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This paper identifies a form of remembering sufficiently overlooked that it has not yet been dignified with a name. I shall christen it Rilkean Memory. This form of memory is, typically, embodied and embedded. It is a form of involuntary, autobiographical memory that is neither implicit nor explicit, neither declarative nor procedural, neither episodic nor semantic, and not Freudian. While a discussion of the importance of Rilkean memory lies beyond the scope of this paper, I shall try to show that admitting Rilkean memory into our ontology does point us in the direction of a very different conception of the mind and mental processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on the way in which Feuerbach's attempt to develop a naturalistic, realist remodeling of Hegel's relational ontology, which culminated in his own version of 'sensualism', led him to emphasize the vulnerability of the subject and the role of affectivity, thus making object-dependence a constitutive feature of subjectivity. We find in Feuerbach the first lineaments of a philosophical theory of object-relations, one that anticipates the well-known psychological theory of the same name, but one that also offers a broader metaphysical basis in which all types of 'essential objects' are shown to matter to subjectivity. This Feuerbachian theory of object-relations, the paper then argues, foreshadows a number of important developments in 20th century post-Hegelian philosophy. In it can be found an anticipation of Adorno's later theory of mimesis. Equally, this theory already emphasizes the 'libidinal' nature of intentionality, in a way that announces Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh. Finally, the last section of the article proposes a model with which we might reconstruct the way in which object-relations and self-relations can be brought together consistently. In this instance, Feuerbach uses concepts that announce Freud's notion of 'primary narcissism'. One contemporary philosopher who has proposed a sophisticated model of subjectivity, in which primary narcissism is shown to complement object-dependence, is Axel Honneth. The last section argues that Feuerbach's full image of subjective identity as reciprocal scaffolding of self- and object-relations reminds strongly of Honneth's core concept of 'positive self-relation'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her paper, Ladelle McWhorter offers a genealogical account of the historical entanglement between the concepts of moral and legal personhood, which introduces a new level of complexity to contemporary debates concerning corporate personhood. In this commentary, I discuss the insights of McWhorter's genealogical analysis and pose two sets of questions concerning the ontological status of corporate personhood and the potential practical difficulties surrounding the creation of non-forensic, corporate entities. Particularly, I emphasize the intimate, historical relationship between legality and corporation, and consider its effects on the ontological and practical possibilities of corporations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Martin Heidegger's account of attunement [Befindlichkeit] through mood [Stimmung] is unprecedented in the history of philosophy and groundbreaking visà- vis contemporary accounts of emotion. On his view, moods are not mere mental states that result from, arise out of, or are caused by our situation or context. Rather, moods are fundamental modes of existence that are disclosive of the way one is or finds oneself [sich befinden] in the world. Mood is one of the basic modes through which we experience the world and through which the world is made present to us. Moreover, moods are the lenses through which things, people, animals, events, and aspects in the world matter to us. In this paper, I make the case that Heidegger's insights with respect to mood can and ought to be extended beyond the narrow scope of his fundamental ontology (in Being and Time) in which they were developed. I argue that contemporary accounts of mood within psychology ought to take these Heideggerian insights seriously and use them when defining, studying, evaluating, and drawing conclusions about the nature of moods. There are three sections to my paper. In section 1, I delineate Heidegger's account of mood. In section 2, I turn to some key studies on mood in psychology, and I elaborate upon some of the main shortcomings in this literature. In section 3, I suggest how psychology might benefit from understanding and utilizing a Heideggerian-inspired phenomenology of mood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The importance of John Locke's discussion of persons is undeniable. Locke never explicitly tells us whether he thinks persons are substances or modes, however. We are thus left in the dark about a fundamental aspect of Locke's view. Many commentators have recently claimed that Lockean persons are modes. In this paper I swim against the current tide in the secondary literature and argue that Lockean persons are substances. Specifically I argue that what Locke says about substance, power, and agency commits him to the claim that persons are substances. I consider the passages mode interpreters cite and show why these passages do not imply that Lockean persons are modes. I also respond to two objections anyone who thinks Lockean persons are substances must address. I show that a substance reading of Locke on persons can be sympathetic and viable. I contend that with a clearer understanding of the ontological status of Lockean persons we can gain a firmer grasp of what Locke's picture of persons looks like. Finally, once we are armed with a better understanding of Locke on substance, mode, and personhood, we can pave the way toward a more nuanced description of the early modern debate over personal identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I put forward some remarks supporting a reading of Spinoza's metaphysics in terms of process ontology, that is, the notion that processes or activities, rather than things, are the most basic entities. I suggest that this reading, while not the only possible one, offers advantages over the traditional substance-properties interpretation. While this claim may sound implausible vis-à-vis Spinoza's language of 'substance' and 'attributes', I show that process ontology illuminates important features of Spinoza's thought and can facilitate solutions to some interpretive problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the concept of physicalism in terms of set of properties and the physical properties to which all other properties bear a certain relation. It examines that nonphysical properties supervene on the physical properties. It investigates the ontological status of mental properties. It highlights research paper of physicist Gerald Feinberg regarding the physics of ordinary matter and pessimistic induction.

