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The sociological study of intellectual recognition has tended to focus on highly cited and highly acclaimed authors and perspectives, while reserving some interest for those who are "forgotten." We know much less about the liminal cases: authors who are in-between fame and oblivion. This paper proposes a way to study intellectual recognition, by examining the liminal case of sociologist Charles H. Cooley. Based on a multilayered (quantitative and qualitative) citation analysis of Cooley's classic work, Human Nature and the Social Order (HNSO), we study the role of intellectual deference in accounting for this liminality. Specifically, we identify two distinct deference processes: acknowledgment and involvement. We argue that Cooley has survived intellectual oblivion by standing on the shoulders of citers, as he has received substantial acknowledgment but decreasing involvement. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of our paper for the understanding of the making of sociological theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the importance of race and racial attitudes among sociologists by attempting to document the existence of what has been called a "black insiders doctrine" and showing that black sociologists are more likely than their white counterparts to subscribe to this doctrine. Data in this paper are based on a survey questionnaire administered during the winter of 1978. The findings show that: (1) race is a strong predictor in determining how sociologists perceive the role and characteristics of black sociologists and (2) black sociologists do not think highly of whites who study race relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines the career of Maurice F. Parmelee, sociologist, government official, nudist, and author of thirteen books, including the first American criminology text (1918). The contents of the latter are examined and contrasts with contemporary textbooks are noted. Parmelee's career is an anomoly, for although he published abundantly, he faded into sociological obscurity. Some conjecture is offered about scholarly career paths generally, drawn out of the Parmelee case. Finally, the paper argues that historical accounts of the development of American criminology are incomplete, for they fail to mention a number of early figures, including Parmelee. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

in this area. A radical re-tooling of some of his earlier definitions and concepts seems to be needed, if these are to become more appreciated and useful in future research. In short, while he undoubtedly knew his empirical evidence very well, Weber, like many other scientists, experienced some painful difficulties in attempting to classify and label it. The major modification tentatively suggested in this paper is that it is necessary to pay close attention to an extremely sharp contrast between the two variants of the traditionalist concept of domination, patrimonialism vs. feudalism. This basic contrast, crucial in his scientific investigation of cultural differentiations, runs most consistently through an unbelievable wealth of research material accumulated by him. It is an empirical typology of two sets of contradictory historical experiences concerning the origin and development of domination and legitimacy. There is another rather significant and frequently overlooked scientific contribution of Max Weber within the context of this paper. Albert Salomon's witty comment from the 1930's on the Me-long dialogue of Max Weber with the ghost of Karl Marx is now very popular among many radical, establishment, and the-rest-of-us sociologists. In spite of being fashionable to refer to it through the 1960's, no serious attempts were made to account for this many-faceted dialogue. This paper will try to settle one of the very much alive aspects of the same dialogue— hopefully to the lasting satisfaction of all. One morning numerous and valuable conceptual tools suggested by Max Weber, a typological dichotomy of patrimonialism vs. feudalism, has not been sufficiently utilized in modem research and obviously for good reasons. But the theoretical potentialities of this dichotomy seem to be imperative and still go begging particularly in an ever-increasing number of fascinating comparative analyses of durable and large political systems in time as well as in space. A consensus seems to be growing that the former is indispensable for the understanding of the latter, because the durability of patterning, found only in the comparison of things in time, is one of the most crucial prerequisites for contemporary studies of comparing things in space. Wesson (1967) and Eisenstadt (1963) in their admirable generalizing sweep of great historical empires, Blum (1964) and Jacobs (1958) in their specialized areas, could have immensely facilitated their formidable tasks if Weber's dichotomy had been available to them, thus only increasing the welldeserved impact of their contributions. Indeed, this dichotomy of Weber's, similarly to some others, does need just about a total rescue if not resurrection, and no student should be blamed for not digging for it for his own needs. Patrimonial-feudal dichotomy is buried in Webers extremely rough-draft writings on the traditionalist type of domination. In addition to being by necessity a residual type—whatever did not qualify for charismatic or legal-rational types was hastily located here perhaps for the time being—the traditionalist type, as presented by Weber, is one of the most mettled and confusing segments of Ms writings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of the kind of social organization necessary to bring about radical social change was raised by Marx in 1843-1844 in his essay on Hegel's philosophy of law. In this essay Marx specified the kind of social organization capable of