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1. F P Ramsey’s 1922 (January) Cambridge Magazine, Three Page Comment on Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability Is the Foolish Ruminations of an Ignorant 18 Year Old Teenager: It Is Not 'brilliant' (G. Wheeler, 2012) It Is Not 'Astute and Meticulous' (Methven, 2015) and It Should Never Have Been Republished in 1989 in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

2. Teaching only about Keynes’s Contributions in Chapter 1 (Plus Possibly Chapters 2, 3, 6 and 26, if Time Permits) of the A Treatise on Probability Falls Far ,far Short of Providing Students with An Informed Foundation about Keynes’s Analysis of Decisionmaking,rationality and expectations

3. What Was E. Borel Referring to in His 1939 Book when He Describes '…the Beautiful Work of Mr. J.m. Keynes…' in the A Treatise on Probability? The Answer Is the Belated Recognition on Borel’s Part of the Extremely Important Part Ii of the A Treatise on Probability on Imprecision and Inexact Measurement

4. Keynes Spelt Out Exactly What 'Degree of Rational Belief ' Meant in His a Treatise on Probability (1921): Correcting the Severe Errors in Courgeau (2012)

5. On the Explicit Connections Between Keynes’s Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability(1921) and Chapter Four of the General Theory(1936):Keynes’s Method in the General Theory is Inexact Measurement and Approximation using Imprecise Probability from the A Treatise on Probability

6. J M Keynes’s 1931 Comment, '…I Yield to Ramsey, I Think He Is Right' Refers to Ramsey’s Work on Precise Probability and Degrees of Belief, Not to Imprecise Probability and Degrees of Rational Belief: 20th and 21st Century Philosophers and Economists Simply Are Ignorant About Keynes’s Imprecise Theory of Probability Contained in Part II of the A Treatise on Probability

7. J M Keynes and E. Borel’s Initial Skipping of Part II of the A Treatise on Probability in His 1924 Review: What Changed Borel’s Mind 15 Years Later?

8. Adam Smith as an Example of Samuelson’s 1952 Point That Mathematics Can Be Written Out in the English Language: On Smith’s Anti-Utilitarianism Based on the Differences Between Precise and Imprecise Probability Presented in 1776 in the Wealth of Nations

9. The Claim That the Diagram on Page 39 of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability(1921) Represents ‘Keynes’s View of Probability’ (S. Bradley, 2019), Has No Support: It Represents a Very Brief Introduction to Part II of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability On Non Additive Probability

10. Keynes Rejected Kalecki’s Theory of Investment Because There Is No Major Difference Between Kalecki’s and Tinbergen’s Theories of Investment: Both Kalecki and Tinbergen Accepted Precise Theories of Probability Because They Were Frequentists

11. Some Examples of 21st Century Philosophers Who Have Written About Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability, but Have Skipped Part II of the A Treatise on Probability, Where Keynes Presented His Interval – Valued Approach to Probability

12. After 100 Years, the Time Has Come to Acknowledge That Boole and Keynes Founded a Mathematically, Technically, and Logically Advanced Approach to Imprecise Probability

13. Can Shiozawa’s, Morioka’s and Taniuchi’s Microfoundations for Evolutionary Economics (2019) Serve As the Microfoundations for '… Post-Keynesian Economics ' (2019, p.vii)? The Answer Is Definitely Yes if Post –Keynesians Can Break Away From Joan Robinson’s Anti-Mathematical, Anti-Formalist Views

14. A Comparison of J. M. Keynes’s Logical Approach to Probability and Any ‘Objective Bayesian’ Approach to Probability Needs to Incorporate All Five Parts of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability, Not Just Part I

15. B. Hill’s ‘Confidence’ Approach to Decision Making Under Uncertainty Completely Overlooks the Contributions Made in J M Keynes’s Parts II -V of His a Treatise on Probability, 1921 and General Theory, 1936: Keynes’s Interval Valued Approach to Imprecise Probability and Decision Weight Approach Appeared Some 60–80 Years Before Hill Began His Research Program

16. J M Keynes’s Contribution to Solving the Certainty Effect Problem: How Some Philosophers Overlooked Keynes’s Conventional Coefficient of Weight and Risk, C

17. The Myth that Ramsey Destroyed and Demolished Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability is Easily Dismissed as a Fairy Tale by Anyone who has read Parts II-V of the A Treatise on Probability (1921)

18. One Hundred Years After Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability Appeared, There Is Still Pervasive Confusion Among Academics About the Logical Theory of Probability: Keynes’s Theory of Logical Probability Is an Interval Valued Theory of Probability Based On Boole That the 18 Year Old Ramsey Never Understood in His Life

19. How Did Clive Bell, One of Keynes’s Bloomsberry Artist Friends, Become a Recognized Expert on Keynes's a Treatise on Probability, given that He Had No Knowledge of Mathematical Logic, Statistics, Probability or Boolean Algebra?