The theme of this year's Spindel Conference was Social Ontologies of Race. This editorial introduction serves as both a general introduction to the topic of racial ontology and an introduction to this volume's contributions and their development of the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the earliest examples of articulating the 'discordance of time'-a theme that serves as a guiding thread woven throughout much of the re-engagement with time that is characteristic of continental philosophy-can be found in a series of essays written by Levinas in the aftermath of World War II. I show how these essays derive from a set of key texts by Bergson and how Bergson already anticipated the distinctive ways of conceptualizing the movement of time that are advanced by Levinas in his early essays. Nevertheless, as I will show, Levinas chooses not to acknowledge this Bergsonian anticipation of his theory of time, despite his recognition, repeated throughout many texts and interviews, of the influence of Bergson on the formation of his own thought. I conclude by reflecting on the complexity of the Bergsonian inheritance in Levinas's philosophy of time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leibniz's widely influential account of time provides a significant puzzle for those seeking to locate this account within his hierarchical ontology. Leibniz follows his scholastic predecessors in supposing that there are different grades of being, with substances being the most real and all other things possessing their reality via their relationships to substance. Following this picture, Leibniz suggests that phenomenal bodies only possess the being that they derive from the substances (i.e., monads) that ground them. Some would argue that time likewise only possesses its being based on the bodies that it relates. Contrary to this suggestion (i.e., that time is twice removed from substances), I will argue that time is derived directly from rational souls. Thus, I will argue that time is on an ontological par with the phenomenal world of bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reconsiders Husserl's concept of Leib in light of Merleau‐Ponty's interpretation of the human body as an ontologically significant phenomenon. I first analyze Husserl's account of the body as a "two‐fold unity" and demonstrate the problematic nature of its four implications, namely, the ambiguous ontological status of the body as subject‐object, the view of "my body" as "my object," the preconstitutive character of the unity of the body, and the restriction of the constitution of the body to touch alone. Building on this analysis, I explain how Merleau‐Ponty resolves the difficulties raised by Husserl's account by reversing it. According to Merleau‐Ponty, "flesh" is not a two‐fold reality comprising subjective and objective aspects, but an ontological dimension from which these aspects can be abstracted through specific cognitive operations. Consequently, all subjective and objective aspects, even beyond the boundaries of one's body, must be understood as founded in the indivisible unity of flesh. I argue that a thorough phenomenological description of the human body requires abandoning Husserl's concept of Leib because it contributes to perpetuating subject‐object dualism. In contrast, Merleau‐Ponty's notion of flesh reveals the circularity between subject and object and its general ontological significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there is a steadily growing literature on epistemic injustice in healthcare, there are few discussions of the role that biomedical technologies play in harming patients in their capacity as knowers. Through an analysis of newborn and pediatric genetic and genomic sequencing technologies (GSTs), I argue that biomedical technologies can lead to epistemic injustice through two primary pathways: epistemic capture and value partitioning. I close by discussing the larger ethical and political context of critical analyses of GSTs and their broader implications for just and equitable healthcare delivery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: According to Chomsky and his followers, language as a biological phenomenon is a property of individual minds and brains; its status as a social phenomenon is merely epiphenomenal and not a proper object of scientific study. On a rival view, the individual's biological capacity for language cannot be properly understood in isolation from the linguistic environment, which it both depends on for its operation and—in collaboration with other speakers—builds and shapes for future generations. I argue here for the rival view by demonstrating firstly its greater consonance with several themes in current biological theory, and secondly its ability to answer two well‐known philosophical challenges to generative linguistics due to Quine and Kripke. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Primitives are both important and unavoidable, and which set of primitives we endorse will greatly shape our theories and how those theories provide solutions to the problems that we take to be important. After introducing the notion of a primitive posit, I discuss the different kinds of primitives that we might posit. Following Cowling ( ), I distinguish between ontological and ideological primitives, and, following Benovsky ( ), between functional and content views of primitives. I then propose that these two distinctions cut across each other leading to four types of primitive posits. I then argue that theoretical virtues should be taken to be metatheoretical ideological primitives. I close with some reflections on the global nature of comparing sets of primitives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT I argue that Descartes is not a reductionist about life, but dissolves or eliminates the category entirely. This is surprising both because he repeatedly refers to the life of humans, animals, and plants and because he appears to rely on the category of life to construct his physiology and medicine. Various attempts have been made in the scholarship to attribute a principled concept of life to Descartes. Most recently, Detlefsen (2016) has argued that Descartes 'is a reductionist with respect to explanation of life phenomena but not an eliminativist with respect to life itself' (143). I show that all these attempts either result in arbitrariness or force Descartes's wider philosophical project into incoherence. I argue that Descartes's ontological commitments make a principled concept of life impossible, that he does not need such a concept, and that his project ends up more coherent without one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

