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This article examines six main elements in the modern story of the impact of Alfred Russel Wallace's 1855 Sarawak Law paper, particularly in the many accounts of Charles Darwin's life and work. These elements are: 1 It was Wallace's first avowal of evolution. 2 Wallace laid out the theory of evolution minus only a “mechanism”. 3 Darwin failed to see how close Wallace was approaching. 4 Lyell did see how close Wallace was approaching. 5 Lyell urged Darwin to publish because of Wallace. 6 Darwin wrote to Wallace to warn him off his patch. Each of these are very frequently repeated as straightforward facts in the popular and scholarly literature. It is here argued that each of these is erroneous and that the role of the Sarawak Law paper in the historiography of Darwin and Wallace needs to be revised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the investigation of the distribution of the protein tenascin-C in canine mammary tumors. The method involved immunohistochemistry of tissue slices, performed by the application of an antibody to tenascin-C that specifically can be made visible for microscopic inspection. The first phase of the project is the making of the protocol, the second the deduction of a pattern of tenascin-C distribution in tumors and the third the writing of a paper. Each of the phases is analyzed separately, using the concept of resistance and accommodation. My purpose is to show that in each phase of the process of producing knowledge, the scientist meets resistances which force him to accommodate by changing his conceptual, technical and methodological approaches. In reverse, the details of the non-human agent (protocol, pattern or paper) have to be accommodated to the wishes and expectations of the scientist. Through this interaction a situation of stability of knowledge is reached at the end of each phase. In the protocol phase, resistance is found in the antibody and tissue slices. In the phase of pattern deduction the resistance is in the pathological diagnosis of the tumors and the expectations and hypothesis with which the scientist had entered the project; in the criteria to be used for assigning the slices to a tenascin-C pattern; and in the responses of colleagues and supervisor. In the paper-writing phase the interaction is between the scientist and the scientific community which should take on board the knowledge from the research project. When stabilization of knowledge is obtained in one of the phases, the agents of resistance turn into allies in the next phase, giving support to accommodating the resistances in this later phase. Second, the stabilization of knowledge of the protocol is further enhanced when stabilization of the pattern is achieved; in addition, knowledge of the pattern is more definite when it has become stabilized and closed knowledge within the science community. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In 1948 Ludwik Fleck published a paper in Polish discussing the use of humans in medical experiments, thereby addressing his peers. Though the paper has so far not been translated or studied, it has been taken to indicate Fleck’s deep commitment to ethical questions, notably the question of informed consent. In being written by a former victim of the Nazi policy and a survivor of the Holocaust also acting as an expert witness in the trial of the IG Farben in Nuremberg, the paper is of interest. A scrutiny of Fleck’s text and related sources discloses, however, not only the complexity of the issue at the centre of the Nuremberg trial, but also Fleck’s unexpected stance in seemingly adducing his arguments from both the German defendants and the prosecution, heavily informed by US scientists. Further, the contentious discussion of the past in Fleck’s paper reveals its links to modern bioethical discussion. Though sometimes oblivious of that past, it still faces the same questions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract In some quarters within philosophy of medicine, more particularly in the phenomenological approaches, naturalism is looked upon with suspicion. This paper argues, first, that it is necessary to distinguish between two expressions of this attitude towards naturalism: phenomenological approaches to illness disagree with naturalism regarding various theoretical claims and they disapprove of naturalism on an ethical level. Second, this paper argues that both the disagreement with and the disapproval of naturalism are to a large extent confused. It then offers some proposals to set up an agenda for future collaboration. Highlights • Naturalism is looked upon with suspicion in the phenomenological approaches within philosophy of medicine. • This attitude takes on two distinct forms: an epistemological disagreement and an ethical disapproval. • Both forms of disagreement are largely confused. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Moderate pluralism is a popular position in contemporary philosophy of biology. Despite its popularity, various authors have argued that it tends to slide off into a radical form of pluralism that is both normatively and descriptively unacceptable. This paper looks at the case of biological species classification, and evaluates a popular way of avoiding radical pluralism by relying on the shared aims and norms of a discipline. The main contention is that while these aims and norms may play an important role in the legitimacy of species classifications, they fail to fend off radical pluralism. It follows from this that the legitimacy of species classifications is also determined by local decisions about the aims of research and how to operationalize and balance these. This is important, I argue, because it means that any acceptable view on the legitimacy of classification should be able to account for these local decisions. Highlights • The paper presents an argument for radical pluralism of legitimate classifications. • The paper rejects an objection to this argument that relies on shared classificatory norms. • The paper argues that local decisions about the aims of classification co-determine the legitimacy of classification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper examines a specific kind of part-whole relations that exist in the molecular genetic domain. The central question is under which conditions a particular molecule, such as a DNA sequence, is a biological part of the human genome. I address this question by analyzing how biologists in fact partition the human genome into parts. This paper thus presents a case study in the metaphysics of biological practice. I develop a metaphysical account of genomic parthood by analyzing the investigative and reasoning practices in the ENCODE (ENCyclopedia Of DNA Elements) project. My account reveals two conditions that determine whether a molecule is a part of the human genome (i.e., a genomic part). First, genomic parts must possess a causal role function in the genome as a whole, that is, their functions must contribute to the genome directing the overall functioning of the cell. Second, genomic parts must have a specific chemical structure and be actual segments of the DNA sequence of the genome. Highlights • A classical philosophical question is explored on the basis of an illuminating case study from actual biological research. • Though ENCODE researcher measure biochemical activities they identify genomic parts on the basis of their functions. • The parts of the human genome are determined by their causal role functions and by their chemical structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME) constitutes a biopolitical problem, a scientific object which needs to be studied, classified and regulated. Assemblages of authorities, knowledges and techniques make CFS/ME subjects and shape their everyday conduct in an attempt to increase their supposed autonomy, wellbeing and health. CFS and CFS/ME identities are