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Sociological research, influenced by feminist and other critical perspectives, has noted how men’s emotional inexpressiveness was influenced, and supported, by patriarchal privilege. Such approaches have argued that ‘inexpression’ needs to be broken down in order to build gender equality and improve men’s own wellbeing. Emerging research has, however, challenged the argument that men are ‘emotionally inexpressive’ on two main premises: that, as a result of feminist critiques, many men now practise ‘softer’ or ‘more emotional’ forms of masculinity; second, that emotions always influence social action and so need to be better incorporated into sociological accounts of men’s behaviour. Yet these approaches entail some conceptual confusion as to what emotions are, how they link to social action and whether men’s emotions are inherently transformative for gender relations. This article first details how emotions and masculinity have been theorized in feminist-inspired approaches. It outlines recent work on emotions, men and masculinities before arguing for an understanding of emotions that engages with both physiologically grounded and postconstructionist debates. It finally suggests incorporating a material-discursive approach to men’s emotions, through feminist work on affect, which is attentive to the political dimensions of ‘increasing emotionality’ in order to contribute to a developing field of sociological research.

In this paper we develop a conceptualisation of organizational decision-making as a practice that is, necessarily, ethical. The paper starts with a discussion of the notion of decision-making as it relates to organizational rationality and the relationship between management and control. Drawing on Derrida's discussions of undecidability and responsibility, we suggest that as well as being able to consider organizational decision-making as an instance of (albeit bounded) rationality or calculability, it can also be regarded as a process of choice amongst heterogenous possibilities. On that basis, we follow Derrida in arguing that for a decision to be considered an instance of responsible action it must be made with neither recourse to knowledge of its outcome nor to the application of pre-ordained rules. Illustrating our argument with a discussion of Eichmann's 'I was just following orders' defence, we suggest that rules for ethical decision making, rather than ensuring ethical outcomes, can work to insulate organizations from moral responsibility. We conclude with a discussion of ethics and democracy in relation to responsible decision making in organizations. © 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review.