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Through a correspondence study, this paper investigates whether employers discriminate job applicants based on their living conditions. Exploiting the natural setting provided by a Rapid Re-housing Program, we sent 1347 job applications for low-qualified front-desk jobs in Brno, Czech Republic. The resumes exogenously differed in only one main aspect represented by the address of the applicants, signaling both the quality of the neighborhood and the quality of the housing conditions in which they were living. We found that while the higher quality of the district has a strong effect in increasing the hiring chances (+20%) the actual improvement of the living conditions standards, per se, does not generate any significant positive effect.

In environments with expected utility, it has long been established that speculative trade cannot occur (Milgrom and Stokey [1982]), and that the value of public information is negative in economies with risk-sharing and no aggregate uncertainty (Hirshleifer [1971], Schlee [2001]). We show that these results are still true even if we relax expected utility, so that either Dynamic Consistency (DC) or Consequentialism is violated. We characterise no speculative trade in terms of a weakening of DC and find that Consequentialism is not required. Moreover, we show that a weakening of both DC and Consequentialism is sufficient for the value of public information to be negative. We therefore generalise these important results for convex preferences which contain several classes of ambiguity averse preferences.

This paper examines how aggressive trading by speed-sensitive arbitrageurs affects market efficiency. At first glance, aggressive trading appears beneficial, because it enables quicker price changes and can help arbitrageurs push the price quickly to its new fundamental value. However, recent theories by Hong and Stein (1999) and Stein (2009) suggest that if arbitrageurs do not anchor their strategies, arbitrage can become “crowded” and make prices overreact. This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with these theories, using trading aggressiveness as a measure of “crowded arbitrage”. Specifically, I find that high trading aggressiveness leads to price overshooting, especially after announcements with larger opinion divergence among unsophisticated investors.