Search

Nuclear terrorism is not a post-9/11 or even post-cold war phenomenon. In fact, this review of declassified intelligence estimates spanning the past five decades reveals that the prospect of a clandestine nuclear attack on the United States—be it from the Soviet Union, China, or al Qaeda—has been a regular concern for U.S. officials since the advent of nuclear weapons. Although the estimates themselves have been a mixed bag of quiet successes and failures, this article’s key findings suggest that the threat of nuclear terrorism is very real and that the U.S. government remains ill prepared to counter that treat.

To reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, we must prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons or materials. This will require, among other things, a sustained effort to keep dangerous nations from going nuclear—in particular North Korea. This article reviews the efforts the United States has undertaken through the years to keep North Korea from building a nuclear arsenal, arguing that the history of proliferation on the Korean Peninsula is marked by five nuclear crises. A sixth could be on the horizon, further compromising American efforts to lessen the likelihood of a nuclear attack on U.S. soil.

The nexus of terrorism and nuclear weapons is today’s greatest security concern. The importance of keeping fissile materials out of the hands of terrorists is now generally accepted. The difficulty of doing so is not. Lack of appreciation, especially for the technical difficulties, is hampering our ability to build a comprehensive safeguards system and prevent nuclear terrorism.

The United States can significantly reduce the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack if it pursues a vigorous, multilayered approach. Such an approach involves controlling nuclear technology and materials, manipulating the black market, and monitoring the behavior of aspiring nuclear actors. After analyzing each of these components, this article outlines the broad contours of a national preventative strategy that should give the nonproliferation community some cause for optimism.

Radical separatists based in the North Caucasus have the motive and are seeking the means to commit an act of nuclear terrorism as well as allies to help them carry it out. Their proximity to insufficiently secured Russian nuclear facilities and their contents makes the prospect of nuclear terror in Russia very real. This article assesses the magnitude of this threat, considers possible attack scenarios, and suggests ways to reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic attack on Russian soil.

This article presents a mathematical model for measuring the global risk of nuclear theft and terrorism. One plausible set of parameter values used in a numerical example suggests a 29 percent probability of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next decade. The expected loss over that period would be $1.17 trillion (undiscounted), or more than $100 billion per year. Historical and other evidence is used to explore the likely values of several of the key parameters, and policy options for reducing the risk are briefly assessed. The uncertainties in estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism are very large, but even a risk dramatically smaller than that estimated in the numerical example used in this article would justify a broad range of actions to reduce the threat.

The threat of nuclear terrorism in the United States has led its leadership to contemplate an extreme military response—namely, nuclear preemption. To some preemption proponents, nuclear weapons are no longer considered the option of last resort. This article argues that reducing the nuclear threshold for some international actors and not others is perhaps just as dangerous as the proliferation the nuclear preemption doctrine is trying counter. The nuclear “taboo” has once again ceased to exist.

Nuclear terrorism is the greatest national security threat facing the United States. This is a point on which few disagree, yet the effort to reduce the global nuclear threat falls short in terms of speed, resources, and level of effort. This article presents four hypothetical nuclear crises to illustrate this point and suggests a series of steps that, if taken, could help prevent each crisis. We are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe, and the global threat is outpacing our response. We must act now.

Yesterday’s nonproliferation efforts were successful, in part, because they addressed the motives of aspiring state proliferants. Today’s efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism should take a similar approach. Understanding—and addressing—the motivations of nonstate actors should be as important as locking down nuclear weapons and materials. The international community has a variety of tools at its disposal for addressing the demand for nuclear weapons. This article suggests a multifaceted approach for understanding, and reducing, the nuclear ambitions of nonstate actors.

Varying technical deficiencies are likely to characterize the nuclear forces of many new proliferators. Regional interactions within a proliferated world probably would include increased nuclear arms racing, inadvertant or calculated nuclear-weapon use, and outside involvement in domestic nuclear coups d'état. In turn, the possible global repercussions of local proliferation are likely to include: a partial erosion of existing alliances, or, to the degree that present superpower ties remain unchanged, the risk of escalating conflict; growing nuclear "black and gray marketeering"; the spread of nuclear terrorism; a corrosion of political authority and legitimacy; and, ulti mately, even growing global anarchy. Whether or not this initial assessment proves accurate will depend upon the difficulties of designing and implementing a proliferation- management strategy. Such a strategy might attempt, on the one hand, to affect which proliferated world emerged and, on the other, to influence Nth countries' nuclear postures, contribute to regional stability, and circumscribe the global repercussions of local proliferation. The gap between the gravity of a proliferated world's varied threats and the probable effectiveness of politically acceptable policy responses supports the fear that the initial depiction may be more than a nightmare scenario.