomes than Whites, regardless of age. Depending on the adverse loan outcome, Asians perform similarly or underperform compared to Whites. In addition, older applicants are more likely to be denied a mortgage loan than younger applicants, while the trends for high-cost loans vary considerably across ethno-racial groups. When examining high-cost loan originations, Latinos above 65 years old (who are the best performing Latino sub-group) underperform Whites regardless of age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gig work platforms often promise workers flexibility and freedom from formal constraints on their work schedules. Some scholars have questioned whether this "formal flexibility" actually helps people arrange gig work around non-work commitments, but few studies have examined this empirically. This paper examines how hours spent in microtask work – a form of gig work with high formal flexibility – influence work-to-life conflict (WLC) relative to conventional work hours, and how these relationships differ by workers' gender and financial situation. Fixed-effects regressions using panel data from workers on Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform (MTurk) suggest that microtask work hours are just as closely associated with WLC as conventional work hours. Moreover, microtask work disadvantages the same groups as conventional work (i.e. women and financially struggling workers). Only financially comfortable men seem immune from microtask hours' association with WLC. This suggests that the benefits of gig work's formal flexibility are often elusive. We argue that platforms like MTurk promote a flexibility mystique: the illusory promise that gig work empowers workers to set their own schedules and earn decent income without disrupting their personal/family lives. The gig economy's expansion may thus do little to bring work-life balance to the masses or alleviate inequalities at the work-life nexus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examine how structural and social-psychological factors combine to motivate urban environmental activism. Specifically, we argue that residents' everyday perceptions about environmental, social, and political conditions in their neighborhoods and cities are connected to their likelihood of involvement in environmental collective action. We use logistic regression models and original survey data from the 2021 Cook County Community Survey (n = 1,069) to investigate whether urban residents' perceptions of the conditions where they live are associated with their likelihood of participating in protests or public meetings around environmental issues. Our findings show that, in the context of the Chicago metropolitan area, residents who perceive worse environmental conditions in their communities, feel a greater sense of belonging to their neighborhoods, and feel they understand local politics and have political power are more likely to mobilize. In contrast, those who are pessimistic about the future of their neighborhoods are less likely to act. The study suggests that participation in urban environmental collective action is partly explained by how people interpret the daily surroundings they routinely navigate and experience where they live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The social changes tied to late modernity and an increasingly precarious labor market have facilitated the emergence of fortune as a potentially significant element for understanding contemporary society. This article approaches this contingent, individualized, secularized, and uncertain panorama from the perspective of the young adults tasked with navigating these societal transformations and the effects of a prolonged economic crisis. Based on a discourse analysis of 20 in-depth interviews and three focus groups with young adults in Spain, it examines how chance/luck is employed by these individuals. A typology is presented and discussed, consisting of four different relationships with fortune. In the participants' narratives this paper finds a meritocratic approach, which involves an understanding that good luck is attained through individual initiative, but also relationships less concerned with human agentic power where it can be conceived as an explanatory or meaning making device, as a threat or as an element tied to hope. Consequently, the article seeks to address a gap in sociological research, which has tended to overlook the analytical relevance of fortune, arguing that it constitutes a central element to the symbolic frameworks of these vulnerable young adults as they make their way through a changing world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American Dream has long been understood as a “shorthand summary of a nation’s collective aspirations” (Hauhart 2015:65). What determines optimism about the Dream? This paper uses nationally representative data collected at a critical historical juncture to advance research which has connected the American Dream to America’s racial history. We find faith in the American Dream was racialized into the 21st-Century, both in the sense that our data show different levels of optimism toward the Dream by race and in that predictors of belief vary by racialized experiences and ideologies. We find that most Americans continued to believe in the American Dream, but contrary to prominent 20th-Century understandings, whites became less optimistic than persons of color, and that this remaining white belief was complex, with racial attitudes being central. Predictors of belief in the Dream were different by race in ways that may vitally reflect how collective aspirations are conceived from within unfolding American racial civic histories and 21st-Century racial hierarchies, patterns we discuss as privileged multiculturalism (whites), meritocratic incorporation (Hispanics), and positive social inclusion (Blacks). Ultimately, these findings suggest that the socio-cultural significance of the American Dream is not just tied to material position but intertwined with racialized cultural expectations, outlooks, and status concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractWithin urban sociology, the unpredictability of poor, urbanized space explains why black youth are “present oriented” and why they treat orientations to the future as futile. But where urban sociology suspends black youth in time and space, this research aims to de-arrest them from the “ethnographic present.” Drawing on data from in-depth interviews with thirty youth, I make the case that within “present orientations” there is prescience. This paper is based on over one year of fieldwork at Run-a-Way – a center for youth in Minneapolis, Minnesota. With limited life chances and limited chances at life, youth at Run-a-Way saw the future as fugitive. Instead of being a paralyzing force keeping youth suspended in time, present orientations were marked by the production of nowness, in light of a prescient vision of what is to come. Because black youth chose not to entertain liberal futurities directed towards “rights” and “freedoms” associated with a post-raciality did not make them present oriented. It made them prepared. As prescience comes to serve as a more accurate signifier of black youth’s relation to the future, we come to see why the “ethnographic present” and the interpellation of blackness through abjection are both unsustainable and obsolete. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do scientists construct the meaning of science as oppositional to politics? How do the institutional contexts of scientists' work environment, training processes, and peer-group interactions reflect scientists' understanding of scientific practices, rules of the scientific field, and themselves as scientists? I argue that scientists' practice of boundary-work between science and politics is institutionally nurtured by a series of processes, which I call boundary-training. Drawing on ethnographic research at a molecular biology laboratory, this article reveals various tactics of boundary-training. Scientists are trained to routinely consume material infrastructure and produce massive scientific data. They internalize productivity-oriented academic life and valorize controllability in science labs to achieve this goal. Individuals' self-reliance and survival become core virtues of scientific enterprise. All combined, scientists are trained to believe that their works are irrelevant to social and political circumstances. This mundane depoliticization of science contributes to the consequence that the scientific field becoming a more efficient apparatus of political and economic powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As sociologists, we engage in history whether or not we see ourselves, professionally, as historical sociologists. These remarks discuss the varieties of ways sociologists use and approach historical scholarship, including history-as-context, analytic comparative/historical sociology, and interpretive approaches. I also reflect on the first fifty years of Midwest Sociological Society to show that, at different moments, the MSS mirrored, propelled, or lagged behind societal change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of 9/11 and the Trump campaign in 2016, organized Islamophobia has been on the rise in the U.S. In this article, I ask: How do those leading and participating in anti-Muslim mobilizations justify this discriminatory activism? To answer this question, I conducted a frame analysis of an anti-Muslim mobilization in Aberdeen, SD from 2016–2017. I analyzed the content of public meetings during this period (n = 8), the public Facebook posts of a local hate group, the Americans First, Task Force (n = 454), and individual Facebook user comments (n = 1370). I find that color-blind racist frames, place-based racial storytelling , white victimhood, and racialization are the central justifications deployed in this mobilization's frames. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women and racial minorities have made significant inroads into senior managerial and, especially, board of director positions over the past half-century. Despite this, there is little research on gender and racial differences in the political behavior of corporate elites. In this study, we investigate whether and how gender, race, and their intersection shape the political donation strategies of elite actors. Relying on a novel longitudinal corporate elites' political donation database, we provide the first systematic elite-level analysis of political donations to U.S. Congressional campaigns during the 1980-2014 election cycles. Overall, we find that, compared to men, women elites are less likely to donate, but are more Democrat-leaning and give to more ideologically extreme candidates. We also find evidence of intersectionality between gender and race in political donations among corporate elites. While elites of color favor the Democratic Party overall, our results suggest minority men concentrate their donations on more centrist candidates relative to women. Notably, white men are the only reliably Republican constituency within this elite group. Our results portend potentially far-reaching consequences for the party system as the composition of the American corporate elite grows more racially and gender diverse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although religion once played a central role in sociological inquiry, today it has fallen from prominence and now occupies a marginal space in the field. Sociologists of religion suggest that this neglect can be explained by the unusual irreligiosity of academia. However, some are hopeful that changes to graduate training and other institutional interventions can overcome this propensity and encourage more sociological engagement with religion, one of the most influential forces in contemporary society. Drawing on a new dataset of 473 sociology graduate students in the top 25 departments in the United States, we assess how personal secularity and departmental support for religious inquiry predict sociological engagement with religion. Personal secularity is a strong predictor of the decision to study religion and of the overall perception of the relevance of religion in contemporary society. Coming from a department where religion is discussed and faculty pursue research on religion predicts the perception of religion's relevance for the secular majority. Our findings contribute to the understanding of sociological knowledge creation and how individual and institutional proclivities – together – shape what we deem important enough to study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the early 2000s, the U.S. government began to partner with local law enforcement agencies for assistance with the enforcement of immigration laws. Participation in the voluntary 287(g) program by law enforcement agencies was an important early iteration of this new strategy. Although relatively few agencies adopted 287(g), its implementation was a critical turning point in the nation's approach to immigration enforcement and has been linked to a wide range of negative consequences for Latinos, including higher levels of violent victimization, and decreases in police trust. This study advances knowledge about the factors associated with 287(g) program adoption during the late 2000s. We examined the role of agency ethnoracial diversity and fiscal capacity and several theoretically relevant indicators of the broader county context. Based on a sample of 880 law enforcement agencies located in 233 counties, rare event logistic regression models indicate that the strongest predictors of 287(g) adoption