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in this area. A radical re-tooling of some of his earlier definitions and concepts seems to be needed, if these are to become more appreciated and useful in future research. In short, while he undoubtedly knew his empirical evidence very well, Weber, like many other scientists, experienced some painful difficulties in attempting to classify and label it. The major modification tentatively suggested in this paper is that it is necessary to pay close attention to an extremely sharp contrast between the two variants of the traditionalist concept of domination, patrimonialism vs. feudalism. This basic contrast, crucial in his scientific investigation of cultural differentiations, runs most consistently through an unbelievable wealth of research material accumulated by him. It is an empirical typology of two sets of contradictory historical experiences concerning the origin and development of domination and legitimacy. There is another rather significant and frequently overlooked scientific contribution of Max Weber within the context of this paper. Albert Salomon's witty comment from the 1930's on the Me-long dialogue of Max Weber with the ghost of Karl Marx is now very popular among many radical, establishment, and the-rest-of-us sociologists. In spite of being fashionable to refer to it through the 1960's, no serious attempts were made to account for this many-faceted dialogue. This paper will try to settle one of the very much alive aspects of the same dialogue— hopefully to the lasting satisfaction of all. One morning numerous and valuable conceptual tools suggested by Max Weber, a typological dichotomy of patrimonialism vs. feudalism, has not been sufficiently utilized in modem research and obviously for good reasons. But the theoretical potentialities of this dichotomy seem to be imperative and still go begging particularly in an ever-increasing number of fascinating comparative analyses of durable and large political systems in time as well as in space. A consensus seems to be growing that the former is indispensable for the understanding of the latter, because the durability of patterning, found only in the comparison of things in time, is one of the most crucial prerequisites for contemporary studies of comparing things in space. Wesson (1967) and Eisenstadt (1963) in their admirable generalizing sweep of great historical empires, Blum (1964) and Jacobs (1958) in their specialized areas, could have immensely facilitated their formidable tasks if Weber's dichotomy had been available to them, thus only increasing the welldeserved impact of their contributions. Indeed, this dichotomy of Weber's, similarly to some others, does need just about a total rescue if not resurrection, and no student should be blamed for not digging for it for his own needs. Patrimonial-feudal dichotomy is buried in Webers extremely rough-draft writings on the traditionalist type of domination. In addition to being by necessity a residual type—whatever did not qualify for charismatic or legal-rational types was hastily located here perhaps for the time being—the traditionalist type, as presented by Weber, is one of the most mettled and confusing segments of Ms writings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of the kind of social organization necessary to bring about radical social change was raised by Marx in 1843-1844 in his essay on Hegel's philosophy of law. In this essay Marx specified the kind of social organization capable of bringing about the total, socialist revolution as the proletariat, a class, in society but not of it, conscious of itself and of its enemies, and organized as a party. (See also Marx and Engels, 1848). In the historical development of Marxism, Marx' answer was reinforced, but also narrowed and specified, by Lenin's classical (1902) formulation of the revolutionary cadre party. In a world in which many now talk of revolution, both in the "Third World," and even in modem industrialized countries, it may be of some use to re-examine the question of the kind of social organization involved in generating radical social change, and to reexamine the Marxist answer. My strategy in this paper is to attack the problem indirectly, by reexamining Max Weber's discussion of the role of certain kinds of Protestant groups in the rise of the capitalist world. I shall try to justify this indirect strategy at the paper's conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the name suggests, social-psychology is a bastard field. It consists of such a variety of peoples doing so many different things in different ways, that it defies definition—at least for me. In spite of the neat delineations which are made in textbooks and the scholarly historical treatments which appear in encyclopediae and symposia, I find it difficult to grasp a concept of "social-psychology" which is anything more than the operational definition: "Social psychology is what people who call themselves social-psychologists, do." That is not much help, but it is all we have got. I mention my own confusion in this matter, not with the aim of confusing others, but by way of explanation: some of the issues I will touch upon in this paper may infringe upon what readers consider to be other areas of sociology. I regret such territorial invasions. But in my own quest for understanding why people act as they do, I have increasingly found that the traditional "fields" in the discipline and the traditional courses in the catalogue do not provide appropriate categories with which I can explain to colleagues and students what it is I am discovering. Having said all of this, let us get down to business. It is a decade since Dennis Wrong published the paper in which he challenged "The oversocialized conception of man in modern society" (1961). Reacting to a determinism which pervaded the social sciences and which seemed to be seeping into popular currency, Wrong asked if man were in fact as constrained by a monolithic culture as we social scientists would have it. A few years later Harold Garfinkel referred more bluntly to the models of men constructed by the various social sciences: he called them "judgmental dopes." The cultural dope and the psychological dope are, respectively, the man in the sociologist's society and the man in the psychologist's society (1967:67-68). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rationality that guides the sociological community has generated principles to evaluate members' work. Under the sway of these principles, Georg Simmel surfaces either as a peripheral member of the community or as an outright failure. His critics have argued that his work is "fragmented," that he begins without having formulated "guiding statements," that he is "unsystematic" and "undisciplined." Yet we can discover in Simmel's writings a distinct rationality that upsets this criticism by its transcendence of it. Had these particular critics read his work more carefully they might have discovered that Simmel had anticipated their criticism and had carefully reevaluated its source of authority. In this paper 1 address the problems of discipline and systematic unity in sociological writing in order to unmask the rationality held within the sociological community and to formulate Simmel's unique contribution as a member of that community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the message of the author as the outgoing editor of the journal "The Sociological Quarterly." The author acknowledges the opportunity that he was granted as the editor of this journal. Further, the author also thanks the members and readers of the journal for their support to him. The author found that during his tenure as the editor of this journal, he acquired knowledge on various facets of sociology as a discipline. Besides, he also came across the new developments that took place in the field of sociological research.

