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Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: When a factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand with supra‐competitive profits. We illustrate this issue with laboratory data. We run n‐firm Cournot experiments with written cheap‐talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to talk. We conduct this comparison for two, four, and six firms. We find that two firms indeed find it easier to collude tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain from communication increases with the number of firms, at a decreasing rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Large retailers may exercise buyer power in their interactions with manufacturers. This article explores the use of exclusive dealing arrangements by a monopoly retailer when purchasing a differentiated product from competing manufacturers. Interactions among the firms are modeled as a bargaining game. When consumers' brand preferences are weak and/or when one brand is preferred by a significant majority of consumers, it is more profitable for the retailer to negotiate an exclusive dealing arrangement with one of the manufacturers than to distribute both products. Also, it is more profitable for the retailer to induce exclusive dealing if the manufacturer of the excluded brand has a lot of bargaining power when negotiating with the retailer. If buyer-induced exclusive dealing reduces the retail price of the exclusive brand in order to encourage 'brand switching' by consumers who favor the excluded brand, the practice may increase consumer welfare and even total welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]