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This paper assesses the role of the BASIC countries — Brazil, South Africa, India, and China — in UN climate change negotiations. The paper explores the formation and evolution of the group, and focuses on how the four major developing countries of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have coordinated their positions and acted jointly to achieve an agreed outcome with other players in the recent UN Climate Change Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, based on an analysis of their country profiles and negotiation positions on a wide range of climate issues. The paper argues that the emergence of the BASIC Group is a reflection of the ongoing power shift from EU–US agreement to BASIC–US compromise in UN climate negotiations since the early 1990s. The rise of BASIC also has its roots in recent global market dynamics and further reflects the power transformation in the economic dimension of the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) established in 2003 brings together three like-minded, democratic, market economies of multi-cultural and multi-ethnic character, sharing a broadly similar economic, political and development situation. At the time of its formation IBSA was widely regarded as representing a novel form of South-South cooperation, transcending older models rooted in the logic of North-South confrontation in the post-colonial, Cold War world. However, now, as the respective countries prepare for their tenth anniversary summit in India, the forum seems to face a growing sense of irrelevance, perhaps even an existential crisis. There has been a proliferation of other forums—notably BRICS and the G20—which means that IBSA needs to differentiate itself if it is to endure. This paper suggests a common vision for IBSA, based on the concept of international liberalism, implying an open international market, well-regulated capital markets and tailored domestic policies such as social policy, health policy and education policy, may well increase the weight IBSA can gain in different international forums. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the practice of international relations, states can pursue different combinations of foreign policy strategies at different systemic levels. The positions of Southern regional powers such as Brazil, on the one hand, between the centre and periphery of the current world system and, on the other hand, at the nexus of international and regional politics, demand particularly complex foreign policy strategies. Strategic approaches have to consider at least three contextual factors: firstly, the continuing superiority of established (the United States) and emerging (China) global actors in terms of material power; secondly, the fact that regional and global affairs are increasingly interrelated; and thirdly, the fact that foreign policy strategies are mapped out against the background of an international system moving from a unipolar to a multipolar order. I argue that Southern regions and their leaders will play a pivotal part in the course of that global transformation as well as in the future world order. The purpose of this paper is to discuss Brazil's strategic foreign policy options after unipolarity. To approach this task, a top-down approach starting at the global level seems most promising. First, I will discuss the potential transformation of the international system and the middle-power role of Brazil in the course of that process, especially with regard to its role in the G3, or India, Brazil and South Africa. Second, I will locate Brazil in its region, analyse its relations with secondary power Venezuela, and ask for strategic options at the regional level. Third, the conclusion will stress the increasing interrelatedness of global and regional affairs, pointing out strategies applied by Brazil in order to become a decision maker in a future multipolar world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After passage of the 1988 Constitution of Brazil, successive democratic governments worked to build bridges between the nation's foreign policy and its defence strategy, thus fostering a dialogue among administrations and constituencies under the aegis of the rule of law. It was under the Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff administrations that Brazil laid out a grand strategy, implementation of which was interrupted by the controversial impeachment proceedings of 2016. The argument unfolds from a consideration of Brazil's development model and domestic politics as key structural variables in analysing the challenges faced in the conception and implementation of its grand strategy. The article is organised into two sections: (1) The sketch of a grand strategy: when Brazil's foreign and defence policies converged; (2) An ambition frustrated? Or, the impact of Brazil's development model and domestic politics on the conception and implementation of its grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the nature of transatlantic relations between Brazil and Namibia in the last two decades and argues that, in stark contrast with any other relationship regarding the African continent, Brazil's motivation in deepening ties with Namibia was largely built upon an extensive military-to-military cooperation partnership. By focusing on long-standing bureaucratic interests, the article demonstrates how Brazilian–Namibian relations were driven over the years by strategic affinities, business opportunities made available by the security sectors of both countries and, more recently, growing concerns over the sovereignty of their respective maritime areas in tandem with renewed interest for security developments within the the South Atlantic region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over