20. The Fundamental Error of Rational Expectations Proponents Is Their Claim that They Have Discovered True Statistical Models: Given that No Model Can Be True, Talk of Having a 'True Model' Is An Anti-Scientific Oxymoron Given Keynesian Uncertainty

21. J M Keynes Was Never Concerned About Ramsey’s ‘Critique’ of His Logical Theory of Probability Because He Realized That Ramsey Had No Idea About What His Theory of Imprecise Probability Entailed: Ramsey Was an Advocate of Precise Probability

22. Keynes’s Method in the A Treatise on Probability and the General Theory Is Inexact Measurement Involving Approximation, Imprecise Probability, and Indeterminate Probability Using Boolean Interval Valued Probability: There Is no Explicit Theory of Ordinal Measurement Developed, Used or Deployed Anywhere in Either the A Treatise on Probability or the General Theory

23. Keynes’s Major Result From Part II of the A Treatise on Probability Was That, Given That Numerical Probabilities Are Additive, Then Non Numerical Probabilities Must Be Non Additive: Non Additivity Is a Sufficient Condition for Some Degree of Uncertainty to Exist

24. J. M. Keynes (Inexact Measurement, Approximation, Non- Linearity, Non-Additivity, Interdependence, Imprecision) Versus J. Tinbergen (Exact Measurement, Linearity, Additivity, Independence, Precision) on Probability in 1939–1940: There Was No Middle Ground Between Them

25. Keynes, and Only J. M. Keynes, Was Responsible for the Logical and Mathematical Development of the Multiplier Concept in 1921(1908) in His a Treatise on Probability (1921) That He Later Used in the General Theory (1936)

26. Greenspan's Synthesis of the ‘Keynes-Knight’ Approach and the Ramsey-De Finetti-Savage Approach in Decision Making: A Continuum Exists Between Situations of No Knowledge and Complete Knowledge

27. The Unbridgeable Gulf Forever Separating A. Smith and J. M. Keynes from Bentham, Classical Economists, Neoclassical Economists, And Modernn Economists (Friedman, Becker, Stigler, Lucas, Sargent, Wallace, Muth, Kydland, Prescott, etc.): The Formal and Mathematical Concepts of Uncertainty, Weight of the Evidence, and Confidence

28. An Examination of Bruno De Finetti's Understanding of J M Keynes's a Treatise on Probability: Close but No Cigar

29. The Formal, Normative Theories of Savage, De Finetti, and Savage and De Finetti Require Additivity. They Never Introduced Sub or Non Additivity (Interval Valued Probability, Imprecise Probability, Indeterminate Probability) into Their Formal, Normative Theories of Subjective Probability or of Maximizing Subjective Expected Utility

30. Hicks's IS LM Interpretation of the IS-LM Model in J M Keynes's Chapter 15 of the General Theory: Partly Wrong in 1937 and Partly Wrong in 1981

31. On Weckstein's 1959, Keynesian, Weight of the Evidence Based Demolition of G L S Shackle's Attack on the Concept of Probability

32. An Examination of the Fundamental Reasons Why Frank Ramsey Failed in His Reviews of J M Keynes's a Treatise on Probability

33. On J M Keynes's Original Contributions to Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Indeterminate, Interval Valued Probabilities in Part II of the a Treatise on Probability and Imprecise, Interval Valued Probabilities in Part V of the a Treatise on Probability

34. How Quantifying Probability Assessments Influences Analysis and Decision Making: Experimental Evidence from National Security Professionals

35. A Likelihood Story: The Theory of Legal Fact-Finding

36. Richard E. Braithwaite on J. M. Keynes's A Treatise on Probability and Logical Theory of Probability: Ignorance is Bliss

37. Essays on Risk and Uncertainty: Comparing J. M. Keynes and the Von Mises Brothers, Richard and Ludwig, on Probability and Decision Theory

38. The Rule of Probabilities: A Practical Approach for Applying Bayes' Rule to the Analysis of DNA Evidence

39. Indeterminate versus Imprecise Interval Probabilities: The Keynes-Knight and the De Finetti-Savage Approaches

40. How Is It Possible for Keynes's Theory of Logical Probability to Be 'Non-Probabilistic'? Answer. Only If You Have Been Confused by Reading Frank P. Ramsey's Reviews of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability

41. Adam Smith's Theory of Probability and the Roles of Risk and Uncertainty in Economic Decision Making

42. Keynes’ Lower-Upper Bound Interval Approach to Probability

43. Combining Imprecise or Conflicting Probability Judgments: A Choice-Based Study

44. The Weight of Argument and Non-Additive Measures: A Note

45. Insurance and Probability Weighting Functions

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