We examine technology adoption and growth in a political economy framework where two alternative mechanisms of redistribution are on the menu of choice for the economy. One of these is a lump-sum transfer given to agents in the economy. The other is in the form of expenditure directed towards institutional reform aimed at bringing about a reduction in the cost of technology adoption in the presence of uncertainty. The choice over these mechanisms is examined under three alternative approaches to collective decision making. In the first setting, voting takes place to determine the proportion of revenue allocated to adoption-cost-reducing institutional expenditure. In the second setting, the government chooses this proportion to maximize a ‘Benthamite’ social welfare function, i.e. the sum of utilities of agents in the economy. The third setting applies the Rawlsian social welfare function, which is the most “egalitarian” in that this proportion is chosen to maximize the minimum level of utility attained in the heterogeneous agent economy. We find that the extent of uncertainty, working through the political economy mechanism, has a positive impact on long run average wealth levels in the economy in all settings. The voting mechanism leads to the fastest transition to sustained balanced growth in all cases, while the slowest transition is experienced in the case of the Rawlsian economy. Expenditures on institutional development are higher in the voting and Benthamite economies relative to the Rawlsian economy. All economies converge to the same inequality and growth rates in the long run. Transitional inequality, however, is highest in the Rawlsian framework.