Sociologists need to recognize the distinction between objective and subjective status inconsistency. Objective inconsistency may be defined in terms of an arbitrary manipulation of an individual's status ranks, or it may be defined in terms of the normative expectations linking together the various status dimensions. Subjective inconsistency, on the other hand, involves asking the respondent to decide for himself whether or not he is inconsistent. When objective inconsistency is defined in terms of arbitrary mathematical manipulations, the relationship between these two components of inconsistency (i.e., objective and subjective) is basically an empirical question. However, when objective inconsistency is defined in terms of the normative expectations in a population, and when the respondent shares these expectations, we propose that these two components of inconsistency will be identical. Conversely, they will not be identical when the respondent does not share these expectations. Finally, the implications of defining inconsistency in terms of normative expectations are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now almost seventy years since Max Weber visited the United States and was inspired to write his delightful and significant essay entitled "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism." (Weber, 1946). I would like to comment on what Weber had to say in that essay concerning American Protestantism, and I would also like to assess Weber's predictions about the future of American Protestantism in the light of certain events since 1904, events that Weber himself might think important to reflect upon were he to come to life again and pay a second visit to this country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Max Weber's work is seldom beyond criticism, and a good deal of it is controversial. Some regard Weber's main contribution on Economy and Society as too aridly typological, even as they perhaps also concede its very considerable stature. There are those who do Weber less than justice because they are offended by a nationalism that repels them even after all qualifications, such as those suggested by Weber's political prudence and sagacity and impatience with political quackery, have been made. But Weber clearly suffers in part from the very massiveness of his achievement. No one could write so much and on so great a variety of matters as he did without making mistakes. And his nationalism, as has just been suggested in effect, did not inhibit great penetration and understanding of many political and social phenomena. In any ease, given Weber's limitations, given a variety of reservations about his performance, that performance in the end remains so outstanding that for many sociologists Weber is unequivocally the intellectual hero of their field up to the present time—the charismatic figure from the past of sociology. It is no doubt a pious thing to look back on him once again after fifty years, but the following observations are not motivated by piety, commendable as it might be if they were. They are rather motivated by a desire to take a somewhat unconventional look at the structure of Weber's sociological thought and to make some suggestions about wisdom and science in sociology today to which Weber's thought appears to give reinforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists often single out the family in our society as a prototype of the primary group. Many emphasize that the family best embodies the denotative properties of smallness, face-to-faceness, duration over time, non-specialized function, and intimacy stressed by Cooley in introducing the concept. The implicit notion is widely held that ties among kin are mutually binding, intimate, and more or less equal, even though casual inspection dictates that relations between most members of the family are not and cannot be equivalent. Husband and wife, for example, engage and share in intimacies that they are not permitted or are unlikely to share with other family members. The range and degree of intimacy and the quality of the ties that each spouse exhibits in his role as parent or that siblings show in relation to each other or to their parents, in fact, underscores that relations, even within the nuclear group, are highly varied. To complicate matters, the quality of ties and relations within the family must inevitably change over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of researcher Robert Blain about the four function paradigm in sociological study is critiqued. Blain has developed a promising synthetic approach designed to facilitate the development of simple, testable, and quantitative sociological propositions. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that Blain has misread the works of his colleagues in several fundamental ways. Blain has pointed out two aspects of the Parsonian scheme which are conceptually incompatible. Furthermore, Blain is incorrect in maintaining that many functional redundancies exist in the Parsonian scheme. The point which Blain has missed is that the entire four function paradigm has a dual application. It has been applied systematically to each of the four system levels, and then re-applied to the general action system as a whole.