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Background: On October 18th, 2019, protestors gathered across Chile to call for social equity, resulting in widespread civil unrest and violent confrontation with the police. In this study we quantify the effects of the 2019 Chilean protests on emergency health services utilization and inpatient admission in Santiago. Methods: We used weekly emergency department (ED) admissions (2015-2019) from three large public hospitals near the focal point of protests in Santiago. The exposure period was from October 18th to December 31st, 2019. The outcome were the number of weekly consultations and hospitalizations by trauma and respiratory causes and the proportion of hospitalizations among consultants per 1,000. We implemented Bayesian structural time series models to calculate the absolute and relative effects and their 95% credible intervals (CrI). Findings: ED consultations declined by 15% for trauma (95%CrI: -42·6%, 12.1%) and 46% for respiratory causes (95%CrI: -95·3%, 3·9%) during the first ten weeks of social protests. In contrast, trauma hospitalizations increased by 17% (95%CrI: 4.9%, 29.1%), and the proportion of hospitalizations among consultations increased by 41% for trauma (95%CrI: 11·1%, 69·1%) and 71% for respiratory causes (95%CrI: 36·5%, 106·7%). Interpretation: The 2019 Chilean protests affected the use of emergency health services by lowering the number of consultations due to trauma and respiratory causes, while increasing the rate of hospitalizations among consulting patients. Crowd-control protocols must be reviewed to prevent negative effects of civil unrest on population health. Funding Information: Comision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica and the Vice Chancellor of Research at Universidad Mayor, Chile. Declaration of Interests: We declare no competing interests. Ethics Approval Statement: The dataset was publicly available on the internet (http://www.deis.cl); thus, no IRB approval was necessary to conduct and publish this work.

Black Law Students experienced a different COVID-19 pandemic than their majority counterparts due in part to the emotional and physical toll caused by the violent, public mistreatment of Black persons at the hands of law enforcement. While some law faculty at some institutions were proactive in identifying the struggles that their Black students were facing, most law faculty and administrators did nothing—prompting Black students to take time away from their studies to organize, draft letters, gather signatures, and have very uncomfortable conversations with university administrators and faculty about the need for change. Meanwhile, Black faculty and faculty of color, who were experiencing their own trials with pandemic teaching, childcare, increased service obligations and mental fatigue from the political and racial unrest, were often called upon to contribute substantial time to the design and implementation of the “diversity” or “anti-racism” initiatives necessary to increase diversity and to create inclusive environments for their BIPOC students and faculty. Most of this labor discounted, if acknowledged at all. We offer recommendations for how law schools can help shift some of these burdens.

Death is an anticipated outcome of war and those who die during an armed conflict, combatant and civilian alike, remain protected by IHL. The laws of armed conflict allow for the burial of those killed during an armed conflict in accordance with their religious rites. There is an understanding that wars render religious faith indispensable in dealing with the suffering and loss associated with conflicts. The comfort of a traditional religious burial at such a time is considerable and plays a role in restoration and healing for societies torn apart by war. Since April 2020, Indian authorities have been burying individuals killed during the occupation in unmarked graves, denying their families the right to give them an Islamic funeral. While the official position is that the bodies are not being handed over due to the coronavirus outbreak, it is clear that the real reason is to prevent protests and unrest at the funerals. There is no question that funerals in politicised communities can become important sites for organised resistance, for instance, political funerals during Apartheid in South Africa served as a scene for calls to action. However, in failing to return the remains of the deceased civilians, India appears to be engaging in a systematic effort to subject them to symbolic indignity in death, and to collectively punish and stigmatise their remaining relatives. It is also acting in violation of international humanitarian law. __________ Editorial note: This paper was sponsored by the Research Society of International Law (RSIL), an International Law and Public Policy think tank based in Pakistan. The paper can be accessed on RSIL's website at: https://rsilpak.org/2021/burial-rites-and-ihl-in-indian-illegally-occupied-jammu-kashmir/

This paper explores the macroeconomic impact of social unrest, using a novel index based on news reports. The findings are threefold. First, unrest has an adverse effect on economic activity, with GDP remaining on average 0.2 percentage points below the pre-shock baseline six quarters after a one-standard deviation increase in the unrest index. This is driven by sharp contractions in manufacturing and services (sectoral dimension), and consumption (demand dimension). Second, unrest lowers confidence and raises uncertainty; however, its adverse effect on GDP can be mitigated by strong institutions and by a country’s policy space. Third, an unrest “event”, which is captured by a large change in the unrest index, is associated with a 1 percentage point reduction in GDP six quarters after the event. Impacts differ by type of event: episodes motivated by socio-economic reasons result in sharper GDP contractions compared to those associated with politics/elections, and events triggered by a combination of both factors lead to sharpest contractions. Results are not driven by countries with adverse growth trajectories prior to unrest events or by fiscal consolidations, and are robust to instrumenting via regional unrest.

Fifty-two years ago, in Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court upheld stop-and-frisk under the Fourth Amendment. At that time, stop-and-frisk had provoked substantial disagreement at the state level—leading to divergent opinions and repeat litigation. But after Terry, the state courts became silent. Since 1968, every state court has lockstepped with Terry in interpreting its own constitutional provisions. This presents a puzzle, since state courts are free to provide more expansive (or less expansive) rights protections in interpreting their own state constitutions. And in other contexts, they have not been shy in doing so. In roughly a quarter of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases, state courts have read their state guarantees to exceed the U.S. Constitution’s protections. Terry’s suspect pedigree further complicates the puzzle. Over the past few decades, stop-and-frisk has helped spark a breakdown in police-community relations. Multiple federal investigations have uncovered its connection to systemic racism. By many accounts, both the stop and the frisk have disproportionately targeted minorities. Terry has also led to nationwide unrest. A Terry stop precipitated the deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, and Freddie Gray. This Note proposes a change in perspective: that litigants challenge stop-and-frisk under state law. It also lays the groundwork for such challenges. It examines the history of stop-and-frisk at the state level before Terry. It analyzes the Terry litigation, relying especially on the NAACP’s briefing, which accurately predicted stop-and-frisk’s perverse potential. And it synthesizes this analysis into three arguments that should be raised against stop-and-frisk under state law.

