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The Corporate Governance concept and instrumentation were significantly challenged by the recent financial crisis, with the result of retaining a more pronounced regulatory nature. It is now clear that better governance may only be achieved through better regulation. The financial crisis context tendered the acceleration of banking corporate governance costumization, while both the business environment and the public policies bring their attention to the radical improvement of governance practices. Using the empirical method of the questionnaire and through the direct contact with executive banking lawyers, it was found that procedures concerning the activity of financial institutions bodies, as well as the protection of minority shareholders only reveals punctual issues that may be solved without regulatory intervention (e.g. usage of independent or at least outside directors in baks' boards, procedures related to the management transparency ec.). The most relevant issue is the necessity of reconceptualizing the significancy of banks' relationship with the stakeholders. The replacement of financial institutions' relationship with the clients (in both deposits and credits) and the government should begin from recognizing their importance in the content of corporate interests' concept. In the banking field, the maximization of shareholders value as prevaling orientation the corporate managers is limited by the public significance of these financial institutions' activty. Therefore, one should seriously take into consideration a new orientation of the law and jurisprudence with the view of recognizing - at a certain extend - the directors duties of care and dilligence to the benefit of stakeholders. Such resettlement would allow banks to get back from the role they assumed before criss - which was the care of showing huge profits on short term - to their fundamental role as financial intermediary in which long term relationship with clients prevails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]