abstract I aim to clarify the argument for space that Newton presents in De Gravitatione (composed prior to 1687) by putting Newton's remarks into conversation with the account of geometrical knowledge found in Proclus's Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements (ca. 450). What I highlight is that both Newton and Proclus adopt an epistemic progression (or 'order of knowing') according to which geometrical knowledge necessarily precedes our knowledge of metaphysical truths concerning the ontological state of affairs. As I argue, Newton's commitment to this order of knowing clarifies the interplay of the imagination and understanding in geometrical inquiry and illuminates how geometrical knowledge of space can lead to knowledge that space depends on and is related to God. In general, appreciating the Proclean elements of Newton's argument brings added light to the significance of geometrical inquiry for his general natural philosophical program and grants us insight into the philosophical grounding for the notion of absolute space that is presented in the Principia mathematica (1687). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have theories of evolution become now (and again) a matter of concern for critically rethinking sex and sexual difference? Why after years of deconstructing the ontologies of sex rooted in biological discourses and metaphysics of identity has critical thought turned to biology, physics, and mathematics? One way to tackle this new turn toward scientific thought may be derived from the reaction against an overused method of textual critique, which has come short of engaging with the reality of matter. If sexuality and sex are material forms of irreducible difference, then one needs a window into the material processes that lead to such forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay discusses the role of being and ontology in the work of Gilles Deleuze. Starting from an examination of Alain Badiou's ontology and theory of the event, I discuss the possible opposition of being and the event in Deleuze's work. Though famous for his discussions of the univocity of being, Deleuze does discuss the event as that which is not being. Deleuze's theory of the event is similar to that of Badiou in that he considers the event to be extra-ontological. The essay closes by considering the differences between Deleuze and Badiou on the subject of the event. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the notions of vorlaufen and Vorläaufigkeit, which means provisionality of thinking, in Martin Heidegger's work "On Time and Being" in 1962. Work notions such as preceding, foregoing and preparatory are intepreted. The notion of temporarity or provisionality in ontotheology refers to the concept of the totality of being as that which will someday be understood. The notion of provisionality then indicates the difference between ontotheology and Heidegger's thought.

Considers some arguments that purport to show either that the theory of special relativity is inconsistent with endurantism or that at the very least perdurantism has substantial explanatory benefits over endurantism. Presentation of possible responses that the endurantist can make to the general worry about how objects can be wholly present given a failure of absolute simultaneity; Exposition on the philosopher, Yuri Balashov's arguments on endurantism.