Responding to the COVID-19 pandemic has created unprecedented social and political challenges. Mitigation strategies often disrupt the daily lives of citizens and constrain rights and privileges. Policies intended to contain disease spread have provoked resentment, resistance, and backlash. We examine the extent to which specific COVID-19 policy responses influence the frequency of civil unrest. Combining insights from both grievance and opportunity models of dissent, we contend that pandemic response policies are most likely to lead to unrest when the grievances and opportunities created by disease mitigation strategies reinforce each other. We test our arguments with nuanced information on specific pandemic mitigation policies, combined with geo-located events data on COVID-19-related social unrest activities. We find that policies such as workplace and school closures, which induce intense grievances and reduce the opportunity cost of engaging in collective mobilization, are associated with increases in dissent activities. Policies that restrict opportunities for mobilization, such as restrictions on public transportation, reduce the number of dissent activities. Notably, economic support policies attenuate the effects of workplace closures on dissent. Our results illustrate the varying effects of pandemic mitigation policies on unrest depending on how the grievances they inspire relate to the opportunity they create.

To the woes of the victims of American over-criminalization, we can add deprivation of the suitable tools for self-defense during national emergency and civil unrest. Federal law disarms “unlawful users” of controlled substances (including medical marijuana), and imposes a permanent firearms ban on substantially all those with prior felony convictions. A notable exception is made for white-collar criminals with felony violations of antitrust and certain business practice statutes. The constitutionality of these restrictions typically is founded on the view that one is tainted as “non-virtuous” for any serious criminal conviction, which includes any felony conviction. Using extensive sampling, this article shows that reliance on this theory is discredited outside the context of the Second Amendment. Modern reliance on the theory, outside the context of firearms rights, has been very infrequent and has been used to validate odious statutes, in cases no longer good law. The unsound judicial effort to derive the validation of these firearms bans from Founding-Era firearms restrictions builds on erroneous premises. The Founding-Era restrictions, detailed in this article, were tailored to the circumstances and do not provide a foundation for the broad, essentially permanent bans that federal law provides and that courts typically validate.

Delivery of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”) in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development should be important to businesses that realize that they will not be able to achieve sustainable success in a world of poverty, inequality, unrest and environmental stress. As such, companies should contribute to the SDGs by upholding recognized standards and principles on human rights, labor, the environment and anti-corruption and transparently reporting on their SDG-related priorities and efforts to investors and other stakeholders. At the level of a specific company, SDG reporting can serve as a valuable strategic tool for engaging stakeholders, supporting sustainable decision-making processes at all levels within a company, shaping business strategy, guiding innovation and driving better performance and value creation and opening up new sources of capital. There is no formal disclosure framework that has been specifically developed relating to business reporting on the SDGs; however, reference can and should be made to several useful and evolving guidance documents and related tools described in this paper.

This paper studies costly political resistance in a non-democracy. When Nazi Germany surrendered in May 1945, 40% of the designated Soviet occupation zone was initially captured by the western Allied Expeditionary Force. This occupation was short-lived: Soviet forces took over after less than two months and installed an authoritarian regime in what became the German Democratic Republic (GDR). We exploit the idiosyncratic line of contact separating Allied and Soviet troops within the GDR to show that areas briefly under Allied occupation had higher incidence of protests during the only major episode of political unrest in the GDR before its demise in 1989 - the East German Uprising of 1953. These areas also exhibited lower regime support during the last free elections in 1946. We argue that even a “glimpse of freedom” can foster civilian opposition to dictatorship.

We examine Chinese cities’ COVID-19 reopening plans as a window into governments’ economic and social priorities. We measure reopenings based on official government news announcements, and show that these are predicted by citizen discontent, as captured by Baidu searches for terms such as “unemployment” and “protest” in the prior week. The effects are particularly strong early in the epidemic, indicating a priority on initiating economic recovery as early as possible. These results indicate that even a non-democratic government may respond to citizen concerns, possibly to minimize dissent.

In this paper, we study the impact of exogenous variations of international oil prices on the incidence of protest, while exploring the role of the shadow economy as a mitigating factor. We find that oil price shocks are negatively associated with protests, but the effect is less severe the higher the initial size of the shadow economy. To explain these results, we show that the size of the shadow economy responds counter-cyclically to oil-price-driven income shocks. In particular, we find that the decline in the GDP per capita growth following a negative oil price shock leads to an increase in the size of the shadow economy. This suggest that the shadow economy’s capacity to absorb persistent oil price fluctuations without provoking political unrest, should regard it as a mitigation tool rather than an economic burden.

This study examines the impacts of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link on residential property prices in West Kowloon, in which the terminus and only station of the Hong Kong section of the high-speed rail link is located. The express rail is characterised as being a link between Hong Kong and her motherland, China, which is a major source of property buyers in Hong Kong. We investigate if there is an east-west connection premium introduced by the project by examining spatial and temporal changes of property prices in affect areas. Based on a sample of 282,131 transactions, this study uses the hedonic pricing and repeat sales models to examine whether property prices in West Kowloon rise because of the development of the high-speed rail which signifies a link between Hong Kong and China and whether they drop because of the 2019 political movement which emphasizes a decouple. We found significant and consistent evidence to support these hypotheses from both the hedonic price and the repeat sales models. The accessibility premium was capitalised in property prices since the announcement of the project, and the size of the premium is the largest during the announcement period. However, the east-west connection premium was significantly offset by the recent political unrest events, with properties located nearest the West Kowloon Station being affected the most. We derived policy implications regarding practical implications for the design and implementation of land value capture schemes and urban planning.

