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Time was when both science and religion claimed to know things, and when both knowledges enjoyed equal indubitable validity. Subsequently there arose a division of labor, a compact according to which science knew one set of things and religion another. An unhappy period then ensued in which science denied the availability of religious knowledge in the sphere of science, and doubted its validity, certainly its verifiableness, even in the region of religion. Henceforth only symbolic significance was to be accorded to religious ideas. Now the function of a symbol is not to report the reality and nature of an object, but to express the feelings of a subject. Thus religion ceases to know things, since cognitive capacity is denied to its system of ideas. In my opinion, the most serious question of the hour is whether religion stands or falls with the affirmation or denial of cognitive function to the ideas which faith possesses. So far it does not appear that religion, as it has been hitherto understood, can endure the negation of the cognitive function and the capability of its ideas. But the interesting point in the present situation is that science, which once urged, then allowed, finally denied, the cognitive function of religious ideas, now disclaims such function for her own ideas and concepts and formulae. "Why do you find fault with me any longer for my attitude to your knowledge, declining to avail myself of it, or to admit your right to do so, since I assume the same attitude to my own knowledge ? If you do not know your reality neither do I mine," says Science to Religion. A chemist of note has recently said that he would as little think of calling a chemical formula "true," as he would of calling it "blue." He also indicates that he would occupy the same position with reference to all the so-called "laws" of which science speaks. Formula and law alike are devices for the manipulation of phenomena and the achievement of practical results-in a word, for orientation of the self in the world of phenom

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