The article discusses the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze regarding ontology of sense concerning dialectic theory. It explores the contradiction of Deleuze against the dialectics theory of Georg Wilhelm Friedric Hegel of the Hegelian dialectics. It mentions that Jean Hyppolite argues that the philosophy of Hegel regarding dialectics reveals human self-consciousness of Absolute Subject. Deleuze also notes that Hegelian philosophy must be an ontology of sense and an ontology of internal difference.

The article offers the author's insights regarding the ontological status of fictional characters particularly Sherlock Holmes of Arthur Conan Doyle's novels. He notes that fictional characters exist due to the responsibility of individuals in bringing such entities into existence. He argues that the assumption of various individuals, such as Amie Thomasson, regarding the fictional character's lack of spatiotemporal location is mistaken.

The article offers the author's insight on the ontological status of dispositions. The author says that various debates in disposition are dominated by metaphysical realists, emphasizing the need for a sufficient prima facie and compliance with C. B. Martin's truthmaker principle. He discusses the theory of philosopher David Armstrong, who argues on the actual existence of disposition. Furthermore, he discusses identificational reductionism (IR) which identifies disposition's categorical bases.

The article offers the author's insights on the philosophy of scattered artifacts. It says that the commonsense ontological premise that artifacts can be in a scattered state should be challenged. It notes that it is better to deny the presence of scattered artifacts rather than accept the idea that mere intentional conditions have such destructive and creative powers.

The article discusses relational ontology. It says that the development of relational ontology can be followed from the dictum of Aristotle in the book "Metaphysics" and from the proposition of philosopher Gilles Deleuze. It mentions that Deleuze has secured a univocal and immanent ontology from philosopher Spinoza by differential conception of the relation of expression. It adds that the elements of Spinoza's ontology have materialized from differential relations.

The article focuses on several theories of inversion related to art and music. It mentions that nature and ontology of works of art play an important role in contemporary aesthetics. It places artwork into two categories and states that in order to reach a deeper understanding of both kinds, finding similarities between the two is required. The two classifications of artwork are visual artwork, relating to pictures or drawings, and musical or literary artwork.

The article focuses on the Numerical Monist Interpretation of Parmenides (NMIP). It states that a version of NMIP does not demonstrate that Parmenides maintains an identity between thinking and being. It mentions that the article "Parmenides and the Eleatic One," by Jonathan Barnes concludes that there is no reason to believe that Parmenides was a numerical monist. The book "The Route of Parmenides," by A. P. D. Mourelatos is presented.

The article focuses on the interpretation of the central objectives of philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's political philosophy which includes its systematic concept and its ontological foundation. The concept of systematicity with the on the notion of justification is discussed. The methods by which this approach dictates the methodology in social and political philosophy, is also discussed.

The article focuses on American Catholic apologist and author David Armstrong's realism regarding universals. He admits particulars and universals into his ontology. He admits them only as dependent entities for their existence upon the states of affairs. Armstrong's ontology are states of affairs, where states of affairs may be likened to facts.

In this article the author made distinction on the concept of Platonism and Nominalism and about their ontology of absolute processes. He states about the two prominent and familiar Nominalist solutions which includes Class Nominalism and Trope Nominalism. He discuses on the complexities of absolute processes and abut the two hallmarks of Platonism which includes repeatables and abstracta.

The article focuses of philosopher Rene Descartes' work called First Meditation, based on mediations and also suggests ways to understand the theme of Cartesian scholars works correctly. It presents various paragraphs of Descartes' work based on omnipresence of work themes and explains his cogito argument which mean I think, therefore I exist, according to Descartes. Descartes provides hypotheses of the deus deceptor and that of the evil genius are distinct.

The article presents the philosophy of George Berkeley and Rene Descartes through a critical study of their accounts of visual depth perception. It examines Descartes' and Berkeley's differing fundamental convictions about the origin of ideas lead to differing conceptions of a language of depth. Descartes and Berkeley discussed a case of perception of distance to investigate the concepts of ontology and optical idealism.

The article explores the careful explanation on bad faith of philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in his book "Being and Nothingness." The trivial ethical implication on the ontological characteristics of bad faith and the lack of salient ethical implication of the book are outlined. The characteristic of the category of distortions in bad faith is also tackled.