Social protection programs are needed more than ever during periods of social upheaval, but are also likely to be even harder to implement successfully. Furthermore, social upheaval makes measuring the impact of such policies all the more difficult. We study the impact of a multi-faceted social protection program, often referred to as a “graduation” model program, in Yemen during a period of civil unrest. We are unable to measure outcomes for four years, thus much remains unknown about what transpired in the intermediary time. After four years we find positive impacts on asset accumulation and savings behavior, albeit substantially less than the amount the household originally received. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Universal Basic Income has been in the lexicon for some time now, propagated as a requirement for the projected disruption that may be caused by automation, and advances in machine learning systems, as well as the ever-rising inequality in society. Proponents often regard it as a viable solution to protect society from unrest. However, an idealist approach is not the only ingredient required to better the economic circumstances of the masses, and a Universal Basic Income not funded through creation of new wealth could also play a negative role and instigate inflationary forces, or economically, be a net-neutral rather than a net-positive. This article examines Universal Basic Income funded without creation of new wealth, its economic and financial viability, and, also, direct and indirect ways it may cause inflation or have no positive economic benefit for society. The article examines evidence relevant to Universal Basic Income, and, also, presents a potential solution for policymakers, based on creation of new wealth, that may provide the necessary financing needed to support the projected displaced workers, as their numbers increase.

This essay, for a symposium on the centennial of the Supreme Court’s decision in Abrams v. United States, suggests that celebration of the Abrams dissent as the origin of the modern First Amendment rests on a misconception. In the months after Abrams was decided, hardly anyone imagined the dissent as a harbinger of aggressive First Amendment review of convictions for seditious activity, let alone judicial invalidation of democratically enacted laws. Instead, the opinion exacerbated progressive concerns about juror bias, disproportionate sentencing, and weak or vindictive judges. Advocates invoked Abrams as a cautionary tale about the susceptibility of illiberal laws to misapplication and abuse, and they held out treatment of the defendants as evidence of longstanding complaints about police brutality and inhumane prison conditions in a period of profound economic inequality, labor unrest, hostility to immigration, and the uncertainty of a global pandemic. They did not, however, cast the opinion as a justification for judicial review. On the contrary, the Abrams dissent generated support for progressive efforts to limit the power of the courts.

Legitimate protests of police killings have led to greater levels of violence across the nation. As people have felt less secure, applications for gun licenses have surged. This essay reflects on this intertwining of the need for protest and the need for self-defense and thus the connection between the First and Second Amendments. It argues based on new evidence that James Madison, the key architect of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, understood the First Amendment and Second Amendment similarly as protecting the individual's natural right to speak and the individual's natural right to self-defense respectively. The similar nature of the First and Second Amendments support making doctrinal analogies between them. The First Amendment helps judges gauge the strength of the public interest justification needed to set a natural right aside. It also can bring to bear a comprehensive body of neutral First Amendment principles to help guide a Second Amendment law that is still in its infancy and to which judges may not be as well-disposed because of professional and social position. This analogy can help answer a pressing Second Amendment issue arising from the unrest in the wake of legitimate protests. Some jurisdictions facing an upswing in violence have delayed the licenses for purchasing or carrying guns for more than month. While the First Amendment permits states to require licenses for demonstrations (for reasons of externalities that also underlie licensing requirements for guns), such licenses cannot be unreasonably delayed as that delay effectively undermines the right of free speech. Delays in licensing guns for self-defense during unrest would make the Second Amendment right of self-defense as ineffective as would delays in licensing for demonstrations to protest recent events.

Current policies to manage ethnic minority unrest in Xinjiang are not working. They do not directly address the core root causes behind Uyghur tensions in the region. Drawing upon lessons learned from global approaches to improve inter-ethnic relations, and factoring China’s institutional behaviour and norms, this article looks at policy responses that can be entertained by the state to improve the conditions of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. It suggests that in the short-term (under a year) the state can be more responsible in using the big data it collects for targeted surveillance, in tandem with a community engagement approach. In the medium-term (1-3 years), the state can employ practices to reduce ethnic-based prejudice by encouraging increased meaningful Uyghur and Han Chinese intergroup contact, and foster an environment that promotes a positive mass media portrayal of Muslim ethnic minorities. In the long-term (3 years plus), the state has an obligation to improve the relative socio-economic inequalities that Uyghurs experience as a cohort. These policy responses, in sum, can break the cyclical pattern of ethnic-based tensions that has characterized Xinjiang in the 21st century.

During this lockdown situation, we have witnessed array of rumors or fake news; from Amul Company shutting down its milk chilling centers to the effective use of ginger, lemon and honey to counter the virus or to dispersing or spraying of the medicine by helicopters. Clearly, the proliferation of inaccurate or misleading news is spiraling upwards, especially during COVID-19 Pandemic situation. Our mobile phones and social media accounts are flooded with fake posts, doctored videos and congenial but unverified theories (especially qua the origin of Corona Virus and its cure), which are quickly shared or forwarded, especially through Whatsapp, Tiktok and Facebook, and out of which some may tickle your fancies at one hand, but some may create tension and unrest amongst people at large. For instance, just couple of days ago, a video on social media went viral where the soldiers of two different armies were shown to be engaged in a provocative incursions and it was being claimed that Chinese soldiers are provoking the Indian army soldiers at the Ladakh Indo-China Border, but the original video was traced back to the year 2014 and pertaining to Arunachal Pradesh Border, though the Indian army has never avowed for the video as well. Such unverified claims or rumors are dangerous and have the ability to instill fear and terror in the minds of people and may cause chaos and disruption in the society and tensions between the countries. Hence, the question is that what is this concept of ‘Fake News’ and why it has assumed immense significance and it is also important to know that in what forms, it exists or reaches to us.

