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This paper explores the relationship between crisis and experience, concentrating on 'excentric positionality' in relation to the shared world, as presented in the work of Helmuth Plessner. A by-product of the 1920s Weimar Germany, Plessner's philosophical anthropology, it is argued, presents us with a forgotten blueprint for transitive and compositional approaches to the social world. Instead of the familiar 'crisis of experience' used to diagnose 'what has gone wrong', it allows us to re-learn how to work with 'the experience of crisis' itself. The latter holds the key to a different type of approach based on 'xeno-communication'. This type of communication utilizes the productive potential of crisis in its uncertainty and hesitation before a decision, showing a way to extend and enlarge experience itself. Cultivation of these 'excentric' dynamics in turn suggests new 'excentric methodologies' based on a more flexible fit between concepts and the worlds they are meant to describe. 'Excentric methodologies' constitute a type of experience-based, analytical response to the shared world. They work with phenomena across spaces and problems, analytically utilizing their joint emergence from the fundamental imbalance and discontinuity characteristic of the human environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article calls for a rethinking of critical sociology. Representing classical critical sociology, the Bourdieusian paradigm illustrated domination, but its negative foundation removed actors' power, privileging sociological knowledge as capable of identifying (social) transcendental categories of thought. Latour's constructivism challenged this privilege, giving actors the political power of aggregating collectives around their common concerns at the cost of emphasizing domination and critique. We propose a critical approach that evades a transcendental perspective reliant on pure negation, producing a more positive critical sociology founded on processualist phenomenological and pragmatic perspectives, principally Merleau-Ponty and Dewey. Actors and researchers can collectively ruminate on their perspectives and concerns to challenge power structures and transform their worlds. At the center of this is the social-mien, a creative reimagination of habitus. A brief discussion of the protests and scholarship surrounding the Notre-Dame-des-Landes activists' practice of democracy highlights the utility of the approach and serves as a model for future application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article questions the place of the child in the metaphysics and imaginary of Western colonization, racialization, and decolonization. In the last chapter of The Wretched of the Earth by Frantz Fanon, children appear not only as victims but also as a problem for which Fanon struggles to account as a theorist of decolonization as much as a psychiatric practitioner. Through a reading of one of the cases, this article interrogates the ways in which colonization attempts to infantilize colonized populations while erasing childhood, and the ways in which decolonization meets colonization by regarding childhood in the end as a misfortune. The work of decolonization, to proceed, thus would demand us to rethink childhood, and in doing so break free of Western metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Stuart Hall's reading of Louis Althusser's main theoretical works. Since the early 1970s, Hall has undertaken a critical confrontation with Althusser's 'structural Marxism', rescuing those useful concepts to think cultural difference and identity, without failing to criticize his 'superstructuralist' interpretation of Marx. However, what Hall will retain as Althusser's most important contribution is, above all, his theory of ideology. In this context, I follow an idea formulated by Hall that could be read as summarizing the theoretical and political scope of Althusser's contribution to Cultural Studies: 'he enabled me to live in and with difference'. By complicating classical interpretations schemes in the Marxist tradition, Hall's Althusser may be read as a 'thinker of difference' who opens up a whole research program to reconsider class conflicts as traversed (or 'overdetermined') by gender, racial or colonial conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article shows that Habermas's modernism and Lyotard's postmodernism are not as antithetical as they are often taken to be. First, we argue that Habermas is not a strong foundationalist concerned with identifying universal rules for language, as postmodern critiques have often interpreted him. Instead, he develops a social pragmatics in which the communicative use of language is the fundamental presupposition of any meaningful interaction. Second, we argue that Lyotard is not a relativist who denies any universal linguistic structure. Instead, he claims that language involves a universal element of dissensus that cannot be subordinated to consensus. Third, we show that neither does Habermas defend a new version of the kind of philosophy of history characteristic of the Enlightenment, nor is Lyotard a historical relativist, but instead they both seek alternatives to these positions. The conclusion calls for more nuance in the interpretation of both perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given their commitment to practices, science studies have bestowed considerable attention upon objects. We have the boundary object, the standardized package, the network object, the immutable mobile, the fluid object, even a fire object has entered the scene. However, these objects do not provide us with a way of understanding their historicity. They are timeless, motionless pictures rather than things that change over time, and while enacting ‘historical moments’ they do not make visible the histories they contain within them. What kind of object could embody history and make that history visible? Inspired by Michel Serres, I suggest the folded object is a way to attend to the temporality and spatiality of objects. In this article I explore this new object by unravelling the history of a DNA reference sequence. I show how, ever since it was produced in the early 1980s, attempts have been made to filter race out of the sequence. That effort has failed due to what one could call ‘political noise’. Making and remaking the sequence have left traces that cannot be erased. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This interview explores the key themes and ideas in Daniel Chernilo's recent book Debating Humanity: Towards a Philosophical Sociology (2017). It is a hugely ambitious book that tackles a range of questions around the notion of humanity and the category of the human. Drawing on a wide range of thinkers, the book pushes at a number of far-reaching issues, problems and questions concerning humanity. It's a rich text that develops themes that are likely to be of interest across the social sciences and humanities, not least because it tackles some of the most difficult and crucial questions that face social theory today. The interview was conducted in October 2017. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The race idea keeps recurring in different guises and yet has an intriguing ‘ever-changing sameness’. Ash Amin has provided an insightful discussion of the question in an earlier issue of this journal. I supplement his account by pointing to the ways in which the nature—culture puzzle identified by Lévi-Strauss creates continuing spaces and seductions for the race idea. I offer an account of the perils of using supposedly ‘natural’ human attributes, as in versions of cognitive anthropology, to explain racism, without completely discounting the idea of human universals. I also explore how ‘race’ retains its continuing hold by intertwining with themes of class, sexuality and nation. I provide an interpretation of racist identities and explain why my account offers both greater pessimism and more optimism than Amin’s more uniform ‘ontological pessimism’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article considers Foucault's analysis of ordoliberal and neoliberal governmental reason and its reorganization of social relations around a notion of enterprise. I focus on the particular idea that the generalization of the enterprise form to social relations was conceptualized in such exhaustive terms that it encompassed subjectivity itself. Self as enterprise highlights, inter alia, dynamics of control in neoliberal regimes which operate through the organized proliferation of individual difference in an economized matrix. It also throws into question conceptions of individual autonomy that underpin much political thought and upon which ideas about political resistance are based. Self as enterprise also problematizes the viability of Foucault's later work on ethics of the self as a practice of resistance. I go on to argue that Foucault's discussion of an unresolved clash in civil society between monarchical and governmental power, between law and norm, offers an elliptical but more promising account of opposition to normalizing bio-power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The figure of today's threat is the suddenly irrupting, locally self-organizing, systemically self-amplifying threat of large-scale disruption. This form of threat, fed by instability and metastability, is not only indiscriminate, it is also indiscriminable; it is indistinguishable from the general environment. The figure of the environment shifts: from the harmony of a natural balance to the normality of a generalized crisis environment so encompassing in its endemic threat-form as to connect, across the spectrum, the polar extremes of war and the weather. Michel Foucault characterizes the dominant contemporary regime of power, coincident with the rise of neoliberalism, as 'environmental': a governmentality which will act on the environment and systematically modify its variables. Its actions, he emphasizes, are not standardizing since the shift in the figure of the environment has moved it out of reach of normalization. Given the indiscriminateness of the environment's autonomous activity, environmentality must work through the 'regulation of effects' rather than of causes. It must remain operationally 'open to unknowns' and catch nonlinear, transversal phenomena before they amplify the stirrings to actual crisis proportions. What systematicity is this? And: does power's becoming-environmental mean that, politically, we are dealing with natural subjects? Where Foucault's question ends is where, today, we must begin, in light of how the recomposition of power whose dawning he glimpsed in 1979 has since played out. In the context of Foucault's theories of power, the question amounts to asking: is this still 'biopolitics'? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its origination in psychology, cognitive theory has been articulated in a number of social science disciplines, most notably anthropology and sociology. It has also been important in shaping the intellectual landscape of emerging disciplines associated with the design of computer systems, human--computer interaction (HCI) and computer supported cooperative work (CSCW). Some people within these disciplines, however, have accepted the criticism of cognitive theory that its emphasis upon the existence and primacy of an interior world does not appreciate the public, cultural and situated grounding of human action. In the theory of 'distributed cognition' they believe, however, that they have found reconciliation between cognitive theory and their understanding of the cultural and social grounds of human action. It is argued here that the hopes for reconciliation are, however, misplaced. There are two main reasons for this. First, 'distributed cognition' is, simply, cognitive theory. Distributed cognition is an attempt to describe the cultural world in the terms of cognitive theory, not an attempt to describe it in its own terms. Thus it is shown that the criticisms of cognitive theory, that it is founded in a conceptually inappropriate distinction between an interior and a public world, are criticisms of distributed cognition. Second, distributed cognition does not actually explain anything about the social world. It is quite possible to subtract the statements about cognitive systems from descriptions of the social world without altering those descriptions one jot. It is thus concluded that distributed cognition is not a cultural overhaul of cognitive theory but an erroneous attempt to describe the cultural and social world in the terms of an illegitimate cognitive theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, my intention is to focus the case against cognitive science and its derivative, cognitive neuroscience, in the form of (maybe) debatable propositions, using the method of paragraphing à la Ludwig Wittgenstein. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores contemporary biopolitics in the light of Michel Foucault's oft quoted suggestion that contemporary politics calls 'life itself' into question. It suggests that recent developments in the life sciences, biomedicine and biotechnology can usefully be analysed along three dimensions. The first concerns logics of control - for contemporary biopolitics is risk politics. The second concerns the regime of truth in the life sciences - for contemporary biopolitics is molecular politics. The third concerns technologies of the self - for contemporary biopolitics is ethopolitics. The article suggests that, in these events, human beings have become 'somatic individuals': personhood is increasingly being defined in terms of corporeality, and new and direct relations are established between our biology and our conduct. At the same time, this somatic and corporeal individuality has become opened up to choice, prudence and responsibility, to experimentation, to contestation and so to a politics of 'life itself'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is an examination of the constituent elements and current features of the prevailing sexual landscape. It looks at the changes that have taken place in its topography in the last twenty years or so by referring to a number of sexual discourses. Attempts to liberalize sexuality, arguments for further concessions, are judged by reference to the fundamental threat that sex is understood to pose to the bastions of civil society. For the most part, what private talk there is about sex is likely to reflect the discursive content of the sexual landscape and is centred around issues of virility and performance, unquestionable sexual drive and appeal--"with whom and when," "how often, what position," etc. As such, this is specifically related to issues of male sexuality. The erotic gloss of the sexual landscape is unlikely to be disfigured by issues related to the everyday lives of women. Prior to the intervention of the sex-expert, the principle of the confession seems to have ruled sex disclosures--the subject would be either absolved or condemned and punished.