however made not only through government, scientific, and medical interventions but also by the patients themselves, a biosocial community who collaborates with scientists, educates itself about the intricacies of biomedicine, and contests psychiatric truth claims. CFS/ME is an illness trapped between medicine and psychology, an illness that is open to debate and therefore difficult to manage and standardise. The paper delineates different interventions by medicine, science, the state and the patients themselves and concludes that CFS/ME remains elusive, only partially standardised, in an on-going battle between all the different actors that want to define it for their own situated interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers what evidence is needed to establish the effectiveness and safety of a drug therapy. The claim that A cures D is a particular case of a causal claim in medicine. So the paper begins with a general analysis of the evidence for causal claims in medicine. Such evidence is divided into two types: statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism. These are further divided into observational and interventional, producing a 2x2 classification. It is shown that historically there have different assessments of the importance of these different types of evidence. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) puts forward the thesis that claims of the form ‘A cures D without harming the patient’ can be established using only randomized controlled trials or RCTs. This thesis of EBM is criticized by considering two historical examples: streptomycin and thalidomide. Generalizing from these, it is claimed that the effectiveness and safety of a drug therapy can only be established by using both statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism. This is a specific instance of the Russo-Williamson thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates German-speaking paleontologists' reception of Darwin's thought and the ways in which they negotiated their space of knowledge production accordingly. In German-speaking regions, the majority of paleontologists welcomed Darwin's magnum opus , since it granted paleontology an independent voice within biology, and thus a new institutional setting. However, in the process of negotiating the features of paleontology within the Darwinian framework, German paleontologists constrained their practices too narrowly, for fear of leaving open possible results at odds with the burgeoning Darwinian biological community. In doing so, they also limited the further development of German paleontology. In other words, paleontologists Karl Alfred von Zittel (1839–1904) and Melchior Neumayr (1845–1890) advocated for a handmaid's role for paleontology, which increased biologists' dependence on paleontologists for empirical evidence, but which limited paleontologists' theoretical autonomy. By analyzing both the institutional strategies and the methodology of German-speaking paleontology at the end of the nineteenth century, this paper shows the importance of scientists' ability to enter into and negotiate their place within the broader biological community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a (2016) paper in this journal, I defuse allegations that theoretical ecological research is problematic because it relies on teleological metaphysical assumptions. Mark Sagoff offers a formal reply. In it, he concedes that I succeeded in establishing that ecologists abandoned robust teleological views long ago and that they use teleological characterizations as metaphors that aid in developing mechanistic explanations of ecological phenomena. Yet, he contends that I did not give enduring criticisms of theoretical ecology a fair shake in my paper. He says this is because enduring criticisms center on concerns about the nature of ecological networks and forces, the instrumentality of ecological laws and theoretical models, and the relation between theoretical and empirical methods in ecology that that paper does not broach. Below I set apart the distinct criticisms Sagoff presents in his commentary and respond to each in turn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that challenges that are grand in scope such as “lifelong health and wellbeing”, “climate action”, or “food security” cannot be addressed through scientific research only. Indeed scientific research could inhibit addressing such challenges if scientific analysis constrains the multiple possible understandings of these challenges into already available scientific categories and concepts without translating between these and everyday concerns. This argument builds on work in philosophy of science and race to postulate a process through which non-scientific notions become part of science. My aim is to make this process available to scrutiny: what I call founding everyday ideas in science is both culturally and epistemologically conditioned. Founding transforms a common idea into one or more scientifically relevant ones, which can be articulated into descriptively thicker and evaluatively deflated terms and enable operationalisation and measurement. The risk of founding however is that it can invisibilise or exclude from realms of scientific scrutiny interpretations that are deemed irrelevant, uninteresting or nonsensical in the domain in question–but which may remain salient for addressing grand-in-scope challenges. The paper considers concepts of “wellbeing” in development economics versus in gerontology to illustrate this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I track the history of post-1945 human genetics and genomics emphasizing the importance of ideas about risk to the scientific study and medical management of human heredity. Drawing on my own scholarship as it is refracted through important new work by other scholars both junior and senior, I explore how radiation risk and then later disease risk mattered to the development of genetics and genomics, particularly in the United States. In this context I excavate one of the central ironies of post-war human genetics: while studies of DNA as the origin and cause of diseases have been lavishly supported by public institutions and private investment around the world, the day-to-day labor of intensive clinical innovation has played a far more important role in the actual human experience of genetic disease and genetic risk for affected families. This has implications for the archival record, where clinical interactions are less readily accessible to historians. This paper then suggests that modern genomics grew out of radiation risk; that it was and remains a risk assessment science; that it is temporally embedded as a form of both prediction and historical reconstruction; and that it has become a big business focused more on risk and prediction (which can be readily marketed) than on effective clinical intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For scientific claims to be reliable and productive they have to be justified. However, on the one hand little is known on what justification precisely means to scientists, and on the other the position held by philosophers of science on what it entails is rather limited; for justifications customarily refer to the written form (textual expressions) of scientific claims, leaving aside images, which, as many cases from the history of science show are relevant to this process. The fact that images can visually express scientific claims independently from text, plus their vast variety and origins, requires an assessment of the way they are currently justified and in turn used as sources to justify scientific claims in the case of particular scientific fields. Similarly, in view of the different nature of images, analysis is required to determine on what side of the philosophical distinction between data and phenomena these different kinds of images fall. This paper historicizes and documents a