The slave narratives created by the Library of Congress shed light on the institution of slavery and its effects. Shocking revelations shared by the former enslaved help readers to understand the paradoxes and nuances of slavery. The lives of a slave were not monolithic. Not every slave wished to see slavery end. Not every slave experienced extreme cruelty. Writers who were employed during the Depression to complete the assignment to memorialize their experience may have come with certain biases, and the former enslaved may have been apprehensive about answering certain questions truthfully during a time of racial unrest. However, as one reads the slave narratives certain themes emerge from the transcripts and the slaves certainly managed to overcome a life of adversity.

This article defends the position that the right of armed self-defense remains important today, in particular in light of the civil unrest of the Summer of 2020. The article proceeds in three parts. The first part will summarize arguments from various prominent commentators that the right to self-defense with firearms is anachronistic in the contemporary United States. These critics argue that Americans can and should rely solely on their local professional police force to protect them. The second part of the article will focus on how this argument has been undermined by recent events. This part documents in great detail the failures of law enforcement in reaction to looting, rioting, and other forms of illegal behavior that threatened the well-being of the public. First, many police departments received implicit or explicit orders from their political supervisors to “stand down.” Second, in many instances, the police themselves were unwilling or unable to combat lawless behavior. If police consistently fail to enforce law and order, the argument against the individual right to bear arms for self-defense purposes significantly weakens. Finally, the last part of the article will discuss examples of individuals and groups of citizens using firearms in self-defense during the recent unrest in the absence of effective law enforcement. Some of these episodes are open to criticism, whether on the grounds that one believes that it’s never worth using or even threatening to use deadly force to defend property, or because the line between justified self-defense and unjustified vigilantism is not always a clear one. Nevertheless, if law enforcement is unwilling or unable to preserve basic law and order, it’s both inevitable that citizens will try to fill the breach, and desirable that law-abiding individuals should be given the means to do so.

The COVID-19 pandemic has served as a turning point for central banks in the formulation of their monetary policy in achieving its core mandates. Central banks (CBs) can often act far faster than other institutions and pass policies that can keep the economy buoyant amid harsh economic conditions. Traditionally, CBs have used their main policy tools to address potential hurdles during times of crisis such as a lack of domestic liquidity, heightened possibility of bank runs, crashing financial markets, and a higher cost of borrowing. These main policy tools come in the form of rate cuts, reserve requirement cuts, and exceptions, and other similar measures. However, COVID-19 presents a huge challenge as it impacts the real economy directly, affecting the supply and demand side substantially with a recovery that is pegged as slow for the remainder of the year. As such, the BSP and other CBs have had to go beyond the traditional ambit of policy tools and venture with other policies that may be unconventional but may quell unrest in the financial markets. This study aims to determine the causal impact of unconventional policy decisions made by the BSP on key financial market variables. It was determined that the unconventional policies done by the BSP were able to lower the rate of borrowing among banks as well and increase investor confidence in the return performance of Philippine bonds. In contrast, this study finds that unconventional policies have no significant causal impact on the equities market and the FX market.

The turmoil of 2020 amplifies the American conversation about the utility and legitimacy of firearms during periods of civil unrest. This article engages that conversation through the lens of the Black American experience. The principles drawn from this treatment help frame a sphere of legitimate gun use during periods of civil unrest and underscore the enduring importance of firearms as a resource for individuals whom the state cannot protect. These principles emerge from a considered philosophy and practice of arms developed by a people who have a long history of confronting violent threats that the state has been unable or unwilling to stop.

The Supreme Court’s decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma has caused considerable unrest in Eastern Oklahoma as non-Indian individuals, businesses, and organizations try to determine how the decision might affect them. That unrest sets the stage for potential conflict and litigation over tribal and state authority in the region. But, while McGirt means that the rules governing civil jurisdiction on Indian reservations now apply to all lands within the Creek Reservation, it is cause for hope, not concern. First, as a practical matter, little is likely to change post-McGirt: tribal civil jurisdiction will mostly remain limited to “Indian lands” while the scope of state civil jurisdiction is also likely to remain largely static, although now subject to a somewhat more complicated and fact-specific inquiry. In addition, Congress has already resolved many potentially disputed jurisdictional issues and others have been avoided through successful intergovernmental cooperation between tribes and the State of Oklahoma. Ultimately, then, this overview of a post-McGirt world demonstrates that there is no reason “why pessimism should rule the day.” Rather than costly winner-take-all litigation or the uncertain outcomes of Congressional politics, the decision instead opens the door for a new era of innovative and effective tribal-state relations.

Iranians have participated in many protests since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Revolutionary forces usually respond to riots with arbitrary mass arrests and mass shootings. Alone during the recent uprising in Nov 2019, more than 1,500 unarmed protestors were killed and 7,000 arrested by the regime. The author commenced empirical research into the drivers of the recent events with over 20,000 people living in Iran. The results show that about two million Iranians proactively support the Islamic Republic now. The majority, regular citizens, with less financial dependency on the regime or moderate religious background, are highly dissatisfied with the cleric rulers. This high level of disapproval leads to five substantial leadership crises challenging Iran's political elite. Besides, data suggest that widespread dissatisfaction and unpopularity seem to have been the leading cause of the most recent unrest in November 2019. Although the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, claimed that the uprising was disturbed and halted, however, one can expect further consequences of the outcry for the regime. According to the findings of this study, an overwhelming majority of Iranians should have boycotted the parliamentary elections in February 2020 - Iranians generally say "no" to the Islamic Republic.

