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In this article, I attempt to address some enduring problems in formulation and practical use of the notion of structure in contemporary social science. I begin by revisiting the question of the fidelity of Anthony Giddens' appropriation of the idea of structure with respect to Levi-Strauss. This requires a reconsideration of Levi-Strauss' original conceptualization of 'social structure' which I argue is a sort of 'methodological structuralism' that stands sharply opposed to Giddens' ontological reconceptualization of the notion. I go on to show that Bourdieu's contemporaneous critique of Levi-Strauss is best understood as an attempt to recover rather than reject the central implication of Levi-Strauss' methodological structuralism, which puts Bourdieu and Giddens on clearly distinct camps in terms of their approach toward the idea of structure. To demonstrate the-insurmountable-conceptual difficulties inherent in the ontological approach, I proceed by critically examining what I consider to be the most influential attempt to resolve the ambiguities in Giddens structuration theory: Sewell's argument for the 'duality of structure.' I show that by retaining Giddens' ontological focus, Sewell ends up with a notion of structure that is at its very core 'anti-structuralist' or only structuralist in a weak sense. I close by considering the implications of the analysis for the possibility of developing the rather neglected 'methodological structuralist' legacy in contemporary social analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]