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This paper critically scrutinizes the thesis put forward by Jennifer Platt in a recent article in The Sociological Review about the general relation between theory and method, based on her investigation of the specific example of functionalism and survey research in post-war US sociology. The present paper questions the extent to which Platt's analysis and general conclusions mask important levels of connectedness between theory and method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many writers hold that research method is necessarily determined by theory, and it is common to suggest the relationship between functionalism and survey method in post-war US sociology as an example of this. This paper questions the extent to which that method and that theory were in reality meaningfully associated, and argues against the position that theory and method are in general invariably connected in the way suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on the relation between sociological theory and method. Compatibility between survey method and hypothetico-deductive forms of theorizing; Distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions; Relationship between functionalism and middle-range theory.

The article presents criticisms of works of the U.S. sociologist Talcott Parsons. The article argues that the conventional criticisms of Parsons are misplaced and that Parsons and his critics share basic assumptions. It concentrate upon two areas where criticism has been most frequently focused, firstly, the relationship between Parsons's early formulation of the action frame of reference and a functionalist methodology and secondly, the concept of the normative and its place in Parsons's theory. The criticisms of Parsons discussed in this article lead to a sociological impasse. It is important to recognise, however, that the form taken by this impasse serves to make the conventional criticisms of Parsons appear plausible, that is, the breakdown of Parsons's theoretical system does take the form of unintegrated theoretical principles, in this sense, then, there are 'two sociologies', but they are not distinct approaches. The attempt to represent them as separate paradigms is an abstraction or reification. The deficiencies of Parsons's theoretical scheme are the characteristic deficiencies of the action frame of reference in sociology.

This collection of essays is designed to show how the various concepts of Norbert Elias’s writings fi t together in an overall vision for sociology, and how this has come to inspire the wide-ranging and interdisciplinary research tradition of ‘fi gurational’ sociology. In this introduction, we focus on a somewhat neglected aspect of Elias’s work, the concept of generation. We explore his role as a teacher, passing the torch to a fi rst generation of scholars, mainly in Europe, examining his generosity to younger colleagues as well as some of his well-known foibles. We then trace his infl uence in the emergence of a second generation that is more far-fl ung, both internationally and across disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how the development of biomedicine influences the meaning of social norms and pathology. The author compares normativity as it relates to both the physical human body and society, thereby conflating sociological and biological analyses of norms and pathology. This is because sociologists see similarities between the functionality, whether social or physiological, of social and vital norms. The author first comments on the analysis of genomes to identify an individual's genetic risk of contracting certain diseases in order to connect genetics and biological determinism. He then goes on to discuss the use of brain imaging to identify mental disorders, offering his thoughts on brain-appearance norms.

The article focuses on the social facts and human agents. Social structures are seen as the results of intentional or meaningful human behavior. With some bending and stretching, the various schools of social theory, such as phenomenology, existentialism, functionalism, structuralism, etc. can then be seen as instances of one or more of these positions. The elements of social organization in any society are seen as a process of human objectivation that, under certain conditions, takes on an alienated form. takes on an alienated form. Objectivation is the process whereby human subjectivity embodies itself in products that are available to oneself, and alienation is the process whereby the unity of the producer and its product is broken. Thus, languages, cultural and ethical norms, etc. are ultimately all embodiments of human subjectivity. Human agency and society are not related "dialectically." An author distinguishes between the genesis of human actions, lying in the reasons, intentions and plans of human agents on the one hand, and the structures governing the reproduction and transformation of social activities on the other.

In the decades after World War II, stimulated by much government and private foundation money in the U.S., and by small sums elsewhere, sociological research blossomed into a small industry. The two dominant tendencies, sometimes connected but more often not, were the Functionalism and the more or less sophisticated empiricism of those driven by a desire to discover how many people thought or were or did something and how this correlated with others who thought or were or did something else. Parsons's theoretical enterprise strongly influenced the work of a whole generation of America's most talented social scientists, for indeed his goal was no less than the development of a general theory of action as the basis of an integrated social science. In this task he was supported by anthropologists, psychologists, economists, and biologists. Large numbers of students, encouraged by the apparent success of this school of thought, carried out large numbers of pieces of research into the functions that various phenomena fulfilled in holding society together.

The article comments on functionalism in social science. It is important for any analysis of the explanatory power of functionalism that the difference between societal survival functionalism and institutional relation functionalism should be appreciated. While the full-scale functionalist model combines them, they are distinct and separable. Some functionalists, however, do not seem to have been aware of this. A well-known account of the relation of functional statements to explanation, that of sociologist Carl Hempel, is relevant to the present consideration of societal survival functionalism. Briefly, Hempel maintains that if a given system can function only given a certain condition, and if that condition can be satisfied only when the system has a given trait, then from the fact that the system functions people can deduce that it has the trait. A further important point is that if the facts of human psychology and behavior on which people rely to explain why social stratification exists are universal or near-universal traits of human nature, then these universal psycho-behavioral facts also explain both why all societies have social stratification systems, and why any particular society has a social stratification system.

The article focuses on functionalism that has come to occupy a position of central importance in sociological theory. Though it has not yet received a comprehensive exposition, much has been said about it from various points of view; many criticisms of it have been advanced; and to a great extent, these criticisms have been met. It seems worthwhile, then, to review the development of functionalist theory and to attempt an assessment of its achievement or, at least, of its potentialities as a social theory. In a sense, Functionalism is extremely old in that its assumptions are implicit in practically all the earlier attempts to think systematically about human society. In "The Rules of Sociological Method," sociologist Emile Durkheim maintains that for an adequate explanation of social facts two things are essential. First: it is necessary that one should have a historical account of how these social facts have come to be what they are and second: one requires an analysis of the functions of these social facts in terms of the social ends they serve.