Deep fakes, a class of AI generated audio-visual materials designed to appear as an authentic record of actual speech, garnered increasing attention as worries of foreign disinformation campaigns and so called “fake news” have increased. Some critics raise concerns that this new technology will be too realistic to differentiate fact from fiction, allowing bad actors to manipulate elections, induce societal unrest, and incite panic. In this view, the influx of deep fake content may lead to the death of trust in media outright, as people will assume all content may be artificially-generated “fake news.” Yet close consideration of the hypotheses put forth so far reveals an unstated assumption that has not yet received attention: that deep fakes, once they are technologically advanced and easy to produce, will either be believed without question or will fundamentally shift public perceptions of video such that even real ones will be dismissed. This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by critiquing the assumption that deep fakes, in the end, will necessarily fool the public into believing lies or rejecting truth. In fact, the likely societal reaction outcome may lie somewhere in the middle, in which society develops proxy mechanisms for assessing the reliability of video evidence in the wake of deep fake technology. That likelihood is based on two classes of observations. First, the reason we trust images and video may stem largely from societal norms about the use of the medium, rather something inherent to the medium itself. Second, history has shown that similar concerns about digital photo editing techniques did not lead to either of the outcomes predicted for societal perceptions of truth; how society reacted to fake photos sheds much light on what is likely to happen with regard to deep fake videos. Identifying the likely and less-drastic social trends in reaction to deep fakes is exceptionally important today, because ongoing fears of the technology have prompted calls for regulatory responses. For example, many propose amending Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA 230”) to increase liability on platforms who do not take reasonable steps to limit the spread of deep fake content on their platforms. To the extent that there is a likely scenario in which ordinary operations of society are likely to manage the impact of deep fakes on perceptions of truth, the need for policy responses (that no doubt will be imperfect and potentially detrimental to valuable technological advances) is strongly lessened. This paper proceeds by covering two main areas: emerging technologies and online platform regulation. It first explains the likely reaction to deep fakes by reviewing the development of similar technologies as well as the key distinctions from technologies of the past. Second, the paper examines whether regulatory responses to deep fakes, focusing primarily on calls to amend CDA 230, are necessary or whether existing regulatory tools and free market forces will be sufficient.

Climate change threatens the supply of vital, life-sustaining resources, creating shortages that will last longer and occur more frequently than in the past. Extreme weather and changed precipitation patterns will disrupt water and food supplies for some very large and populous regions throughout the world, and electricity supply for regions dependent upon hydropower. This paper explores the dynamics of how climate-induced shortages could induce hoarding of these resources, exacerbating economic inequality and creating the potential for civil unrest. Hoarding takes place when expectations form that prices will be higher or availability will be lower in the future (or both). This paper sets forth a two-period, two-agent model of hoarding, in which one agent is able to bid up the price of some good that is elastic at high quantities, but inelastic at low quantities. Hoarding is both socially and privately inefficient, but if climate change renders the supply of vital resources uncertain or volatile (or both), then hoarding becomes a rational course of action for those who can afford it. For those that cannot afford it, welfare losses in the inelastic region of demand are likely to be very high.

This paper establishes a new method of estimating public dissent that is both cost effective and adaptable. Twitter allows users to post short messages that can be viewed and shared by other users, creating a network of freely and easily observable information. Drawing data directly from Twitter, we collect tweets containing specified words and phrases from citizens voicing dissatisfaction with their government. The collected tweets are processed using a regular expressions based algorithm to estimate individual dissent; which is aggregated to an overall measure of public dissent. A comparative case study of Canada and Kenya during the summer of 2016 provides proof of concept. Controlling for user base differences, we find there is more public dissent in Kenya than Canada. This obvious, but necessary, result suggests that our measure of public dissent is a better representation of each country’s internal dynamics than other more sporadic measures. As a robustness check, we test our estimates against real-world civil unrest events. Results shows our estimates of public dissent are significantly predictive of civil unrest events days before they occur in both countries.

The Kashmir conflict has remained a triggering event for contention between India and Pakistan. The two despite being neighbors, and nuclear states have not solved this issue yet. From both sides of the border voices of an "Independent Kashmir" have been raised multiple times. While most present this as a viable option, its sustainability has not been explored or tested. This issue has remained a dividing point between the two states and has kept unrest in the region. Kashmir is sandwiched between two nuclear giants, lacks infrastructure, is prone to terrorism, has a landlocked geography, no economic sustenance, has multiple stake holders and is a hub of ethnic complexities. Due to these factors its sustainability as an independent state is not possible. India and Pakistan should decide and mediate this matter among themselves.

Coercive institutions are essential components of authoritarian states and contribute to regime durability. However, variation in the internal structures of these institutions remains relatively unexplored. I argue that frequent intra-agency reforms of coercive institutions shape the incentives and constraints facing individual bureaucrats. Increases in the number of units within an agency responsible for the same task generate competition for successful outcomes on tangible, observable indicators, such as the registration of collaborators who provide information on the opposition. I test this argument using a research design which exploits an exogenous shock to the organization of the state security apparatus caused by an administrative district reform in socialist Poland. I find that areas which saw an increase in the number of regional secret police offices experienced significantly faster growth in the state security's network of secret informants and collaborators. The effects of the reform on the collaborator network were large, even compared to those of mass unrest in 1976, and increasing both through time and with the number of new administrations created. My results suggest that internal structures and reforms of authoritarian bureaucracies deserve greater attention from scholars of autocracy and democratization.

