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After more than half a century, the debate on the Gettier problem is still alive and continues to produce proposals of solution (or dissolution) that, regardless of their success, constitute interesting contributions to epistemology and even to other philosophical areas. As is well known, the Gettier problem is the challenge to provide an analysis of knowledge free of counterexamples. In this paper, first I review and critically examine the main proposals to tackle the problem; then, I draw some conclusions and offer my own suggestions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we address the Normative Question with respect to rationality. We draw an analogy with the epistemic domain and argue that the normativity of rationality has to be understood in terms of its characteristic achievement, that is, in terms of how the subject responds to reasons. Rational requirements reflect a particular way in which a rational subject adjusts her attitudes and thus provide a subject adequately engaged in this task of adjustment with genuine independent reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I defend the epistemological view of testimony according to which the peculiarity of this phenomenon lies in the commitments generated by the interpersonal relationship in which giver and receiver are immersed. More specifically, I aim to bring out the epistemic significance of this relationship in terms of the norm governing the act of telling someone something, in contrast with the norm governing mere assertions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I defend the view that truth is a constitutive norm of belief formation, argue in favour of a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic evaluation and respond to possible objections. In §I, I argue that belief necessarily aims at truth. In §II, I defend a virtue-theoretic approach to epistemic evaluation in response to concerns about epistemic luck and doxastic control. In §III, I distinguish between evaluative and deontic norms in order to avoid the charge that we are subject to impossible epistemic demands. In §IV, I study the relationship between epistemic norms, practical interests and ascriptions of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]