particular aspect of contemporary life sciences research: the use of the molecular image as vehicle of knowledge production in cell studies, a field that has undergone a significant shift in visual expressions from the early 1980s onwards. Focussing on textbooks as sources that have been overlooked in the historiography of contemporary biomedicine, the aim is to explore (1) whether the shift of cell studies, entailing a superseding of the optical image traditionally conceptualised as primary data, by the molecular image, corresponds with a shift of justificatory practices, and (2) to assess the role of the molecular image as primary data. This paper also explores the dual role of images as teaching resources and as resources for the construction of knowledge in cell studies especially in its relation to discovery and justification. Finally, this paper seeks to stimulate reflection on what kind of archival resources could benefit the work of present and future epistemic historians in particular those interested on the role of images as sources of training and knowledge production in scientific disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses a Boolean method for establishing constitutive regularity statements which, according to the regularity theory of mechanistic constitution, form the core of any mechanistic explanation in neuroscience. After presenting the regularity definition for the constitution relation, the paper develops a set of inference rules allowing one to establish constitutive hypotheses in light of certain kinds of empirical evidence. The general methodology consisting of these rules is characterized as having formed the basis of many successful explanatory projects in neuroscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers of biology disagree about an adequate explication of the concept of function. Instead of perpetuating the debate on the level of in principle-arguments, this paper aims first at reconstructing functional talk in the biological research papers of Marom and Braun, which focus on two different kinds of evolving networks, and in discussing the ontological consequences which the authors draw from their results. Marom investigates evolving neural networks controlling Braitenberg vehicles. Braun observes the evolutionary rearrangement or “rewiring” of the genetic network of genetically modified yeast on a short time scale. In both cases, the parameters under investigation are defined in functional terms. However, both authors report striking differences in the structures that realize one and the same function, as well as striking differences in the function of identical structures. From this, they construct an argument against reductionism. The second aim of my paper is an inquiry into the epistemic legitimacy of this conclusion. This requires addressing critically several concepts on which Marom and Braun's argument is built. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the context and the origin of a particular debate that concerns the evolution of phenotypic plasticity. In 1965, British biologist A. D. Bradshaw proposed a widely cited model intended to explain the evolution of norms of reaction, based on his studies of plant populations. Bradshaw's model went beyond the notion of the “adaptive norm of reaction” discussed before him by Dobzhansky and Schmalhausen by suggesting that “plasticity”—the ability of a phenotype to be modified by the environment—should be genetically determined. To prove Bradshaw's hypothesis, it became necessary for some authors to identify the pressures exerted by natural selection on phenotypic plasticity in particular traits, and thus to model its evolution. In this paper, I contrast two different views, based on quantitative genetic models, proposed in the mid-1980s: Russell Lande and Sara Via's conception of phenotypic plasticity, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is linked to the evolution of the plastic trait itself, and Samuel Scheiner and Richard Lyman's view, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is independent from the evolution of the trait. I show how the origin of this specific debate, and different assumptions about the evolution of phenotypic plasticity, depended on Bradshaw's definition of plasticity and the context of quantitative genetics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plant ecologist Anthony David Bradshaw's account of the evolution of adaptive phenotypic plasticity remains central to contemporary research aimed at understanding how organisms persist in heterogeneous environments. Bradshaw suggested that changes in particular traits in response to specific environmental factors could be under direct genetic control, and that natural selection could therefore act directly to shape those responses: plasticity was not “noise” obscuring a genetic signal, but could be specific and refined just as any other adaptive phenotypic trait. In this paper, I document the contexts and development of Bradshaw's investigation of phenotypic plasticity in plants, including a series of unreported experiments in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Contrary to the mythology that later emerged around Bradshaw's ideas, Bradshaw was engaged in a serious and sustained empirical research program concerning plasticity in the 1950s and 1960s that went far beyond a single review paper. Moreover, that work was not isolated, but was surrounded by an already rich theoretical discourse and a substantial body of empirical research concerning the evolution of developmental plasticity and stability. Bradshaw recast the problem of how to understand (and control) plasticity and stability within an epistemic framework focused on genetic differences and natural selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes how, from the early twentieth century, and especially in the early Cold War era, the plant physiologists considered their discipline ideally suited among all the plant sciences to study and explain biological functions and processes, and ranked their discipline among the dominant forms of the biological sciences. At their apex in the late-1960s, the plant physiologists laid claim to having discovered nothing less than the “basic laws of physiology.” This paper unwraps that claim, showing that it emerged from the construction of monumental big science laboratories known as phytotrons that gave control over the growing environment. Control meant that plant physiologists claimed to be able to produce a standard phenotype valid for experimental biology. Invoking the standards of the physical sciences, the plant physiologists heralded basic biological science from the phytotronic produced phenotype. In the context of the Cold War era, the ability to pursue basic science represented the highest pinnacle of standing within the scientific community. More broadly, I suggest that by recovering the history of an underappreciated discipline, plant physiology, and by establishing the centrality of the story of the plant sciences in the history of biology can historians understand the massive changes wrought to biology by the conceptual emergence of the molecular understanding of life, the dominance of the discipline of molecular biology, and the rise of biotechnology in the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to use Sir William Crookes' researches into psychical phenomena as a sustained case study of the role of epistemic virtues within scientific enquiry. Despite growing interest in virtues in science, there are few integrated historical and philosophical studies, and even fewer studies focussing on controversial or ‘fringe’ sciences where, one might suppose, certain epistemic virtues (like open-mindedness and tolerance) may be subjected to sterner tests. Using the virtue of epistemic courage as my focus, it emerges that Crookes' psychical researches were indeed epistemically courageous, but that this judgment must be grounded in sensitivity to the motivational complexity and context-sensitivity of the exercise of epistemic virtues. The paper then considers Crookes' remarks on the relationship between epistemic virtuousness and the intellectual integrity and public duties of scientists, thereby placing epistemic virtues in the context of wider debates about the authority of science in late modern societies. I conclude that Crookes' researches into psychical phenomena offer instructive lessons for historians of science and virtue epistemologists concerning the complexity and contextuality of epistemic virtues, and the profitable forms that future studies of virtues in science could take. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If there is any value in the idea that disease is something other than the mere absence of health then that value must lie in the way that diseases are classified. This paper offers further development of a view advanced previously, the Contrastive Model of Disease : it develops the account to handle asymptomatic disease (previously excluded); and in doing so it relates the model to a broadly biostatistical view of health (where before the model was neutral in the naturalism debate). The developments are prompted by considering cancers featuring viruses as prominent causes, since these appear to amount to cases where the prescriptions of the Contrastive Model could be followed, but aren't. The resulting Irrelevance Objection claims that the Contrastive Model is irrelevant to medical science and practice. The paper seeks to rebut the Irrelevance Objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the attitude of the British Physiologist William Benjamin Carpenter (1813–1885) to spiritualist claims and other alleged psychical phenomena in the second half of the Nineteenth Century. It argues that existing portraits of Carpenter as a critic of psychical studies need to be refined so as to include his curiosity about certain ‘unexplained phenomena’, as well as broadened so as to take into account his overarching epistemological approach in a context of theological and social fluidity within nineteenth-century British Unitarianism. Carpenter's hostility towards spiritualism has been well documented, but his interest in the possibility of thought-transference or his secret fascination with the medium Henry Slade have not been mentioned until now. This paper therefore highlights Carpenter's ambivalences and focuses on his conciliatory attitude towards a number of heterodoxies while suggesting that his Unitarian faith offers the keys to understanding his unflinching rationalism, his belief in the enduring power of mind, and his effort to resolve dualisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the relationship between the ‘elusive’ science of psychical research and experimental physics in the period approximately, 1870–1930. Most studies of the relationship between psychical research and the established sciences have examined the ways in which psychical researchers used theories in the established sciences to give greater plausibility to their interpretations of such puzzling phenomena as telepathy, telekinesis and ectoplasm. A smaller literature has examined the use of laboratory instruments to produce scientific evidence for these phenomena. This paper argues that the cultures of experiment in the established science of physics could matter to psychical research in a different way: it suggests that experience of capricious effects, recalcitrant instruments and other problems of the physical laboratory made British physicists especially sympathetic towards the difficulties of the spiritualistic séance and other sites of psychical enquiry. In the wake of widely-reported claims that the mediums they had investigated had been exposed as frauds, these scientific practitioners were eventually persuaded by the merits of an older argument that human psychic subjects could not be treated like laboratory hardware. However, well into the twentieth century, they maintained that experimental physics had important lessons for psychical researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the close links in medical understandings of miscarriage and abortion in the first half of the twentieth century in Britain. In the absence of a clear legal framework for abortion, and the secrecy surrounding the practice, medical literature suggests contradictory and confused views about women presenting with clinical signs of pregnancy loss. On one hand, there was a lack of clarity as to whether pregnancy loss was natural or induced, with a clear tendency to assume that symptoms of miscarriage were the result of criminal interference gone wrong. On the other hand, women who did not present for treatment when miscarriage was underway were accused of neglecting their unborn children. The paper suggests that discourses around pregnancy loss were class-based, distrustful of female patients, and shaped by the wider context of fertility decline and concerns about infant mortality. The close historical connection between miscarriage and abortion offers some insight into why both the pro-life movement and miscarriage support advocates today draw on similar imagery and rhetoric about early fetal loss. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this commentary I explore how the papers here illuminate the processes of collection that have been so central to the history of human genetics since 1945. The development of human population genetics in the Cold War period produced databases and biobanks that have endured into the present, and that continue to be used and debated. In the decades after the bomb, scientists collected and transferred human biological materials and information from populations of interest, and as they moved these biological resources or biosocial resources acquired new meanings and uses. The papers here collate these practices and map their desires and ironies. They explore how a large international network of geneticists, biological anthropologists, virologists and other physicians and scientists interacted with local informants, research subjects and public officials. They also track the networks and standards that mobilized the transfer of information, genealogies, tissue and blood samples. As Joanna Radin suggests here, the massive collections of human biological materials and data were often understood to be resources for an “as-yet-unknown” future. The stories told here contain elements of surveillance, extraction, salvage and eschatology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the emergence of human population genetics in Brazil in the decades following World War II, and pays particular attention to narratives about the formation of the Brazilian nation. We analyze the institutionalization of this branch of genetics in the 1950s and 1960s, and look at research on the characteristics of the population of Brazil, which made use of new explanatory models of evolutionary dynamics. These developments were greatly influenced by the activities of the Rockefeller Foundation and by the presence of North American geneticists in Brazil, especially Theodosius Dobzhansky. One of the main points of this paper is to show that explanations of Brazilian human genetic diversity constructed in the mid-twentieth century closely followed interpretations that had been produced since the end of the nineteenth century, in which notions of ‘racial mixing’ played a central role. Even as population genetics was conditioned by nationalist concerns that had long marked Brazilian history, we argue that its emergence and institutionalization was closely associated with global, post-World War II socio-political contexts, especially with regards to modernization projects and growing scientific internationalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-war era saw the emergence of large-scale and longitudinal social and medical surveys in