the past decade, power dynamics within the South Atlantic region have undergone significant changes. While the area has historically been dominated by North–South ties, both in terms of material flows and with respect to political influence, more recently there has been a surge in cooperation between developing countries within this space. As trade, investment and other forms of exchange and dialogue increase among actors from within the region (notably between South America and Africa) and with states located outside the region, the BRICS countries become more relevant to the South Atlantic. Individually, they have become relevant players in the South Atlantic's economic, political and security dimensions. Collectively, as inter-BRICS flows and political coordination intensify, new configurations of cooperation emerge within the South Atlantic. These initiatives suggest that rising powers are contributing towards making the South Atlantic – long dominated by North–South ties – a space where South–South cooperation and norms predominate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Africa's economic rise and growing prosperity over the past decade has attracted the attention of investors, development agencies and governments from across the globe. Brazil has joined this charge of established and emerging powers in Africa. Recent activities across the continent and the development of certain bilateral agreements suggest an alternative approach from other emerging powers in Africa, underpinned by development cooperation between Brazilian and African partners in key sectors. The ‘Brazilian way’, building on its positive image in Africa – primarily through development cooperation – while accumulating core commercial and strategic assets, appears to be aiming at sustainable engagement with long-term objectives. The explicit role of business in Brazil's development agenda in Africa sets it apart from traditional European and US counterparts, which have typically relied on donor-led aid and development. However, criticism has also crept in around Brazil's general reluctance to use its influence and commercial leverage to push for greater democratic freedoms in some of the African countries where it operates. While Brazil's commercial interests on the African continent are slightly different from commodity-starved players like India and China, which are explicitly reliant on extractive motives linked to price and efficiency, the question remains, ‘Is Brazil's interest and engagement with Africa any different from the rest?’ [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum was launched in June 2003 to push for these countries' bids for a place on the United Nation' Security Council, but IBSA's attention has shifted over time towards development and economic reform. This article discusses the progress in addressing social development challenges within the member countries of IBSA. It examines the social achievements of IBSA members, in the context of their economic performance and the Millennium Development Goals. It also assesses the forces which propel these societies' social policies, especially the influence of civil society, and whether there has been benefit in this regard in their collaboration within the IBSA forum. Their experiences show the critical importance of civil society in design and execution of programmes directed towards the poor, an important factor to be kept in mind by multilateral and bilateral agencies involved in poverty alleviation projects in developing countries. The three nations could cooperate to share ideas for effective social welfare programmes, and join together in multilateral forums to form a powerful voice for change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following a period of some distancing through the 1980s and 1990s, Brazil has made a concerted effort to engage with Africa. Today, under the leadership of President Lula, Africa is clearly a priority, especially as Brazil emerges as a global economic power and leader of the developing South. Yet, relatively little is written of Brazil's engagement with Africa and the rationale behind the political and economic drive toward the continent. What is clear is that Brazil's engagement with Africa, viewed in the historical context, maintains its underlying foreign policy principles of economic development on the one hand and the preservation of autonomy in an asymmetric world on the other. Brazil's engagement with Africa has taken on a three-pronged approach of political diplomacy, commercial engagement and development co-operation. This is indicative of a new era of Brazilian foreign policy and Brazil's process of internationalisation in general. This is a complex and inter-related process that Brazil seems to have managed well through a high degree of diplomatic sophistication and open cooperation between the political, commercial and various development entities. Africa displays one of the best contextual examples of Brazil's delicate balancing act between commercial and strategic interests and external development assistance. The way Brazil manages this and builds on its positive image in Africa is indicative of its role and approach as a new and emerging power on the international stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the South-South Cooperation of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) political alliance. It notes that IBSA's agenda focuses on the trilateral cooperation on security, bio-fuels, trade, research and development, and social development. It speculates that the initiatives of IBSA such as the United Nations (UN) reform will demonstrate slower progress. It advises that IBSA must settle their views on nuclear disarmament and World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiation issues.