In the era of recent modern history of the human civilization, the modes of spreading or disseminating news/information to the general public were limited to print-media (newspapers and magazines) and electronic-media (Television or radio Broadcasters) and therefore, the ways to stop or block some idea or information (fake or truthful) to get spread was easier as well, like shutting down the newspaper-publishing house or threatening the announcer. But more recently, ‘Internet’ has also joined the list of modes of information/news. The internet has brought the citizens an entirely new free world of unlimited sharing and exchange of information. The strength of the ‘internet’ for being a mode of information is that of its ‘wide-coverage’ as the correct and relevant information can reach to millions within few minutes, but interestingly that is a weakness too, as fake or pseudo-news can also reach to millions as well. Due to creation of the new sources of information (based upon internet), Fake News is also generated easily or spread massively and so quickly that it is almost impossible to stop it from being generated or restrict it from spreading further, which can have serious repercussions on the social, political or economic system of a country. The proliferation of inaccurate or misleading news is really high these days and that is why the concept of ‘Fake News’ has assumed a lot of significance in recent times and is seen as one of the grand global challenges. The problem of the Fake News cannot be underestimated as it carries the potential to cause unrest or challenge any political or economic system of any country. This paper will discuss about the definition and the types of ‘Fake News’, issues surrounding them, what legal steps and policies can be taken to curtail this, and what laws/policies have been proposed/passed in different Jurisdictions of the world.

In discussions of the unrest that followed the Arab Spring uprisings, the relationship between Egypt and the United Arab Emirates has attracted considerable scholarly attention. The Arab region has over the years undergone radical political changes in terms of both Arab countries’ internal affairs and the formation of regional alliances. In the period from Egypt’s July 1952 revolution to the uprising of January 25, 2013, its relations with Gulf states ranged from tension to alliance, from the climate of the Cold War and the struggle for influence in the Arab world to competition and, at times, cooperation. The final turning point was the protest on June 30, 2013, that led to the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government by Egypt’s armed forces. Egypt’s decision to turn its attention to the Gulf, in particular to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, is unsurprising, being motivated largely by the desire to formulate a new strategic alliance capable of meeting the challenges of the post-Arab Spring period. The UAE took the lead among the Arab countries that helped Egypt to overcome the economic crises plaguing it after the army deposed President Mohamed Morsi. The aim of this paper is to describe and explore the evolving strategic partnership between Egypt under General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the UAE.

We develop a model of reform and rebellion to explore Alexis de Tocqueville's conjecture that reform provokes political unrest. Our theory emphasizes that reform often must be implemented by local actors with a stake in the status quo. In this setting, the promise of reform represents an implicit contract against which subsequent implementation is measured: when implementation falls short of the promise, citizens are aggrieved and more likely to rebel. In equilibrium, when reform is predominantly under local control, a more ambitious reform encourages greater implementation; nonetheless, the equilibrium probability of rebellion also increases. We illustrate our argument with a discussion of Russia's Emancipation Reform of 1861.

This paper aims at appreciating the need for and relevance of Entrepreneurial perspectives at the grass root level in the context of Indian economy. These days rural entrepreneurship is seen as the largest force in the development of the rural areas. Infect, many of the developing countries in the world have use the concept of rural entrepreneurship as a very successful method of deterring rural unrest. Entrepreneurial, orientation to rural development is based on stimulating local entrepreneurial talent and subsequent growth of indigenous companies. In this context, an entrepreneurial perspective as a strategic development intervention for the rural India is of great interest for the government and researchers in the country as a means to enhance the socio-economic well-being of the rural people especially the educated and unemployed rural youths. This paper attempts to contribute to the existing body of knowledge about rural entrepreneurship which exists rather in piecemeal form and attempts to broaden the awareness by presenting the conceptual frame of the prevailing philosophy of rural Entrepreneurism and Rural entrepreneurship development efforts in the Indian Perspective. This will enable the people concerned to capture a holistic perspective about the entrepreneurial practices, the status of rural entrepreneurship development in India, the present initiative in the form of rural entrepreneurship development schemes and programmes and institutional network development for rural entrepreneurship development.

David Caplovitz is remembered primarily for his book The Poor Pay More and his writing about poor consumers. This article addresses why this work propelled the reconstruction of consumer financial protection law, by placing it within the context of widespread urban rioting and the civil rights movements of the 1960s. It argues that Capolvoitz presented the American political center with a clinical, denatured sociological explanation for urban rioting, which involved a more palatable and less threatening suggested response to unrest than explanations premised on intrinsic white racism or class oppression. According to Caplovitz, the riots more than anything else reflected a political and social failure to appreciate the importance of consumer finance. He recommended addressing racism and deeper social grievances through major revisions to commercial and consumer law. Sidestepping other “root causes,” Caplovitz helped courts, law-makers, and many middle-class Americans revalue consumer law and its connection to domestic peace, poverty and economic justice.

Incitement, a First Amendment doctrine that has long been relegated to the history section of law school case books, is now the centerpiece of two major lawsuits: one against Donald Trump for the violence that erupted in his Louisville, Kentucky rally, and one against the organizers of the fatal Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Incitement, a long-recognized exception to the freedom of expression, has been rarely used except in times of political unrest. Unsurprisingly, then, as political unrest has re-emerged in the wake of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, incitement has become relevant once again. However, the alleged incitement at these violent political rallies is largely dependent on the use of modern technology, including ubiquitous media reporting and the ease and anonymity of social media, and therefore presents an odd fit for the more traditional incitement definition stated in Brandenburg v. Ohio. For that reason, this article argues that the Trump rally in Louisville and the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville show how incitement should evolve to include more context, and how that context will become essential to properly decide incitement cases going forward.

The military often intervenes in politics shortly after elections. This might be because election results reveal information about the ease with which a coup can succeed. Would-be coup perpetrators use this information to infer whether the incumbent can be removed from office without provoking popular unrest. We argue that the informational content of elections depends on the electoral rules that translate votes into outcomes. In electoral systems that incentivize strategic voting, election returns are less informative about the distribution of political support than in electoral systems that incentivize sincere voting. An extensive battery of statistical tests shows that vote-shares of election winners do not predict coup attempts in plurality systems, which encourage strategic voting, but they do predict coup attempts in non-plurality electoral systems, which do not encourage strategic voting. Thus, incumbents who have performed well in elections face a lower risk of coup attempts, but only in institutional environments where voting results are highly informative about the distribution of political support. We apply this logic to illuminate the decisions of the military to intervene into politics during the famous failed 1936 coup in Spain and the successful 1973 coup in Chile.