were the share of county population estimated to be undocumented immigrants, the degree of support for the Republican Presidential candidate, and the relative unemployment of Hispanic and non-Hispanic White residents. Overall, the results suggest that 287(g) was primarily a political response to concerns about the potential threats associated with undocumented immigration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Illicit drug markets have long been associated with violence as a mode of regulating market behavior, especially regarding debts linked to drug purchase. While a growing literature examines violent and nonviolent modes of ensuring repayment by dealers and lenders, little research has focused on strategies of buyers and borrowers in navigating drug debt. Drawing on interviews with 75 people who use drugs within a materially disadvantaged neighborhood, we explore experiences in managing debt to dealers and within social networks adjacent to drug markets. Findings describe complex strategies to protect reputation, foster relationships with dealers, and employ cooperative, assertive, or coercive tactics to negotiate credit arrangements that sustain and stabilize the drug market while mitigating violent retaliation for unpaid debt. Findings also elucidate informal credit arrangements within social networks, identifying reciprocity and self-control as constitutive of social capital within friendship groups that serve as financial and social safety nets. This research considers socially embedded, boundedly rational decisions of marginalized drug market actors, highlighting diverse financial management practices among structurally vulnerable borrowers that serve economic and social goals while seeking to mitigate the risk of violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Christian nationalism has been linked to a variety of political and social outcomes in the contemporary United States, however little research has investigated factors that give rise to it. Most scholars examining Christian nationalism contend that it is unmoored from extant social institutions, and even oppositional to institutional Christianity. This claim is associated with earlier research arguing for the declining influence of denominations, and particularly mainline Protestantism. In contrast, social movement theory views Christian nationalism as an ideological outgrowth of religious organizations, structured by exclusivist religious beliefs, and reenforced through religious participation. Using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) this investigation examines how religious and political factors inform subscription to Christian nationalism and explores how religious and political commitments are connected. In general, the findings support the expectations of the social movement perspective. Christian nationalism is strongly predicted by ties to sectarian Protestantism, religious participation, and fundamentalist beliefs, and it is not embraced by secular and non-Christian Americans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2013 a group of science fiction authors launched a campaign to reform the Hugos, one of science fiction's most prestigious awards. Dubbing themselves "Sad Puppies," these activists sought to correct what they viewed as a political imbalance. Science fiction, they argued, had moved away from entertaining story telling in favor of heavy-handed message fiction meant to spread pernicious liberal values. This article draws on an analysis of internet posts by actors involved in the movement to examine the Puppies' efforts to reform the science fiction field, reclaiming it as a space for conservative authors and fans. I argue that the leaders of the movement were able to build small fan communities into a larger social movement by framing the movement in such a way as to link their efforts to exogenous political and cultural debates occurring in proximate social fields. This analysis demonstrates the processes by which tournament rituals in popular culture can come to serve as contests of values, arenas within which larger political and cultural conflicts are waged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. young adults in the 2000s and 2010s entered a national labor market that was highly stratified by education. While the socioeconomic consequences of a four-year bachelor's degree are well documented during this period, less is known about the consequences of seeking a sub-baccalaureate credential. I analyze the employment, earnings, and student debt outcomes associated with several sub-baccalaureate experiences differentiated by enrollment, credential level, and for-profit attendance using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth-1997 Cohort. Using fixed-effects regression models, I find that certificates and associate degrees are associated with employment advantages relative to a high school diploma. However, young adults with some two-year college and no credential or a certificate have no higher earnings than those with a high school diploma. Sub-baccalaureate credentials can also be costly, as those who attend a for-profit college have more student debt than those who do not. Results shed light on labor market inequality among a large but understudied segment of higher education and underscore the importance of considering debt alongside labor market outcomes in analyses of the socioeconomic consequences of higher education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While previous scholarship highlights the importance of cross-class alliances between intellectuals and workers in past social-democratic and labor movements, the growth of right-wing populism may signal the breakdown of this political alignment today. We investigate the extent to which intellectuals and workers remain politically aligned through a case study of political developments in the state of Wisconsin, which pioneered social-democratic reforms in the US in the early twentieth century and then turned toward right-wing populism in the twenty-first century. We draw on Alvin Gouldner and Pierre Bourdieu to theorize intellectual-worker alliances. We then present historical evidence that an intellectual-worker alliance played an important role in the earlier period. Logistic regression analysis with survey data shows continued political antagonism between the state's wealthiest and most highly educated citizens in the later period, as well as an enduring political alignment of highly educated and working-class Wisconsinites. Our results demonstrate that right-wing populism prevailed in Wisconsin despite an intellectual-worker alliance, not because the alliance broke down. We conclude with a discussion of what these findings imply about contemporary right-wing populism beyond Wisconsin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]