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Natural history, observational, and interview data from a study of two anti-pornography crusades and the social movement organizations which created and directed them are used to assess nine propositions formulated by Zald and Ash (1966) concerning the structure and dynamics of social movement organizations. The Zald-Ash propositions were formulated from the literature on national, established social movement organizations. This paper explores the applicability of the propositions to those organizations which are small and emerging. The propositions are generally supported. Discrepancies are accounted for by the significant influence of leadership orientation, goal specificity, and incentive structure in determining other structural and dynamic characteristics of small or emerging social movement organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest in the diffusion of innovations has, in the last twenty years, produced a plethora of research findings, which have been summarized by a number of writers (e.g., Lionberger, 1960; Rogers, 1962, 1967 and 1968; Katz et al., 1963; Jones, 1967; Bohlen, 1064). However, these summaries are basically taxonomic and programmatic rather than theoretic in nature. As the paucity of theoretical work in diffusion studies has been well recognized (cf. Bogers, 1962:300; Robinson and Bailey, 1965:332), there exists a real need for us to search for a general theory pertinent to this field. The aim of the present paper is to discuss a recurrent theme running through many diffusion studies, namely the old concept of adopter-innovation compatibility, and to show how this concept looms as highly suggestive of its utility as a theoretical approach to the studies in the diffusion of innovations and social change. The notion of adopter-innovation compatibility has been utilized in recent diffusion research in two general ways: explicitly and implicitly. We shall therefore discuss first these two different modes in which it has been used and then its implications as a general theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its first systematic treatment by Max Weber in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in the early twenties, the concept of charisma has been of only limited use to the social sciences. This is so because of fundamental disagreement concerning its meaning and application. In response to this, the present paper offers (1) a brief examination of Weber's contribution, (2) a critical analysis of this position based in part on the recent literature, and (3) a final formulation of the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is required for understanding models of development is a combination of linguistic analysis and sociological analysis. It might well be that what is needed is nothing short of a combination of the logical skills of Wittgenstein and the sociological capacities of Weber. It would be presumptuous of me to claim to have effected such a synthesis. On the other hand, it would be ludicrous of all of us not to at least make an attempt to scale the heights. The word model is as slippery a concept as is currently in use by the social sciences. Even if we can settle on a formal definition of the word, namely, that a model is an isomorphic representation of objects that leads to an unmistakable identification of the expression of the object with the physical object, we are left with a host of substantive issues. There are at least three different fundamental meanings which attach to the term model—meanings which almost put the word in a different universe of discourse each time. First, model is used as a surrogate for levels, or an epistemological statement of how the world is carved up. Second, model is used as a surrogate for strategies. This entails the pragmatics of social change, or how one goes about carving a world up. Third, model is often used as a surrogate for theory, or how the explanation of changes in the world can best be made. What I should like to do here is provide at the outset a framework showing what is entailed in each of these types of models of development and then showing the implications of model-construction for social change. In this paper, I do not take my chore to be other than an accounting of the meaning of development at the macroscopic scale (rather than its microscopic details). Nor do I interpret my chore as a presentation of my own model, since this has been attempted elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a great amount of criticism of structural-functional theory, particularly with respect to its supposed inability to deal with social change. Should structural-functional theory be unable to account for the sources of social change, then it is indeed guilty of an implicit ideological commitment to the status quo. If it can be shown that this theory is capable of dealing with social change, then we can accept Merton's statement: … it is the evaluations which permit the pouring of ideological content into the bottles of functionalism. The bottles themselves are neutral to their contents, and may serve equally well as containers for ideological poison or for ideological nectar. The position taken here is that Merton's statement is correct, provided that an important accommodation is made. This accommodation consists in the explicit incorporation of the dialectical process into structural-functional theory. The dialectical process implies a conflict model of society; it is in the tradition of Marx, who argued that without conflict there can be no progress. It adopts the proposition that conflict is empirically both a normal and an essential element in the social structure. In the simplest terms, the dialectic tells us something about the sources of a particular kind of social change. We are not content, as is Dahrendorf, with advocating a conflict model of society as an alternative to functionalism. The goal is nothing less than to reconcile the two approaches. Dahrendorf has himself recognized that the conflict model cannot provide all the answers since society is "Janusheaded." It is extremely difficult to talk about the prediction of empirical outcomes when one is required to look first at an integration model and then turn to the conflict model. It is necessary to construct one model which will qualify the integration model of society so as to give weight (the exact amount is an empirical question) to the disruptive elements in society. A considerable portion of this paper will be devoted to disengaging the dialectic from its ideological moorings and making it trim for sociological analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A genuinely sociological theory of social change is lacking, but the literature of the social sciences abounds with the elements of such a theory. The present paper deals with one of these elements, namely the change from tribalism to urbanism as a major instance of social change. For this purpose the concepts of culture and civilization are examined, and a plea is made to restore the concept of civilization to its rightful place in the vocabulary of sociologists and anthropologists. In doing this, the intention is not to reduce social change to the process of urbanization, but rather to isolate the sociological element which makes for social change within the supersession of a familial by a territorial society, wherever it occurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]