Machine-coded event datasets have become popular in conflict research. I argue that systematic media biases render news-based event data unsuitable for studying anti-government networks of insurgents and political parties. Insurgent networks are too secretive to be captured by media reports, whereas alliances among regular political parties are too constant to be considered newsworthy. I analyze the data accuracy of Metternich et al.’s (2013) network study of insurgents and political parties in Thailand, which is based on the most comprehensive event dataset currently available – the ICEWS project. Based on simple evaluation criteria, I show that most of the network data entries are incorrect, leading to a depiction of the networks that is unrelated to real-world cleavages in Thailand. While my hand-coded event dataset captures relatively more network-relevant information than ICEWS, the comparison confirms that journalists specifically underreport cooperative events among insurgents and parties. In addition, the ICEWS project provides unreliable counts of conflictual events in Thailand. Using alternative conflict measurements from the Deep South Watch dataset, and a dummy variable based on established periods of unrest, I show that violent activities in Thailand’s Deep South declined during periods of conflict between pro- and anti-Thaksin groups. Conflicts were unrelated to network fragmentation, contradicting Metternich et al.’s primary finding.

We propose a non-parametric procedure for estimating systemic co-jumps and independent idiosyncratic jumps, and study associated news reported in Factiva and Bloomberg for thirty five stock markets from 1988 to 2014. Our results suggest that it is important to distinguish between systemic co-jumps and idiosyncratic jumps. We find idiosyncratic jumps to have economically significant impact on portfolios weights involving emerging markets. Both jumps have important implications for home-bias investors. Our news analysis suggests systemic jumps are typically caused by currency crises, sectoral failure, liquidity issues, and deteriorating economic climate, while idiosyncratic jumps are caused by political unrest, currency instability, and large firm effects on small economies. Many of the idiosyncratic jumps in fact originate from the same source but impact different stock markets at different times and levels.

This year witnessed political tensions resulting from a series of provocative nuclear and missiles tests in North Korea and from domestic political unrest, culminating in the abrupt leadership change in the Republic of Korea. All these events pose enormous challenges for minimizing the risks of military confrontation and war in the Northeast Asian region. A significant dampening factor on these possibilities is the real progress made in recent decades in economic cooperation and integration within the region, which contributes to reducing military action in the Korean Peninsula. North Korea, however, still remains the critical gap in an otherwise productive network of dynamic regional economic growth. For Northeast Asia, there is a continuing and growing need for promoting peaceful economic interactions and research on a common basis for cross border economic cooperation for the future common good, as a means of ameliorating political tensions and frictions in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Toward this end, the KIEP–NEAEF collaborative project seeks to fulfill the need for timely and forward-looking research activities by focusing on some of the critical components, such as strengthening economic cooperation with China and exploring future scenarios of North Korea as an integral part of broader regional economic cooperation in the region. This collaborative work on Northeast Asia remains essential in carrying out activities aimed at building a future Northeast Asian economic community on the basis of the strong network the NEAEF has built over the years for functional economic cooperation, through discussions and consultations among stakeholder country experts on issues such as cross border infrastructure development and financial cooperation. This volume in the series of proceedings volumes is titled Sustaining the Momentum for Building a Northeast Asian Economic Community and comprises summaries of research presentations and discussions on building a Northeast Asian economic community presented at the planning meeting in Honolulu and at the Annual Conference of the Northeast Asia Economic Forum in Hong Kong, China, in 2017. The results of this project represent activities that have been contributing to efforts toward regional economic cooperation and have been carried out in a spirit of cooperation. KIEP is grateful to Dr. Lee-Jay Cho, Chairman of NEAEF, for his leadership in implementing the project, and to the authors of the presentations, conference participants and discussants who contributed to this volume. Drs. Lee-Jay Cho and Hyung-Gon Jeong would like to extend their appreciation to the NEAEF staff for their assistance in the course of the successful implementation of this project, and to Drs. Karla Fallon and Kennon Breazeale for their editorial review and editing of this volume.

This paper presents evidence of the eect of labor unrest on labor production in the policing context using data from New York City. When contract negotiations last for an extended period, old contracts can expire before new ones are approved. Working under an expired contract, or being "out of contract," can be costly for police o¢ cers both monetarily and psychologically. This paper studies the eect of time spent out of contract on police misconduct using new data and a research design that exploits the fact that dierent ranks of NYPD o¢ cers are out of contract at dierent points in time and for dierent lengths of time. I …nd evidence that incidents of police o¢ cer discourtesy and abuse of authority increase with the amount of time spent out of contract; there is no statistically signi…cant relationship between incidents of excessive force and time spent out of contract.

This paper explores the dynamics of nation-building policies and the conditions under which a state can promote a shared national identity on its territory. A forward-looking central government that internalizes identity dynamics shapes them by choosing the level of political centralization. Homogenization attempts are constrained by political unrest and by the intergenerational transmission of identities within the family. We find nation-building efforts are generally characterized by fast interventions. We show that a zero-sum conflict over resources pushes long-run dynamics toward homogeneous steady states and extreme levels of (de)centralization. We also find the ability to foster a common identity is highly dependent on initial conditions, and that country-specific historical factors can have a lasting impact on the long-run distribution of identities.