Britain. That these surveys were both representative of an entire nation and could follow individuals throughout their lives, gave them a privileged position in relation to policy-making. This paper will focus on two closely interrelated surveys, both instigated by the Population Investigation Committee at London School of Economics—the National Survey of Health and Development, which began in 1946, and the Scottish Mental Survey of 1947. These surveys had a critical role in educational research and policy and, more specifically, in changing perspectives regarding the concept and measurement of intelligence. They were seen to privilege social and environmental factors as determinants of mental ability, and they shifted attention away from genetic factors and eugenic concerns. However, while the surveys were indeed powerful tools, their structure, the questions they asked, the methods they used and the choices made over the data to be tabulated, also determined what could be known. The paper will examine the growing criticism and debate over the large-scale survey. Many argued that smaller-scale studies were more effective in understanding the social and biological causes of intellectual differences, and better for identifying the benefits and dangers of using intelligence and merit as a means of organising society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Creationism is an ambiguous term used in a variety of contexts: political, scientific, religious and educational. This paper attempts to trace the discourse on creationism in two European countries (France and the United Kingdom) and show how different cultural backgrounds shape the construction of its meaning. The striking difference between the total redefinition of the narration on creationism in France after the Harun Yahya's case, and the practically oriented steady development of the discussion in the United Kingdom seems to result from two different political sensitivities, deeply rooted in local cultures. The goal of my paper is doublefold. It attempts to present the emergence of two distinct incommensurable conceptualisations of a social problem and in the same time it tries to answer how to discuss them in a democratic framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Introduces “Fifth Business” concept to critically analyze less prominent scientists. [•] Argues the need to broaden analysis of historical actors in bioscience. [•] E.g.: Ray Wu solved a stubborn problem for sequencing complementary DNA base pairs. [•] Yet Wu’s crucial contribution to DNA sequencing history has been little acknowledged. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The use of ‘race’ as a proxy for population structure in the genetic mapping of complex traits has provoked controversy about its legitimacy as a category for biomedical research, given its social and political connotations. The controversy has reignited debates among scientists and philosophers of science about whether there is a legitimate biological concept of race. This paper examines the genetic race concept as it developed historically in the work of Theodosius Dobzhansky from the 1930s to 1950s. Dobzhansky’s definitions of race changed over this time from races as ‘arrays of forms’ or ‘clusters’ in 1933–1939, to races as genetically distinct geographical populations in 1940–1946, to races as genetically distinct ‘Mendelian populations’ in 1947–1955. Dobzhansky responded to nominalist challenges by appealing to the biological reality of race as a process. This response came into tension with the object ontology of race that was implied by Dobzhansky’s increasingly holistic treatment of Mendelian populations, a tension, the paper argues, he failed to appreciate or resolve. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Many epistemological terms, such as investigation, inquiry, argument, evidence, and fact were established in law well before being associated with science. However, while legal proof remained qualified by standards of ‘moral certainty’, scientific proof attained a reputation for objectivity. Although most forms of legal evidence (including expert evidence) continue to be treated as fallible ‘opinions’ rather than objective ‘facts’, forensic DNA evidence increasingly is being granted an exceptional factual status. It did not always enjoy such status. Two decades ago, the scientific status of forensic DNA evidence was challenged in the scientific literature and in courts of law, but by the late 1990s it was being granted exceptional legal status. This paper reviews the ascendancy of DNA profiling, and argues that its widely-heralded objective status is bound up with systems of administrative accountability. The ‘administrative objectivity’ of DNA evidence rests upon observable and reportable bureaucratic rules, records, recording devices, protocols, and architectural arrangements. By highlighting administrative sources of objectivity, this paper suggests that DNA evidence remains bound within the context of ordinary organisational and practical routines, and is not a transcendent source of ‘truth’ in the criminal justice system. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper explores whether we can interpret the notion of ‘forensic culture’ as something akin to what Knorr-Cetina called an ‘epistemic culture’. Can we speak of a ‘forensic culture’, and, if so, how is it similar to, or different from, other epistemic cultures that exist in what is conventionally called ‘science’? This question has important policy implications given the National Academy Science’s (NAS) recent identification of ‘culture’ as one of the problems at the root of what it identified as ‘serious deficiencies’ in U.S. forensic science and ‘scientific culture’ as an antidote to those problems. Finding the NAS’s characterisation of ‘scientific culture’ overly general and naïve, this paper offers a preliminary exploration of what might be called a ‘forensic culture’. Specifically, the paper explores the way in which few of the empirical findings accumulated by sociologists of science about research science seem to apply to forensic science. Instead, forensic science seems to have developed a distinct culture for which a sociological analysis will require new explanatory tools. Faithful sociological analysis of ‘forensic culture’ will be a necessary prerequisite for the kind of culture change prescribed by external reformist bodies like the NAS. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper examines the fortunes of the controversial use of hypnosis to ‘enhance’ autobiographical memories in postwar America. From the 1950s through the early 1980s, hypnosis became increasingly popular as a means to exhume information thought to be buried within the mind. This practice was encouraged by lay understandings of memory drawn from a material culture full of new recording devices (motion pictures, tape and then video recorders); and during the years when the practice was becoming most popular and accepted, academic psychologists developed a contrary, reconstructive, account of memory that was put to use in a series of battles meant to put an end to hypnotic recall. But popular commitment to the idea of permanent memory ‘recordings’ sustained the practice and the assumptions about memory and self that were associated with it, and in the face of a culture of academic psychology fully committed to the idea of ‘reconstructive’, malleable memory, a tidal wave of ‘enhanced’ memories swept America in the late 1980s and 1990s, in the so-called ‘memory wars’. These, in turn, provoked academic psychologists to research the claims and counter claims central to the memory wars. The paper will also make an argument about the importance of lay knowledge in the psychological sciences explored in this paper: that popular psychological beliefs played a significant, even formative role in defining the nature of forensic psychological expertise, and also the framing of elite academic psychological research. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The present paper deals with the tools that can be used to represent causation and to reason about it and, specifically, with their diversity. It focuses on so-called “causal probabilities”—that is, probabilities of effects given one of their causes—and critically surveys a recent paper in which Joyce (2010) argues that the values of these probabilities do not depend on one’s conception of causation. I first establish a stronger independence claim: I show that the very definition of causal probabilities is independent of one’s conception of causation. Second, I investigate whether causal probabilities indeed take the same values under their different possible definitions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper analyses the understandings of Daoist alchemy and Chinese sexuality of Joseph Needham and his friend and correspondent, the Chinese-Swedish writer Jolan Chang (Chang Chung-lan, 1917-2002). Using the extensive correspondence between the two men, as well as Needham’s files on “inner alchemy” deposited at the Needham Research Institute, the paper begins with a partial reconstruction of a 1977 symposium, chaired by Needham, to promote Chang’s new book, The Tao of Love and Sex: The Ancient Chinese Way to Ecstasy. Needham and Chang’s visions of Chinese sex are then read against excerpts from Science and Civilisation in China, specifically Volume V: Chemistry and Chemical Technology, Part 5: Spagyrical Discovery and Invention: Physiological Alchemy (1983). Three inter-related aspects are explored. First, reading Science and Civilisation in China against materials in the Needham archives offers crucial hints to Needham’s historiography and historical practice. Second, the way that Daoist regimens came to be actively reconstructed and repackaged as practices concerned with the enhancement of sexual pleasure and intensity. Third, the investigation of the networks and circulations of assumptions, visions, fantasies about “China”. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Much scholarship in the history of cybernetics has focused on the far-reaching cultural dimensions of the movement. What has garnered less attention are efforts by cyberneticians such as Warren McCulloch and Norbert Wiener to transform scientific practice in an array of disciplines in the biomedical sciences, and the complex ways these efforts were received by members of traditional disciplines. In a quest for scientific unity that had a decidedly imperialistic flavour, cyberneticians sought to apply practices common in the exact sciences—mainly theoretical modeling—to problems in disciplines that were traditionally defined by highly empirical practices, such as neurophysiology and neuroanatomy. Their efforts were met with mixed, often critical responses. This paper attempts to make sense of such dynamics by exploring the notion of a scientific style and its usefulness in accounting for the contrasts in scientific practice in brain research and in cybernetics during the 1940s. Focusing on two key institutional contexts of brain research and the role of the Rockefeller and Macy Foundations in directing brain research and cybernetics, the paper argues that the conflicts between these fields were not simply about experiment vs. theory but turned more closely on the questions that defined each area and the language used to elaborate answers. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper places Husserl’s mature work, The Crisis of the European Sciences, in the context of his engagement with—and critique of—experimental psychology at the time. I begin by showing (a) that Husserl accorded psychology a crucial role in his philosophy, i.e., that of providing a scientific analysis of subjectivity, and (b) that he viewed contemporary psychology—due to its naturalism—as having failed to pursue this goal in the appropriate manner. I then provide an analysis of Husserl’s views about naturalism and scientific philosophy. Some central themes of the Crisis are traced back to Husserl’s earlier work and to his relationship with his teacher, Franz Brentano, with whom he disagreed about the status of “inner perception” as the proper scientific method for a phenomenological analysis. The paper then shows that Husserl was well aware of at least one publication about the crisis of psychology (Bühler’s 1927 book), and it teases out some aspects of the complicated relationship between Husserl and members of the Würzburg School of thought psychology: The latter had drawn on Husserl’s writings, but Husserl felt that they had misunderstood his central thesis. I conclude by placing Husserl’s work in the wider context of scientific, cultural, and political crisis-discourses at the time. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper examines the claims of the Gestalt psychologists that there was a crisis in experimental psychology ca. 1900, which arose because the prevailing sensory atomism excluded meaning from among psychological phenomena. The Gestaltists claim that a primary motivation of their movement was to show, against the speculative psychologists and philosophers and Verstehen historians, that natural scientific psychology can handle meaning. Purportedly, they revealed this motivation in their initial German-language presentations but in English emphasized their scientific accomplishments for an American audience. The paper finds that: there was a recognized crisis in the new experimental psychology ca. 1900 pertaining especially to sensory atomism; that the Gestaltists responded to the crisis with new experimental findings and theoretical concepts (Gestalten) that challenged atomism; in both languages, they raised problems of meaning and discussed the contest with speculative psychology and philosophy only after presenting their scientific case; that they introduced phenomenological observations on meaning and perceptual organization into their psychology but did not develop a theory of meaning or solve philosophical problems; that they argued “philosophically,” that is, using abstract, conceptual arguments; and that this aspect of their cognitive style was not received well by some prominent members of their American audience. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The origin and development of Punnett’s Square for the enumeration and display of genotypes arising in a cross in Mendelian genetics is described. Due to R. C. Punnett, the idea evolved through the work of the ‘Cambridge geneticists’, including Punnett’s colleagues William Bateson, E. R. Saunders and R. H. Lock, soon after the rediscovery of Mendel’s paper in 1900. These geneticists were thoroughly familiar with Mendel’s paper, which itself contained a similar square diagram. A previously-unpublished three-factor diagram by Sir Francis Galton existing in the Bateson correspondence in Cambridge University Library is then described. Finally the connection between Punnett’s Square and Venn Diagrams is emphasized, and it is pointed out that Punnett, Lock and John Venn overlapped as Fellows of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Copious illustrations are given. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper argues that the notion of natural purpose developed by Hegel can only be thoroughly grasped by considering its intimate connection with the idea of contradiction and, particularly, with what Hegel in his philosophy of nature called the ‘activity of deficiency’. This expression is used by Hegel to denote the ontological situation of every living being, which is embodied most authentically in the concepts of need and drive. For Hegel, life itself is imbued with contradiction because it is inextricably bound up with what it lacks: its identity is at one with its negation. This paper defends the thesis that Hegel’s philosophy—and not just his philosophy of nature—can be characterized as an ‘ontology of life’ (to use the same expression that Martin Heidegger applied to Aristotle’s De Anima), or more precisely, as an ontology of living individuality. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper approaches the issue of the status of teleological reasoning in contemporary biology through a historical examination of events of the 1930s that surrounded Niels Bohr’s efforts to introduce ‘complementarity’ into biological discussions. The paper examines responses of three theoretical physicists who engaged boundary questions between the biological and physical sciences in this period in response to Bohr—Ernst Pascual Jordan (1902–80), Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961), and Max Delbrück (1906–81). It is claimed that none of these physicists sufficiently understood Bohr’s ‘critical’ teleological arguments, which are traced to the lineage of Kant and Harald Høffding and their respective resolutions of the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment. The positions of these four historical actors are discussed in terms of Ernst Mayr’s distinction of ‘teleological,’ ‘teleomatic,’ and ‘teleonomic’ explanations. A return to some of the views articulated by Bohr, and behind him, to Høffding and Kant, is claimed to provide a framework for reintroducing a ‘critical’ teleology into biological discussions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: There is an immense philosophical literature dealing with the notions of normativity and agency, as well as a sizeable and rapidly growing scientific literature on the topic of autonomous agents. However, there has been very little cross-fertilization between these two literatures. As a result, the philosophical literature tends to assume a somewhat outdated mechanistic image of living things, resulting in a quasi-dualistic picture in which only human beings, or the higher animals, can be normative agents properly speaking. From this perspective, the project of ‘naturalizing normativity’ becomes almost a contradiction in terms. At the same time, the scientific literature tends to misuse ‘normativity,’ ‘agency,’ and related terms, assuming that it is meaningful to ascribe these concepts to ‘autonomous agents’ conceived of as physical systems whose behavior is to be explained in terms of ordinary physical law. From this perspective, the true depth of the difficulty involved in understanding what makes living systems distinctive qua physical systems becomes occluded. In this essay, I begin the attempt to remedy this situation. After some preliminary discussion of terminology and situating of my project within the contemporary philosophical landscape, I make a distinction between two different aspects of the project of naturalizing normativity: (1) the ‘Scope Problem,’ which consists in saying how widely in nature our concept of normative agency may properly be applied; and (2) the ‘Ground Problem,’ which consists in rationalizing the phenomenon of normative agency in terms of the rest of our knowledge of nature. Then, in the remainder of this paper, I argue that the Scope Problem ought to be resolved in favor of attributing normative agency, in the proper sense of those words, to living things as such. The Ground Problem will be discussed in a companion paper at a later time. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Systems biology aims at explaining life processes by means of detailed models of molecular networks, mainly on the whole-cell scale. The whole cell perspective distinguishes the new field of systems biology from earlier approaches within molecular cell biology. The shift was made possible by the high throughput methods that were developed for gathering ‘omic’ (genomic, proteomic, etc.) data. These new techniques are made commercially available as semi-automatic analytic equipment, ready-made analytic kits and probe arrays. There is a whole industry of supplies for what may be called convenience experimentation. My paper inquires some epistemic consequences of strong reliance on convenience experimentation in systems biology. In times when experimentation was automated to a lesser degree, modeling and in part even experimentation could be understood fairly well as either being driven by hypotheses, and thus proceed by the testing of hypothesis, or as being performed in an exploratory mode, intended to sharpen concepts or initially vague phenomena. In systems biology, the situation is dramatically different. Data collection became so easy (though not cheap) that experimentation is, to a high degree, driven by convenience equipment, and model building is driven by the vast amount of data that is produced by convenience experimentation. This results in a shift in the mode of science. The paper shows that convenience driven science is not primarily hypothesis-testing, nor is it in an exploratory mode. It rather proceeds in a gathering mode. This shift demands another shift in the mode of evaluation, which now becomes an exploratory endeavor, in response to the superabundance of gathered data. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Till late in the 20th century, biological diversity has been understood and addressed in terms of "genetic resources". This paper proposes a history of this "genetic resources" concept and the biopolitical practices it was related to. A semantic history of the 'resource' idiom first sheds light on how, in the age of empires and fossil industrialism, the Earth came to be considered as a stock of static mineral and living reserves. Then we follow how the gene became the unit of this "resourcist" view of biological diversity as static stocks of entities open to prospection, harnessing and "conservation". Erwin Baur, Nikolai I. Vavilov, Aleksandr S. Serebrovsky and Hermann J. Muller were key biologists who introduced a spatial turn to the gene concept. Beyond the space-time of Neo-mendelian and Morganian laboratory genetics, genes became understood though a geographical gaze at a planetary scale. The world became a "universal store of genes" (Vavilov, 1929). From 1926 to World War 2, this advent of genes as new global epistemic objects went hand in hand with genes' new modes of existence as geopolitical objects. The article documents Interwar years' scramble for genes as well as first collaborative international efforts to conserve and exchange genetic material (which prefigured post WW2 initiatives), and situates the rise of the 'genetic resources' category within mid 20th century's imperialism, high-modernism, agricultural modernization and biopolitics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we investigate the ways in which a group of scientists in Edinburgh worked across mice and sheep during the last quarter of the twentieth century. With this local episode, we show the utility of an interspecies perspective to investigate recent historical transformations in the life sciences. We argue that the emergence of animal biotechnology was the result of interactions between neoliberal policymakers, science administrators, molecular biologists, agricultural breeders, and the laboratory and farm organisms with which they worked. During the early 1980s, all these actors believed that the exportation of genetic engineering techniques from mice to farm animals would lead to more effective breeding programmes in the agricultural sciences. However, the circulation of people, money, expertise and infrastructures that the experiments required, as well as the practical constraints of working with mice and sheep, resisted a simple scaling-up from one organism to the other. This displaced the goals of the Edinburgh scientists from the production of transgenic sheep to stem cell research and human regenerative medicine. We account for this unexpected shift by looking at the interplay between science policy and its implementation via collective action and bench work across different organisms. The emergence of animal biotechnology in Edinburgh also provides historiographical insights on the birth of Dolly the sheep and, more generally, on the interactions between the molecular and the reproductive sciences at the fall of the twentieth century. • The work of scientists across mice, sheep and other species provides a new lens to look at the history of biotechnology. • Interspecies work enables historians to think differently about the interactions between developmental and molecular biology. • Agricultural biotechnology stemmed from the collective action of different people, animals, institutions and places. • Animals were as important as human actors in the configuration of agricultural biotechnology. • The birth of Dolly was a contingent product of research to produce genetically modified – rather than identical – sheep. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the concept of representation in the brain which occurs in the writings of the neurologist John Hughlings Jackson (1835–1911). Jackson was immersed in Victorian physiological psychology, a hybrid of British associationism and a reflex theory of the operation of the nervous system. Furthermore, Jackson was deeply influenced by Herbert Spencer, and I argue that Spencer's progressivist evolutionary ideas are in tension with the more mechanistic approach of the reflex theory. I also discuss Jackson's legacy in the 20th century and the longstanding debate about localisation of function in the brain. • A comprehensive analysis of the concept of neurological representation, developed by John Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911). • Jacksonian representations are a precurrsor to current, computational notions of neural representations. • This study of representations suggests some limitations of mechanistic explanations, as encountered in this era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the period from 1962 to 1967, the development of a meningococcal A vaccine could be considered as feasible despite all the drawbacks of working with cerebrospinal meningitis A. In this paper, I analyse why and how this programme for vaccine development was put into place, and in particular how the problem was perceived as feasible. Deploying the concept of Doable Problems developed by Joan Fujimura, I examine the complex range of factors that led to the outcome of the trial in Yako in 1967. Thus I show how the different protagonists were mobilized and their work organized at different levels in order to produce and test a vaccine. Indeed, a number of elements seemed to stand in the way of successfully producing a vaccine, but the collaboration of the different actors under the aegis of the WHO provides interesting lessons about the management of this kind of project. Seen in a wider historical context, this approach could provide ideas and lessons for approaching current questions in vaccination from a new perspective. • An original history of the development of the anti-meningococcal vaccine. • An account of the vaccine project of the Institut Mérieux. • Collaborations between private and public actors in attacking a public health problem. • Destabilisation and relaunching of vaccine development project. • Analysis in terms of Fujimura's 'doable problems' concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The notion of "progress" can be defined as a directional change towards the better, implying both a descriptive and an axiological element. "Organic progress" refers to this notion applied to the history of life, whereas "technological progress" refers to this notion applied to the history of technological artifacts. This paper aims to disentangle conceptual questions about the notion of organic progress with respect to evolutionary theory, by proposing an epistemological perspective that also accounts for technological progress. My argument is set out in four sections. In section 2, drawing on the thought of some eminent evolutionary biologists, I will pinpoint a theoretical claim according to which a specific notion of organic progress is consistent with evolutionary theory. In section 3, I show some limits and problems that arise in the application of this theoretical claim to the organic domain. In section 4, I consider why these problems with application are often underestimated: I hypothesize that this is linked to the analogy frequently made between organic and technological progress. Finally, in section 5, I will carry on the analysis of this analogy by proposing a distinction between two levels of axiology. I claim that this distinction avoids several common confusions when talking about progress. Highlights • The notion of "progress" refers to the organic and technological domain. • A notion of progress is consistent with evolutionary theory: functional improvement. • Functional improvement raises different problems in the organic and technological domains. • Analogizing organic and technological functional improvements may be misleading. • Two levels of axiology should be distinguished in organic and technological progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper evaluates the application of evidentiary standards originating from evidence-based medicine in nutrition advice. It shows that it is problematic to criticize nutrition recommendations for not being based on randomized controlled trials. Due to practical, ethical and methodological and reasons, it is difficult to conduct rigorous randomized controlled trials for acquiring evidence that is relevant for achieving the goals of population-level nutrition recommendations. Given the non-epistemic goals of the dietary recommendations, criteria of acceptable evidence should be adapted to the goals of the practice and the practical, ethical, and methodological constraints of the situation. Highlights • Nutrition guidelines are often criticized for the lack of evidence from RCTs. • Conducting rigorous RCTs in the nutritional context is problematic. • The standards of evidence used for evaluating nutrition advice should be flexible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Utilising the unique source of articles, poems, stories and cartoons from student magazines from all of the Irish universities, in addition to the memoirs of Irish doctors, and the accounts of correspondents, this paper will discuss the Irish student’s experience of anatomy in the early twentieth century. For many medical students, anatomy dissections were seen as a rite of passage, while one student at Queen’s College Belfast claimed that ‘the dissecting-room is to the student a club, a smoke room, common room research room—one in all.’ However, the dissecting rooms of Irish medical schools were often rife with bawdy conversation, sexual undertones and black humour. Recognising this, following the admission of women to Irish medical schools from the 1880s, university authorities constructed separate dissecting rooms for the women students, and part of this paper will investigate why this separation occurred. I will examine the Irish dissecting room as a centre of learning and integral part of student experience in the period. The paper will suggest that the black humour and pranks that were commonplace within the context of the dissecting room acted as a means for students to reconcile their fears and anxiety about dissecting. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The paper presents selected figures of chick embryogenesis as depicted in the classic studies of Caspar Friedrich Wolff (1734–1794), Christian Heinrich Pander (1794–1865) and Karl Ernst von Baer (1792–1786). My main objective here is (1) to demonstrate how the imagery of Wolff, Pander and Baer attempted to project an image of a 3-dimensional rotating body into static figures on paper by means of linear contours, and (2) to ponder on the efficacy and pervasiveness of dots, lines and arrows for depicting embryogenesis. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]