bringing about the total, socialist revolution as the proletariat, a class, in society but not of it, conscious of itself and of its enemies, and organized as a party. (See also Marx and Engels, 1848). In the historical development of Marxism, Marx' answer was reinforced, but also narrowed and specified, by Lenin's classical (1902) formulation of the revolutionary cadre party. In a world in which many now talk of revolution, both in the "Third World," and even in modem industrialized countries, it may be of some use to re-examine the question of the kind of social organization involved in generating radical social change, and to reexamine the Marxist answer. My strategy in this paper is to attack the problem indirectly, by reexamining Max Weber's discussion of the role of certain kinds of Protestant groups in the rise of the capitalist world. I shall try to justify this indirect strategy at the paper's conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of science it has often happened that a scholar's ideas are denied full recognition because of that scholar's real or assumed connection to some controversial ideology. The position accorded to Vilfredo Pareto is one illustration of such practice in present-day sociology. This scholar is often said to have been a "Newton of the Moral World," or altogether a fascist ideologist. So Faris informs us that "The book [The Mind and Society] formulates the implicit philosophy of Italian Fascism, advocating the right of the strong to take what they want without apology or appeal to moral principles." In tracing the development of social thought, Bogardus devotes an entire chapter to "Pareto and Fascist Thought," and authoritatively argues that "While fascism has some of its roots in Nietzsche's concepts and other roots in Machiavellianism, yet Pareto's ideas come even closer to giving an adequate basis." Zanden, in turn, interprets Pareto's sociology to be "a philosophy of society, a social creed, determined mainly by violent and ever purely personal passions. The logical fulfillment of this political manifesto is fascism." We need not continue further; analogous affirmations are bountiful in the literature. To be sure, not all sociologists accept this view, but to date little or no systematic effort has been made to resolve the controversy, with the result that many students of sociology are unwitting victims of one of the most cruel intellectual hoaxes perpetrated against their discipline and one of their kind. The present paper proposes to offer a clarification with respect to the alleged connection between Pareto's sociology and fascist ideology. Our approach takes us in two major directions: first, an examination of Pareto's Treatise, his chief sociological work, and second, an examination of a series of letters written to his great friend Pantaleoni during the period when fascism was a political reality in Italy. Before proceeding to present our argument, it may be useful to inquire briefly about the meaning of "fascism," as his critics tend to use that word. A rapid glance at the literature reveals that the following are generally believed to be among the chief characteristics of fascist ideology: distrust of reason, a code of behavior based on "race" and violence, belligerent nationalism, government by an elite, and totalitarianism. Characteristically, these then provide the basis for accusing Pareto of "antirationalism," "anti-intellectualism," "contempt for democracy," and approval of the use of force at all costs. The major portion of this paper will be concerned, therefore, with explicating Pareto's position on these four issues. We shall begin by considering Pareto's alleged antirationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the applicability of Parsonian "pattern-variables" in defining a constructed type. Specification of boundaries or cutting-off points of role relationships in Weber's three types of authority systems, while an intriguing problem, is a project too great in scope for a short paper. Instead, for this preliminary attempt, a social system has been selected in which a few crucial role relationships define its character. It is also a system familiar to sociologists. The setting selected is the educational institution at the university level. The type to be defined, "the seat of learning," is perhaps the most "ideal" of ideal types. A number of other constructed type educational institutions might be isolated, e.g., "marriage markets," "sources of status," "diploma mills," or, perhaps, "campus playgrounds." Sets of role relationships could be specified to define any of these types. For purposes of illustration, however, the definition of one type will be sufficient. Four steps are involved in defining the constructed type: (1) selection of the crucial role pairs; (2) the definition of the chosen role relationships by use of the pattern-variables; (3) measurement of the pattern- variable choices; and (4) establishment of boundary points for the pattern-variables themselves. The fourth step will not be completed in this paper; it is felt that the necessary methodological apparatuses are already available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an increasing necessity for sociologists to improve their skills in writing sociological research papers. The connection between writing and thinking is close and crucial. Thinking requires symbols, because they are not a sufficient cause of thought but a necessary condition. Therefore, the written version can be brought closer to what one really thinks. Furthermore, writing has a palpability that the ephemeral, spoken word lacks. The concern for effective writing is not a trivial form over content. Good writing is a condition, slowly achieved, of saying what one means to say, of being what one means to be. It is a condition of achieving an adequate professional identity for the community of sociologists.