Can the adoption of labor-saving technology lead to social instability and unrest? We examine a canonical historical case, the so-called 'Captain Swing' riots in 1830s Britain. Variously attributed to the adverse consequences of weather shocks, the shortcomings of the Poor Law, or the after-effects of enclosure, we emphasize the importance of a new technology - the threshing machine. Invented in the 1780s, it spread during and after the Napoleonic Wars. Using farm advertisements from newspapers published in 66 English and Welsh towns, we compile a new measure of the technology's diffusion. Parishes with ads for threshing machines had much higher riot probabilities in 1830 - and the relationship was even stronger for machine-breaking attacks. Threshing machines were mainly useful in wheat-growing areas. To establish a causal role for labor-saving technology, we instrument technology adoption with the FAO measure of soil suitability for wheat, and show that this in turn predicts unrest.

Intersubjective ethnic categorization is typically treated as obvious and stable, under the assumption that it is a function of matching sticky descent-based attributes to ethnic categories. This paper presents evidence that political affiliation, which is not descent-based, can alter intersubjective ethnic categorization: under some circumstances, individuals deny the (self-professed) ethnic identity of political adversaries to delegitimize and punish them, while endorsing the ethnic identity of political allies. This is illustrated through the Malay ethnic identity in Malaysia, which has highly ambiguous boundaries and is strongly politicized. The findings have several implications: they demonstrate the complexity of intersubjective ethnic categorization, which challenges parsimonious conceptualizations of ethnic identity. They also illuminate a channel through which politicizing ethnic identity increases the risk of ethnic unrest: the vulnerability to attacks on their ethnic identity by political adversaries can create an ethnic outbidding dynamic in which political leaders compete to demonstrate their ethnic credentials.

This paper investigates the competitive conditions and revenues drivers of commercial banks in MENA region in the context of Panzar-Rosse model. It is the first study of its kind that examines a large sample of MENA banks for an extensive period (1999-2012) during an era of political and economic unrest and transformation that includes the 2007 global crisis, providing the ability to draw reliable conclusions. We find that MENA banks operate under monopolistic competition. Our findings indicate that policies that favoured relaxing capital adequacy requirements, decreasing state role and mergers are not empirically justified for MENA banks during this period.

In this paper, we consider incidences of arrears to the IMF, focusing on protracted arrears cases and attempt to identify determinants of their occurrence. We use narrative and formal methods. In addition, we analyze determinants of the duration of arrears. We find that previous arrears, reserves coverage, and institutional quality are among the main determinants of arrears. In addition, we identify a role for political developments, including civil unrest, which make arrears more likely to arise and to last longer. We conclude that improved macroeconomic conditions and turnaround of political fortunes would help to clear the currently remaining protracted arrears cases.

Pollution and stress are the two major challenges in this era of technology revolution. Extensive research toward eco-friendly technology awareness to control pollution has helped to tackle the problem of pollution, but if talked about stress, in spite of extensive research all over the world, a decreasing quality of life, increasing health hazards, unrest among society and youth are all different expression of stress, have shown no trend of decrease (Goel & Goel, 2005).Bhartiya Wisdom spelt out in Vedas, Bhagwad Gita, Upanishads, Yoga are the new rays of hopes which are essential to face these modern life problems, especially stress. The present paper attempts to describe management of stress through the application of wisdom of Bharat.

This paper discusses the internal dynamics of Karachi which shape the overall security trends within the city. Karachi is the most populous city of Pakistan and boasts grossing more than 70 percent of the national revenue. Unfortunately, this economic hub has been affected by communal violence and religious extremism for far too long. This protracted unrest has greatly damaged the national economy. This paper argues that the law and order situation in Karachi needs a firm commitment from political leaders to put a conclusive end to the chaos and anarchy in the city. Karachi’s peace and security is directly linked to that of Pakistan. The internal security of Karachi can only be improved by addressing the ethno-political and sectarian differences for achieving stability in the long term.

This paper investigates the influence of broadband Internet availability in the occurrence of events of civil unrest, both with theory and empirical evidence. We first propose minor changes to a recent model of protests considering the hypothesis that the Internet sets an environment for communication and information exchange that boosts collective dissatisfaction towards unfair policies. We then use collected data on the locations of 2011's Occupy Movement in the United States, together with an instrumental variable approach, to estimate the positive, statistically significant impact of one extra Internet Service Provider on the probability of evidencing protests in a given location.

We explore the relationship between capacity for collective action and representation in autocracies with data from Imperial Russia. Our primary empirical exercise relates peasant representation in new institutions of local self-government to the frequency of peasant unrest in the decade prior to reform. To correct for measurement error in the unrest data and other sources of endogeneity, we exploit idiosyncratic variation in two determinants of peasant unrest: the historical incidence of serfdom and religious polarization. We find that peasants were granted less representation in districts with more frequent unrest in preceding years — a relationship consistent with the Acemoglu- Robinson model of political transitions and inconsistent with numerous other theories of institutional change. At the same time, we observe patterns of redistribution in subsequent years that are inconsistent with the commitment mechanism central to the Acemoglu-Robinson model. Building on these results, we discuss possible directions for future theoretical work.

This case discusses how Raya Holding (Raya) has complied with the Egyptian code of corporate governance published in 2011 and the consequential improvement in organisational performance that has taken place over the last decade. The case uses the 2014 annual report and the company’s website to address Raya’s compliance with the code. The central theme of the case is that improvements in corporate governance could be correlated to organisational performance even though this relationship is a very complex one. Enhanced organisational performance might have taken place due to factors other than improvements in corporate governance. Considering the 2011 revolution where Egypt witnessed political unrest, Raya is a good example that is worthy of study since it was able to overcome the political unrest and the challenging environment that Egypt had in 2011 where it scored the fifth rank in the ESG index compared to the tenth rank in 2010. Moreover, Raya’s board attributed their success and good standing after the revolution to their continuous work on corporate governance throughout the previous years.