Sociology has fractured into a number of schools, each claiming to be distinct from the others and to have its own theory. The trouble with the theories is that most of them fail to make their general propositions explicit. Were they made explicit, all the theories would turn out to contain at least the general propositions of behavioral psychology, and the intellectual unification of sociology could begin. The paper discusses the reasons why many sociologists are reluctant to accept this argument. It also discusses other claimants to the status of theory, including "pattern" theories, functional theories (one of which is really behavioral), and the difficulties created by some uses of the concept, social structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers central correctionsn to J. David Lewis' paper "The Classic American Pragmatists As Forerunners to Symbolic Interactionism," that appeared in "The Sociological Quarterly," in the Summer of 1976. Misrepresentations of the views of sociologist George Herbert Mead. The weakness of Lewis' major argument that symbolic interactionists do not follow the position of Mead, but take instead, the position of John Dewey, was pointed out. Lewis' speculative conjecture is evident in his effort to trace the intellectual history some sociologists in the case of symbolic interactionism.

The rationality that guides the sociological community has generated principles to evaluate members' work. Under the sway of these principles, Georg Simmel surfaces either as a peripheral member of the community or as an outright failure. His critics have argued that his work is "fragmented," that he begins without having formulated "guiding statements," that he is "unsystematic" and "undisciplined." Yet we can discover in Simmel's writings a distinct rationality that upsets this criticism by its transcendence of it. Had these particular critics read his work more carefully they might have discovered that Simmel had anticipated their criticism and had carefully reevaluated its source of authority. In this paper 1 address the problems of discipline and systematic unity in sociological writing in order to unmask the rationality held within the sociological community and to formulate Simmel's unique contribution as a member of that community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When sociologists discuss the analytical concept "integration" they use an implicit conceptual imagery which must be made clear if some of the most common confusions and misunderstandings in this area are to be avoided. The recent discussion of the concept has been vigorous, but a systematic appraisal of the issue is needed. It is attempted in this paper. Our analysis must have two parts: first, we must understand the formal meaning of the concept "integration" as such—its logical properties, as it were, which stem from its nature as a characterization of whole-part relationships; second, we must apply the formal insights gained to a brief review of the analytical uses of the concept in sociological theory; it may then be possible to specify at least some of the conceptual relationships between different types of "integration theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Only a new, direct, systematic, and comprehensively envisaged effort to develop an appropriate terminology would seem to promise a thorough, effective removal of these defects. The proposals offered in this paper stem from an intensive study of Cooley's major works and the fields they represent, his own distinctive conceptual contributions, the basic assumptions pervading his general methodological and theoretic stance, and allied terminological differentiations embodying the same basic views in disciplines other than sociology. Stated simply and directly, the results of this inquiry indicate that Cooley's general sociological orientation is constituted of a configuration of ideas involving idealism, organicism, diversitarianism, nonrationality, the pervasiveness of conflict or opposition, and the constancy of change. Perhaps the best general designation for this configuration of ideas would be romanticism or romantic idealism, as Cooley's respect for and indebtedness to Hegel, Schaeffle, Emerson, and especially Goethe might suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]